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The	   creation	   of	   devolved	   institutions	   in	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   in	   1999	   provided	  
nationalist	   parties	   in	   both	   the	   opportunity	   to	   act	   within	   an	   institution	   solely	   within	  
their	   nation’s	   territorial	   boundaries.	   	   In	   2007,	   they	  entered	  government	   for	   the	   first	  
time.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  embarked	  upon	  public	  
engagement	   strategies	   in	   office	   which	   were	   designed	   to	   build	   support	   for	   their	  
constitutional	  ambitions	  –	  namely,	  independence	  for	  Scotland	  and	  (in	  the	  short-­‐term)	  
full	   legislative	   powers	   for	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales,	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	  
Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  
	  
This	   thesis	  explores	   the	  public	  engagement	   strategy	  of	  both	  parties,	   focusing	  on	   the	  
respective	  consultations	  of	   the	  parties	   in	  government	  –	  A	  National	  Conversation	  and	  
the	  All	  Wales	   Convention	   –	   and	   the	   following	   campaign	   for	   (in	   Scotland)	   and	   at	   (in	  
Wales)	   a	   referendum	   intended	   to	   deliver	   their	   preferred	   outcome.	   	   The	   aim	   of	   this	  
thesis	   is	   to	   consider	   why	   public	   engagement	   strategies	   were	   considered	   the	   best	  
vehicle	  to	  take	  forward	  the	  respective	  parties’	  constitutional	  goals	  and	  to	  evaluate	  the	  
success	  each	  party	  achieved	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  objectives.	  
	  
This	   thesis	   argues	   that,	   while	   both	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   have	   achieved	   some	  
success	  with	   regard	   to	   their	   constitutional	   objectives,	   this	   success	   can	   be	  measured	  
differently	   depending	   whether	   short-­‐term	   or	   long-­‐term	   goals	   are	   the	   defining	  
standard.	   	   In	   Wales,	   Plaid	   Cymru’s	   constitutional	   consultation	   found	   limited	  
engagement	  with	  the	  wider	  Welsh	  population,	  and	  though	  the	  referendum	  succeeded	  
in	  securing	  legislative	  powers	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  public	  engagement	  
with	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  in	  Wales	  continues	  to	  lack	  enthusiasm.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  
SNP’s	   National	   Conversation	   saw	   more	   enthusiastic	   engagement,	   but	   without	   a	  
referendum	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  process,	  a	  clear	  lack	  of	  a	  tangible	  short-­‐term	  outcome.	  	  
However,	   the	   SNP	   in	   government	   did	   succeed	   in	   moving	   the	   constitutional	   debate	  
firmly	  onto	  the	  political	  agenda,	  and	  engagement	  in	  this	  debate	  is	  now	  widespread	  in	  
Scottish	   society,	   particularly	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   an	   agreement	   to	   hold	   an	   independence	  











Researching	  and	  writing	  a	  project	  of	  this	  magnitude	  has	  taken	  over	  my	  life	  for	  the	  past	  
four	  years.	  	  Fortunately	  for	  me,	  I	  have	  some	  of	  the	  most	  understanding	  family,	  friends	  
and	  colleagues	   I	  could	  ask	  for,	  and	  I	  will	   forever	  be	   in	  their	  debt	  for	  their	  assistance,	  
large	  or	   small,	   over	   this	   period.	   	   Four	  people,	   in	  particular,	   I	   owe	  a	  massive	  debt	  of	  
gratitude	  to,	  a	  debt	  that	  I	  doubt	  I	  shall	  ever	  be	  able	  to	  repay	  in	  full.	  
	  
To	  my	  supervisor,	  Peter	  Lynch,	  for	  keeping	  me	  on	  the	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  for	  reading	  my	  work	  
and	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   suggestions	   to	   change	   the	  more	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   ideas,	   and	   for	   the	  welcome	  
break	  from	  work	  our	  rugby	  expeditions	  delivered	  –	  thank	  you.	   	  Never	  underestimate	  
just	  how	  much	  help	  a	  quick	  chat	  or	  a	  word	  of	  encouragement	  now	  and	  again	  can	  be	  
for	  your	  future	  PhD	  candidates	  –	  it	  was	  invaluable	  to	  me!	  
	  
To	   my	   Mum	   and	   Dad,	   this	   project	   simply	   would	   not	   have	   happened	   without	   you.	  	  
Thank	  you	  for	  funding	  my	  studies,	  and	  for	  feeding	  my	  thirst	  for	  knowledge	  when	  I	  was	  
a	  wee	  boy.	  	  Words	  can’t	  express	  my	  gratitude	  for	  the	  love	  and	  faith	  in	  my	  ability	  you	  
have	  shown	  me.	  
	  
And	   to	  my	  wife	   Fiona,	   you	   could	   not	   have	   been	  more	   supportive,	   understanding	   or	  
encouraging	  throughout	  this	  process.	  	  I	  hope	  I	  can	  be	  as	  good	  a	  husband	  to	  you	  and	  a	  
father	   to	  our	   future	  children	  as	  you	  have	  been	  a	  wife	   to	  me	  while	   I	  have	  completed	  
 ii	  
this	  PhD.	   	  Thanks	  for	  everything	  –	  I	  very	  simply	  love	  you,	  and	  could	  not	  have	  done	  it	  
without	  you.	  
	  
Thanks	   also	   to	   my	   parents’-­‐in-­‐law	   Sandy	   and	   Shona	   for	   their	   understanding	   (or	  
patience	  –	  I	  promise	  I’ll	  get	  a	  job	  now!);	  to	  my	  Gran	  (for	  reading	  practically	  everything	  
I’ve	  ever	  written	  at	  university);	  to	  those	  who	  agreed	  to	  be	  interviewed	  for	  this	  thesis;	  
to	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  universities	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  Stirling	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  Strathclyde	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  employing	  me	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  teaching	  assistant	  
(a	   lifeline	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   an	   unfunded	   PhD	   candidate);	   to	   the	   Electoral	   Reform	   Society	   (who	  
employed	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  an	   intern	  and	   let	  me	   research	   some	   really	   fun	   stuff);	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   the	  Herald	  
Scotland	   team,	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   James	   and	   Jeff	   (for	   blogging	   opportunities);	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postgraduate	  students	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  (Alan,	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To	  everyone	  above,	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  everyone	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  forgotten.	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  hope	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  following	  78,802	  words	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The	  creation	  of	  devolved	  institutions	  in	  Scotland,	  Wales	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  in	  1999	  
was	   the	  “most	   radical	   constitutional	   change”	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  since	   the	  Great	  
Reform	  Act	   of	   1832.1	   	  While	   the	   process	   of	   administrative	   devolution	   –	   that	   is,	   the	  
ability	   of	   the	   respective	   Secretary	   of	   State	   to	   administer	   legislation	   within	   their	  
competence	   –	   had	   been	   ongoing	   for	   decades,	   the	   democratisation	   of	   that	   process	  
presented	  a	  distinct	  challenge	  to	  the	  UK’s	  “unitary	  and	  centralised”	  constitution.2	  	  The	  
Scottish	  Parliament	  was	   re-­‐established	  nearly	  300	  years	  after	   its	   abolition	  with	  wide	  
legislative	   powers	   and	   a	   solitary	   tax	   power	   –	   the	   ability	   to	   vary	   the	   basic	   rate	   of	  
income	   tax	   in	   Scotland	  by	   up	   to	   3	   pence.	   	   The	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales,	  with	   a	  
weaker	  mandate,	  was	  a	  much	  weaker	  institution,	  established	  in	  the	  model	  of	  a	  “body	  
corporate”	  and	  provided	  with	  only	   secondary	   legislative	  powers.	   	   The	  Northern	   Irish	  
Assembly	   was	   also	   restored	   (as	   part	   of	   the	   1998	   Good	   Friday	   Agreement)	   25	   years	  
after	  its	  suspension	  and	  subsequent	  abolition.	  	  In	  2000,	  a	  devolved	  institution	  followed	  
in	   London,	   which	   had	   supported	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   Greater	   London	   Authority	   in	   a	  
referendum.	  	  Labour’s	  plans	  for	  devolution	  did	  not	  end	  there	  –	  but	  the	  legislation	  did.	  	  
An	  elected	  assembly	  was	  offered	  to	  voters	   in	  the	  North-­‐East	  of	  England	  but	  rejected	  
with	   only	   22%	   voting	   in	   favour	   thereby	   ending	   government	   attempts	   to	   further	  
decentralise.3	   	  The	  result	  was	  a	  model	  of	  asymmetrical	  devolution,	   similar	   to	   that	  of	  
Spain	   –	   though	   in	   this	   case	   this	   was	   an	   outcome	   which	   was	   unplanned.	   	   Scotland,	  
                                                
1	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Devolution	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.1.	  
2	  Lijphart,	  A.	  Patterns	  of	  Democracy:	  Government	  Forms	  and	  Performance	  in	  Thirty-­‐Six	  Countries,	  
London,	  Yale,	  1999,	  p.17.	  
3	  Tickell,	  A.	  et.	  al.	  ‘The	  Referendum	  Campaign:	  Issues	  and	  Turning	  Points	  in	  the	  North	  East’	  in	  Devolution	  
Briefing	  No.	  20,	  ESRC	  Devolution	  and	  Constitutional	  Change	  Research	  Programme,	  2005.	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Wales	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  –	  with	  their	  devolved	  institutions	  –	  can	  provide	  distinctive	  
legislation	  within	  their	  devolved	  competencies	  for	  their	  populations	  while	  England,	  the	  
largest	  component	  nation	  of	  the	  UK	  by	  far,	  cannot,	  and	  remains	  governed	  by	  the	  UK	  
government	  at	  Westminster.	  	  However,	  for	  some	  –	  in	  particular,	  the	  nationalist	  parties	  
in	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   –	   this	   changed	   constitutional	   arrangement	   did	   not	   go	   far	  
enough.	   	   And	  with	   their	   election	   to	   govern	   these	   devolved	   institutions	   in	   2007,	   the	  
constitutional	  question	  was	  once	  again	  on	  the	  political	  agenda.	  	  	  
	  
This	   thesis	   considers	   the	  constitutional	  question	   through	   the	  dual	  prism	  of	  devolved	  
politics	  and	  deliberative	  democracy.	   	  While	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  Assembly	  requires	  the	  
presence	  of	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   government	   through	   its	   power-­‐sharing	   agreement,	  
2007	   marked	   the	   first	   instance	   that	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   Scotland	   (the	   Scottish	  
National	   Party)	   and	   Wales	   (Plaid	   Cymru)	   entered	   government	   in	   their	   respective	  
devolved	   institutions.	   	  With	  Labour	  dominating	  both	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  the	  
National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales,	   and	   leading	   the	  executives	  of	  both	   institutions	   for	   the	  
prior	   eight	   years	   of	   their	   existence,	   the	   2007	   devolved	   elections	   provided	   a	  
considerable	  shock	  to	  the	  established	  order.	  	  In	  Scotland,	  a	  plurality	  of	  one	  (47	  seats	  to	  
Labour’s	  46)	  let	  the	  SNP	  establish	  a	  minority	  administration	  at	  Holyrood	  while	  Labour’s	  
failure	  to	  win	  a	  majority	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  led	  to	  Plaid	  Cymru	  
joining	   them	   in	   government	   as	   the	   junior	   coalition	   partner.	   	   In	   both	   Scotland	   and	  
Wales	   the	   office	   success	   of	   nationalist	   parties	   had	   far-­‐reaching	   constitutional	  






The	  nature	  of	  devolution	  is,	  in	  Ron	  Davies	  oft-­‐quoted	  phraseology,	  a	  “process,	  not	  an	  
event”.4	  	  And	  as	  Davies	  explained	  further,	  devolution	  is	  not	  a	  “journey	  with	  a	  fixed	  end	  
point”,	  nor	  an	  “end	  in	  itself	  but	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end”.5	  	  That	  description	  of	  devolution	  is	  
as	  apt	  for	  nationalists	  as	  it	  is	  for	  unionists.	  	  For	  nationalists,	  devolution	  is	  the	  means	  to	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   Union,	   the	   means	   to	   self-­‐determination	   –	   in	   whatever	   form	   that	  
determination	  takes.	   	  For	  Unionists,	  devolved	  governance	   is	  the	  means	  of	  preserving	  
the	  Union	  against	  the	  threat	  of	  separation.	  	  Indeed,	  for	  some	  Unionists,	  extending	  the	  
devolution	  settlement	  further	  –	  even	  as	  far	  as	  federalism	  –	  is	  a	  logical	  step	  in	  order	  to	  
preserve	  the	  Union.	  	  For	  both,	  devolution	  represents	  an	  opportunity	  to	  deliver	  for	  the	  
populations	   of	   the	   devolved	   nations	   policy	   commitments	   which	   are	   frequently	  
different	  to	  those	  which	  central	  government	  can	  offer	  the	  whole	  UK	  populace.	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   that	   flexible	  understanding	  of	   devolution	  which	  has	   informed	   the	   constitutional	  
debates	   in	   the	   UK	   in	   the	   years	   since	   the	   devolved	   institutions	   were	   established	   in	  
1999.6	   	   The	   asymmetrical	   nature	   of	   devolution	   –	   the	   fact	   Scotland	   was	   granted	   a	  
legislative	  “parliament”	   (with	  a	   solitary	   tax	  power)	   to	  Wales’	   “Assembly”	  meant	   that	  
questions	  about	  the	  extension	  of	  Welsh	  devolution	  to	  mimic	  the	  Scottish	  model	  were	  
never	  far	  away.7	  	  The	  experience	  of	  devolution	  taught	  both	  institutions	  the	  limitations	  
of	  their	  powers,	  and	  pressed	  upon	  members	  –	  even	  those	  without	  nationalist	  leanings	  
–	  the	  desire	  to	  extend	  their	  remit	  beyond	  that	  which	  had	  originally	  been	  granted.	  
                                                
4	  Davies,	  R.	  ‘Devolution:	  A	  Process	  not	  an	  Event’	  in	  The	  Gregynog	  Papers,	  Vol.	  2,	  No.	  2,	  Cardiff,	  Institute	  
of	  Welsh	  Affairs,	  1999,	  p.15.	  
5	  ibid.	  
6	  Bodganor,	  V.	  1999,	  op	  cit.	  




Nationalist	  parties	  have	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  devolution	  debates	  in	  both	  
Scotland	   and	   Wales.	   	   In	   1999,	   Plaid	   Cymru	   produced	   a	   “quiet	   earthquake”8	  
establishing	  themselves	  as	  the	  second	  largest	  party	  in	  the	  newly-­‐constituted	  National	  
Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  balancing	  their	  desire	  to	  see	  devolution	  succeed	  with	  frustration	  
at	  the	  lack	  of	  legislative	  powers	  the	  Assembly	  had.9	  	  Plaid	  Cymru’s	  Lord	  Elis-­‐Thomas,	  as	  
Presiding	  Officer	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  had	  a	  key	  position	  in	  reforming	  
the	  Procedures	  of	  the	  Assembly	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  and	  subsequent	  pressure	  –	  not	  just	  
from	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  but	  from	  all	  political	  parties	  represented	  in	  the	  Assembly	  –	  led	  to	  a	  
thriving	   elite-­‐level	   discussion	   as	   to	   how	   to	   improve	   the	   devolution	   structure	   in	  
Wales.10	   	   Even	   now,	   post-­‐Government	   of	   Wales	   Act	   2006,	   post-­‐Welsh	   powers	  
referendum	   2011,	   and	  with	   a	   National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales	   which	   now	   has	   primary	  
legislative	   powers,	   debate	   continues	   as	   to	   how	   further	   powers	   –	   most	   particularly,	  
fiscal	  powers	  –	  might	  be	  added	  to	  the	  Assembly’s	  remit.11	   	  The	  Holtham	  Commission	  
Report	   –	   delivered	   in	   the	   latter	   stages	   of	   the	  All	  Wales	   Convention	   and	  prior	   to	   the	  
fixing	  of	  the	  referendum	  date	  –	  only	  strengthened	  the	  hand	  of	  those	  who	  consider	  a	  
change	  to	  the	  fiscal	  arrangements	  the	  logical	  next	  step	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2011	  elections	  to	  the	  Assembly,	  a	  new	  “Commission	  
                                                
8	  Elias,	  A.	  ‘Plaid	  Cymru	  and	  the	  Challenges	  of	  Adapting	  to	  Post	  Devolution	  Wales’	  in	  Contemporary	  
Wales,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  1,	  November,	  2009,	  p.114.	  
9	  McAllister,	  L.	  ‘The	  New	  Politics	  in	  Wales:	  Rhetoric	  or	  Reality?’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  53,	  No.	  3,	  
2000,	  p.599.	  
10	  Stirbu,	  D.	  S.	  ‘Instituting	  Constitutions:	  Welsh	  Constitutional	  Dynamics	  and	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  2005-­‐2007’	  in	  Contemporary	  Wales,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  1.	  November,	  2009.	  p.99.	  
11	  Holtham	  Commission,	  ‘Fairness	  and	  accountability:	  a	  new	  funding	  settlement	  for	  Wales’	  Final	  Report	  




on	   Devolution	   in	  Wales”	   (informally,	   The	   Silk	   Commission)12	   was	   established	   –	  with	  
cross-­‐party	   membership	   –	   to	   examine	   options	   to	   devolve	   more	   powers	   (including	  
some	  fiscal	  powers)	  to	  Wales.	  	  This	  debate,	  however,	  has	  largely	  by-­‐passed	  the	  wider	  
Welsh	  population	  and	  has,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  engaged	  only	  elite	  actors.	  
	  
In	   Scotland,	   the	   SNP’s	   consistent	   calls	   for	   independence	   –	   and	   their	   elevation	   to	  
minority	  government	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  2007	  –	  put	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  firmly	  
on	   the	  Scottish	  political	   agenda.	   	   The	  establishment	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	   as	  a	  
government	   consultation	   saw	   the	   opposition	   Unionist	   parties	   respond	   with	   the	  
Commission	  on	  Scottish	  Devolution	  (which	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Calman	  Commission,	  
after	   its	   chairman,	   Sir	   Kenneth	   Calman),	   leading	   to	   two	   parallel	   but	   separate	  
discussions.	   	   It	   was,	   as	   Alan	   Trench	   argued,	   a	   decidedly	   “disjointed	   constitutional	  
debate”.13	   	   Nevertheless,	   it	   was	   proof	   of	   one	   considerable	   fact	   –	   that	   the	  
constitutional	   settlement	   as	   it	   stood	  was	   no	   longer	   the	   “settled	  will	   of	   the	   Scottish	  
people”	   (as	   had	   been	   famously	   proclaimed	   by	   former	   Labour	   leader	   John	   Smith).14	  	  
The	  constitutional	  debate	  had	  moved	  from	  whether	  change	  was	  required	  to	  the	  shape	  
and	   form	   that	   change	   should	   take.15	   	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   that	   sentiment	   still	  
appears	  to	  be	  true,	  and	  the	  discussion	  has	  moved	  beyond	  political	  actors	  to	  Scottish	  
civic	  society	  and	  beyond.	  	  The	  result	  of	  the	  Calman	  Commission,	  the	  UK	  Government’s	  
Scotland	   Bill,	   extended	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   in	   several	   areas,	  
                                                
12	  See	  http://commissionondevolutioninwales.independent.gov.uk/	  for	  the	  Commissions	  terms	  and	  
remit.	  
13	  Trench,	  A.	  ‘Introduction:	  The	  Second	  Phase	  of	  Devolution’	  in	  Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  
2008,	  Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2008,	  p.14.	  
14	  Jones,	  P.	  ‘A	  Start	  to	  a	  New	  Song:	  The	  1997	  Devolution	  Referendum	  Campaign’	  in	  Scottish	  Affairs,	  No.	  
21,	  autumn,	  1997.	  
15	  Crawford,	  B.	  ‘Ten	  Years	  of	  Devolution’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs,	  Vol.63,	  No.	  1,	  2010,	  p.95.	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including	  bestowing	  on	  Holyrood	  borrowing	  powers	   for	   the	  first	   time.	   	  However,	   the	  
SNP	   remained	   unconvinced	   that	   the	   Bill	   went	   far	   enough	   and,	   with	   their	   hand	  
strengthened	  by	  a	  stunning	  election	  victory	  in	  2011	  which	  delivered	  them	  a	  majority	  in	  
the	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  the	  party	  in	  government	  were	  in	  a	  stronger	  position	  to	  make	  
that	   case.16	   	   Indeed,	   their	   plans	   to	   hold	   an	   independence	   referendum	   towards	   the	  
latter	  part	  of	  the	  2011-­‐16	  Scottish	  Parliamentary	  term	  look	  ever	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  
fruition,	  though	  they	  will	  have	  work	  to	  do	  if	  they	  are	  to	  convince	  a	  sceptical	  Scottish	  
public	  that	  their	  constitutional	  preference	  is	  desirable.	  
	  
Research	  Questions	  
The	  research	  here	   is	  situated	   in	  a	   juncture	  between	  two	  distinct	   fields.	   	  The	  primary	  
consideration	   is	   that	   of	   deliberative	   democracy.	   	   This	   consideration	   draws	   upon	   the	  
theoretical	  work	  of	  key	  deliberative	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Fishkin17	  and	  Dryzek18	  to	  explore	  
the	  merits	  of	  utilising	  such	  methods,	  and	  to	  place	  in	  such	  a	  context	  the	  constitutional	  
debate	   in	   Scotland	   and	   Wales.	   	   This	   theoretical	   framework	   is	   supplemented	   by	  
Hogwood	   and	   Gunn’s	   work	   on	   policy	   analysis,19	   and	   Hogwood’s	   contention	   that	   “if	  
consultation	   is	   everything	   then	   maybe	   it’s	   nothing”.20	   	   This	   framework	   for	   analysis	  
allows	   the	   thesis	   the	   opportunity	   to	   consider	   the	   methods	   employed	   by	   the	   two	  
governments	  examined	  in	  the	  case	  studies	   in	  greater	  detail	  –	  to	  place	  the	  respective	  
consultations	  and	  referendums	  in	  the	  context	  of	  deliberative	  theory,	  and	  to	  consider	  
                                                
16	  Keating,	  M.	  Scotland	  and	  Independence,	  Quebec,	  The	  Federal	  Idea,	  October,	  2011,	  p.4.	  
17	  Fishkin,	  J.	  S.	  When	  the	  People	  Speak:	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  and	  Public	  Consultation,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2009.	  
18	  Dryzek,	  J.	  S.	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  and	  Beyond:	  Liberals,	  Critics,	  Contestations,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2000.	  
19	  Hogwood,	  B.	  W.	  and	  Gunn,	  L.	  A.	  Policy	  Analysis	  for	  the	  Real	  World,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
1984,	  p.4.	  
20	  Hogwood,	  B.	  W.	  ‘If	  Consultation	  is	  Everything	  then	  maybe	  it’s	  Nothing’	  in	  Strathclyde	  Papers	  on	  
Government	  and	  Politics,	  No.	  44,	  1984,	  p.14.	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each	  as	  the	  key	  constitutional	  policy	  of	  the	  respective	  governments.	  	  The	  key	  question	  
this	  thesis	  asks	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  is	  why	  public	  engagement	  was	  
considered	   the	   best	  means	   by	  which	   to	   deliver	   upon	   the	   constitutional	   goals	   of	   the	  
respective	  nationalist	  parties.	  	  To	  answer	  necessitates	  consideration	  of	  a	  second	  field	  –	  
that	   of	   party	   strategy.	   	   Here,	   the	   work	   of	  Müller	   and	   Strøm	   on	   the	  motivations	   of	  
political	   parties	   is	   utilised.	   	   Their	   work	   identifies	   three	   clear	   motivation	   types	   for	  
political	  parties:	  policy	  success,	  office	  success	  and	  vote	  (electoral)	  success.21	  	  It	  is	  clear	  
that	  these	  areas	  overlap	  somewhat	  –	  the	  ability	  to	  achieve	  office	   in	  most	  cases	  rests	  
upon	   some	   measure	   of	   electoral	   success	   for	   example	   –	   but	   for	   Müller	   and	   Strøm,	  
parties	  fall	  into	  one	  of	  the	  three	  categories.	  	  Identifying	  which	  of	  these	  goals	  motivates	  
parties	  gives	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  they	  develop	  their	  strategy,	  and	  it	  is	  by	  utilising	  this	  
theory	  that	  the	  use	  of	  consultations	  and	  referendums	  by	  these	  parties	  in	  government	  
can	   be	   best	   understood.	   	   This	   approach	   combines	   analysis	   of	   quantitative	   data	  
(opinion	   polls,	   election	   and	   referendum	   results)	   which	   provides	   evidence	   of	   public	  
support	   for	   the	   parties	   and	   their	   constitutional	   positions,	   as	   well	   as	   qualitative	  
indicators,	   such	   as	   considering	   in	   what	   ways	   these	   parties	   have	   affected	   the	  
constitutional	  debate	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  	  
	  
By	  utilising	  both	  deliberative	  democracy	  theory	  and	  that	  of	  party	  strategies,	  this	  thesis	  
considers	  why	   the	  nationalist	  parties	   in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  undertook	  consultations	  
and	   referendums	   to	   pursue	   their	   constitutional	   goals.	   	   It	   argues	   that	   the	   answer	   is	  
threefold.	  	  Firstly,	  it	  was	  done	  out	  of	  necessity.	  	  In	  Wales	  this	  was	  a	  legal	  and	  political	  
necessity	   –	   as	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   due	   course,	   the	   Government	   of	  Wales	   Act	   2006	  
                                                
21	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  Policy,	  Office	  or	  Votes?	  How	  Political	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  make	  hard	  
decisions,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  pg.1.	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decreed	   that	  a	   referendum	  was	   legally	   required	   to	  devolve	   the	  desired	  powers;	   and	  
public	  consultation	  became	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  One	  Wales	  coalition	  agreement	  –	  
while	   in	   Scotland	   that	   necessity	  was	   borne	   out	   of	   public	   expectation.	   	   Thus	   in	   both	  
cases,	   the	   parties	  were	   partly	   playing	   the	   hand	  dealt	   to	   them.	   	   Secondly,	   the	   thesis	  
argues	  that	  by	  utilising	  the	  combined	  consultation	  and	  referendum	  strategy,	  the	  two	  
parties	  were	   concerned	  with	  public	   engagement	   in	   the	  process.	   	   Public	   attitudes	  on	  
the	   respective	   issues	   at	   stake	   –	   independence	   for	   Scotland,	   further	   devolution	   for	  
Wales	  –	  were	  not	   in	  tune	  with	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  despite	  their	  
electoral	  and	  office	  success.	  	  Thus	  the	  parties	  themselves	  had	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  ensuring	  
that	   their	   own	   constitutional	   policies	   achieved	  a	  measure	  of	  public	   legitimacy	  –	   and	  
this	  was	  best	   achieved	   in	   each	   case	   through	  public	   engagement	   –	  with	   consultation	  
recognised	   as	   being	   a	   popular	   government	   activity.22	   	   By	   engaging	   the	   public	   in	  
discourse,	  the	  parties	  sought	  to	  tie	  the	  popularity	  of	  that	  activity	  to	  their	  constitutional	  
objectives	  (with	  limited	  success	  here).	  	  Consultation	  also	  allowed	  the	  parties	  in	  office	  
to	   appear	   transparent	   and	   responsive	   –	   both	   favoured	   qualities	   in	   governments	   –	  
which	  resonated	  with	  their	  aim	  to	  provide	  “competent	  government”.23	  	  Finally,	  opting	  
for	  a	  consultation	  and	  referendum	  strategy	  was	  also	  a	  tactical	  decision.	  	  It	  was	  utilised	  
as	  a	  means	  of	  delivering	  a	  desired	  outcome,	  but	  also	  to	  provide	  clear	  accountability	  to	  
the	  process,	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  normalisation	  of	  the	  debates.	  	  This	  was	  characterised	  in	  
two	  ways:	   engaging	   the	   civil	   service	   in	  work	  on	   the	   subject	   (and	   thus	   preparing	   the	  
machinery	  of	  government	   for	  any	  constitutional	  eventuality)	  while	  at	   the	   same	   time	  
                                                
22	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Gammell,	  E.	  The	  Art	  of	  Consultation:	  Public	  Dialogues	  in	  a	  Noisy	  World	  London,	  Biteback	  
Publishing	  Ltd.,	  2009	  




also	   engaging	   other	   political	   parties	   on	   the	   issue.24	   	   The	   latter	   was	   particularly	  
important	   in	   Scotland,	   where	   the	   SNP’s	   opposition	   were	   much	   more	   reluctant	   to	  
countenance	  constitutional	  change	  (in	  contrast,	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  saw	  
unanimous	  support	  for	  a	  move	  to	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006,	  and	  by	  
extension,	   considerable	   constitutional	   change).	   	   In	   considering	   the	   case	   studies	  
following,	  these	  arguments	  will	  be	  developed	  more	  fully.	  
	  
Of	  equal	  importance	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  success	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  utilising	  
these	  methods.	  	  In	  some	  senses,	  measuring	  success	  in	  politics	  is	  relatively	  simple:	  the	  
parties	  have	  a	  desired	  outcome,	  if	  that	  is	  achieved	  then	  they	  have	  succeeded,	  while	  if	  
it	   has	   not	   been	   achieved,	   then	   they	   have	   failed.	   	   However,	   as	   with	   much	   political	  
discussion,	   the	  success	  of	  a	  particular	  political	  strategy	   is	  not	  quite	  as	  simple.	   	  There	  
are	  a	   range	  of	  measures	  of	   success	   in	   terms	  of	  policy	  analysis,25	  and	   the	  outcome	   is	  
just	  one	  of	  many.	   	  Thus,	  while	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  the	  measure	  of	  success	   in	  
terms	  of	  outcome	  is	  quite	  clear	  (the	  party	  succeeded	  in	  achieving	  its	  short-­‐term	  goal	  of	  
winning	   the	   referendum	   on	   further	   powers	   for	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales	   in	  
2011),	   for	   the	   SNP,	   by	   this	   measure,	   the	   party	   has	   not	   yet	   achieved	   its	   goal.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   alternative	   measures	   indicate	   that	   the	   party	   did	   achieve	   several	  
successes	  through	  their	  consultation	  process	  –	  and	  seem	  poised	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  
in	   2014	   on	   their	   constitutional	   goal	   (though	   whether	   the	   result	   will	   deliver	   their	  
intended	   outcome	   remains	   to	   be	   seen).	   	   Thus,	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   central	   research	  
question,	   this	   thesis	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  parties	   in	  each	  case	  study	  have	  seen	  relative	  
success	   through	   their	   consultation	   and	   referendum	   strategies,	   but	   that	   that	   success	  
                                                
24	  Interview	  with	  Kevin	  Pringle	  (Scottish	  Government	  Special	  Advisor)	  (May	  2010).	  
25	  Hogwood,	  B.	  W.	  and	  Gunn,	  L.	  A.	  op.	  cit.	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can	  be	  divided	  between	  short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  success.	  	  It	  will	  do	  so	  by	  utilising	  a	  
comparative	  analysis	  of	   the	  cases	  of	  Scotland	  and	  Wales,	  dedicating	  two	  chapters	   to	  
each,	  examining	  both	  consultation	  and	  referendum	  strategies	   in	  detail,	  exploring	  the	  
construction	  and	  campaigning	   in	  both	   to	  determine	   the	  merits	  of	   the	   strategies	  and	  
the	   relative	   success	   of	   each.	   	   There	   is	   also	   a	   normative	   dimension	   to	   the	   use	   of	  
deliberative	   strategies,	   and	   the	   desirability	   of	   public	   engagement	   as	   a	   “democratic	  
good”	  will	  also	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  the	  processes.	  
	  
Thesis	  Structure	  
The	  thesis	  begins	  with	  a	  theoretical	  chapter	  which	  has	  a	  three-­‐fold	  purpose.	  	  Firstly,	  it	  
establishes	   the	  methodology	   employed	  within	   the	   thesis.	   	   This	   section	   sets	   out	   the	  
reasons	   such	   a	   comparative	   study	  has	  been	  undertaken,	   establishing	   the	   similarities	  
within	   and	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   cases,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   use	   of	   primary	   and	  
secondary	   sources	   in	   the	   research.	   	   Secondly	   it	   sets	   the	   thesis	   within	   the	   field	   of	  
research	   by	   providing	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   literature	   informing	   the	   research.	   	   This	  
section	  focuses	  on	  three	  separate	  areas	  which	  are	  utilised	  within	  the	  thesis:	  	  literature	  
on	   the	  motivations	   of	   political	   parties,	   on	   governments	   and	   government	   formation,	  
and	   finally	   on	   the	   actions	   of	   parties	   in	   government.	   	   The	   latter	   section	   examines	  
particularly	   the	   concept	   of	   deliberative	   democracy	   and	   considers	  why	   parties	   utilise	  
means	   of	   mass	   public	   participation	   in	   more	   detail	   –	   a	   key	   aspect	   of	   the	   following	  
research.	   	   Finally,	   it	   considers	   what	   we	   might	   expect	   of	   nationalist	   parties	   in	  




Chapter	   two	   details	   the	   devolution	   processes	   in	   Scotland	   and	  Wales,	   analysing	   the	  
differences	   in	   political	   terrain	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   and	   emphasising	   how	  we	  
arrived	   in	   1999	   with	   two	   distinctly	   different	   models	   of	   devolution	   enacted.	   	   This	  
chapter	  sets	  up	  the	  considerations	  of	  the	  public	  engagement	  strategies	  of	  the	  parties	  
in	   office	   as	   they	   attempted	   to	   advance	   their	   constitutional	   objectives	   through	  
consultation	  and	  referendum.	  
	  
Chapter	   three	   provides	   a	   history	   of	   the	   two	   parties	   which	   the	   thesis	   focuses	   on,	  
utilising	   the	   Pedersen	   and	   Deschouwer	   lifespan	   models	   in	   order	   to	   analyse	   the	  
similarities	  and	  differences	   in	  how	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  have	  developed.	   	  These	  
similarities	  and	  differences	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  histories	  of	  their	  respective	  nations	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   institutional	   setting	   in	  which	   the	   parties	   operate.	   	   Of	   particular	   interest	  
here	   is	   the	  most	   recent	   history	   –	   namely,	   the	   decisions	   of	   both	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	  
Cymru	  to	  enter	  into	  government	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  2007,	  and	  how	  that	  government	  
was	   formed.	   	   These	   factors	   –	   the	   progression	   of	   the	   parties	   from	  political	   outsiders	  
into	  government,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  government	  each	  entered	  into	  –	  are	  argued	  to	  have	  
played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  how	  the	  parties’	  respective	  constitutional	  policies	  developed.	  
	  
Chapter	  four	  examines	  A	  National	  Conversation	  in	  depth,	  beginning	  with	  consideration	  
of	   the	  origins	  and	  design	  of	   the	  consultation	  and	   its	  evolution	  from	  small-­‐scale	  web-­‐
based	   consultation	   to	   the	   larger,	   event-­‐and-­‐publication-­‐oriented	   discussion	  with	   the	  
Scottish	   electorate	   it	   became.	   	   It	   considers	  A	  National	   Conversation	   through	   a	   dual	  
prism,	  both	  as	  a	  consultation	  and	  as	  part	  of	  wider	  attempts	  at	  deliberative	  democracy,	  
as	  a	  means	  (deliberative	  discussion)	  to	  an	  end	  (an	  affirmative	  vote	  in	  a	  referendum	  on	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Scottish	   independence).	   	   It	   then	  moves	   to	   evaluation	   of	   the	   success	   of	   the	   process,	  
arguing	   that	   while	   it	   set	   the	   agenda	   firmly	   on	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   for	   the	  
duration	   of	   its	   existence	   –	   and	   provoked	   a	   substantive	   reaction	   from	   the	   SNP’s	  
opposition	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  Calman	  Commission	  and,	  subsequently,	  the	  Scotland	  Bill	  
–	   its	   impact	   upon	   the	   views	   of	   the	   Scottish	   electorate	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   independence	   was	  
negligible.	   	   It	   was,	   however,	   the	   precursor	   to	   a	   much	   larger	   constitutional	   debate	  
which,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  is	  still	  ongoing,	  and	  comprises	  actors	  ranging	  from	  the	  UK	  
and	   Scottish	   Governments,	   political	   parties	   and	   trades	   unions	   to	  wider	   civic	   society	  
and	  the	  Scottish	  and	  UK	  media.	   	  This,	  arguably,	  has	  been	  the	  greatest	  success	  of	  the	  
SNP’s	  public	  engagement	  strategy.	  
	  
Chapter	   five	   moves	   the	   consideration	   of	   public	   consultation	   to	   Wales,	   with	   an	  
examination	   of	   the	   All	   Wales	   Convention.	   	   It	   begins	   with	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	  
background	  to	   the	  consultation	  –	  with	  a	  different	   institutional	   setting	  and	  governing	  
set-­‐up,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   to	   note	   that	   the	   ambitions	   of	   this	   consultation	   differed	  
markedly	   from	   the	   ambitions	   of	   A	   National	   Conversation.	   	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
consultation	  in	  Wales	  covered	  similar	  ground	  to	  that	  in	  Scotland	  with	  its	  base	  intention	  
–	   the	   preparation	   of	   the	   population	   for	   a	   referendum	   on	   a	   constitutional	   issue	   in	  
which	  the	  governing	  parties	  desired	  an	  affirmative	  response.	  	  The	  chapter	  moves	  on	  to	  
examine	  the	  engagement	  of	  the	  Welsh	  public	  with	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  arguing	  
that	  while	  informing	  the	  public	  about	  the	  devolution	  settlement	  was	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  its	  
remit,	  and	  though	  it	  had	  some	  success	  in	  engaging	  the	  Welsh	  public	  in	  debates	  about	  
devolution,	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  did	  not	  find	  a	  willing	  audience	  for	  the	  discussion.	  	  
However,	   it	  recognises	  that	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  had	  a	  key	  role	  to	  play	   in	   laying	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the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  Welsh	  Powers	  Referendum,	  held	   in	  2011,	   the	  move	  towards	  
which	   was	   recommended	   by	   the	   final	   report	   of	   its	   executive	   committee,	   without	  
which	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  progress	  towards	  the	  referendum	  itself	  would	  have	  been	  halted.	  	  
While	   a	   further	   Welsh	   commission	   on	   devolution	   emerged	   in	   the	   period	   after	   the	  
referendum	  was	  won,	  public	  engagement	  with	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  remained	  at	  
a	  low	  level.	  
	  
Chapter	   six	   considers	   the	  Welsh	   Powers	   Referendum	  of	   2011	   and	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  
SNP’s	   bid	   to	   hold	   an	   independence	   referendum	   in	   Scotland	   during	   the	   2007-­‐11	  
parliamentary	  term.	   	   It	  places	  the	  2011	  campaign	   in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  two	  previous	  
devolution	  referendums	  in	  Wales:	  the	  heavy	  defeat	  of	  1979	  and	  the	  narrow	  mandate	  
achieved	   in	  1997.	   	   It	   considers	  at	   its	  heart	  a	  clear	  question:	   	  why	  was	  a	   referendum	  
considered	  as	  the	  best	  means	  to	  deliver	  on	  constitutional	  change	  in	  each	  of	  the	  cases?	  	  
The	   question	   is	   answered	   in	   relation	   to	  Wales	   by	   placing	   the	  move	   to	   a	   legislative	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  in	  historical	  context,	  arguing	  that	  referendums	  had	  been	  
previously	  utilised	  to	  ascertain	  public	  views	  on	  the	  devolution	  of	  powers	  to	  Wales	  and	  
that,	   on	   the	   back	   of	   this	   precedent,	   such	   a	   referendum	  was	   desired	   in	   this	   case	   to	  
provide	  a	  mandate	   for	   further	  devolution.	   	   It	   is	  also	  noted	   that,	   in	   this	   instance,	   the	  
referendum	  was	  considered	  as	  a	  conservative	  device,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  delaying	  the	  move	  
towards	  further	  devolution	  by	  putting	  a	  barrier	  –	  the	  need	  for	  a	  clear	  show	  of	  public	  
support	  –	   in	  the	  way.	   	  That	  this	  succeeded	  for	  only	  a	  short	  while	   is	  testament	  to	  the	  
unanimous	  support	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  for	  the	  proposals	  contained	  in	  
Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006,	  the	  lack	  of	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  system	  of	  
Legislative	  Competence	  Orders	  established	  through	  the	  same	  Act	  and	  the	  support	  of	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the	  public,	  which	  was	  apparent	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  findings.	  	  This	  
second	   point,	   it	   is	   argued,	   was	   a	   political	   solution,	   with	   divisions	   between	   pro-­‐
devolutionists	  and	  those	  more	  sceptical	  of	   further	  powers	   for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  
for	  Wales	  in	  the	  Welsh	  Labour	  Party	  (and,	  in	  particular,	  among	  the	  Welsh	  Labour	  MPs)	  
requiring	   such	   this	   outcome.	   	   Thus,	   the	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   is	   not	   one	   for	   the	  
nationalist	   party	   in	   Wales	   –	   who	   would	   have	   preferred	   to	   have	   seen	   the	   powers	  
delivered	   without	   recourse	   to	   a	   referendum	   –	   but	   one	   for	   the	   Labour	   party,	   and	  
speaks	   to	   the	   tensions	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	   Government.	   	   In	   the	  
Scottish	   case,	   the	   evolving	   referendum	   strategy	   of	   the	   SNP	   is	   evaluated	   –	   both	   by	  
considering	   the	   short	   and	   long	   term	   implications	   of	   public	   engagement	   on	   the	  
constitutional	   question.	   	   The	   argument	   is	   made	   that,	   while	   deliberative	   democracy	  
informed	   the	  decision	   to	  pursue	   such	  a	   strategy	  of	  public	   engagement,	  delaying	   the	  
referendum	  –	  in	  both	  cases	  –	  until	  the	  government	  was	  more	  convinced	  that	  it	  could	  
deliver	  an	  affirmative	  outcome	   is	  somewhat	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  principles	  espoused	  by	  
deliberative	  theorists.	  
	  
The	  thesis	  concludes	  by	  considering	  the	  two	  consultations	  and	  two	  referendums	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  public	  participation	  and	  democratic	  structures.	   	   It	  argues	  that,	  though	  the	  
use	   of	  mass	   participation	  methods	   by	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   in	   government	  was	  
very	  much	  a	  means	   to	   an	  end	  –	   constitutional	   change	  –	   the	  parties	   recognised	   that	  
such	  an	  end	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  without	  the	  explicit	  consent	  of	  the	  population	  they	  
represented.	  	  Thus,	  their	  use	  of	  participative	  methods	  of	  democracy	  was	  a	  key	  aspect	  
of	   their	   respective	  nation-­‐building	  and	  governing	   strategies,	   allowing	  both	  parties	   to	  
advance	   their	   core	   political	   and	   constitutional	   goals	   while	   appearing	   as	   open	   and	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accountable	  governments.	   	  Their	  strategies	  were	  developed	  out	  of	  necessity	  yes,	  but	  
also	   out	   of	   tactical	   thinking	   as	   a	   means	   of	   normalising	   the	   debates,	   providing	  
accountability,	  and	  taking	  forward	  a	  popular	  method	  –	  consultation	  –	  and	  associating	  
their	   respective	   administrations	   with	   the	   transparency	   and	   opportunity	   for	   public	  
engagement	  afforded	  by	   these	  methods.	   	  The	   two	  cases,	  befitting	   the	  differences	   in	  
political	   histories	   and	   institutional	   settings,	   saw	   strikingly	   different	   outcomes.	   	   The	  
process	   in	   Scotland	   began	   as	   a	   top-­‐down,	   government-­‐led	   consultation,	   but	   by	   the	  
SNP’s	   second	   term	   in	   office	   it	   had	   widened	   to	   engage	   more	   of	   civic	   society	   and	  
beyond,	  and	  led	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  to	  the	  SNP’s	  desired	  referendum.	  	  In	  Wales,	  despite	  
the	   short-­‐term	   success	   of	   the	   referendum	   result,	   the	   debate	   –	   for	   the	  most	   part	   –	  
failed	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  elite	  actors;	   the	   ‘usual	  suspects’	  of	  political	  debate.	   	  That	  
the	  two	  populations	  reacted	  very	  differently	  to	  two	  similar	  consultative	  processes	  may	  
have	  clear	  repercussions	  for	  future	  constitutional	  debates.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	  the	  following	  pages,	  this	  thesis	  considers	  the	  current	  constitutional	  arrangements	  in	  
the	  UK,	   in	   the	   context	  of	  nationalist	  parties	   in	  government.	   	   Focusing	   specifically	  on	  
the	  2007-­‐11	  terms	  of	  office	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales,	   it	   seeks	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   attempts	  made	   by	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   to	  
build	   public	   support	   for	   their	   constitutional	   preferences.	   	   It	   considers	   the	   success	  
achieved	  by	  Plaid	  Cymru,	   firstly	   in	  establishing	  a	  national	   consultation	   to	  discuss	   the	  
devolution	  arrangements	  in	  Wales,	  then	  in	  campaigning	  for	  –	  and	  ultimately	  winning	  –	  
a	  referendum	  to	  enhance	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales.	   	  However,	  
Plaid	  Cymru’s	  constitutional	  success	  was	  tempered	  slightly	  by	  their	  performance	  in	  the	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2011	   Assembly	   election	   where	   the	   party	   fell	   to	   third	   in	   the	   Assembly	   and	   out	   of	  
government	   office.	   	   This	   situation	   contrasts	   sharply	   with	   that	   in	   Scotland,	   where	  
reaction	   to	   the	   SNP’s	   National	   Conversation	   was	   lukewarm	   –	   especially	   among	  
supporters	  of	  other	  parties	  –	  and	  attempts	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  during	  the	  previous	  
Scottish	   Parliamentary	   term	   were	   thwarted	   by	   minority	   governance.	   	   Nevertheless,	  
the	  party	  was	  returned	  to	  government,	  winning	  an	  unexpected	  majority	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  
Scottish	   Parliament	   and	   the	   opportunity	   to	   deliver	   a	   referendum	   on	   their	  
constitutional	  preference	  during	  the	  following	  term	  in	  office.	  	  The	  success	  of	  the	  Welsh	  
Powers	  Referendum	  means	  that,	  for	  a	  short	  while	  at	  least,	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  in	  
Wales	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  static,	  with	  further	  change	  to	  the	  devolution	  settlement	  unlikely	  
over	   the	   coming	   term	   (although	   a	   further	   commission	   has	   been	   established	   to	  
consider	  the	  Assembly’s	  fiscal	  arrangements,	  legislation	  is	  not	  expected	  in	  this	  area	  for	  
the	   foreseeable	   future).	   	   The	   same	  cannot	  be	   said	  of	   Scotland,	  where	   constitutional	  
change	   –	   whether	   through	   a	   reformed	   devolution	   settlement	   or	   independence	   –	  
remains	   firmly	   on	   the	   political	   agenda.	   	   This	   thesis	   fits	   within	   that	   constitutional	  
debate	   by	   considering	   the	   developments	   in	   devolution	   over	   the	   last	   four	   years	   and	  
examining	  how	  those	  developments	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  nationalist	  parties	  involved	  in	  





Chapter	  1:	  Nationalist	  parties	  	  




This	  thesis	  considers	  the	  process	  of	  public	  engagement	  employed	  by	  nationalist	  parties	  
in	  government	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  constitutional	  goals.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  two	  cases	  studies	  –	  
those	   of	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   –	   are	   compared.	   	   The	   key	   aspects	   which	   have	  
underpinned	   the	   respective	   nationalist	   parties’	   objectives	   in	   office	   –	   namely	   the	  
pursuit	  of	  a	  national	  consultation	  on	  constitutional	  change	  followed	  by	  a	  referendum	  
on	   the	   issue	   –	   form	   the	   backbone	   of	   this	   thesis,	   providing	   evidence	   for	   its	   central	  
hypothesis:	   that	   public	   engagement	   is	   a	   strategy	   utilised	   to	   drive	   successful	  
constitutional	  change.	  	  This	  opening	  chapter	  will	  serve	  three	  functions.	  
	  
Firstly,	   it	  sets	  out	  the	  methodology	  employed,	  exploring	  the	  selection	  of	  case	  studies	  
to	   be	   examined	   and	   discussing	   the	   fieldwork	   undertaken	   in	   researching	   the	   thesis.	  	  
This	  is	  an	  important	  discussion	  in	  any	  thesis,	  and	  this	  one	  is	  no	  different.	  	  Secondly,	  it	  
will	  also	  place	  this	  thesis	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  literature	  which	  surrounds	  and	  informs	  
it.	  	  To	  fulfil	  this	  function,	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  split	  into	  three	  sections.	  	  The	  first	  
of	  these	  sections	  looks	  at	  the	  distinct	  motivations	  of	  political	  parties	  –	  in	  particular,	  the	  
motivations	  of	  autonomist	  parties	  –	  and	  why	  they	  have	  chosen	  to	  enter	  office	  in	  order	  
to	   pursue	   their	   goals.	   	   Here,	   the	   work	   of	   Kaare	   Strøm	   and	   Wolfgang	   C.	   Müller	   is	  
considered	  as	  a	  model	  of	  analysis,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  what	  drives	  nationalist	  parties	  is	  
examined.	  	  The	  second	  section	  focuses	  on	  governments;	  on	  how	  they	  are	  formed,	  and	  
on	  the	  two	  specific	  types	  of	  government	  (coalition	  and	  minority)	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	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the	  two	  case	  studies.	  	  This	  section	  also	  considers	  the	  motivations	  of	  parties	  in	  entering	  
office	  but	  considers	  why	  parties	  choose	  to	  govern	  in	  the	  manner	  they	  do.	  	  This	  entails	  
a	   brief	   examination	   of	   coalition	   theory	   versus	  motivations	   to	   govern	   as	   a	  minority,	  
providing	  further	  context	  for	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  two	  case	  studies,	  and	  argues	  that	  
government	  type	  inevitably	  has	  an	  impact	  upon	  the	  actions	  a	  party	  can	  undertake	  in	  
office	  –	  again,	  a	  clear	  factor	  in	  how	  the	  nationalist	  parties	  in	  both	  cases	  operated.	  	  The	  
third	   section	   considers	   the	   bulk	   of	   work	   undertaken	   in	   this	   thesis	   –	   the	   strategies	  
pursued	   and	   the	   action	   undertaken	   by	   the	   parties	   when	   they	   enter	   government	   in	  
pursuit	  of	  constitutional	  change.	   	  The	  focus	  here,	  naturally,	   is	  upon	  consultation	  and	  
referendum.	  	  Here,	  the	  chapter	  sets	  out	  reasons	  why	  parties	  focus	  their	  efforts	  upon	  
mass	  participation	  by	  drawing	  on	  theorists	  from	  the	  field	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	  as	  
well	   as	   proponents	   of	   referendums	   and	   more	   effective	   consultations.	   	   Finally,	   the	  
chapter	  considers	  each	  of	  these	  aspects	  together	  –	  the	  actions	  of	  autonomist	  parties	  
in	  government	  –	  and	  hypothesises	  about	  what	  we	  might	  expect	  from	  a	  government	  in	  
these	  circumstances.	  	  These	  hypotheses	  are	  explored	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  which	  
consider	  in	  greater	  depth	  the	  development	  of	  the	  parties	  from	  political	  outsiders	  into	  
government,	   and	   their	   respective	   constitutional	   consultations	   and	   referendum	  
strategies	   employed	   by	   each	   of	   the	   parties	   in	   government.	   	   The	   thesis	   itself	  
subsequently	   follows	  the	  same	  structure:	   the	  early	  chapters	  provide	  the	   institutional	  
background	   to	   the	   devolution	   settlement	   and	   chart	   the	   development	   of	   the	   parties	  
and	   their	  decision	   to	  enter	  devolved	  government;	   the	   subsequent	   chapters	  examine	  





Methodology:	  Cases	  for	  analysis	  
This	   thesis	   is	   constructed	   as	   a	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   two	   similar	   but	   distinctively	  
different	   case	   studies	   –	   those	   of	   the	   SNP,	   who	   between	   2007	   and	   2011	   formed	   a	  
minority	   administration	   to	   run	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   (previously	   the	   Scottish	  
Executive),	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru,	   who	   were	   junior	   partners	   to	   Labour	   in	   the	   Welsh	  
Assembly	  Government	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  	  The	  cases	  are	  of	  interest	  for	  students	  
of	  devolved	  politics	  and	  minority	  nationalist	  parties,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  
public	  engagement	  strategies.	  	  Labour	  peer	  Lord	  Robertson,	  when	  he	  was	  Secretary	  of	  
State	   for	   Scotland	   in	   the	   late	   1990s,	   argued	   that	   devolution	  would	   “kill	   nationalism	  
stone	  dead”.1	  	  The	  logic	  employed	  by	  Robertson,	  amongst	  others,	  was	  that	  devolution	  
would	  defuse	  demands	  for	  independence	  among	  nationalists,	  and	  that	  the	  SNP	  would	  
see	  their	  support	  fall.2	  	  However,	  just	  eight	  years	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  devolved	  
institutions	   in	   Edinburgh	   and	   Cardiff,	   nationalist	   parties	   entered	   office	   there	   for	   the	  
first	   time,	   testing	   this	   theory	   to	  a	  greater	  extent	   than	  when	   the	  parties	  had	  been	   in	  
opposition.	   	   That	   those	   responsible	   for	   establishing	   the	   very	   institutions	   which	  
nationalist	   parties	   now	   governed	   believed	   that	   the	   institutions	   would	   kill	   off	  
nationalism	   rather	   than	   allow	   the	   parties	   into	   government	   makes	   consideration	   of	  
these	   two	   cases	   of	   interest	   –	   this	   was	   an	   unexpected	   phenomenon	   in	   UK	   politics.	  	  
There	   are,	   however,	   good	   reasons	   to	   consider	   the	   cases	   of	   just	   Scotland	   and	  Wales	  
(and	  not,	  for	  example,	  Northern	  Ireland)	  here.	  
	  
                                                
1	  McEwen,	  N.	  ‘From	  Devolution	  to	  Independence?	  Scots	  elect	  their	  first	  nationalist	  government’	  in	  
Policy	  Options,	  June,	  2007,	  p.57.	  
2	  Lynch,	  P.	  and	  Elias,	  A.	  ‘Devolution	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  Inexorable	  Rise	  of	  Scottish	  and	  Welsh	  
Nationalism?	  World	  Congress	  of	  Political	  Science	  Conference	  Paper,	  July,	  2009,	  p.1.	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Firstly,	   and	   perhaps	  most	   obviously,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   similarities	   in	   the	   cases	  
which	  helps	   to	   build	   a	   positive	   case	   for	   analysis.	   	   The	  historical	   development	  of	   the	  
devolution	   debates	   in	   Scotland	   and	  Wales	   have	   followed	   a	   similar	   course,	   with	   the	  
nationalist	  parties	  in	  each	  also	  developing	  along	  concurrent	  lines	  through	  the	  various	  
stages	  of	  Pedersen’s	  party	  lifespan	  model	  to	  achieving	  governmental	  office	  success	  in	  
2007.3	  	  That	  each	  party	  has	  also	  experienced	  rejuvenation	  in	  electoral	  fortunes	  under	  
devolution	  and	  become	  key	  actors	  within	  the	  respective	  institutions	  is	  also	  important	  
in	  analysis.	  	  Equally,	  though	  the	  nationalism	  espoused	  in	  each	  case	  is	  slightly	  different	  
–	  more	   civic	   in	   Scotland,	   cultural	   in	  Wales	  –	   the	  methods	  which	  each	  has	  utilised	   in	  
order	   to	  promote	   their	   constitutional	   goals	  has	  been	   similar.	   	   The	  differences	   in	   the	  
cases	  too	  –	  in	  particular,	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  the	  autonomist-­‐centrist	  dichotomy	  
in	   Scotland	   (between	   the	   SNP	   and	   their	   opposition,	   Unionist	   parties)	   and	   in	  Wales,	  
where	  that	   tension	   is	  played	  out	  more	  fully	  within	  the	  confines	  of	   the	  Welsh	  Labour	  
party,	  rather	  than	  between	  Plaid	  Cymru	  and	  other	  parties	  –	  is	  also	  of	  note,	  and	  will	  be	  
considered	   in	   the	   concluding	   chapters	   as	   part	   of	   the	   explanation	   for	   the	   differing	  
processes	  and	  differing	  outcomes	  in	  the	  two	  cases.	  
	  
Secondly,	   the	   political	   system	   which	   each	   party	   finds	   itself	   competing	   in	   is	   broadly	  
similar.	   	   The	   three	   main	   state-­‐wide	   parties	   (Labour,	   Conservatives	   and	   Liberal	  
Democrats)	   contest	   elections	   across	   the	   country	   (with	   the	   exception	   of	   in	   Northern	  
Ireland)	  while	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  contest	  elections	  solely	  in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  
respectively.	   	   And	   while	   the	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   the	   UK	   have	   seen	   their	   electoral	  
                                                
3	  Lynch,	  P.	  ‘The	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Political	  Representation’	  Conference	  Paper,	  
From	  Protest	  to	  Power:	  Minority	  Nationalist	  Parties	  and	  the	  Challenges	  of	  Representation,	  University	  of	  
Wales,	  Aberystwyth,	  27-­‐29	  October	  2006;	  Elias,	  A.	  ‘Plaid	  Cymru	  and	  the	  Challenges	  of	  Adapting	  to	  Post	  
Devolution	  Wales’	  in	  Contemporary	  Wales,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  1,	  November,	  2009.	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fortunes	   improve	  dramatically	  with	   the	  devolution	  of	  power	   to	   regional	   legislatures,	  
they	  continue	  to	  fare	  less	  well	  in	  elections	  to	  the	  UK	  Parliament,	  where	  they	  remain	  on	  
the	  periphery.	   	   Two	  distinct	   party	   systems	  exist	   at	   the	  different	   levels	   (regional	   and	  
statewide)	  of	  election	  in	  the	  UK.4	  	  While	  the	  state-­‐wide	  systems	  could	  be	  described	  as	  
two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   party	   systems,5	   regional	   elections	   in	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   exhibit	  
elements	  of	  a	  fragmented	  party	  system,6	  with	  support	  spread	  between	  four	  or	  more	  
parties.7	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  electorate	  in	  both	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  is	  predominantly	  centre-­‐left,	  with	  only	  the	  
Conservatives	  gaining	  any	  real	  level	  of	  support	  on	  the	  centre-­‐right.	  	  Labour,	  the	  Liberal	  
Democrats,	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   each	   have	   policies	   (including	   support	   for	   free	  
NHS	  prescriptions,	  a	  lack	  of	  tuition	  fees	  for	  university	  students	  and	  free	  personal	  care	  
for	  the	  elderly)	  which	  mark	  them	  out	  as	  social	  democratic,	  thereby	  making	  the	  party	  
competition	   centre	   around	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   centre-­‐left.8	   	   In	   Scotland,	   most	  
prominently	   in	   the	   second	   session	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   from	   2003-­‐2007,	   that	  
fragmentation	  was	  further	  augmented	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  Greens,	  the	  Scottish	  
Socialist	  Party	  (SSP)	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Senior	  Citizens’	  Unity	  Party	  (SSCUP),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
election	  of	  three	  independents.	  	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  SSCUP’s	  sole	  MSP	  and	  the	  
Conservatives,	   the	  remainder	  of	   the	  parties	  and	   independents	  were	  broadly	  situated	  
                                                
4	  Bennie,	  L.	  and	  Clark,	  A.	  ‘Towards	  Moderate	  Pluralism:	  Scotland’s	  Post-­‐Devolution	  Party	  System	  1999-­‐
2002’	  in	  British	  Elections	  and	  Parties	  Review,	  Vol.	  13,	  2003.	  
5	  Blondel,	  J.	  ‘Types	  of	  Party	  System’	  in	  Mair,	  P.	  (ed)	  The	  West	  European	  Party	  System,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1990,	  p.304.	  
6	  Sartori,	  G.	  Parties	  and	  Party	  Systems:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Analysis	  (Volume	  1),	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1976.	  
7	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  sociological	  and	  institutional	  factors	  influencing	  why	  party	  systems	  differ,	  see	  
Ware,	  A.	  Political	  Parties	  and	  Party	  Systems,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996,	  p.184-­‐99.	  
8	  Keating,	  M.	  The	  Government	  of	  Scotland:	  Pubic	  Policy	  Making	  After	  Devolution	  (Second	  Edition),	  
Edinburgh,	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010,	  p.53.	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on	  the	  centre-­‐left.9	  	  In	  Wales,	  while	  further	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  party	  system	  has	  not	  
taken	   place	   (a	   result,	   predominantly,	   of	   an	   Additional	   Member	   System	   weighted	  
heavily	  towards	  First-­‐Past-­‐the-­‐Post	  winning	  constituency	  members)	  the	  competition	  is	  
broadly	  similar,	  with	  a	  tendency	  towards	  the	  centre-­‐left.10	  
	  
Thirdly,	   the	   fact	   that	   both	   parties	   have	   experienced	   a	   full	   term	   in	   office	   in	   their	  
respective	  institutions	  –	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  thereby	  experiencing	  the	  same	  difficult	  
global	   economic	   conditions	   –	   provides	   an	   opportunity	   to	   compare	   what	   they	   have	  
been	   able	   to	   achieve	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   fundamental	   objective:	   constitutional	  
change.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  some	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  cases,	  which	  should	  be	  
considered	   during	   the	   following	   analysis.	   	   The	   nature	   of	   devolution	   in	   each	   case	   is	  
different.	  	  In	  1997,	  the	  Scottish	  electorate	  was	  offered	  a	  legislative	  parliament	  with	  a	  
solitary	   tax-­‐varying	   power	   in	   a	   referendum,	   both	   of	   which	   were	   accepted	   and	   the	  
institution	  established.	   	  The	  Scottish	  Parliament	  was	  given	  powers	   to	   legislate	   in	   the	  
areas	  of	  health,	  education,	  justice,	  culture,	  transport,	  agriculture	  and	  rural	  affairs.11	  	  It	  
was	  also	  –	  uniquely	  of	  the	  devolved	  institutions	  –	  given	  a	  tax	  power,	  the	  ability	  to	  vary	  
the	  rate	  of	   income	  tax	   in	  Scotland	  by	  a	  maximum	  of	  3p.	   	  But	   in	  Wales,	  the	  assembly	  
offered	  had	  a	  very	  different	  model,	  based	  on	   the	  executive	  devolution	  model	  of	   the	  
Welsh	  Office	  in	  Whitehall	  with	  no	  tax	  powers	  and	  limited	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  secondary	  –	  
legislative	   authority.12	   	   It	   was	   narrowly	   accepted	   in	   a	   referendum,	   and	   the	  
subsequently-­‐established	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales	  had	  no	   legislative	  powers	  but	  
                                                
9	  Mitchell,	  J.	  ‘Scotland:	  Expectations,	  Policy	  Types	  and	  Devolution’	  in	  Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  Has	  Devolution	  
Made	  a	  Difference?	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  2004,	  Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2004,	  p.19-­‐21.	  
10	  Scully,	  R.	  and	  Elias,	  A.	  ‘The	  2007	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Election’	  in	  Regional	  and	  Federal	  Studies,	  Vol.	  18,	  
No.	  1,	  February,	  2008,	  p.107.	  
11	  HM	  Government,	  Scotland	  Act	  1998,	  Schedule	  5,	  London,	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  1998(a).	  
12	  Trench,	  A.	  ‘Wales	  and	  the	  Westminster	  Model’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  63,	  No.	  1,	  2010,	  p.119.	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was	   given	   the	  opportunity	   to	   implement	   legislation	  passed	  at	  UK	   level	   that	   affected	  
Wales.13	  	  
	  
Thus,	  while	  the	  historical	  debates	  surrounding	  devolution	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  devolved	  
party	   systems	   and	   the	   global	   economic	   conditions	   under	   which	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	  
Cymru	  have	  functioned	  in	  government	  have	  been	  similar,	  the	  institutional	  setting,	  and	  
the	   dynamic	   of	   inter-­‐party	   and	   intra-­‐party	   competition,	   in	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   is	  
distinctly	  different.	  	  So	  too,	  is	  the	  type	  of	  government	  in	  which	  each	  party	  participated	  
in	  during	   the	  2007-­‐11	   terms.	   	   The	  SNP,	  after	  exploring	  potential	   coalitions,	   chose	   to	  
form	  a	  minority	  administration,	  while	  Plaid	  Cymru	  entered	  into	  coalition	  with	  Labour	  
after	   efforts	   to	   form	   a	   “rainbow	   coalition”	   with	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   Liberal	  
Democrats	  failed	  to	  be	  agreed.	  	  The	  decisions	  to	  enter	  office	  –	  and	  the	  form	  that	  such	  
governance	  takes	  –	  is	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  how	  much	  progress	  parties	  can	  make	  with	  regard	  
to	  their	  policy	  objectives.	  	  For	  autonomist	  parties	  like	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  these	  
policy	  objectives	  are	  clearly	  centred	  upon	  changing	  the	  constitutional	  status	  quo.	  	  Thus	  
the	   type	   of	   government	   each	   has	   entered	   into	   is	   worth	   exploring,	   and	   will	   be	  
considered	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  more	  specifically,	  in	  chapter	  three.	  
	  
Methodology:	  Researching	  the	  cases	  	  
Structurally,	  the	  thesis	  begins	  by	  providing	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  the	  case	  study	  
analysis	  which	  follows.	  	  This	  chapter	  considers	  the	  three	  aspects	  –	  party	  motivations,	  
government	  type	  and	  public	  engagement	  –	  which	  are	  crucial	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  
how	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  attempted	  to	  move	  forward	  the	  constitutional	  debate.	  	  
                                                




The	   four	   subsequent	   chapters	   examine	   in	   more	   detail	   the	   devolution	   timeline;	   the	  
parties’	   development	   (utilising	   the	   Pedersen	   lifespan	   model)	   and	   their	   entry	   into	  
government;	   their	   respective	   consultation	   processes	   (A	   National	   Conversation	   in	  
Scotland	  and	  The	  All	  Wales	  Convention	   in	  Wales)	  and	  attempts	  to	  hold	  constitutional	  
referendums.	  	  	  
	  
Informing	   this	   thesis	   is	   research	   incorporating	   both	   primary	   and	   secondary	   sources.	  	  
Primary	  sources	  take	  the	  form	  of	  40	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews,	  split	  evenly	  between	  
actors	   in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales.	   	   Interviews	  were	  conducted	  at	  elite	   level	   (Members	  of	  
the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   and	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales,	   Scottish	   Government	  
and	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  officials	  and	  ministers)	  as	  well	  as	  with	  members	  of	  
organisations	   (the	   Welsh	   Council	   for	   Voluntary	   Associations,	   the	   National	   Farmers	  
Union	   in	  Wales,	   the	  Methodist	   Church	   in	   Scotland	   and	   several	   Scottish	   Community	  
Councillors)	   who	   had	   engaged	   with	   the	   consultations	   that	   their	   respective	  
governments	   had	   organised.	   	   That	   the	   interviews	   were	   semi-­‐structured,	   and	   that	  
interviewees	  were	   asked	  different	   questions	   depending	  upon	   their	   position,	   level	   of	  
engagement	   with	   the	   process	   and	   the	   consultation	   with	   which	   they	   had	   been	  
engaged,	   were	   decisions	   taken	   by	   the	   author	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that,	   while	  
interviewees	  could	  be	  directed	  towards	  the	  area	  of	  research,	  they	  would	  also	  be	  free	  
to	  provide	  fuller,	  more	  wide-­‐ranging	  answers.	  	  This	  also	  meant	  that	  the	  experiences	  of	  
those	   running	   the	   consultations	   and	   those	  who	  were	   engaged	   by	   the	   consultations	  
could	  be	  compared,	  that	  perceptions	  of	  success	  or	  failure	  could	  be	  challenged.	  	  Semi-­‐
structured	  interviews	  also	  allowed	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  interview	  to	  be	  controlled	  and	  
altered	  if	  required	  –	  taking	  the	  questioning	  in	  a	  different	  direction	  from	  that	  which	  had	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been	   intended	   if	   the	   interviewee	   introduced	  an	   idea	  which	  had	  not	  previously	  been	  
considered.	  	  The	  information	  from	  these	  sources	  is	  utilised	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  and	  
appears	  in	  footnotes	  throughout	  the	  case	  study	  chapters.	  	  A	  list	  of	  those	  interviewed	  
in	  conjunction	  with	  this	  research	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendices	  One	  and	  Two	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
While	  these	  interviews	  provide	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  how	  these	  processes	  were	  initiated,	  
organised	  and	   conducted,	   as	  well	   as	   insider	   views	  on	   their	   respective	   successes	   and	  
failures,	   there	   are	   inherent	   challenges	   when	   relying	   on	   interviewees	   –	   particularly	  
those	  who	  have	   clear	  political	   alignments	  –	   for	   information.	   	  Ministers	   and	  MSPs	  or	  
AMs	  involved	  in	  the	  consultation	  process,	  for	  example,	  would	  highlight	  the	  success	  of	  
engagement	   with	   the	   public	   while	   opposition	   politicians	   sought,	   in	   some	   cases,	   to	  
criticise	  the	  governing	  parties’	  role.	   	  This	   is	  an	  expected	  consequence	  of	   interviewing	  
political	  actors,	  and	  an	  unavoidable	  difficulty	  in	  utilising	  these	  sources.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
in	   order	   to	   get	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   processes	   involved	   and	   the	  
considerations	  of	  actors	  when	  developing	  consultation	  strategies,	  interviews	  were	  the	  
best	  means	  available	  of	  accessing	  this	  information.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  some	  difficulties	  were	  encountered	  in	  the	  process	  of	  interviewee	  selection,	  
particularly	   for	   the	  Welsh	   case.	   	   External	   restraints	   and	   funding	   issues	   required	   that	  
interviews	   in	  Cardiff	  were	  conducted	   in	  one	  three-­‐week	  block	   in	  summer	  2010.	   	  This	  
was	  not	  ideal	  for	  several	  reasons:	  the	  Convention	  had	  concluded	  with	  the	  One	  Wales	  
Government	  considering	  their	  next	  move,	  several	  Assembly	  Members	  were	  on	  holiday	  
or	  otherwise	  unavailable	  to	  be	  interviewed,	  the	  date	  for	  the	  referendum	  was	  yet	  to	  be	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finalised,	   and	   the	   campaign	   itself	   was	   a	   long	   way	   off.	   	   The	   interviewee	   list	   was	  
originally	   more	   extensive,	   but	   with	   finite	   resources	   (both	   monetary	   and	   time	  
constraints)	   the	   decision	   was	   taken	   to	   proceed	   with	   those	   interviewees	   who	   were	  
available.	   	   Undoubtedly,	   further	   interviews	   with	   key	   actors	   within	   the	   All	   Wales	  
Convention	  –	  particularly	  those	  who	  negotiated	  the	  One	  Wales	  Agreement,	  and	  more	  
of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  –	  would	  have	  strengthened	  the	  thesis,	  however	  given	  the	  
aforementioned	  constraints,	  this	  was	  not	  possible.	  
	  
Alongside	   these	   interviews,	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   official	   and	   government	   documents,	  
speeches,	  parliamentary	  debates	  and	  publications	  related	  to	  these	  processes	  provided	  
key	   information	  as	   to	   the	  conduct	  of	  both	  consultations	  and	  referendums,	  and	  were	  
also	   used	   to	   support	   the	   evidence	   provided	   in	   interviews.	   	   The	   list	   of	   secondary	  
sources	  extends	  to	  the	  plentiful	  supply	  of	  academic	  books	  and	  journals	  on	  the	  subject	  
of	   devolution,	   as	   well	   as	   political	   parties,	   party	   systems,	   deliberative	   democracy,	  
government	  formation	  and	  referendums.	  	  These	  sources	  were	  utilised	  in	  particular	  to	  
give	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   to	   this	   thesis,	   establishing	   the	   parameters	   of	   public	  
engagement	  which	  the	  respective	  consultations	  and	  Welsh	  referendum	  engaged	  with	  
(and	   the	   engagement	   strategy	   behind	   the	   postponed	   Scottish	   referendum).	   	   This	  
framework	   for	   analysis	   begins	  with	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	   parties	   themselves	   (their	  
development	  and	  motivations),	   their	  movement	   into	  government	   (and	  how	  the	  type	  
of	  government	   formed	  affected	  their	  ability	   to	  pursue	  their	  constitutional	  goals)	  and	  
their	   public	   engagement	   strategy	   when	   they	   got	   into	   government	   (the	   use	   of	  




Parties:	  The	  Party	  Lifespan	  Model	  
Mogens	   Pedersen	   established	   a	   typology	   of	   the	   lifespan	   of	   political	   parties,	   utilising	  
four	   “threshold	   concepts”	   to	   identify	  distinct	  phases	   in	   this	   lifespan,	  encouraging	  an	  
understanding	  of	  parties	  as	  organic	  objects	  and	  tracing	  their	  development	  from	  birth	  
through	  infancy	  and	  maturation	  to	  death	  (when	  the	  party	  no	  longer	  exists).14	  	  The	  first	  
of	   these	   thresholds	   is	   that	   of	   declaration	   –	   deciding	   as	   a	   party	   to	   participate	   in	  
electoral	  politics.	  	  This	  is	  not	  as	  simple	  a	  concept	  as	  it	  appears,	  as	  the	  emergence	  and	  
early	  development	  of	  parties	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  often	  not	  straightforward.15	  	  And,	  indeed,	  
even	  though	  a	  party	  declares	  its	  intention	  to	  seek	  office,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  
are	  ready	  or	  prepared	  for	  the	  process.	   	   It	   is	  only	  when	  they	  pass	  through	  Pedersen’s	  
second	   threshold	   –	   that	   of	   authorisation	   –	   they	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   ready	   to	   fully	  
participate	   in	  the	  process.	   	  This	  threshold	  takes	   into	  account	   legal	  requirements	  (the	  
provision	  of	  deposits	  for	  candidates	  for	  example)	  to	  field	  candidates	  in	  elections	  but	  it	  
also	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  party	  organisation	  to	  comply	  with	  these	  requirements.	  	  
Pedersen’s	   third	   threshold,	   that	   of	   representation,	   refers	   to	   the	   point	   at	   which	   the	  
party	  breaks	   through	  and	  wins	  parliamentary	   representation	  at	   the	  national	   level	  of	  
politics.	   	   Pedersen’s	   fourth	   and	   final	   threshold	   relates	   to	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   party	   to	  
make	   a	   difference	   in	   politics	   and	   policy	  within	   the	   state	   –	   namely,	  when	   they	   have	  
relevance	  in	  the	  political	  system.16	  	  	  
	  
                                                
14	  Pedersen,	  M.	  ‘Towards	  a	  New	  Typology	  of	  Party	  Lifespans	  and	  Minor	  Parties’	  in	  Scandinavian	  Political	  
Studies,	  1982,	  Vol.	  5,	  Issue	  1,	  pp1-­‐16	  
15	  Lynch,	  P.	  2006,	  op	  cit.	  p.2.	  
16	  Pedersen,	  M.	  op	  cit.	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Kris	  Deschouwer	  expanded	  upon	  this	  typology	  by	  amending	  the	  threshold	  of	  relevance	  
and	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  further	  threshold.17	  	  Firstly,	  by	  referring	  to	  Sartori’s	  definitions	  of	  
relevance	   he	   split	   the	   relevance	   phase	   into	   two	   distinctly	   different	   but	   equally	  
important	   phases.18	   	   Sartori’s	   first	   definition	   of	   relevance	   relates	   to	   the	   blackmail	  
potential	   of	   a	   party	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   ability	   of	   a	   party	   to	   influence	   the	  political	   agenda	  
regardless	   of	   the	   size	   of	   its	   parliamentary	   representation.	   	   This	   is	   most	   relevant	   to	  
pressing	  an	   issue	  onto	   the	  political	   agenda	  by	  competing	   for	   the	   same	  electorate	  as	  
another	  party	  and	  pressuring	   them	  to	  address	   that	   issue.	   	  Thus	  a	  party	  can	  pass	   the	  
threshold	  of	  relevance	  with	  regard	  to	  blackmail	  potential	  with	  little	  electoral	  success.	  	  
Sartori’s	  second	  definition	  of	  relevance	  refers	  to	  coalition	  (or,	  as	  Deschouwer	  refers	  to	  
it,	  governing)	  potential.19	  	  	  




                                                
17	  Deschouwer,	  K.	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  time,	  London,	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This	   threshold	   relates	   to	   the	   party’s	   growth	   from	   having	   representation	   to	   having	  
enough	  representatives	   to	  make	  governing	  a	  possibility.	   	   Finally,	  Deschouwer	  adds	  a	  
further	  threshold	  to	  Pedersen’s	   typology,	   the	  threshold	  of	  governance	  which,	  as	  one	  
would	   expect,	   describes	   the	   phase	   of	   a	   party’s	   development	   tracing	   its	   movement	  
from	  opposition	  into	  government	  for	  the	  first	  time	  (figure	  1.1).21	   
	  
Parties:	  The	  Motivations	  Model	  
As	  autonomist	  parties,	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  have,	  as	  their	  primary	  characteristic,	  a	  
concern	  with	  constitutional	  change	  –	   the	  reorganisation	  of	   the	  political	   structures	  of	  
the	  state	  to	  align	  them	  with	  their	  nation.	  	  This	  is	  their	  “core	  business”.22	  	  Autonomist	  
parties	   base	   these	   goals	   on	   ethnic	   differentiation	   and	   territorial	   claims	   within	   the	  
states	   in	   which	   they	   operate,	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   geographically	   concentrated	  
peripheral	   minorities	   whose	   historic,	   cultural	   or	   linguistic	   identity	   they	   aim	   to	  
protect.23	  	  These	  claims	  can	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  protection	  through	  affirmative	  action	  
policies,	  autonomy	  solely	  for	  their	  region,	  a	  federalist	  solution	  to	  regional	  differences	  
within	   the	   state,	   secession	   as	   an	   independent	   state	   or	   secession	   and	   annexation	   to	  
another	  state.24	   	  The	  desire	  for	  congruence	  of	  nation	  and	  state	  is	  the	  principle	  which	  
defines	   nationalist	   parties	   –	   however,	   for	  Müller	   and	   Strøm,	   the	  motivation	   behind	  
their	   actions	   is	   more	   complicated	   than	   simply	   seeking	   to	   implement	   their	   chosen	  
                                                
21	  Deschouwer,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.3-­‐6.	  
22	  De	  Winter,	  L.	  ‘Towards	  a	  Comparative	  Analysis’	  in	  De	  Winter,	  L.	  and	  Türsan,	  H.	  (eds)	  Regionalist	  
Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  London,	  Routledge,	  1998,	  p.205-­‐7.	  
23	  Türsan,	  H.	  ‘Ethnoregionalist	  parties	  as	  ethnic	  entrepreneurs’	  in	  De	  Winter,	  L.	  and	  Türsan,	  H.	  (eds)	  
Regionalist	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  London,	  Routledge,	  1998,	  p.5-­‐6;	  Müller-­‐Rommel,	  F.	  
‘Ethnoregionalist	  parties	  in	  Western	  Europe:	  theoretical	  considerations	  and	  framework	  of	  analysis	  in	  De	  
Winter,	  L.	  and	  Türsan,	  H.	  (eds)	  Regionalist	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  London,	  Routledge,	  1998,	  p.19.	  
24	  De	  Winter,	  L.	  op	  cit.	  p.205-­‐7.	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policy	  goal	  –	  and	  these	  considerations	  are	  examined	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  the	  following	  
chapter.	  
	  
The	  decision	  to	  cross	  the	  threshold	  from	  opposition	  into	  government	  is	  one	  which	  will	  
not	  be	  taken	  lightly	  by	  any	  party,	  not	  least	  because	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  important	  
factors	  which	  may	  influence	  their	  decision.	  	  The	  institution	  itself,	  the	  desire	  to	  take	  on	  
the	  responsibility	  of	  governing,	  the	  ability	  to	  govern	  effectively	  –	  either	  as	  a	  majority	  
or	  minority	  administration,	  or	  as	  part	  of	  a	  governing	  coalition	  –	  and	  the	  risks	  (electoral	  
defeat)	   and	   rewards	   (policy	   success)	   of	   accepting	   the	   responsibility	   make	   such	   a	  
decision	  a	  hard	  one.25	  	  This	  decision,	  in	  many	  cases,	  will	  be	  based	  upon	  what	  particular	  
motivations	  a	  particular	  party	  has	  and	  what	  constitutes	  realisation	  of	  their	  goals.	  	  For	  
Müller	   and	   Strøm	   these	   goals	   can	   be	   understood	  with	   reference	   to	   three	   concepts:	  
policy,	  office	  and	  votes	  (figure	  1.2).26	  	   
 
Figure	  1.2:	  Party	  Motivations	  Model27	  
	  
                                                
25	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  Policy,	  Office	  or	  Votes?	  How	  Political	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  make	  hard	  
decisions,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.1.	  








Office-­‐seeking	   parties	   seek	   to	   maximise	   their	   control	   over	   the	   benefits	   of	   political	  
office	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  they	  want	  to	  control	  the	  executive	  and	  are	  motivated	  by	  this	  
goal	  above	  all	  else.	   	  This	   is	   influenced	  by	  Riker’s	  work	  relating	  coalition-­‐building	  with	  
game	  theory,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  on	  government	  below.28	  	  An	  office-­‐
seeking	  party’s	  decision-­‐making	  process	  is	  thus	  influenced	  by	  their	  desire	  to	  win	  office,	  
which	  makes	  the	  decision	  to	  enter	  office	  for	  these	  types	  of	  parties	  slightly	  easier.	  	  	  
	  
Rather	  than	  simply	  seeking	  office	  for	  its	  benefits,	  policy-­‐seeking	  parties	  will	  attempt	  to	  
maximise	  their	   influence	  on	  public	  policy.	   	  To	  this	  end,	  office	  is	  an	  instrumental	  goal,	  
since	  being	  part	  of	  the	  executive	  means	  more	  opportunities	  to	  pursue	  preferred	  policy	  
paths.	   	  There	   is	  thus	  recognition	  of	  the	  value	  of	  government	  office	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  
end	   –	   namely	   their	   preferred	   policy	   –	   but	   also	   recognition	   that	   the	   “parliamentary	  
game	  is	  about	  determination	  of	  major	  government	  policy”29	  and	  as	  such,	   if	  the	  party	  
can	   influence	   government	   policy	   from	   opposition	   then	   the	   decision	   to	   move	   from	  
opposition	  to	  government	  will	  be	  more	  difficult,	  but	  will	  be	  based	  on	  whether	  taking	  
on	   the	   responsibilities	  of	  office	  will	  have	  a	  positive	   impact	  on	   their	   ability	   to	  deliver	  
policy.	  	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  trade-­‐off	  inherent	  in	  any	  decision	  made	  here.	  	  When	  entering	  
government,	  the	  chances	  of	  losing	  seats	  at	  the	  subsequent	  election	  increases.30	  	  What	  
this	  means	  is	  that,	  if	  a	  party	  cannot	  deliver	  its	  objectives	  in	  its	  first	  term	  in	  office	  then	  
it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  get	  another	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so	  after	  the	  next	  election.	  	  There	  is	  thus	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  Riker,	  W.	  The	  Theory	  of	  Political	  Coalitions,	  New	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  CT,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1962.	  
29	  De	  Swaan,	  A.	  Coalition	  theories	  and	  cabinet	  formation,	  Amsterdam,	  Elsevier,	  1973,	  cited	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  W.	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and	  Strøm,	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  op	  cit.	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  Rose,	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  Mackie,	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  in	  government:	  asset	  or	  liability?’	  in	  Daalder,	  H.	  and	  Mair,	  P.	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a	   considerable	   downside	   to	   entering	   office,	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   electoral	   defeat	  
weighs	  heavily	  upon	  the	  decision	  to	  enter	  office	  for	  policy-­‐seeking	  parties.	  
	  
Vote-­‐seeking	  parties	  aim,	  at	  the	  outset	  at	  least,	  to	  maximise	  their	  electoral	  support	  in	  
order	  to	  control	  government,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  focus	  which	  determines	  their	  behaviour	  in	  
deciding	  whether	  to	  enter	  office,	  carefully	  weighing	  the	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  risks	  and	  
rewards	  of	  occupying	  office.	  	  The	  distinction	  here,	  between	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  goals	  
is	   also	  an	   important	  one,	   since	   some	  political	  decisions	  are	   clearly	   taken	  with	   short-­‐
term	   rewards	   in	   mind	   while	   others	   are	   based	   upon	   a	   longer-­‐term	   strategy	   (a	  
distinction	  which	  is	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  thesis).	  	  	  
	  
The	  priority	  given	   to	  each	  of	   these	  motivations	  will	   shape	  how	  parties	  approach	   the	  
decision	   to	   cross	   the	   threshold	   into	   government.	   	   The	   policy-­‐office-­‐votes	   triangle	   is	  
particularly	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis	  in	  that	  it	  can	  be	  directly	  applied	  to	  the	  motivations	  
of	   nationalist	   parties.	   	   The	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   both	   have	   “core	   business”	   which	  
relates	   to	   a	   policy	   concern	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   re-­‐organisation	   of	   the	   state	   to	   become	  
independent,	   sovereign	   states.	   	   Their	   focus	   is	   thus	   predominantly	   on	   policy	  
considerations,	  and	  their	  actions	  can	  be	  considered	  in	  light	  of	  these	  motivations.	  	  For	  
both,	   however,	   electoral	   success	   (votes)	   and	   entrance	   into	   government	   (office)	   are	  
important	   secondary	   considerations,	   most	   especially	   since	   both	   necessitate	  
engagement	  with	   the	  public	  which	  will	   provide	  a	  platform	   to	  build	   support	   for	   their	  
constitutional	   goals.	   	   This	   is	   a	   key	   consideration	   when	   examining	   the	   government	  
strategies	   of	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   in	   promoting	   their	   respective	   constitutional	  
consultations.	   	   Both	   required	   the	   votes	   of	   the	   electorate	   to	   put	   themselves	   in	   a	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position	  where	   they	   could	  directly	   influence	  policy,	  with	   that	  policy	  depending	  once	  
more	   on	   public	   engagement	   for	   its	   success.	   	   Clearly	   then,	   the	  motivations	   of	   these	  
political	  parties	  are	  a	  complex	  combination	  of	  the	  Müller	  and	  Strøm	  models.	  
	  
Government:	  Formation	  
Considerations	   as	   to	   whether	   to	   enter	   into	   government	   may	   be	   informed	   by	   the	  
motivations	  of	  a	  particular	  party	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Müller	  and	  Strøm	  model	  outlined	  
above.	   	   However,	   the	   type	   of	   government	   which	   can	   be	   formed	   can	   also	   have	   a	  
substantial	   influence	   on	   whether	   a	   party	   chooses	   to	   involve	   itself	   in	   the	   executive.	  	  
This	   is	   particularly	   true	  when	   there	   are	  multiple	   levels	   of	   governance	   in	   the	   system	  
which,	  according	  to	  Ştefuriuc,	  makes	  “coalition	  formation	  one	  of	  the	  main	  challenges	  
that	   political	   parties	   face	   in	   decentralised	   systems”	   as	   parties	   must	   consider	   the	  
impact	  of	  their	  agreement	  not	  only	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  level	  of	  the	  agreement,	  
but	  also	  at	  higher	  and	  lower	  levels	  of	  government.31	  	  Parties	  who	  enter	  government	  at	  
one	   level	   whilst	   remaining	   in	   opposition	   at	   others	   face	   the	   difficulty	   of	   pursuing	  
policies	   in	   government	  which	  may	   be	   in	   conflict	  with	   their	   position	   in	   opposition	   at	  
another.	  	  	  
	  
But	   the	   risks	   and	   rewards	   of	   governance	   are	   not	   confined	   to	   potential	   conflicts	   of	  
interest	  between	  levels.	   	  The	  potential	  rewards	  of	  implementing	  key	  party	  policies	  at	  
the	   level	   the	   party	   takes	   the	   opportunity	   to	   govern	   are	   tempered	  with	   the	   risks	   of	  
being	  blamed	  by	  the	  electorate	  and	  defeated	  at	  the	  next	  election.32	  	  For	  any	  party,	  this	  
                                                
31	  Ştefuriuc,	  I.	  ‘Government	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  quest	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  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  1,	  2009,	  p.93.	  
32	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  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.4.	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is	  a	   significant	  negative	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  governing	  –	  effectively,	   they	  may	  only	  get	  
one	  shot	  at	  implementing	  their	  key	  policies,	  and	  if	  they	  cannot	  do	  so	  in	  their	  first	  term	  
in	  office,	  they	  may	  lose	  the	  opportunity	  to	  try	  again	  if	  they	  are	  defeated	  at	  the	  polls.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  opportunity	  to	  govern	  does	  not	  arrive	  after	  every	  election,	  and	  
with	   that	  office	   success	   comes	   the	  opportunity	   to	   implement	   the	  policies	  which	   the	  
party	  sees	  as	  key	  to	  its	  existence.	  	  	  
	  
For	  the	  parties	  in	  this	  study	  –	  nationalist	  parties	  whose	  raison	  d’etre	  is	  to	  implement	  a	  
constitutional	   policy	   resulting	   in	   a	   substantial	   change	   to	   the	   status	  quo	  –	   this	   risk	   is	  
even	  more	  pronounced,	   for	  unlike	  other	  parties	  whose	  reason	  for	  existence	   is	  based	  
upon	   a	   fundamental	   political	   ideology,	   they	   exist	   purely	   to	   achieve	   their	   stated	  
constitutional	   goals.	   	   The	  difficulties	   in	  putting	   constitutional	   change	  on	   the	  political	  
agenda,	   far	   less	   implementing	   it,	  are	  extensive	  –	   thus,	  even	   if	  nationalist	  parties	  are	  
electorally	  successful	  and	  enter	  into	  government	  office,	  their	  opportunities	  to	  change	  
the	   constitution	   are	   limited,	   and	   the	   potential	   of	   success	   small.	   	   This	   raises	   a	  more	  
fundamental	   question:	   why	   do	   nationalist	   parties	   seek	   office	   in	   the	   first	   place,	  
especially	  if	  that	  office	  success	  is	  no	  guarantee	  of	  policy	  success?	  	  	  
	  
With	   reference	   to	   the	   Müller	   and	   Strøm	   model	   set	   out	   above,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	  
answer	  to	  this	  lies	  in	  viewing	  the	  nationalist	  parties	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis	  as	  policy-­‐
seeking	  parties.	  	  Office-­‐seeking,	  in	  this	  context,	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  extrinsic	  goal,	  a	  
means	   (opportunity)	   to	  an	  end	   (progress	   towards	  a	  goal)	   rather	   than	  a	  goal	   in	   itself.	  	  
The	   value	   of	   office	   for	   nationalist	   parties	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   platform	   from	   which	   to	  
popularise	  their	  constitutional	  goals	  –	  an	  opportunity	  to	  set	  the	  political	  agenda	  and	  to	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move	   forward	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   on	   their	   terms.	   	   It	   is	   the	  methods	   used	   in	  
office	  to	  promote	  these	  goals	  which	  provide	  the	  case	  studies	  for	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
Government:	  Coalition	  Theory	  
Thus,	  deciding	  to	  enter	  government	  is	  a	  difficult	  decision	  for	  parties	  to	  take	  for	  reasons	  
relating	   to	   the	   risks	  and	  rewards	  of	   such	  a	  position.33	   	  Equally,	  however,	   the	   type	  of	  
government	   –	   and	   the	   potential	   partners	   in	   office	   which	   a	   party	   may	   have	   to	   co-­‐
operate	  with	  –	  may	  also	  cause	  pause	  for	  parties	  to	  consider	  their	  position.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  
Bogdanor	   points	   out,	   in	   systems	   where	   coalition	   is	   the	   likeliest	   outcome,	   “the	  
strategies	  of	  political	  parties	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  knowledge	  that	  they	  will	  
be	  unlikely	  to	  win	  power	  on	  their	  own”.34	  	  	  
	  
Traditional	   coalition	   theory	   (especially	   Riker’s	   work)	   is	   primarily	   policy	   blind,35	  
preferring	   to	   focus	   fully	   on	   the	   numbers	   required	   to	   maintain	   the	   support	   of	   the	  
legislature:	   a	   minimum-­‐winning	   coalition,	   delivering	   the	   smallest	   number	   of	   parties	  
and	  sharing	   the	  spoils	  of	  office	  with	  only	  enough	  parties	   to	  pass	   legislation.36	   	  Some	  
theorists	   have	   taken	   this	   concept	   further	   with	   discussion	   of	   “minimal	   connected	  
winning	   coalitions”,	   taking	   into	   account	   both	   the	   size	   of	   potential	   coalition	   partners	  
(enough	   to	   maintain	   a	   majority	   in	   the	   legislature)	   and	   the	   distance	   between	   the	  
parties	  in	  ideological	  terms.37	  	  Budge	  and	  Keman	  recognise	  the	  ‘zero	  sum’	  (one	  winner,	  
                                                
33	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.1.	  
34	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  (ed)	  Coalition	  Government	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  London,	  Heinemann	  Educational,	  1983,	  
p.1.	  
35	  Riker,	  W.	  op	  cit.	  
36	  Leiserson,	  M.	  ‘Factions	  and	  coalitions	  in	  one-­‐party	  Japan:	  An	  interpretation	  based	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  
games’	  in	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  Issue	  62,	  1968.	  
37	  Notably	  Axelrod,	  R.	  Conflict	  of	  interest,	  Chicago,	  Markham,	  1970,	  and	  De	  Swaan,	  A.	  op	  cit.	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one	   loser)	   and	   ‘constant	   sum’	   (limited,	  non-­‐expandable	   rewards)	  of	  Riker’s	  minimal-­‐
winning	   coalition	   theory	   and	   propose	   including	   policy	   considerations	   based	   on	   De	  
Swaan’s	  model.38	  	  This	  results	  in	  a	  model	  which	  remains	  ‘zero-­‐sum’	  but	  is	  also	  ‘variable	  
sum’,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  the	  policy	  gains	  can	  be	  enjoyed	  by	  all,	  with	  less	  restrictions	  on	  the	  
benefits	   of	   coalition	   –	   policy	   outcomes	   can	   be	   benefits	   as	   much	   as	   participating	   in	  
office	  can	  be.39	  	  	  
	  
More	   recently,	  De	  Winter	   and	  Dumont	   recognised	   that	   there	   are	   a	   large	  number	  of	  
factors	   which	   affect	   the	   consideration	   of	   coalition	   partners,	   including	   any	   previous	  
experience	  they	  have	  of	  working	  together,	  electoral	  performances	  of	  each	  (including	  
losses	  incurred	  after	  previous	  election)	  and	  any	  previous	  bitter	  competition	  within	  the	  
legislature.40	   	   Browne	   and	   Dreijmanis	   move	   the	   consideration	   further,	   arguing	   that	  
there	  are	  three	  situations	  in	  which	  parties	  are	  prevented	  from	  joining	  a	  coalition:	  the	  
institutional	   structure	   excluding	   parties	   (Switzerland	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   this);	  
exclusion	  by	  other	  potential	  governing	  parties	   (as,	   for	  example,	  an	  extremist	  or	  anti-­‐
state	   party);	   and	   self-­‐exclusion	   (for	   reasons	   of	   doctrinal	   purity	   or	   tactical	  
considerations).41	   	   For	  Müller,	   Bergman	   and	   Strøm,	   government	   formation	   is	   one	  of	  
the	  phases	  in	  the	  life	  cycle	  of	  coalition	  politics	  (see	  figure	  1.3).	  	  	  
	  
                                                
38	  Budge,	  I.	  and	  Keman,	  H.	  Parties	  and	  Democracy:	  Coalition	  Formation	  and	  Government	  Functioning	  in	  
20	  states,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  	  
39	  ibid.	  p.12.	  
40	  De	  Winter,	  L.	  and	  Dumont,	  P.	  ‘Uncertainty	  and	  Complexity	  in	  Cabinet	  Formation’	  in	  Strøm,	  K.	  et.	  al.	  
(eds)	  Cabinets	  and	  Coalition	  Bargaining:	  The	  Democratic	  Life	  Cycle	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2008,	  p.125-­‐6.	  
41	  Browne,	  E.	  C.	  and	  Dreijmanis,	  J.	  (eds).	  Government	  Coalitions	  in	  Western	  Democracy,	  London,	  
Longman,	  1982,	  p.346-­‐7.	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Coalition	  discussions	  –	  once	  a	  potential	  partner	  has	  been	  identified	  –	  are	  also	  difficult	  
to	  conclude,	  conducted	  as	  they	  are	  with	  one	  eye	  on	  the	  previous	  electoral	  results	  and	  
one	   on	   future	   elections.	   	   Again,	   this	   is	   especially	   true	   in	   multi-­‐level	   settings	   where	  
performance	   in	   several	   elections	   (local,	   regional,	   state-­‐wide	   and	   European)	   could	  
potentially	  be	  affected	  by	  coalition	  government	  at	  any	  one	  of	  those	  levels.	  	  Decisions	  
have	   to	   be	   taken	   on	   portfolio	   allocation,	   government	   reorganisation,	   how	   decisions	  
are	  to	  be	  reached	  on	  a	  cross-­‐party	  basis,	  the	  policy	  programme	  of	  the	  new	  executive,	  
prospects	  for	  electoral	  co-­‐operation	  at	  subsequent	  elections	  and	  whether	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   agreement	   results	   in	   a	   new	   election.43	   	   With	   so	   many	   issues	   to	   resolve,	   some	  
negotiations	   take	  weeks	   to	   conclude	  while	  others	   fall	   at	   the	   first	  hurdle,	   leaving	   the	  
larger	   party	   to	   consider	   other	   potential	   partners	   or	   the	   option	   of	   minority	  
government.	   	   At	   regional	   level,	   discussions	   are	   further	   clouded	   by	   the	   autonomist-­‐
centralist	   axis,	  which	   provides	   a	   second	   cleavage	   for	   parties	   to	   compete	   along.	   	   For	  
                                                
42	  Müller,	  W.C.	  et.	  al.	  ‘Coalition	  Theory	  and	  Cabinet	  Governance:	  An	  Introduction’	  in	  Strøm,	  K.	  et.	  al.	  op	  
cit.	  2008.	  









nationalist	   parties,	   the	   opportunity	   to	   govern	   does	   not	   come	   along	   often	   –	   in	  
particular	   at	   state	   level,	  when	   the	   party	   tend	   to	   compete	   in	   only	   one	   region	   of	   the	  
state,	  thereby	  making	  governance	  at	  that	  level	  improbable.	  	  Thus,	  when	  the	  parties	  do	  
achieve	   power	   within	   their	   regional	   legislatures,	   their	   performance	   in	   office	   –	   and	  
specifically,	  how	  they	  promote	  their	  constitutional	  goals	  –	  is	  worthy	  of	  study.	  
	  
Government:	  Coalition	  versus	  minority	  government	  
The	   electoral	   system	   in	   use	   in	   both	   cases	   examined	   in	   this	   thesis	   –	   namely,	   the	  
Additional	  Member	   System	   (AMS)	   form	   of	   proportional	   representation	   –	  makes	   the	  
possibility	   of	   single-­‐party	   government	   possible	   in	   Wales	   (give	   the	   2:1	   ratio	   of	  
constituency	  to	  regional	  seats	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales)	  and	  improbable	  in	  
Scotland	   (though	   not	   impossible,	   as	   the	   SNP’s	  majority	   post-­‐2011	   proved).	   	   This,	   as	  
discussed	   above,	   has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   strategies	   of	   parties	   competing	   in	   these	  
systems.44	   	   If	   no	  majority	   exists	   after	   an	   election,	   one	   of	   three	   outcomes	   occurs:	   a	  
coalition	   agreement	   between	   two	   or	   more	   parties	   in	   order	   to	   form	   a	   stable	  
government;	  a	  minority	  administration	  which	  is	  less	  stable	  as	  it	  cannot	  guarantee	  the	  
support	  of	  parliament	  not	   to	   vote	   it	   out	  of	  office;	   or	   a	   further	  election	   to	   allow	   the	  
electorate	   another	   opportunity	   to	   increase	   its	   support	   for	   one	   of	   the	   potential	  
governing	  parties.	  	  The	  third	  option,	  given	  the	  28-­‐day	  deadline	  to	  elect	  a	  First	  Minister	  
outlined	   in	   the	   Scotland	   Act	   1998,	   is	   a	   possibility	   though	   tactical	   political	  
considerations	  make	  it	  an	  unlikely	  scenario	  (in	  Scotland	  at	  least	  –	  the	  electoral	  rules	  in	  
Wales	  were	  less	  clear	  on	  this	  issue	  prior	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006).	  	  Thus,	  
potential	   governing	   parties	   must	   decide	   between	   going	   it	   alone	   as	   a	   minority	  
                                                
44	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1983,	  op	  cit.	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administration,	   or	   seeking	   assistance	   from	   another	   party	   –	  who	  may	   have	   distinctly	  
different	  priorities	  from	  them	  –	  in	  order	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  government	  which	  has	  the	  
backing	   of	   a	  majority	  within	   the	   legislature.	   	   And,	   to	   provide	   an	   incentive	   to	   speed	  
along	  the	  resolution,	  the	  parties	  only	  have	  28	  days	  to	  decide	  what	  they	  will	  do	  or	  face	  
a	  further	  election.45	  
	  
Depending	  on	  the	  relative	  sizes	  of	  parties	  represented	  within	  an	  institution,	  coalition	  
may	  be	  the	  first	  consideration	  the	  potential	  governing	  party	  may	  make.	  	  The	  primary	  
advantage	  of	  such	  an	  agreement	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  some	  stability	  for	  the	  government	  
to	   function	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   parliament.	   	   In	  most	   (though	  not	   all)	   cases,	   coalition	  provides	   a	  
parliamentary	  majority	   for	   the	   government	   allowing	   implementation	   of	   government	  
policy	  without	   fear	   that	   it	   will	   be	   defeated	   by	   opposition	   parties	   in	   the	   parliament.	  	  
However,	   coalition	   also	   involves	   compromise	  with	   another	   party	   in	   order	   to	   secure	  
that	  parliamentary	  stability.	  	  This	  compromise	  usually	  involves	  a	  combination	  of	  policy	  
concessions	   and	   the	   distribution	   of	   government	   office,	   usually	   in	   proportion	   to	   the	  
number	  of	  seats	  each	  party	  is	  contributing	  to	  the	  government.46	  	  Thus,	  a	  party	  has	  to	  
prioritise	  the	  policies	  in	  its	  manifesto	  to	  decide	  which	  are	  core	  to	  the	  party	  and	  must	  
be	  delivered	  in	  government	  and	  which	  are	  less	  so,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  negotiated	  away	  in	  
coalition	  discussions.	  	  As	  considered	  above,	  the	  decision	  to	  find	  a	  coalition	  partner	  can	  
be	   complicated	   by	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   including	   the	   desire	   to	   carry	   a	   majority	   in	  
parliament,	   the	   ideological	  distance	  between	   the	  parties	  and	  previous	  experience	  of	  
                                                
45	  HM	  Government,	  1998(a),	  op	  cit.	  
46	  Gamson,	  W.	  A.	  ‘A	  Theory	  of	  Coalition	  Formation’	  in	  American	  Sociological	  Review,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	  3,	  June,	  
1961,	  cited	  Warwick,	  P.	  V.	  and	  Drunkman,	  J.	  N.	  ‘The	  Portfolio	  Allocation	  Paradox:	  An	  investigation	  into	  
the	  nature	  of	  a	  very	  strong	  but	  puzzling	  relationship’	  in	  European	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Research,	  Vol.	  45,	  
Issue	  4,	  June,	  2006.	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coalitions.	   	   Additional	   considerations	   are	   the	   relative	   popularity	   of	   the	   party	  
considered	   for	   coalition	   (how	  much	  will	   inviting	   their	   input	   into	  government	  help	  or	  
hinder	  the	  party),	  individual	  personalities	  within	  the	  parties	  themselves	  (the	  potential	  
for	  conflict	  between	  individuals	  could	  be	  a	  major	  hurdle	  in	  coalition	  negotiations)	  and	  
the	  reaction	  of	  party	  activists	  and	  supporters	  to	  any	  potential	  agreement	  with	  a	  rival	  
party.	   	   If	   each	   of	   these	   considerations	   can	   be	   resolved	   positively,	   the	   likelihood	   of	  
coalition	  government	  is	  higher.	  	  However,	  if	  a	  party	  considers	  that	  it	  cannot	  overcome	  
any	  or	  all	  of	   these	  difficulties	   in	  order	  to	  work	  with	  a	  coalition	  partner	  then	  perhaps	  
minority	   government	   is	   its	   preferable	   route.	   	   Labour	   and	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	  had	  
found	  enough	  common	  ground	  to	  form	  coalitions	  for	  the	  both	  of	  the	  first	  two	  terms	  of	  
the	   Scottish	   Parliament,	   while	   also	   –	   after	   Labour	   had	   attempted	   to	   run	   a	  minority	  
administration	  –	  for	  much	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales.	  
	  
While	  minority	   government	   sounds	   “counterintuitive”	   in	   the	  world	   of	   parliamentary	  
democracy,	  this	  form	  of	  governance	  is	  quite	  popular	  and	  numbers	  about	  one-­‐third	  of	  
all	  post-­‐war	  governments.47	   	  The	  advantage	  of	  minority	  government	   is	   that	   it	  allows	  
the	  party	  in	  government	  to	  retain	  their	  doctrinal	  purity	  (that	  is,	  remain	  “untainted”	  by	  
collusion	   with	   another	   party)	   and	   control	   over	   ministerial	   offices.	   	   However,	   these	  
advantages	   are	   tempered	  by	   the	  need	   to	   build	   legislative	  majorities	   on	   an	   issue-­‐by-­‐
issue	   basis	   –	   which,	   although	   allowing	   the	   government	   the	   maximum	   amount	   of	  
flexibility	  (in	  deciding	  which	  parties	  to	  offer	  compromises	  to)	  it	  also	  leaves	  them	  much	  
                                                
47	  Strøm,	  K.	  Minority	  Government	  and	  Majority	  Rule,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1990,	  p.8;	  
Bergman,	  T.	  ‘Formation	  Rules	  and	  Minority	  Government’	  in	  European	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Research,	  Vol.	  
23,	  Issue	  1,	  January,	  1993,	  p.55.	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more	  susceptible	  to	  defeat	  on	  any	  number	  of	   issues.48	   	  Here,	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘ad-­‐hoc	  
coalitions’	  or	  ‘shifting	  majorities’	  is	  important.	  	  A	  governing	  party	  is	  thus	  reliant	  on	  its	  
ability	  to	  negotiate	  compromises	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  potentially	  diluting	   its	  own	  
policy	  preferences	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  office	  but	  also	  gain	  a	  measure	  of	  policy	  success.	  	  	  
	  
This	  theory	  of	  minority	  government	  is	  also	  dependent	  upon	  parties	  represented	  in	  the	  
legislature	   being	   motivated	   predominantly	   by	   policy	   considerations	   –	   and	   by	   their	  
ability	   to	   influence	   policy	   without	   achieving	   the	   ministerial	   office	   success	   which	  
normally	   precedes	   this	   ability.	   	   This	   attitude	   is	   much	   more	   common	   in	   European	  
systems	   which	   utilise	   proportional	   representation	   than	   in	   the	   more	   conflict-­‐driven	  
Westminster	  models.	   	  Opposition	   in	   the	   latter	   case	   tends	   to	  be	  much	  more	   focused	  
upon	  critiquing	  the	  government	  of	  the	  day	  and	  emphasising	  the	  potential	  alternative	  it	  
provides	   rather	   than	   seeking	   to	   influence	   government	   policy	   by	   compromise	   and	  
negotiation.49	  	  A	  final,	  important,	  distinction	  is	  made	  by	  Bergman,	  who	  identifies	  two	  
types	  of	  scenario	  which	  allow	  minority	  governments	  to	  survive.	  	  	  The	  first	  of	  those	  is	  a	  
positive	  form	  of	  acceptance	  (where	  50%	  plus	  one	  of	  the	  representatives	  must	  actively	  
support	   the	   government	   –	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   vote	   to	   accept	   its	   entering	   office).	   	   The	  
second	   is	   a	   negative	   form	   (where	   opposition	   parties	   tolerate	   but	   do	   not	   actively	  
support	   the	   party	   in	   power)	   in	   which	   it	   is	   only	   through	   an	   active	   vote	   against	   the	  
government	  –	  a	  vote	  of	  confidence	  or	  a	  rejection	  of	  its	  budget	  –	  that	  the	  government	  
is	  threatened.50	  	  The	  distinction	  is	  important	  as,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  the	  government	  
actually	   derives	   its	   legitimacy	   from	   opposition	   support	   –	   and	   it	   must	   maintain	   that	  
                                                
48	  Strøm,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.97	  
49	  ibid.	  p.40-­‐2.	  
50	  Bergman,	  T.	  op	  cit.	  p.55-­‐7.	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support	  to	  continue	  to	  function	  –	  while	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  opposition	  to	  
show	   (in	   a	   vote	   of	   confidence)	   that	   the	   government	   is	   no	   longer	   tolerated	   by	   the	  
legislature.	  
	  
The	  development	  of	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  as	  political	  parties	  through	  the	  Pedersen	  
lifespan	  model	   from	   ‘anti-­‐political	   establishment	   parties’51	   to	   taking	   the	   decision	   to	  
enter	   government	   office	   is	   a	   crucial	   step	   in	   the	   life	   of	   these	   parties	   and	   has	   wide	  
implications	   for	   the	   constitutional	   future	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   	   As	   policy-­‐seeking	  
parties,	   the	  opportunity	   to	  progress	   their	   constitutional	   goals	  meant	   that	   office	  was	  
only	   ever	   seen	   as	   a	   secondary	   objective,	   a	   means	   to	   an	   end.	   	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
decision	   to	   enter	   office	   –	   to	   accept	   the	   challenges	   of	   governing	   alongside	   the	  
opportunities	  presented	  –	  was	  a	  watershed	  moment	  for	  both.	  	  That	  the	  SNP	  chose	  to	  
enter	   minority	   government	   after	   preliminary	   coalition	   talks	   suggested	   that	   an	  
agreement	   with	   other	   parties	   would	   not	   be	   forthcoming	   meant	   that	   their	   first	  
experience	  of	  government	  would	  be	  alone.	  	  This	  was	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  agreement	  in	  
Wales	  which	  saw	  Plaid	  Cymru	  enter	  government	  as	  a	  junior	  coalition	  partner,	  but	  with	  
a	   strong	   enough	   hand	   that	   their	   position	   on	   the	   Government	   of	   Wales	   Act	   was	  
accepted	   as	   part	   of	   the	   deal.	   	   Their	   entry	   into	   government	   –	   and	   the	   form	   that	  
government	  has	   taken	  –	  has	   shaped	  how	  each	   could	   approach	   their	   immediate	   and	  
long-­‐term	   constitutional	   goals.	   	   Both	   embarked	   upon	   a	   programme	   of	   public	  
engagement	   aimed	   at	   building	   support	   for	   their	   objectives.	   	   The	   following	   section	  
                                                
51	  Some	  argue	  that	  these	  parties	  have	  retained	  their	  identities	  as	  ‘anti-­‐establishment	  parties’	  even	  after	  
entering	  office.	  	  See	  Abedi,	  A.	  and	  Lundberg,	  T.	  C.	  ‘The	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  as	  Anti-­‐Political	  Establishment	  
Parties’,	  Paper	  presented	  to	  the	  Political	  Studies	  Association	  Specialist	  Group:	  Territorial	  Politics	  Biennial	  
Conference,	  Brussels,	  13-­‐14	  September,	  2012.	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locates	   these	   attempts	   in	   the	   context	   of	   contemporary	   debates	   about	   direct	   and	  
deliberative	  democracy,	  and	  considers	  the	  perceived	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  methods.	  
	  
Action:	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  
Deliberative	  democracy	  has	   its	   origins	   in	   the	  direct	   democracy	  of	   ancient	   city-­‐states	  
like	   Athens,	  where,	   rather	   than	   electing	   or	   appointing	   representatives	   to	   determine	  
laws,	   eligible	   citizens	   attended	   in	   vast	   numbers,	   discussed	   and	   voted	   upon	   the	   laws	  
and	   economic	   policies	   of	   the	   city-­‐state	   themselves.52	   	   Modern	   forms	   of	   direct	  
democracy	   include	   citizen	   initiatives	   (utilised	   in	   many	   US	   states	   and	   Switzerland	   in	  
particular)	   and	   referendums,	   which	   are	   finding	   an	   ever-­‐increasing	   use	   around	   the	  
world.53	   	   Deliberative	   democracy,	   however,	   takes	   further	   the	   idea	   of	   citizen	  
participation	   in	   the	   democratic	   process	   by	   placing	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   deliberative	  
aspect	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  arguing	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  law	  derives	  more	  from	  the	  
deliberations	  themselves	  than	  any	  vote	  upon	  them,	  since	  the	  debate	  itself	  will	  prove	  
self-­‐improving	  and	  educating.54	  	  Indeed,	  the	  factor	  which	  unites	  deliberative	  theorists	  
most	  is	  that	  decisions	  are	  made	  better	  when	  they	  are	  “open	  and	  reflective”,	  and	  that	  
participants	  “listen	  as	  well	  as	  speak,	  and	   in	  doing	  so	  are	  amenable	   to	  changing	   their	  
positions”.55	   	   For	  proponents	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	   representative	  and	  pluralist	  
structures	   of	   democracy	   struggle	   to	   realise	   authentic	   conceptualisations	   of	  
democracy.56	  	  Habermas,57	  Pateman,58	  Barber,59	  and	  more	  recently,	  Elster,60	  Dryzek,61	  
                                                
52	  Budge,	  I.	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Direct	  Democracy,	  Cambridge,	  Polity	  Press,	  p.35.	  
53	  Setäla,	  M.	  ‘Referendums	  in	  Western	  Europe:	  A	  Wave	  of	  Direct	  Democracy?’	  in	  Scandinavian	  Political	  
Studies,	  Vol.	  22,	  Issue	  4,	  December,	  1999.	  
54	  Budge,	  I.	  op	  cit.	  p.38.	  
55	  Tierney,	  S.	  Constitutional	  Referendums:	  The	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  of	  Republican	  Deliberation,	  Oxford,	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012,	  p.6.	  
56	  Fischer,	  F.	  ‘Citizen	  Participation	  and	  the	  democratisation	  of	  policy	  expertise:	  from	  theoretical	  inquiry	  
to	  practical	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  in	  Policy	  Sciences,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	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  1993,	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and	   Fishkin62	   offer	   considerations	   on	   the	   limits	   of	   representative	   democracy	   and,	   in	  
some	  cases,	  innovative	  methods	  of	  incorporating	  elements	  of	  citizen	  participation	  into	  
contemporary	  representative	  democratic	  structures.	  	  James	  S.	  Fishkin	  in	  particular	  has	  
been	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   experimental	   democratic	   methods	   in	   the	   United	   States,	  
implementing	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘deliberative	  polls’	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  determine	  the	  impact	  
of	   information	  and	   the	  opportunity	   for	  discussion	  on	  public	  opinion.63	   	  Having	   taken	  
part	   in	   several	   of	   these	   deliberative	   experiments,	   Fishkin	   argues	   that	   deliberation	  
helps	  to	  shape	  public	  opinion	  –	  which	   leads	  to	  better	   informed	  decision-­‐making.	   	  He	  
argues	   that,	   in	   order	   that	   the	   public	   can	   be	   better	   informed	   prior	   to	   voting	   upon	  
issues,	   states	   should	   institute	   a	   national	   “deliberation	   day”	   to	   allow	   the	   public	   to	  
discuss	  the	  issues	  in	  large	  groups.64	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   methods	   of	   deliberative	   democracy	   considered	   by	  
these	   scholars	   are	   intended	   as	   complimentary	   to	   –	   and	   not	   a	   replacement	   for	   –	  
representative	   democracy.	   	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   referendums	   and	   deliberative	  
polling,	  both	  have	  been	  trialled	  successfully	  and	  incorporated	  into	  existing	  democratic	  
institutional	  structures.	   	  While	  the	  consultations	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis	  do	  not	  quite	  
fit	  Fishkin’s	  model	  of	  deliberative	  polling,	  the	  intention	  of	  consultations	  at	  base	  level	  –	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to	  inform	  the	  public	  of	  intended	  action,	  to	  provide	  information	  on	  the	  subject	  and	  to	  
ascertain	  public	  opinion	  on	  the	  issue	  itself,	  thus	  informing	  the	  outcome	  –	  is	  in-­‐keeping	  
with	  aspects	  of	  the	  direct,	  participatory	  and	  deliberative	  democracy	  theories	  outlined	  
above.	   	   It	   is	   also	   clear	   that,	   in	   the	   context	   that	   the	   SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  developed	  
their	  public	  engagement	  strategies,	  the	  respective	  consultations	  were	  consistent	  with	  
these	  intentions.	  
	  
This	  thesis	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  two	  consultations	  and	  two	  (intended)	  referendums,	  
and	   will	   place	   the	   decision	   to	   use	   these	   measures	   in	   the	   context	   of	   theories	   of	  
deliberative	  democracy.	   	   It	   is	   important	  to	  establish,	  however,	   that	  this	   is	  neither	  an	  
over-­‐arching	  framework	  of	  analysis	  for	  the	  thesis	  nor	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  
deliberative	   democracy	   as	   a	  means	   of	   improving	   democracy.	   	   The	   theories	   outlined	  
above	  are	  used	  simply	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  contextualise	  decisions	  made	  in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  
to	  pursue	  these	  methods	  as	  a	  means	  of	  furthering	  constitutional	  goals.	  
	  
Action:	  Consultations	  
In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  referendums	  have	  become	  vogue	  in	  recent	  years,	  particularly	  in	  
the	  UK,	  so	  too	  have	  consultations	  become	  the	  medium	  of	  choice	  for	  governments	  to	  
involve	   their	   citizens	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.65	   	   The	   key	   consideration	   for	  
governments	   is	   that	   involving	   their	   citizenship	   in	   such	   a	   manner	   leads	   to	   better	  
decisions	   and	   better	   government	   –	   or,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   decisions	   which	   are	   more	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widely	   accepted	   and	   recognised	   as	   legitimate.66	   	   Indeed,	   governments	   are	   not	   only	  
keen	   to	   consult,	  but	  keen	   to	  prove	   that	   the	   results	  of	   their	   consultations	  have	  been	  
utilised	   and	   influenced	   outcomes	   in	   some	  way.67	   	   And	  while	   consultation	   appears	   a	  
well-­‐intentioned	  attempt	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  representative	  democracy	  on	  the	  
one	   hand	   and	   an	   ever	   disengaged	   general	   public	   on	   the	   other,	   for	   some	   it	   is	   an	  
“uncomfortable	   half-­‐way	   house”	   between	   the	   direct	  models	   of	   democracy	   outlined	  
above	  and	  traditional,	  representative	  models.68	  
	  
The	  UK	  National	  Consumer	  Council	  (NCC)	  published	  its	  own	  consultation	  document	  on	  
the	  subject	  of	  consultations	   in	  1997,	  outlining	   its	  concerns	  with	  some	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  
which	   consultations	   were	   being	   organised,	   as	   well	   as	   providing	   examples	   of	   good	  
practice	   in	   consultations	  and	  “what	  not	   to	  do”.69	   	  Arguing	   that	   consultations	  were	  a	  
means	  of	  allowing	  the	  government	  to	  be	  “properly	  accountable	  for	  its	  policy-­‐making”	  
they	  provided	  five	  reasons	  why	  consultations	  should	  be	  undertaken:	  
	  
• To	  seek	  expert	  knowledge;	  
• To	  seek	  ideas;	  
• To	  identify	  potential	  implementation	  problems;	  
• To	  improve	  the	  initial	  proposals;	  and	  
• To	  seek	  to	  fashion	  a	  consensus.70	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It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  that	  consultations	  can	  be	  undertaken	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  and	  
that	  they	  can	  fulfil	  several	  distinct	  objectives	  for	  practitioners.	   	  The	  desire	  for	  expert	  
opinions	   and	   evidence	   can	   be	   a	   key	   aspect	   of	   the	   policy	   process,	   helping	   to	   shape,	  
provide	  different	  options	  or	   judge	  the	  success	  of	  a	  policy.71	   	  For	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  
Government	   comprising	   Labour	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	   the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	   could	  be	  
understood	   as	   a	  means	   of	   achieving	   each	   of	   the	  NCC’s	   objectives	   for	   consultations.	  	  
For	   the	   SNP,	   the	   desire	   for	   expert	   opinions	   was	   less	   important	   than	   engaging	   the	  
public	  on	   their	  own	  proposals	   in	  order	   to	  build	   support	  and	   fashion	  a	   consensus	   for	  
independence.	  
	  
However,	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  use	  of	  consultations	  in	  public	  life	  –	  on	  issues	  of	  varying	  
levels	   of	   importance	   and	   interest	   to	   the	   public	   –	   has	   led	   to	   some	   suggestions	   that	  
politicians	  should	  stop	  passing	  the	  buck,	  stop	  trying	  to	  engage	  citizens	  to	  make	  difficult	  
decisions	  for	  them	  and	  do	  what	  they	  were	  elected	  to	  do:	  lead.72	  	  This	  criticism	  is	  worth	  
considering	  in	   light	  of	  the	  perceived	  democratic	  deficit	  (falling	  turnout	   in	  elections	   in	  
the	  UK	  and	  across	  Europe)	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  evidence-­‐based	  policy-­‐making.	  	  Time	  and	  
space	   restraints	   make	   it	   difficult	   to	   consider	   the	   many	   and	   varied	   reasons	   for	   the	  
increasing	   democratic	   deficit,	   but	   that	   consultation	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   mitigate	   or	  
overcome	  this	  disconnect	  between	  politicians	  and	  the	  public	   is	  clear.	   	  Contemporary	  
politicians,	   fearing	   that	   decreasing	   turnouts	  mean	   a	   corresponding	   lack	   of	  mandate,	  
are	  keen	  to	  defer	  making	  difficult	  decisions	  and	  instead	  look	  for	  evidence	  in	  the	  form	  
of	   public	   opinion	   in	   order	   to	   give	   their	   decision	   more	   legitimacy.	   	   However,	   how	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evidence	  is	  collected	  –	  and	  from	  whom	  –	  means	  that	  it	  is	  rare	  that	  such	  evidence	  is	  not	  
influenced	  by	  previously-­‐held	  beliefs	  about	  the	  issue	  in	  question.73	  	  Indeed,	  that	  is	  one	  
of	  many	  issues	  which	  make	  consultation	  a	  “crucial,	  yet	  deeply	  problematic	  process”.74	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   problems	   faced	   by	   practitioners	   of	   consultations	   (in	   this	   case,	  
governments)	   is	   that	   they	   themselves	   often	   have	   a	   preferred	   outcome	   prior	   to	  
undertaking	  the	  consultation.	  	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn	  identify	  nine	  stages	  through	  which	  
a	  policy	  may	  pass,	  from	  deciding	  on	  which	  issue	  to	  pursue	  through	  implementation	  to	  
the	  continuation	  or	  termination	  of	  the	  policy	  itself.75	  	  At	  several	  stages	  of	  their	  analysis	  
(and	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  NCC’s	  reasons	  for	  consultation)	  a	  consultation	  could	  be	  
considered	   –	   at	   the	   beginning	   (to	   seek	   ideas),	   at	   the	   forecasting	   stage	   (to	   identify	  
implementation	   problems)	   and	   during	   the	   evaluation	   stage	   (to	   improve	   the	   initial	  
proposals)	  to	  name	  three.	  	  One	  of	  the	  issues	  here	  is	  that	  the	  process	  of	  selecting	  and	  
establishing	  a	  policy	  can	  close	  off	  the	  potential	  for	  other	  policy	  considerations.	  	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  consultation,	   this	  can	   limit	   the	  range	  of	  policy	  possibilities	  and	  outcomes;	  
essentially	   closing	   the	   consultation	   to	   views	   falling	   outwith	   the	   government’s	  
preferred	  policy	  course.76	   	   If	  this	   is	  the	  case,	   it	  raises	   legitimate	  questions	  about	  why	  
the	  government	  is	  deigning	  to	  consult	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  	  Of	  course,	  in	  some	  cases,	  
governments	  or	  local	  authorities	  are	  legally	  obliged	  to	  consult	  –	  and	  while	  this	  ensures	  
that	   a	   consultation	   will	   take	   place,	   it	   does	   not	   ensure	   that	   it	   is	   an	   effective	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consultation,	  nor	  that	  any	  of	  the	  respondents	  concerns	  will	  be	  factored	  into	  the	  policy	  
outcomes.77	  	  
	  
The	  consultations	  examined	  in	  two	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis	  –	  the	  Scottish	  Government’s	  
National	  Conversation	  and	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government’s	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  –	  
were	   constructed	   with	   their	   respective	   governments’	   policy	   preferences	   in	   mind.	  	  
However,	  neither	  were	  “closed	  shops”.	  	  The	  Scottish	  Government	  presented	  their	  view	  
–	   along	  with	   several	   other	   options	   –	   on	   the	   constitutional	   future	   of	   Scotland	  which	  
explicitly	  declared	  their	  own	  preference	  for	  independence	  but	  pressed	  how	  keen	  they	  
were	  to	  hear	  the	  public’s	  views.	   	  This	  was	  a	  unique	  type	  of	  consultation	  (based,	  as	   it	  
was,	  on	  the	  SNP’s	  raison	  d’etre	  and	  not,	  as	  is	  most	  often	  the	  case,	  on	  a	  specific	  policy	  
area)	   and	   as	   such,	   falls	   slightly	   outwith	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   general	   consultation	  
literature.	   	   The	   Welsh	   Assembly	   Government’s	   consultation	   was	   the	   result	   of	   a	  
coalition	  agreement	  between	  Labour	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  the	  latter	  naming	  the	  All	  Wales	  
Convention	   as	   the	   price	   of	   their	   participation.	   	   However,	   it	   was	   constituted	   and	  
progressed	  in	  a	  scrupulously	  neutral	  manner,	  with	  the	  executive	  committee	  favouring	  
neither	  side	  of	  the	  debate,	  either	  in	  the	  national	  events	  or	  in	  their	  final	  report.	  	  Both	  
will	  be	  considered	   in	  detail	   in	   the	   respective	  chapters	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  principles	  of	  
consultation	  outlined	  above.	  
	  
Action:	  Referendums	  
Referendums	  are	   the	   clearest	  examples	  of	  direct	  democracy	   in	  use	   in	   contemporary	  
representative	  democracies,	  and	  their	  use	  has	  become	  widespread.78	   	  For	  some,	  this	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increase	  in	  use	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  negative	  role	  of	  the	  people	  in	  
representative	  democracies	  –	   that	   is,	   the	  power	  of	   the	  people	   is	   limited	   to	  selecting	  
and	   de-­‐selecting	   their	   preferred	   representatives	   in	   elections.79	   	   For	   others,	   it	   is	   a	  
question	  of	   increasing	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   a	  particular	   course	  of	   action	  –	   if	   the	  people	  
vote	   for	   it,	   it	   appears	   to	  have	  more	   legitimacy.80	   	   For	  Qvortrup,	   referendums	  are	   “a	  
supplement	   to	   indirect	   democracy”,	   giving	   the	   public	   the	   deciding	   vote	   and	   an	  
opportunity	  to	  take	  democracy	  closer	  to	  the	  “ideal	  of	  government	  by	  discussion”	  than	  
whipped	   votes	   along	   party	   lines	   in	   contemporary	   representative	   democracies.81	  	  
However,	   Chambers	   argues	   that	   the	   polarisation	   of	   debate	   in	   referendums	   and	   the	  
inevitability	   of	  majoritarian	  outcomes	   actually	   “derails	   deliberation	   and,	   in	   so	  doing,	  
undermines	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  outcomes”.82	  	  Indeed,	  this	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  seeing	  voting	  in	  
a	   referendum	   as	   “final”	   and	   citing	   referendums	   as	   a	   “zero-­‐sum	   game”.83	   	   LeDuc’s	  
criticism	  goes	   further,	   noting	   that	   referendums	  are	  often	   susceptible	   to	   “insufficient	  
information,	  confusing	  question	  wording,	  or	  contradictory	  lines	  of	  argument	  regarding	  
the	   possible	   consequences	   of	   a	   referendum	   vote”.84	   	   Tierney	   points	   out	   that	  
referendums	  in	  the	  context	  of	  representative	  democracies	  are	  problematic,	  potentially	  
                                                                                                                                         
78	  Butler,	  D.	  and	  Ranney,	  A.	  Referendums	  around	  the	  world:	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  of	  direct	  democracy,	  
Basingstoke,	  MacMillan	  Press	  Ltd,	  1994.	  
79	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  ‘Western	  Europe’	  in	  Butler,	  D.	  and	  Ranney,	  A.	  op	  cit.	  2004,	  p.24;	  Qvortrup,	  M.	  A	  
Comparative	  Study	  of	  Referendums:	  Government	  by	  the	  People,	  Manchester,	  Manchester	  University	  
Press,	  2005,	  p.1.	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  in	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  p.37.	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  Democratic	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  in	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  and	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anti-­‐democratic,	  and	  may	  not	  be	  the	  most	  appropriate	  means	  of	  directly	  engaging	  the	  
public	  in	  political	  (and	  especially,	  constitutional)	  discussions.85	  
	  
The	   most	   famous	   proponent	   of	   referendum	   democracy	   in	   the	   UK,	   A.V	   Dicey,	  
considered	   the	   referendum	   the	  answer	   to	  what	  he	   saw	  as	   the	  problem	   that	  a	   small	  
majority	   in	   the	  House	  of	  Commons	  could	  change	  the	  constitution	  without	  the	  public	  
having	   any	   influence	   on	   the	   decision.86	   	   In	   his	   view,	   the	   referendum	   was	   a	  
“conservative	   device”	   given	   his	   proposal	   to	   use	   referendums	   to	   limit	   the	   ability	   of	  
parliament	  to	  radically	  alter	  the	  constitution	  without	  necessarily	  having	  the	  support	  of	  
the	   public.87	   	   Bogdanor	   argues	   that	   Dicey	   is	   both	   right	   and	   wrong:	   right	   that	   on	  
constitutional	   issues	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   public	   should	   count	   for	   more	   than	   that	   of	  
parliament,	   but	   wrong	   that	   the	   referendum	   could	   be	   employed	   only	   for	   a	   small	  
number	   of	   constitutional	   questions.88	   	   In	   the	   UK,	   referendums	   remain	   ad	   hoc	   and	  
consultative	  in	  nature;	  ad	  hoc	  because	  there	  is	  no	  constitutional	  requirement	  for	  some	  
issues	   to	   be	   decided	  by	   referendum	   thus	   governments	   can	  decide	  on	   a	   referendum	  
strategy	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons;	   and	   consultative	   because	   the	   principle	   of	  
parliamentary	   sovereignty	  means	   that,	  whatever	   the	   outcome	  of	   a	   referendum,	   the	  
UK	   Parliament	   retains	   the	   authority	   to	   not	   be	   bound	   by	   it,	   and	   to	   take	   action	   in	   a	  
manner	   which	   it	   deems	   appropriate.	   	   And	   because	   referendums	   in	   the	   UK	   are	   not	  
stipulated	   by	   any	   formal	   legislation	   –	   and	   the	   constitutional	   rationale	   for	   holding	  
referendums	  differs	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis,	  making	  precedent	  difficult	  to	  determine	  –	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  Tierney,	  S.	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88	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Politics	  and	  the	  Constitution:	  Essays	  on	  British	  Government,	  Aldershot,	  Dartmouth	  
Publishing	  Company	  Limited,	  1996,	  p.xv-­‐xix.	  
 
52	  
political	  expediency	  becomes	  a	  distinct	  motivating	  factor	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  hold	  one.89	  	  
This	  gives	  governments	  in	  the	  UK	  control	  over	  referendums	  in	  several	  ways.	  	  They	  can	  
decide	  upon	  which	   issues	  referendums	  will	  be	  held,	  when	  these	  referendums	  will	  be	  
held	   and	   what	   the	   question	   will	   be.	   	   In	   short,	   they	   control	   the	   agenda	   of	   the	  
referendum	   and	   its	   initiation.90	   	   Generally,	   a	   governing	   party	   would	   only	   choose	   to	  
pursue	   a	   referendum	   strategy	   when	   it	   considers	   that	   it	   will	   win.91	   	   However,	  
oftentimes	   the	   referendum	  will	  not	  be	  held	   in	   isolation	   in	   the	  electorate’s	  mind	  and	  
the	  vote	  may	  become	  a	   judgement	  on	   the	  government’s	  performance	   rather	   than	  a	  
question	  on	  a	  particular	  issue.	  	  This	  will	  also	  influence	  a	  government’s	  decision	  to	  hold	  
a	  referendum.	  
	  
The	   UK	   House	   of	   Lords	   appointed	   its	   Select	   Committee	   on	   the	   Constitution	   to	  
investigate	   “the	   role	   of	   referendums	   in	   the	   UK’s	   constitutional	   experience”.92	   	   The	  
report	  examined	  a	  range	  of	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  continuing,	  expanding	  or	  formalising	  
the	   use	   of	   referendums	   in	   the	   UK.	   	   Reasons	   to	   do	   so	   included:	   settling	   an	   issue;	  
enhancing	   citizen	   engagement;	   promoting	   voter	   education;	   safeguarding	   the	  
parliament	  or	  government	  from	  controversial	  decisions;	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  the	  public	  
make	   their	   position	   known	   in	   a	   referendum	   that	   position	   is	   difficult	   to	   reverse;	   and	  
that	  the	  referendum	  is	  a	  compliment	  to	  representative	  democracy	  as	  practised	  in	  the	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UK.93	   	   Against	   that,	   they	   heard	   evidence	   that	   referendums	   were	   simply	   tactical	  
devices;	  that	  the	  campaigns	  were	  dominated	  by	  elite	  groups;	  had	  a	  damaging	  impact	  
on	  minority	   groups;	   are	   a	   block	   on	   progress;	   do	   not	   settle	   an	   issue;	   tend	   not	   to	   be	  
about	   the	   issue	   in	   question;	   are	   costly;	   and,	   in	   fact,	   undermine	   representative	  
democracy.94	   	  They	  concluded	  that	  while	  they	  held	  particular	  criticism	  for	  the	  ad	  hoc	  
nature	  of	  referendums	  –	  specifically,	  their	  use	  as	  tactical	  devices	  –	  there	  was	  a	  place	  
for	   referendums	   in	   the	   UK,	   and	   that	   place	   was	   most	   appropriately	   in	   dealing	   with	  
“fundamental	   constitutional	   issues”	   such	   as	   changing	   the	   electoral	   system	   for	   the	  
House	  of	  Commons	  or	  matters	  of	  national	  secession	  from	  the	  Union.95	  	  	  
	  
Thus	   there	   is	   an	   understanding	   from	   the	   upper	   house	   of	   the	   UK	   Parliament	   that	  
referendums	  do	  fit	  with	  the	  model	  of	  representative	  democracy	  practised	   in	  the	  UK.	  	  
While	   the	   UK	   Government	   is	   not	   bound	   by	   a	   committee	   report,	   the	   fact	   that	   a	  
component	  part	  of	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  –	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  –	  recognises	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  
referendum,	  and	  in	  particular,	  points	  to	  secession	  as	  an	  issue	  for	  which	  a	  referendum	  
would	  be	   appropriately	   used,	   suggests	   that	   the	   SNP’s	   intention	   to	   decide	   Scotland’s	  
constitutional	  future	  through	  a	  referendum	  would	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  UK	  Parliament.	  	  
That	   is,	   of	   course,	   simply	   recognition	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   a	   referendum	   –	   the	   rules,	  
franchise,	  regulators	  and	  question	   itself	   in	  any	  referendum	  on	  the	  subject	  would	  still	  
be	  the	  subject	  of	  negotiation	  between	  the	  two	  governments.	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Of	   the	   intended	   referendums	   examined	   in	   this	   thesis,	   both	   fall	   into	   the	   category	   of	  
“fundamental	   constitutional	   issues”	   envisioned	   by	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   Select	  
Committee.	   	   The	   referendum	   in	   Wales	   on	   extending	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   National	  
Assembly	   for	  Wales	  was,	   in	   fact,	   an	   example	   of	   a	   referendum	   in	   the	  UK	  which	  was	  
required	  by	  law,	  set	  out	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  	  The	  intended	  
referendum	   in	   Scotland	   (which	   never	   transpired	   during	   the	   2007-­‐11	   parliamentary	  
term)	  would	  also	  have	  fallen	  into	  the	  category	  of	  “fundamental	  constitutional	   issue”,	  
dealing	  as	  it	  did	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  Scottish	  independence	  –	  meaning	  secession	  from	  the	  
Union.	  	  Both	  examples	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  detail	  in	  their	  respective	  chapters.	  	  	  
	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   as	   a	   constitutional	   monarchy,	   there	   is	   no	  
requirement	  for	  the	  government	  to	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  to	  vote	  on	  specific	  issues	  
–	   the	   system	   of	   representative	   democracy	   entitles	   the	   electorate	   to	   vote	   for	   a	  
constituency	  MP	  who	  will	   vote	   on	   issues	   arising	   in	   the	  House	   of	   Commons	   on	   their	  
behalf.	   	   So	   much	   a	   part	   of	   the	   British	   democratic	   tradition	   is	   this	   sentiment	   that	  
referendums	  have	  rarely	  been	  utilised	  –	  and	  when	  they	  have	   it	  has	  always	  been	  in	  a	  
non-­‐binding,	   advisory	   capacity	   only,	   thus	   maintaining	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   UK	  
Parliament.96	  	  Nevertheless,	  a	  precedent	  has	  been	  set	  in	  the	  UK	  that,	  when	  legislating	  
on	  constitutional	   issues,	  the	  government	  will	  consult	  with	  the	  public	   in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
referendum	  –	  and	  though	  notionally	  advisory	  exercises,	  the	  government	  has	  ceded	  to	  
public	   opinion	   in	   each	   of	   the	   eleven	   cases	   a	   referendum	   has	   occurred	   to	   date	   (see	  
table	  1.1).	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Table	  1.1:	  Referendums	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (1973-­‐2011)	  
 
Year	   Issue	   Area	  of	  UK	   Outcome	  
1973	   Northern	  Ireland	  Border	  Poll	   Northern	  Ireland	   N.I.	  remains	  part	  of	  UK	  	  
1975	   EEC	  Membership	   UK-­‐wide	   UK	  remains	  member	  of	  EEC	  
1979	   Scottish	  devolution	   Scotland	   No	  Assembly	  (40%	  rule)	  
1979	   Welsh	  devolution	   Wales	   No	  Assembly	  
1997	   Scottish	  devolution	   Scotland	   Scottish	  Parliament	  accepted	  
1997	   Welsh	  devolution	   Wales	   Assembly	  for	  Wales	  accepted	  
1998	   London	  devolution	   London	   GLA	  and	  Mayor	  for	  London	  
1998	   Good	  Friday	  Agreement	   Northern	  Ireland	   Agreement	  accepted	  
2004	   North-­‐East	  Devolution	   North-­‐East	  England	   No	  Assembly	  
2011	   Welsh	  devolution	  powers	   Wales	   Extended	  powers	  for	  NAW	  
2011	   Alternative	  Vote	   UK-­‐wide	   No	  change	  to	  electoral	  system	  
	  
Nationalist	  parties	  in	  government	  
Nationalist	  parties,	  distinctively	  of	  political	  parties,	  have	  a	  clear	  objective	  focused	  upon	  
a	   constitutional	   goal,	   a	   raison	   d’etre	  which	   is	   separate	   from	   their	   political	   ideology.	  	  
This	   raison	   d’etre	   manifests	   itself	   as	   some	   form	   of	   autonomy	   goal	   –	   be	   it	   simply	  
regional	  autonomy	  to	  protect	  a	  distinct	   linguistic	   identity	  or,	  at	   the	  other	  end	  of	   the	  
scale,	   secession	   from	  a	   state	   to	   create	   a	   new,	   independent	   nation.97	   	  When	   a	   party	  
takes	  control	  of	  a	  government,	  their	  ideology	  shapes	  how	  they	  govern.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  
a	   conservative	   party	   were	   elected	   to	   govern,	   the	   expectation	   would	   be	   of	   a	  
government	   that	   focuses	   on	   protecting	   business	   interests	   or	   cutting	   taxes,	   while	   a	  
social	  democratic	  party	  might	  focus	  on	  providing	  public	  services	  and	  a	  welfare	  system.	  	  
For	  a	  nationalist	  party,	  it	  is	  their	  autonomy	  goal	  –	  whatever	  form	  it	  takes	  –	  that	  guides	  
the	  party	  in	  electoral	  competition,	  in	  policy	  formation	  and,	  importantly	  for	  this	  thesis,	  
in	  how	  the	  party	  acts	  as	  a	  party	  of	  government.98	   	  As	  outlined	  above,	  how	  a	  party	  –	  
any	   party	   –	   acts	   in	   government	  will	   also	   depend	   on	   structural	   factors:	   	   the	   level	   of	  
government,	   the	   type	   of	   government	   (majority,	   minority,	   coalition,	   issue-­‐based	  
                                                




agreement)	   and	   the	   electoral	   competition	   which	   has	   produced	   this	   form	   of	  
government.	   	   What	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   the	   case	   of	   nationalist	   parties	  
governing	   at	   the	   regional	   level	   is	   the	   complex	   relationship	   it	   has	   with	   central	  
government	  and	  the	  state-­‐wide	  parties	  there.	   	  This	  relationship	  can	  be	  characterised	  
by	  periods	  of	  both	  co-­‐operation	  and	  conflict,	  depending	  upon	  the	  respective	  positions	  
of	  the	  governing	  parties	  on	  a	  left-­‐right	  and	  autonomist-­‐centrist	  spectrum.99	  	  
	  
Government	  at	  the	  regional	   level	  carries	   its	  own	  complexities	  as	  well.	   	   In	  the	  case	  of	  
coalition	   building,	   some	   policies	   are	   agreed	   by	   both	   parties,	   some	   are	   thrown	   out	  
altogether	   and	   some	  are	   altered	   to	  become	  acceptable	   to	  both,	   a	   hybrid	  of	   policies	  
from	   each	   party	   manifesto.100	   	   When	   a	   party	   chooses	   the	   option	   of	   minority	  
government,	  the	  link	  between	  party	  and	  government	  policy	  is	  muddied	  further.	  	  Here,	  
a	   party	   pursues	   only	   the	   policies	   it	   feels	   have	   an	   opportunity	   to	   gain	   majority	  
agreement	   in	   the	   legislature.	   	   They	   may	   be	   the	   same	   policies	   that	   the	   party	  
campaigned	  on	  or	  they	  may	  be	  slightly	  altered,	  but	  if	  the	  governing	  party	  can	  identify	  
another	  party	  who	  will	  potentially	  vote	  for	  their	  measure	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  continue	  
as	   a	   government	   then	   that	   policy	   will	   be	   implemented	   through	   the	   government	  
apparatus.101	   	  A	   further	  complication	  arises	  when	   the	  party	   that	  controls	   the	  central	  
government	   is	  one	  of	   the	  opposition	  parties	  at	   the	   regional	   level.	   	  How	  far	  can	   they	  
support	   the	   policies	   of	   a	   regionalist	   party	   in	   government	   that	   are	   fundamentally	  
opposed	   to	   their	   views	   on	   the	   autonomist-­‐centrist	   axis?	   	   And	   how	  much	   does	   their	  
                                                
99	  Heller,	  W.	  B.	  ‘Regional	  Parties	  and	  National	  Parties	  in	  Europe:	  Spain’s	  estado	  de	  las	  autonomias	  1993	  
to	  2000’	  in	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies,	  Vol.	  35,	  No.	  6,	  August,	  2002,	  p.665.	  
100	  Ware,	  A.	  op	  cit.	  p.336.	  
101	  Deschouwer,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.5.	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position	  upon	  this	  axis	  impact	  upon	  their	  ability	  to	  make	  deals	  with	  a	  party	  which	  is	  on	  
the	  opposite	  end	  of	  this	  cleavage?	  
	  
Thus,	   the	   realisation	   of	   party	   policies	   at	   regional	   government	   level	   is	   a	   complicated	  
process,	   and	   the	   selection	   of	   policies	   to	   pursue	   is	   important	   for	   parties	   not	   only	   in	  
maintaining	   support	   for	   their	   government	   within	   the	   legislature	   but	   also	   with	   the	  
electorate.	  	  For	  nationalist	  parties,	  this	  process	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  their	  political	  
ambitions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  constitutional	  future	  of	  their	  region.	   	  They	  face	  pressure	  from	  
within	  the	  party	  to	  push	  forward	  with	  autonomy	  goals	  which	  are	  (often)	  opposed	  by	  
most	  other	  parties	  within	  the	  legislature	  (including	  potential	  coalition	  partners)	  as	  well	  
as	  from	  their	  electorate,	  who	  may	  have	  voted	  for	  them	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  policies	  
regarding	  autonomy.	   	   They	  have	   to	  work	  as	  a	  government	   to	  promote	   their	  policies	  
against	   an	   opposition	  which	   is	   openly	   hostile	   to	   their	   core	   political	   objectives.	   	   And	  
they	  must	  act	  as	  a	  “regular”	  government	  would	  –	  running	  departments,	  winning	  votes,	  
passing	  legislation	  –	  all	  the	  while	  promoting	  their	  own	  goals	  for	  the	  region.	  	  A	  delicate	  
balancing	  act	  is	  required.	  
	  
Hypothesis	  
So	  what	  would	  we	   expect	   to	   see	   from	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   government?	   	   In	  many	  
ways,	  the	  same	  things	  we	  would	  expect	  from	  any	  other	  parties	  in	  government:	  tackling	  
issues	  within	   the	   competences	  of	   their	   legislature	   –	   infrastructure,	   transport,	   health	  
and	  education	  policy	  where	  devolved	  –	  issues	  which	  are	  important	  for	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  
running	   of	   the	   region.	   	   But	   we	   would	   also	   expect	   to	   see	   a	   larger	   focus	   on	   nation-­‐
building,	  promotion	  of	  their	  goals	  through	  celebration	  of	  national	  days,	  focus	  on	  flags	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and	  national	   symbols,	   emphasis	   on	   key	   aspects	  of	   culture	   such	  as	   language	  and	   the	  
means	  to	  enhance	  this.102	  	  Further,	  attempts	  to	  engage	  the	  public	  in	  these	  aspects	  of	  
nation-­‐building	  and	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  constitutional	  change	  would	  also	  be	  expected.	  	  We	  
would	  also	  expect	  the	  nationalist	  parties	  in	  power	  to	  face	  criticism	  for	  their	  focus	  from	  
those	  adverse	   to	   their	  goals.	   	  We	  might	  also	  expect	   to	   see	  moderation	  of	  manifesto	  
pledges	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   nationalist	   party	   (whether	   acting	   as	   part	   of	   a	   governing	  
coalition	  or	  a	  minority	  administration)	  in	  order	  to	  pass	  legislation	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  
proposals	   presented	   to	   the	   electorate.	   	   Most	   importantly,	   as	   a	   nationalist	   party	   in	  
government,	  we	  might	  expect	  to	  see	  moderation	  of	  their	  constitutional	  goals	  in	  order	  
to	   gain	   and	   maintain	   power	   –	   power	   as	   a	   means	   to	   further	   their	   cause	   through	  
presenting	  themselves	  as	  a	  competent	  government,	  able	  to	  function	  without	  the	  need	  
for	  the	  centre.103	  	  	  
	  
The	  net	  result	  of	  this	  is	  that	  nationalist	  parties	  in	  government	  may	  pass	  fewer	  bills	  and	  
create	  less	  legislation	  that	  other	  parties	  in	  power,	  but	  the	  region	  which	  they	  represent	  
may	   enjoy	   a	   higher	   profile	   due	   to	   the	   focus	   on	   nation-­‐building.	   	   If	   the	   party	   are	  
successful,	   they	   may	   build	   public	   support	   for	   their	   constitutional	   goals	   (or	   indeed,	  
simply	  for	  their	  governing	  style)	  and	  as	  such	  this	  will	  be	  reflected	  in	  further	  electoral	  
success.	   	   But	   this	   electoral	   success	   may	   come	   at	   a	   price	   –	   a	   lack	   of	   success	   in	  
converting	  party	  policy	   into	  government	  policy.	   	  This	  could	  be	   interpreted	  as	  a	   long-­‐
term	   strategy	   for	   maximising	   the	   opportunity	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   public	   eye	   as	   a	  
government	   party	   and	   presenting	   their	   constitutional	   goals	   to	   the	   electorate.	   	   This	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  Llobera,	  J.	  R.	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  Role	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then,	   would	   potentially	   transform	   the	   party	   from	   a	   policy-­‐seeking	   party	   to	   a	   vote-­‐
seeking	  or	   office-­‐seeking	  party	   –	  with	   constitutional	   policy	   relegated	   to	   a	   secondary	  
consideration	   behind	   returning	   to	   office.104	   	   An	   alternative	   interpretation	   might	   be	  
that	  the	  party	  considers	  the	  constitutional	  policy	  too	  important	  to	  risk	  at	  a	  time	  when	  
they	   have	   not	   yet	   convinced	   the	   electorate,	   and	   a	   subsequent	   term	   in	   office	   is	  
required	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  this	  process	  of	  building	  public	  support	  for	  the	  issue.	  	  In	  
this	   respect,	   office	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   short-­‐term	   or	   “proximate”	   goal	   while	  
constitutional	  change	  remains	  the	  “ultimate”	  goal,	  thereby	  retaining	  the	  party’s	  status	  
as	   a	   policy-­‐seeking	   party.105	   	   In	   this	   context,	   evaluating	   the	   success	   of	   the	   party	   in	  
office	  cannot	  be	  judged	  solely	  on	  their	  constitutional	  policy.	  	  It	  would	  be	  equally	  wrong	  
to	  consider	  the	  constitutional	  question	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game,	  with	  success	  represented	  
only	  by	  complete	  achievement	  of	  the	  party’s	  constitutional	  goals.	  	  	  
	  
For	   the	  parties	  examined	   in	   this	   thesis,	   the	   focus	   is	  on	  how	   they	  have	  attempted	   to	  
build	  public	  support	  for	  their	  constitutional	  goals.	  	  The	  methods	  of	  public	  participation	  
outlined	   above	   –	   consultation	   and	   referendum	   strategies	   –	   have	   featured	   heavily	   in	  
their	   program	   of	   government.	   	   How	   they	   have	   utilised	   consultations	   to	   open	  
discussions	  with	  the	  electorate	  and	  build	  support	  for	  constitutional	  change	  will	  be	  the	  
focus	  of	  two	  of	  the	  following	  chapters,	  while	  chapter	  six	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  referendum	  
strategies	  employed	   in	  each	  case.	   	  The	  working	  hypothesis	   is	   that	  nationalist	  parties	  
need	  to	  cultivate	   the	  public	  support	  which	  delivered	  them	   into	  office	   through	  public	  
consultations	  if	  they	  are	  to	  have	  any	  success	  in	  delivering	  (and	  winning)	  a	  referendum	  
upon	   their	   constitutional	   objectives.	   	   By	   examining	   in	   more	   depth,	   firstly	   how	   the	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devolution	  debates	   have	   evolved	  over	   the	  past	   four	   decades	   and	   subsequently	   how	  
the	  respective	  parties	  organised	  their	  consultations	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  the	  public	  more	  
closely	   in	   the	   constitutional	   debate,	   this	   thesis	   aims	   to	   explore	   the	   relationship	  
between	  nationalist	  parties	  in	  power	  and	  their	  electorates.	  	  	  
	  
It	  argues	  that	  this	  engagement	  had	  to	  deliver	  on	  two	  fronts	  –	  both	  on	  a	  practical	  level	  
(actively	   seeking	  out	  public	  opinion	  on	   the	   issue	   in	  question)	  and	  on	  a	   subconscious	  
level,	   that	   is,	   providing	   a	   perception	   that	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   is	   a	   permanent	  
fixture	   of	   the	   contemporary	   political	   debate	   –	   in	   order	   to	   convince	   the	   public	   to	  
support	   the	   constitutional	   objectives	   of	   the	   party	   in	   question.	   	   Drawing	   upon	   the	  
literature	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	  consultations	  and	  referendums,	  this	  
thesis	  considers	  the	  constitutional	  strategies	  of	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  arguing	  that	  
the	   respective	   public	   engagement	   strategies	   were	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   constitutional	  
process.	   	   The	   consultations	   themselves	   were	   part	   of	   a	   legitimisation	   process;	   that	  
consultations	  were	  already	  considered	  a	  part	  of	  governing,	  therefore	  by	  consulting	  on	  
constitutional	   issues	   this	   subsequently	  made	   the	   constitution	   part	   of	   governing	   and	  
legitimised	  the	  debate.	  	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  public	  are	  and	  need	  to	  be	  a	  key	  component	  
of	   the	   constitutional	   debate,	   that	   a	   public	   engagement	   strategy	   is	   required	   if	  
nationalist	  parties	  in	  government	  are	  to	  have	  any	  success	  in	  moving	  forward	  with	  their	  
constitutional	  goals.	  	  More	  generally,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  two	  governments	  saw	  
mixed	   results	   in	   outcomes.	   	   In	   Wales,	   Plaid	   Cymru	   and	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government	  saw	  their	  public	  engagement	  strategy	  succeed	  in	  delivering	  an	  affirmative	  
outcome	  in	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	   issue,	  but	  the	  party	  were	  voted	  out	  of	  office	   in	  the	  
2011	  National	  Assembly	  election.	  	  And	  while	  a	  further	  commission	  to	  examine	  Welsh	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devolution	  was	  established,	  the	  public	  remained	  largely	  disengaged	  from	  the	  debate.	  	  
Contrastingly,	  while	  the	  SNP	  Scottish	  Government	  failed	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  
constitutional	   issue	   during	   their	   term	   of	   minority	   government,	   their	   return	   to	  
government	   with	   a	   parliamentary	   majority	   in	   2011	   not	   only	   signalled	   that	   a	  
referendum	   would	   be	   held	   in	   2014,	   but	   saw	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   continue	  
through	   pressure	   groups,	   civic	   society	   and	   social	   media	   –	   becoming	   a	   multi-­‐lateral	  
discussion	   in	   which	   the	   government	   was	   no	   longer	   the	   main	   actor.	   	   Arguably,	   this	  
places	   the	   SNP	   in	   a	   stronger	   position	   than	   Plaid	   Cymru	   with	   regards	   to	   the	  
constitutional	  debate	  going	  forward.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   has	   sought	   to	   examine	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   motivations	   of	  
political	  parties;	  on	  governing	  and	  forms	  of	  government;	  and	  on	  the	  methods	  of	  public	  
participation	  pursued	  in	  government,	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  of	  analysis	  for	  case	  
studies	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  on	  Scotland	  and	  Wales.	  	  It	  has	  done	  so	  by	  examining	  
the	   three	   elements	   in	   turn.	   	   It	   began	   by	   focusing	   upon	   the	  motivations	   of	   political	  
parties,	  as	  outlined	  by	  Müller	  and	  Strøm,	  arguing	  that	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  which	  
comprise	   the	   two	   case	   studies	   that	   follow,	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   policy-­‐seeking	  
parties.	  	  It	  then	  examined	  the	  considerations	  of	  parties	  entering	  government	  and	  the	  
decisions	   to	   enter	   coalition	   or	   minority	   government,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   type	   of	  
government	  which	   the	   two	   parties	   found	   themselves	   in	   significantly	   impacted	   upon	  
how	  they	  approached	   the	  constitutional	  debate	  while	   in	  office.	   	  The	   third	  section	  of	  
this	   chapter	   dealt	   with	   the	   actions	   pursued	   by	   the	   parties	   in	   government	   –	   the	  
methods	   of	   public	   participation	   –	   in	   the	   context	   of	   contemporary	   debates	   about	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deliberative	  democracy.	  	  The	  chapter	  considered	  what	  expectations	  we	  might	  have	  of	  
nationalist	   parties	   in	   government,	   arguing	   that	   we	   should	   expect	   all	   the	   things	   we	  
would	  expect	  of	  other	  parties	   in	  government,	  with	  the	  additional	   focus	  upon	  nation-­‐
building	   associated	   with	   nationalist	   parties.	   	   Finally,	   the	   chapter	   established	   the	  
argument	   of	   this	   thesis	   which	   will	   be	   developed	   over	   the	   following	   case	   study	  
chapters,	   namely	   that	   public	   engagement	   on	   the	   constitution	   is	   central	   to	   the	  
approach	   of	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   government;	   that	   this	   is	   part	   of	   a	   process	   of	  
legitimising	  the	  constitutional	  debate;	  and	  that	  while	  opposition	  to	  these	  parties	  will	  
inevitably	  see	  a	  lack	  of	  constitutional	  change	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  this	  strategy,	  this	  is	  a	  false	  
conclusion,	  for	  the	  engagement	  of	  the	  public	  on	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  represents	  a	  
considerable	   achievement	   for	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   power,	   and	   the	   continuation	   of	  




Chapter	  2:	  Devolution:	  a	  process,	  not	  an	  event	  	  
 
Introduction	  
Devolution,	   in	  the	  words	  of	  Ron	  Davies,	   is	  a	  “process,	  not	  an	  event”.1	   	  And	  as	  Davies	  
explained	  further,	  devolution	  is	  not	  a	  “journey	  with	  a	  fixed	  end	  point”,	  nor	  an	  “end	  in	  
itself	  but	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end”.2	  	  It	  has	  been	  a	  five-­‐decade-­‐long	  process	  in	  the	  UK	  thus	  
far,	  and	  with	  the	  constitution	  firmly	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  as	  a	  (partial)	  result	  of	  the	  
electoral	  and	  policy	  success	  of	  nationalist	  parties	   in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales,	   it	  shows	  no	  
signs	   of	   disappearing.	   	   This	   chapter	   tracks	   the	   parallel	   processes	   of	   devolution	   in	  
Scotland	   and	   Wales	   as	   each	   rejected	   (at	   least	   within	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   legislation)	  
devolution	  in	  the	  1970s	  before	  embracing	  the	  concept	  (rather	  more	  enthusiastically	  in	  
Scotland	  than	  in	  Wales)	  in	  1997.	  	  Here,	  the	  actors	  involved	  and	  the	  public	  engagement	  
that	  was	  attempted	   in	   the	  earlier	  devolution	  debates	  are	  examined	  as	  precursors	   to	  
the	   public	   engagement	   strategies	   of	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   in	   office	   and,	   it	   is	  
argued,	  these	  earlier	  processes	  had	  a	  direct	  impact	  upon	  how	  the	  nationalist	  parties	  in	  
government	  decided	  to	  approach	  the	  constitutional	  question	  later.	  
	  
The	  Devolution	  Story	  in	  Scotland	  
The	   SNP’s	   victory	   in	   the	   1967	   Hamilton	   by-­‐election	   was	   the	   catalyst	   for	   action	   on	  
devolution	  in	  the	  1970s,	  but	  the	  referendum	  as	  a	  device	  to	  deliver	  devolution	  –	  and,	  
for	  the	  SNP,	  independence	  –	  did	  not	  come	  until	  later,	  and	  even	  then	  not	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
action	  by	  pro-­‐devolutionists.	  	  While	  both	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  had	  previously	  
                                                
1	  Davies,	  R.	  ‘Devolution:	  A	  Process	  not	  an	  Event’	  in	  The	  Gregynog	  Papers,	  Vol.	  2,	  No.	  2,	  Cardiff,	  Institute	  




seen	  MPs	   talk	  about	  a	  Scottish	  assembly	  –	  and	  even	  go	  so	   far	  as	  making	  devolution	  
party	  policy	  –	  it	  was	  not	  until	  Winnie	  Ewing’s	  surprising	  victory	  in	  Hamilton	  that	  these	  
sentiments	  provoked	  more	  than	  political	   rhetoric.	   	  Then-­‐Conservative	   leader	  Edward	  
Heath	  committed	  his	  party	  to	  a	  pro-­‐devolution	  stance	   in	  his	   ‘Declaration	  of	  Perth’	  of	  
1968	  (a	  position	  the	  party	  later	  reversed	  under	  Margaret	  Thatcher)	  and	  established	  a	  
Scottish	  Constitutional	  Committee	  to	  examine	  the	  policy.	  	  	  This	  Committee	  reported	  in	  
1970	   (before	   the	   Conservatives	   returned	   to	   government)	   and	   provided	  
recommendations	   in	   favour	   of	   establishing	   an	   assembly	   which	   would	   assume	   the	  
functions	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Grand	   Committee.3	   	   The	   plans	  were	   incorporated	   into	   the	  
party’s	   manifesto	   –	   and	   subsequently,	   the	   Queen’s	   Speech	   –	   but	   were	   never	  
implemented.4	  	  	  
	  
Labour,	  however,	  were	  moved	  into	  action	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  SNP.	  	  Seeing	  the	  party	  win	  
what	  had	  been	  a	   relatively	  safe	  Labour	  seat	   led	   the	  party	   to	  consider	  more	   fully	   the	  
implications	  of	  a	  party	  competition	  distinct	  from	  their	  historic	  two-­‐horse	  race	  with	  the	  
Conservatives.	   	   If	   the	   SNP	  were	  winning	   seats	   in	   Labour	   heartlands	   by	   appealing	   to	  
traditional	   Labour	   voters,	   it	   would	   be	   very	   difficult	   for	   Labour	   to	   win	   a	  majority	   at	  
Westminster.	   	   Labour’s	   strategy	   then,	   was	   to	   outflank	   the	   SNP	   by	   appearing	   more	  
nationalistic	   than	   the	   nationalists.	   	   While	   independence	   was	   not	   a	   solution	   Labour	  
could	   countenance,	   devolution	   was.	   	   Here	   was	   a	   policy	   which	   would	   at	   once	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  party	  was	  in	  touch	  with	  what	  its	  Scottish	  electorate	  and	  at	  the	  
same	   time	  would	   deal	   with	   the	   electoral	   threat	   posed	   by	   the	   fledgling	   SNP	   –	   for	   if	  
                                                
3	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Committee	  Scotland’s	  Government:	  The	  Report	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  
Committee,	  Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Committee,	  1970.	  
4	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Devolution,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1979,	  p.110.	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Scotland	   had	   its	   own	   assembly,	   and	   a	   strong	   Labour	   voice	   in	   London,	  why	  would	   it	  
need	   independence?	   	  Labour	  thus	  decided	  to	  establish	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  
Constitution	  to	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  devolution	  for	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  to	  
determine	  the	  scope	  of	  powers	  such	  an	  assembly	  should	  obtain.	  	  Its	  remit	  was:	  
	  
to	  examine	  the	  present	  function	  of	  the	  central	  legislature	  and	  
government	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  several	  countries,	  nations	  and	  
regions	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   to	   consider...	   whether	   any	  
changes	   are	   desirable	   in	   those	   functions	   or	   otherwise	   in	  
present	  constitutional	  and	  economic	  relationships.5	  
	  
Reporting	   four	   years	   after	   its	   establishment	   –	  with	   Labour	   now	   in	   opposition	   –	   the	  
Commission	   was	   divided.	   	   Three	   members	   resigned	   during	   the	   process	   while	   two	  
members	  of	  the	  original	  Commission	  –	  including	  the	  chair,	  Lord	  Crowther	  –	  died.6	  	  In	  
their	   own	   evidence	   to	   the	   Commission,	   the	   Scottish	   Labour	   Party	   declared	   their	  
opposition	   to	   devolution,	   arguing	   that	   it	   would	   “damage	   Scotland’s	   economic	  
development”.7	   	   There	  was	   limited	   engagement	  with	   the	   Commission	   from	   Scottish	  
pressure	  groups,	  with	  only	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Advocates,	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Scotland,	  the	  
Scottish	  Law	  Commission,	  the	  Saltire	  Society,	  the	  Scottish	  Economic	  Planning	  Council	  
and	   the	  Scottish	  Plebiscite	  Society	  accepting	   invitations	   to	  submit	  evidence.8	   	   	  While	  
the	   Commission	   itself	   considered	   wide-­‐ranging	   options,	   including	   devolution,	  
confederalism	   and	   even	   independence	   for	   the	   UK’s	   constituent	   nations,	   their	   final	  
report	   –	   which	   did	   not	   have	   the	   unanimous	   backing	   of	   the	   Commissioners	   –	  
                                                
5	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Constitution	  (Kilbrandon	  Commission)	  Report	  of	  the	  Royal	  
Commission	  on	  the	  Constitution	  1969-­‐1973,	  Volume	  1,	  Report	  (Cmnd.	  5460),	  London,	  Her	  
Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  1973,	  p.iii-­‐iv.	  
6	  Drucker,	  H.	  M.	  and	  Brown,	  G.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Nationalism	  and	  Devolution,	  London,	  Longman,	  1980,	  
p.59.	  
7	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Devolution	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.141.	  
8	  Drucker,	  H.	  M.	  and	  Brown,	  G.	  op	  cit.	  p.72-­‐4.	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recommended	  devolved	  assemblies	  for	  Scotland	  and	  Wales.	  	  Two	  members	  published	  
a	  minority	  report	  –	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Dissent	  –	  in	  which	  they	  outlined	  proposals	  for	  
seven	  devolved	  regional	  assemblies	  (for	  Scotland,	  Wales	  and	  five	  English	  regions).	   	  In	  
the	  end,	  the	  recommendations	  looked	  messy	  and,	  with	  a	  Conservative	  government	  in	  
power	   –	   and	   the	   Nationalist	   charge	   seemingly	   halted	   –	   the	   proposals	   were	   quietly	  
ignored.9	  	  However,	  when	  the	  Conservatives	  went	  to	  the	  polls	  in	  February	  1974,	  it	  was	  
Labour	   who	   emerged	   from	   the	   General	   Election	   in	   government	   –	   albeit	   by	   a	   small	  
margin	  –	  while	   the	  SNP	  returned	  7	  MPs,	   increasing	  the	  pressure	  on	  Labour	  to	  adopt	  
devolution	   as	   party	   policy.	   	   Within	   months	   of	   taking	   office,	   Labour	   published	   a	  
devolution	  White	  Paper,	  Command	  Paper	  5732	  entitled	  “Democracy	  and	  Devolution:	  
Proposals	   for	   Scotland	   and	   Wales”.	   	   However,	   before	   any	   further	   action	   could	   be	  
taken,	  a	  new	  General	  Election	  was	  called	  for	  October	  1974	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  increase	  
the	  strength	  of	  the	  Labour	  party	  in	  office.	  	  While	  the	  government	  was	  returned	  –	  with	  
a	   majority	   of	   three	   –	   it	   was	   the	   SNP	   who	   made	   the	   headlines,	   increasing	   their	  
representation	  from	  7	  seats	  to	  11,	  taking	  over	  30%	  of	  the	  Scottish	  vote.	   	   In	  addition,	  
the	  party	  was	  second	  in	  another	  42	  seats	  –	  35	  of	  them	  held	  by	  Labour.10	  	  There	  was	  a	  
real	   concern	   in	   Labour	   ranks	   about	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   SNP,	   and	   their	   electoral	   support	  
gave	  added	  impetus	  to	  the	  devolution	  debate,	  putting	  further	  pressure	  on	  the	  Labour	  
government	   to	   move	   forward	   with	   the	   proposals.	   	   A	   further	   White	   Paper	   was	  
published	   in	   November	   1975	   entitled:	   “Our	   Changing	   Democracy”	   with	   a	  
supplementary	   paper	   the	   following	   August.11	   	   Finally,	   the	   government	   published	   its	  
devolution	  plans	   in	   the	   shape	  of	   a	  bill	   –	   the	   Scotland	  and	  Wales	  Bill	   –	   in	  November	  
                                                
9	  ibid,	  p.59.	  
10	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1979,	  op	  cit.	  p.93.	  
11	  HM	  Government,	  Our	  Changing	  Democracy:	  Devolution	  to	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  (Cmnd.	  6348),	  London,	  
Her	  Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  1975.	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1976.	  	  The	  Labour	  party	  however,	  like	  their	  Royal	  Commission	  previously,	  was	  split	  on	  
devolution.	  	  The	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  Bill	  was	  to	  prove	  a	  false	  dawn	  for	  devolutionists.	  	  
Parliamentary	   procedures	   –	   Shadow	   Cabinet	   opposition	   to	   the	   bill	   and	   backbench	  
rebellion	  –	  meant	   that	   the	  bill	   fell	   to	  a	  guillotine	  motion	   in	  February	  1977.	   	  Crucially	  
however,	  the	  government	  had	  conceded	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  post-­‐legislative	  referendum	  
to	  anti-­‐devolutionists	  during	  the	  debates	  in	  order	  to	  try	  and	  save	  the	  bill.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  
this	   was	   thought	   to	   have	  weakened	   the	   chances	   of	   devolution	   passing	   for	  Wales	   –	  
where	  public	  support	  was	  weak	  –	  but	  increasing	  the	  chances	  of	  establishing	  a	  Scottish	  
assembly,	  since	  the	  Scottish	  public	  appeared	  to	  back	  devolution.12	  	  
	  
With	   the	   Lib-­‐Lab	   pact	   signed	   the	   following	  month,	   the	   government	   secured	   Liberal	  
support	   for	   its	   continued	  existence	  –	  providing	  devolution	  was	   reintroduced.	   	   James	  
Callaghan	   appointed	   the	   pro-­‐devolutionist	   John	   Smith	   to	   pilot	   the	   new	   legislation	  
through	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  –	  and	  this	  time,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  crucial	  difference:	  
there	  would	  be	  two	  devolution	  bills,	  one	  for	  Scotland	  and	  one	  for	  Wales.	  	  The	  Scotland	  
Bill	   was	   subsequently	   published	   in	   November	   1977	   –	   with	   the	   government’s	  
concession	   of	   a	   post-­‐legislative	   referendum	   during	   the	   previous	   debates	   remaining	  
intact.	   	   It	  was	   this	   concession	  which	  would	   set	   a	  precedent	   for	   future	   constitutional	  
change.	   	  However,	   the	  decision	  to	  proceed	  with	  a	   referendum	  was	  not	  an	  especially	  
principled	   one.	   	   The	   debate	   was	   not	   about	   whether	   constitutional	   change	   should	  
require	   a	   public	   vote.	   	   The	   Labour	   government	   faced	   clear	   internal	   division	   on	   the	  
issue	   –	   just	   as	   they	   had	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   continued	   membership	   of	   the	   European	  
Economic	   Community	   (EEC)	   in	   1975	   –	   and	   as	   they	   had	   done	   on	   that	   occasion,	   they	  
                                                
12	  Drucker,	  H.	  M.	  and	  Brown,	  G.	  op	  cit.	  p112.	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deemed	   it	   politically	   expedient	   to	   consult	   the	   public	   in	   a	   referendum.13	   	  What	   was	  
clear	  was	  that	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  for	  constitutional	  change	  was	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  those	  it	  
would	   directly	   affect	   –	   thus	   only	   the	   electorates	   in	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   would	   be	  
consulted	  upon	  the	  devolution	  proposals.	  	  This	  was	  also	  an	  important	  precedent,	  as	  it	  
not	   only	   affected	   the	   future	   devolution	   referendums	   (in	   1997)	   but	   established	   the	  
principle	   that	   the	   component	   nations	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   could	   determine	   for	  
themselves	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  membership.14	  	  
	  
Table	  2.1:	  Scotland	  Devolution	  Opinion	  Polls	  (1979)15	  
	  
Date	   Poll	   Yes	   No	  
8-­‐20	  January	   System	  Three	   64%	   36%	  
29	  January-­‐	  6	  February	   System	  Three	   56%	   44%	  
6-­‐11	  February	   ORC	   60%	   40%	  
12-­‐14	  February	   MORI	   64%	   36%	  
15-­‐16	  February	   NOP	   59%	   41%	  
20-­‐22	  February	   MORI	   60%	   40%	  
23-­‐25	  February	   System	  Three	   52%	   48%	  
27-­‐28	  February	   MORI	   50%	   50%	  
	  
However,	   given	   the	   perceived	   public	   support	   for	   devolution	   in	   Scotland	   the	  
referendum	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  big	  enough	  concession	  for	  anti-­‐devolutionists	  in	  the	  
Labour	  ranks.	  	  An	  amendment	  to	  the	  Scotland	  Bill	  –	  and	  also	  to	  the	  Wales	  Bill,	  which	  
was	  now	  looking	  even	  less	   likely	  to	  win	  public	  support	  –	  was	  passed	  in	  January	  1978	  
which	  stipulated	   that,	   for	   the	   legislation	   to	  be	  passed,	  40%	  of	   the	  eligible	  electorate	  
would	  have	  to	  give	  their	  assent	  to	  the	  proposals.	  	  The	  Cunningham	  Amendment,	  as	  the	  
threshold	   became	   known,	   was	   a	   critical	   blow	   for	   pro-­‐devolutionists.	   	   For	   while	  
                                                
13	  Bochel,	  J.	  et.	  al.,	  “Conclusions”	  in	  Bochel,	  J.	  Denver,	  D.	  and	  Macartney,	  A.	  (eds)	  The	  Referendum	  
Experience:	  Scotland	  1979,	  Aberdeen,	  Aberdeen	  University	  Press,	  1981,	  p.170.	  
14	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1979,	  op	  cit.	  p.156.	  




majority	  support	  remained	  in	  favour	  of	  devolution	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  referendum	  
campaign	  (see	  table	  2.1)	  obtaining	  a	  winning	  margin	  which	  surpassed	  the	  40%	  of	  the	  
electorate	  did	  not	  appear	  likely.	  
	  
When	   the	   referendum	   itself	   arrived	   –	   1	  March	   1979	   –	   the	   amendment	   proved	   the	  
difference	   between	   victory	   and	   defeat	   for	   pro-­‐devolutionists.	   	   Support	   for	   the	  
devolution	  proposal	  polled	  51.6%	  of	  those	  voting,	  with	  48.9%	  against	  (see	  table	  5.2).	  	  
On	  a	  turnout	  of	  63.8%,	  this	  meant	  that	  only	  32.9%	  of	  the	  eligible	  electorate	  had	  voted	  
for	  devolution	  –	  well	  short	  of	  the	  40%	  required	  by	  the	  Cunningham	  Amendment.	  	  Thus	  
while	  Scotland	  had	  voted	  –	  marginally	  –	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  devolution,	   the	  
technical	  requirements	  of	  the	  process	  mean	  that	  devolution	  would	  be	  defeated.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  2.2:	  Scotland	  Devolution	  Referendum	  Result	  (1979)16	  
	  
Question:	  “Parliament	  has	  decided	  to	  consult	  the	  electorate	  in	  Scotland	  on	  the	  
question	  whether	  the	  Scotland	  Act	  1978	  should	  be	  put	  into	  effect.	  Do	  you	  want	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Scotland	  Act	  1978	  to	  be	  put	  into	  effect?"	  
Yes	   No	   Yes	  (of	  electorate)	   No	  (of	  electorate)	   Did	  not	  vote	  
51.6%	   48.4%	   32.85%	   30.78%	   37.1%	  
	  
In	   the	   House	   of	   Commons,	   Labour	   moved	   to	   repeal	   the	   Scotland	   Act,	   citing	   the	  
referendum	   result	   as	   proof	   that	   devolution	   lacked	   a	  mandate	   in	   Scotland.	   	   The	   SNP	  
moved	   a	   motion	   of	   confidence	   in	   the	   Labour	   government,	   a	   motion	   which	   was	  
superseded	  by	  a	  Conservative	  motion.	  	  Given	  that	  Labour	  had	  begun	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  
Nationalists	  in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  to	  maintain	  their	  position,	  the	  motion	  –	  supported	  
by	   the	   SNP	   –	   carried	   a	  majority	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Commons,	   bringing	   an	   end	   to	   the	  
Labour	  government,	  and	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Margaret	  Thatcher-­‐led	  Conservatives.	  	  The	  
                                                
16	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1999,	  op	  cit.	  p.190.	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SNP	  suffered	  for	  their	  inability	  to	  win	  the	  devolution	  referendum,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  part	  
in	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Labour	   government,	   losing	   all	   but	   two	  of	   their	   seats.	   	  Devolution’s	  
prominent	  place	  on	   the	  British	  political	   agenda	  –	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	   SNP’s	   electoral	  
charge	  –	  disappeared.17	   	   For	   the	   foreseeable	   future,	  with	   the	  now	  anti-­‐devolutionist	  
Conservatives	  in	  government,	  devolution	  was	  dead.	  
	  
The	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention	  
However,	  attempts	  to	  resurrect	  the	  principle	  of	  devolution	  began	  almost	  immediately.	  	  
The	  Campaign	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Assembly	  (CSA)	  was	  formed,	  ostensibly	  a	  non-­‐party	  group	  
though	   individuals	   with	   clear	   partisan	   ties	   were	   involved.	   	   Its	   guiding	   principle	   was	  
that,	   by	   any	   fair	  measure,	   the	   Scottish	   people	   supported	   the	   principle	   of	   a	   Scottish	  
Assembly	   –	   and,	   they	   had	   done	   so	   in	   the	   1979	   referendum	   only	   to	   be	   denied	  
devolution	  by	  a	  technicality.	  	  Thus,	  the	  campaign	  determined	  that	  they	  would	  exist	  to	  
pressure	   the	   UK	   government	   to	   deliver	   an	   Assembly.	   	   By	   1985	   –	   and	   after	   the	   re-­‐
election	   of	   the	   Conservative	   government	   in	   1983	   –	   the	   CSA	   decided	   upon	   a	   new	  
strategy.	   	   While	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   there	   was	   public	   support	   for	   the	   principle	   of	  
devolution,	  articulating	  that	  support	  was	  the	  key	  to	  its	  success.	  	  They	  believed	  that	  the	  
best	   way	   to	   do	   this	   was	   to	   establish	   a	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention,	   thereby	  
attempting	  to	  engage	  the	  wider	  public	  in	  the	  constitutional	  debate.	  
	  
After	  a	  further	  Conservative	  electoral	  victory	  in	  1987	  –	  with	  an	  ever-­‐diminishing	  return	  
of	  Scottish	  MPs	  –	  the	  CSA	  published	  “A	  Claim	  of	  Right	  for	  Scotland”	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  
1988,	  articulating	  the	  need	  for	  a	  constitutional	  convention	  and	  detailing	  how	  it	  might	  
                                                
17	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1979,	  op	  cit.	  p.89.	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be	  organised.	   	  The	  Claim	  of	  Right	  provided	  three	  tasks	   for	   the	  Convention:	   	  design	  a	  
scheme	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Assembly;	  mobilise	  Scottish	  opinion	  to	  support	  it;	  and	  lobby	  the	  
UK	  Government	  to	  deliver	  it.18	  	  It	  was	  an	  optimistic	  Convention	  which	  met	  for	  the	  first	  
time	  in	  the	  Church	  of	  Scotland	  Assembly	  Hall	  in	  March	  1989.	  	  Chairman	  Canon	  Kenyon	  
Wright,	   giving	   his	   address,	   famously	   appealed	   to	   the	   historical	   claims	   that	   Scottish	  
sovereignty	  lies	  with	  the	  people	  when	  he	  commented:	  	  
	  
What	   if	   that	   other	   voice	   we	   all	   know	   so	   well	   responds	   by	  
saying,	  'We	  say	  no,	  and	  we	  are	  the	  state'?	  Well	  we	  say	  yes	  -­‐	  
and	  we	  are	  the	  people.19	  
	  
Wright’s	  own	  view	  was	  that	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  Convention	  was	  largely	  a	  symbolic	  
meeting,	   gathering	   together	   those	  who	  would	  play	  a	   clear	   role	   in	   the	   future	  debate	  
and	  planting	   their	   standard.20	   	   The	  Convention	  process	   took	   the	   form	  of	   two	   stages	  
over	  the	  following	  years.	  	  Firstly,	  the	  leadership	  wrote	  to	  over	  150	  organisations	  within	  
Scotland	   to	   invite	   views	   upon	   the	   constitutional	   settlement	   and	   thoughts	   on	   the	  
design	  of	  devolution.	   	  This	  was	  an	  extension	  of	   the	  attempts	  to	  engage	  more	  widely	  
with	   the	  public	  and	  with	  organisations	  outwith	   the	  “usual	   subjects”	  of	  public	  bodies	  
(something	   the	   SNP	   tried	   to	   replicate	   through	  A	   National	   Conversation).	   	   However,	  
these	  attempts	  were	  largely	  seen	  as	  having	  failed	  in	  popularising	  the	  issue	  and	  left	  the	  
body	   continuing	   to	   lack	   public	   support.21	   	   The	   second	   stage	   of	   the	   Convention’s	  
operation	  was	  more	   inward	   looking,	   and	   saw	   the	  membership	   establish	   six	  working	  
                                                
18	  Campaign	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Assembly,	  A	  Claim	  of	  Right	  for	  Scotland:	  Report	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Steering	  
Group	  Presented	  to	  the	  Campaign	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Assembly,	  Edinburgh,	  The	  Campaign	  for	  a	  Scottish	  
Assembly,	  July	  1988,	  p.18.	  
19	  Wright,	  K.	  The	  People	  Say	  Yes:	  The	  Making	  of	  Scotland’s	  Parliament,	  Argyll,	  Argyll	  Publishing,	  1997,	  
p.52.	  
20	  ibid,	  p.52.	  
21	  Mitchell,	  J.	  Strategies	  for	  Self-­‐Government:	  The	  Campaigns	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  Edinburgh,	  
Polygon,	  1996,	  p.287.	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groups	   to	   consider	   specific	   elements	   of	   the	   design	   for	   a	   Scottish	   Assembly,	   how	   it	  
would	  be	  elected	  and	  how	  to	  ensure	  the	  equal	  representation	  of	  women	  in	  the	  new	  
institution.22	   	   The	   Convention	   produced	   a	   report	   entitled	   “Towards	   Scotland’s	  
Parliament”	   in	   1990	   which	   outlined	   the	   principles	   of	   devolution.23	   	   	   However,	   key	  
questions,	  such	  as	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system	  to	  be	  utilised,	  were	  left	  unanswered	  at	  
this	  stage.24	  	  This	  was	  readied	  as	  the	  precursor	  to	  an	  expected	  change	  of	  government	  
after	   the	   1992	   general	   election.	   	   However,	   though	   the	   Conservatives	   were	  
comprehensively	  outperformed	  by	  pro-­‐devolutionist	  parties	  in	  Scotland,	  their	  electoral	  
performance	  in	  England	  ensured	  a	  fourth	  consecutive	  Conservative	  government.	  	  	  
	  
Defeat	  –	  and	  renewal	  
The	   initial	   reaction	  of	  pro-­‐devolutionists	  –	   in	   the	  Convention,	   in	  political	  parties	  and	  
beyond	   –	   was	   one	   of	   shock.	   	   However,	   as	   Mitchell	   argues,	   the	   inability	   of	   historic	  
movements	  for	  self-­‐government	  to	  translate	  support	  for	  that	  principle	  into	  meaningful	  
political	   change	  meant	   that	   it	   should	  not	  have	  come	  as	  a	   surprise.25	   	   Indeed,	  Harvie	  
and	  Jones	  argue	  that	  this	  was	  the	  “enigma	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  in	  
Scotland,”	  namely,	  that	  while	  there	  continued	  to	  exist	  broad	  support	  for	  the	  principle	  
of	  devolution,	  constitutional	  change	  remained	  a	  low	  priority	  for	  voters.26	  	  Indeed,	  they	  
went	  further,	  arguing	  that	  the	  election	  result	  indicated	  that	  devolution	  was	  “a	  media	  
and	   chattering	   classes’	   obsession”,	   further	   evidence	   of	   Mitchell’s	   claims	   that	   the	  
                                                
22	  Wright,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p124.	  
23	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention	  Towards	  Scotland's	  Parliament,	  Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  
Convention,	  1990.	  
24	  Lynch,	  P.	  ‘The	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention	  1992-­‐5’	  in	  Scottish	  Affairs,	  No.	  15,	  Spring,	  1996.	  
25	  Mitchell,	  J.	  Constitutional	  Conventions	  and	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Movement:	  Origins,	  Agendas	  and	  
Outcomes,	  Strathclyde	  Papers	  on	  Government	  and	  Politics,	  No.	  78,	  Glasgow,	  University	  of	  Strathclyde,	  
1999,	  p.39.	  




Convention	  was	   not	   representative	   of	   all	   of	   Scotland.27	   	   Nevertheless,	   shock	   quickly	  
turned	  to	  resolve,	  and	  several	  pro-­‐devolution	  organisations	  –	  more	  public-­‐based	  than	  
the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention	   –	  were	   formed	   in	   the	   days	   and	  weeks	  which	  
followed.	  	  “Common	  Cause”	  brought	  together	  key	  thinkers	  and	  writers	  in	  Scotland	  to	  
build	   upon	   their	   own	   vision	   for	   a	   Scottish	   parliament.	   	   “Scotland	   United”	   drew	  
politicians	   from	   Labour	   and	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats,	   together	  with	   Scottish	  musicians	  
like	   Deacon	   Blue’s	   Ricky	   Ross	   and	   Hue	   and	   Cry’s	   Pat	   Kane,	   to	   a	   rally	   in	   Glasgow’s	  
George	  Square.	  	  “Democracy	  for	  Scotland”	  began	  a	  vigil	  on	  Calton	  Hill,	  outside	  the	  old	  
Royal	  High	  School	  –	  the	  building	  earmarked	  for	  the	  Scottish	  Assembly	  of	  the	  1970s	  –	  
which	   would	   last	   until	   the	   1997	   general	   election.28	   	   The	   organisation	   within	   these	  
bodies,	   and	   their	   operation	   –	   demonstrations,	   vigils	   and	   petitions	   –	   was	   a	   clear	  
difference	   from	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Convention.	   	   Here	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   engage	   the	  
public,	   rather	   than	   the	   elites,	   in	   the	   process	   of	   working	   towards	   a	   devolution	  
settlement.	   	   Indeed,	   these	   organisations	   rather	   ignored	   the	   Convention	   in	   order	   to	  
“develop	   grassroots	   networks”,	   culminating	   in	   a	   demonstration	   attracting	   300,000	  
participants	   during	   the	   European	   Council	   summit	   in	   Edinburgh	   in	   December	   1992.29	  	  
While	   the	  Convention	  was	   in	  danger	  of	  disintegrating	  and	  disbanding	   in	   the	  wake	  of	  
the	   electoral	   defeat	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   these	   new	   organisations,	   it	   finally	   re-­‐
emerged	  in	  1993	  to	  take	  on	  the	  big	   issues	  surrounding	  the	  organisation	  of	  a	  Scottish	  
parliament	  which	  it	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  agree	  upon	  previously	  –	  and	  to	  hold	  together	  
                                                
27	  ibid	  p.160.	  
28	  ibid,	  p.160;	  Wright,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p	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29	  Lynch,	  P.	  1996	  op	  cit.	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the	  elites	   it	  had	  gathered	   in	  support	  of	  devolution,	  without	  whom	  the	  whole	  project	  
could	  not	  hope	  to	  proceed.30	  
	  
By	   the	   time	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention	   re-­‐emerged	   there	   were	   clear	  
partisan	  tensions	  at	  its	  heart.	  	  The	  three	  distinct	  large	  groupings	  –	  Labour,	  the	  Liberal	  
Democrats	   and	   the	   STUC	   –	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	   agree	   on	   details	   and	   structure.	   	   Of	  
particular	   difficulty	  were	   the	  proposed	  proportional	   electoral	   system	   the	  parliament	  
should	  utilise	  and	  how	  to	  ensure	  the	  representation	  of	  women	  in	  the	  new	  institution.	  	  
It	  needed	  a	  new	  strategy	  to	  deal	  with	  these	   increasing	  tensions.	   	  This	  duly	  arrived	   in	  
the	  form	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  which	  the	  Convention’s	  Executive	  
established	   as	   independent	   of	   the	   Convention	   to	   resolve	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   it	   had	  
been	  unable	  to	  resolve	  itself.	  	  It	  did	  so	  by	  providing	  recommendations	  on	  the	  electoral	  
system,	  women’s	  representation	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Scottish	  parliament	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
European	   context,	   not	   to	   mention	   the	   thorny	   issue	   of	   revenues.31	   	   While	   the	  
Commission	   did	   not	   adequately	   resolve	   each	   of	   the	   issues,	   it	   provided	   a	   forum	   for	  
discussion	  and	  an	  agenda	  for	  future	  negotiations	  between	  Convention	  parties.32	   	  The	  
Convention	   itself	   produced	   two	   documents	   in	   1995.	   	   First	   “Key	   Proposals	   for	  
Scotland’s	   Parliament”	  was	  published	  by	   the	   Executive	  Committee	   in	  October	  which	  
updated	  the	  1990	  “Towards	  Scotland’s	  Parliament”	  document	  with	  further	  principles	  
which	   had	   been	   recently	   agreed	   (including	   the	   adoption	   of	   an	   additional	   member	  
                                                
30	  Wright,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.162.	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  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Commission,	  Further	  Steps	  towards	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  Parliament,	  
Edinburgh,	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electoral	  system	  to	  elect	  129	  members).33	  	  Secondly,	  these	  proposals	  were	  presented	  
to	   the	   Scottish	   public	   on	   30	   November	   (St	   Andrew’s	   Day)	   in	   the	   Convention’s	   final	  
report,	   “Scotland’s	   Parliament,	   Scotland’s	   Right”.34	   	   Crucially,	   it	   had	   done	   so	   by	  
maintaining	  the	  support	  of	  both	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and,	  in	  Labour,	  the	  likely	  next	  
party	   of	   government.	   	   In	   obtaining	   the	   support	   of	   both	   at	   party	   conferences	   the	  
following	   year,	   the	   Convention	   made	   devolution	   a	   key	   pledge	   of	   their	   election	  
manifestos	  for	  the	  coming	  general	  election.	  	  However,	  in	  mid-­‐1996,	  a	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  
election,	   Labour’s	   leader	   Tony	   Blair	   announced	   that,	   should	   Labour	   win	   power,	   the	  
devolution	  legislation	  would	  once	  again	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  referendums.	  	  Referendums	  
plural,	  for	  the	  proposal	  to	  allow	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  a	  tax	  varying	  power	  was	  also	  
to	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  referendum.	  	  A	  test	  of	  public	  opinion	  was	  back	  on	  the	  agenda	  for	  
devolution.	  	  
	  
Plans	  for	  a	  referendum	  
Naturally,	   this	   took	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention	   by	   surprise	   and	   many	  
involved	   in	  the	  process	  were	  sceptical	  that	  Blair’s	  announcement	  was	  anything	  more	  
than	   an	   attempt	   to	   derail	   the	   devolution	   plans.	   	   It	   was	   also	   perceived	   as	   a	   London	  
slight	  on	  the	  process.	  	  George	  Robertson,	  the	  Shadow	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Scotland	  
had	  been	  briefing	  as	   late	  as	  the	  week	  before	  Blair’s	  announcement	  that	  there	  would	  
be	  no	  referendum,	  while	  his	  deputy	  John	  McAllion	  resigned	  his	  post	   in	  protest	  at	  his	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  Scottish	  Constitutional	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lack	   of	   foreknowledge	   of	   the	   move.35	   	   Meetings	   between	   Tony	   Blair	   and	   Kenyon	  
Wright,	   still	   in	   his	   role	   as	   the	   Chair	   of	   the	   Convention’s	   Executive	   Committee	   were	  
hastily	   arranged,	  with	   the	   former	   arguing	   that	   the	   referendum	  be	  used	   as	   a	   tactical	  
device	  aimed	  at	  easing	  the	  passage	  of	  a	  Scotland	  Bill	  through	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  –	  and,	  
more	  specifically,	  to	  entrench	  the	  parliament	  as	  part	  of	  the	  political	  scenery.36	  	  Though	  
not	  recognised	  by	  those	  opposed	  to	  a	  referendum,	  Blair’s	  proposed	  referendum	  was	  
actually	  a	  continuation	  of	  his	  predecessor’s	  strategy	  with	  regard	  to	  devolution.	   	   John	  
Smith,	   in	   an	   interview	   given	   in	   1981	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   first	   devolution	  
referendum	  argued	  that	  a	  further	  devolution	  referendum	  would	  be	  “inevitable”	  which	  
would	   subsequently	   “give	   the	   government	   solid	   grounds	   for	   pressing	   ahead”.37	  	  
Smith’s	  view	  had	  not	  only	  been	  that	  a	  referendum	  was	  a	  positive	  good	  for	  devolution	  
–	  that	  it	  would,	  as	  Tony	  Blair	  intended,	  entrench	  the	  subsequent	  devolved	  institution	  –	  
but	   that	   the	   precedent	   of	   asking	   the	   public	   in	   1979	   meant	   that	   any	   further	   move	  
towards	   devolution	   would	   necessitate	   a	   similar	   strategy.38	   	   These	   considerations,	  
alongside	   the	   desire	   to	   consult	   the	   public	   and	   the	   precedent	   set	   by	   the	   prior	  
devolution	   referendum,	   helped	   to	   shape	   the	   SNP’s	   referendum	   strategy	   for	  
independence.	  
	  
The	   nature	   of	   the	   announcement	   though,	   caused	   some	   consternation	   among	   the	  
Scottish	   political	   parties	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention.	   	   Scottish	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  D.	  and	  Lewis,	  B.	  ‘The	  Scottish	  and	  Welsh	  Referendum	  Campaigns’	  in	  Taylor,	  B.	  and	  
Thomson,	  K.	  (eds)	  Scotland	  and	  Wales:	  Nations	  Again?	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  1999,	  p.19.	  
36	  ibid,	  p.	  18,	  22.	  
37	  Smith,	  J.	  (1998	  [1981])	  “Interview:	  Portrait	  of	  a	  Devolutionist”	  in	  Paterson,	  L.	  A	  Diverse	  Assembly:	  The	  
Debate	  on	  a	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  Edinburgh,	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  1998,	  p.136.	  	  The	  original	  
interview	  with	  John	  Smith	  was	  conducted	  by	  Neal	  Ascherson	  and	  Tom	  Nairn	  and	  featured	  in	  the	  Bulletin	  




Labour’s	   National	   Executive	   Committee	   had	   to	   be	   coaxed	   into	   supporting	   the	  
proposals	  –	  and	  only	   then	  at	   the	   second	   time	  of	  asking.	   	  The	  Convention’s	   co-­‐chairs	  
were	   unimpressed	   by	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   announcement	   which	   came	   without	   any	  
consultation,	  and	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  were	  equally	   furious.39	   	  The	  concern	  among	  
the	   Convention	   was	   that	   the	   task	   of	   informing,	   educating	   and	   awareness	   building	  
among	   the	   Scottish	   public	   –	   a	   task	  which	   the	  Convention	  had	   agreed	   –	   had	  not	   yet	  
been	  embarked	  upon,	  and	  provided	  further	  evidence	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  
public	   during	   the	   process.40	   	   However,	   bridges	   were	   built	   once	   more	   between	   the	  
parties,	  and	  the	  Convention	  was	  once	  again	  united	  behind	  the	  devolution	  proposals.	  	  
	  
The	  Referendum	  Campaign	  
After	  Labour	  won	  the	  1997	  general	  election	  –	  by	  a	  landslide	  margin	  –	  the	  referendum	  
bill	  was	  published	  two	  weeks	  later,	  and	  scheduled	  for	  11	  September	  1997.41	  	  While	  the	  
Convention	  recognised	  that	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  demand	  for	  devolution	  as	  evidenced	  by	  
its	  strong	  showing	  in	  opinion	  polls	  in	  the	  period	  up	  to	  and	  beyond	  the	  general	  election	  
(see	  table	  2.3)	  they	  also	  recognised	  that	  this	  would	  count	  for	  nothing	  if	  the	  campaign	  
was	  as	  disunited	  as	   in	  1979.	   	  This	  meant	  reaching	  out	  to	  the	  SNP	  who	  had	  remained	  
outside	  the	  Convention	  process	  having	  seen	  it	  as	  a	  means	  of	  diminishing	  the	  prospects	  
of	   independence.	   	  Getting	   the	  SNP	  on	  board	  was	  a	  key	  objective,	  and	  moves	   to	   this	  
end	  were	  made	  early	   in	  the	  summer	  of	  1997.42	   	  The	  SNP	  themselves	  wanted	  to	  wait	  
                                                
39	  Harvie,	  C.	  and	  Jones,	  P.	  op	  cit.	  p.173.	  
40	  Wright,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p230.	  
41	  McCrone,	  D.	  and	  Lewis,	  B.	  op	  cit.	  p24.	  
42	  McLean,	  B.	  Getting	  it	  Together:	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Campaign	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Assembly/	  Parliament,	  
Edinburgh,	  Luath,	  2005,	  p.164.	  
 
78	  
and	   see	   what	   the	   form	   of	   Labour’s	   White	   Paper43	   would	   take	   before	   committing	  
themselves	   to	   campaign	   for	   devolution.	   	   Former	   SNP	   leader	   Gordon	   Wilson	   was	  
vehemently	   opposed	   to	   the	   party	   joining	   the	   campaign,	   calling	   it	   a	   “devolution	  
swamp,”	  but	   the	  party’s	   national	   council	   voted	  overwhelmingly	   to	   support	   a	  double	  
yes	   (the	   two	   questions	   –	   to	   devolution	   and	   to	   tax-­‐varying	   powers	   –	   having	   been	  
combined	   in	  one	   referendum)	   in	   the	  upcoming	   referendum,	  and	   the	  SNP	   joined	   the	  
Yes-­‐Yes	  campaign.44	  
	  
Table	  2.3:	  Scotland	  Devolution	  Opinion	  Polls	  (1997)45	  
	  
	   	   Question	  1*	   Question	  2*	  
Date	   Poll	   Yes	   No	   DK	   Yes	   No	   DK	  
Jan	   ICM/	  The	  Scotsman	   69	   27	   4	   59	   33	   8	  
Mar	   ICM/	  The	  Scotsman	   71	   26	   3	   58	   34	   8	  
Apr	   ICM/	  The	  Scotsman	   64	   28	   8	   52	   34	   12	  
May	   System	  Three/	  The	  Herald	   64	   21	   15	   53	   28	   19	  
June	   ICM/	  The	  Scotsman	   72	   22	   6	   61	   32	   7	  
June	   System	  Three/	  The	  Herald	   68	   21	   11	   56	   26	   18	  
July	   ICM/	  The	  Scotsman	   68	   22	   10	   55	   36	   9	  
July	   System	  Three/	  The	  Herald	   65	   19	   16	   54	   27	   19	  
Aug	   ICM/	  The	  Scotsman	   66	   23	   11	   55	   38	   9	  
Aug	   System	  Three/	  The	  Herald	   61	   23	   16	   47	   32	   11	  
Sept	   ICM/	  The	  Scotsman	   63	   25	   12	   48	   40	   12	  
Sept	   System	  Three/	  The	  Herald	   61	   20	   19	   45	   31	   14	  
*Question	  1	  asked	  respondents	  whether	  there	  should	  be	  a	  Scottish	  Parliament.	  	  	  
Question	  2	  asked	  whether	  a	  Scottish	  Parliament	  should	  have	  the	  	  
power	  to	  vary	  the	  basic	  rate	  of	  income	  tax	  by	  3p.	  
	  
	  
The	   referendum	   campaign	   proper	   was	   a	   short	   one,	   beginning	   in	   early	   August	   and	  
ending	   with	   the	   poll	   itself	   on	   11	   September.	   	   The	   Convention	   agreed	   that	   a	   new	  
                                                
43	  The	  White	  Paper	  was	  published	  in	  July	  1997	  and	  contained	  within	  it	  the	  proposals	  which	  would	  be	  
enacted	  should	  the	  referendum	  return	  an	  affirmative	  vote.	  	  Scottish	  Office,	  Scotland’s	  Parliament,	  
(Cmnd.3658),	  London,	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  July,	  1997,	  at:	  
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/government/devolution/scpa-­‐00.asp	  	  
44	  McCrone,	  D.	  and	  Lewis,	  B.	  op	  cit.	  p25.	  
45	  ibid,	  p.25	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organisation	   was	   needed	   to	   run	   the	   campaign,	   and	   “Scotland	   FORward”	   was	  
established	  with	  Nigel	  Smith,	  a	  businessman	  and	  devolution	  enthusiast	  in	  the	  chair.46	  	  
With	  the	  SNP	  now	  on	  board	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  having	  lost	  all	  of	  their	  Scottish	  MPs	  
in	   the	   general	   election,	   the	   Yes-­‐Yes	   campaign	   had	   the	   backing	   of	   almost	   all	   of	  
Scotland’s	  MPs.	  	  Of	  course	  there	  were	  several	  anti-­‐devolutionists	  –	  remnants	  of	  the	  No	  
campaign	  in	  1979	  –	  remaining	  within	  the	  Labour	  party,	  but	  their	  role	  in	  this	  campaign	  
was	  limited.	  	  With	  the	  polls	  projecting	  a	  large	  win	  for	  devolution,	  all	  the	  campaign	  had	  
to	   do	   was	   make	   sure	   the	   voters	   turned	   out.	   	   However,	   with	   the	   death	   of	   Diana,	  
Princess	  of	  Wales	  on	  31	  August,	  the	  new	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Scotland	  Donald	  Dewar	  
announced	   a	   temporary	   cessation	   in	   campaigning	   until	   the	   Monday	   following	   the	  
funeral.	  	  This	  left	  just	  three	  days	  in	  which	  campaigners	  could	  get	  their	  message	  across	  
to	   the	   electorate,	   and	   though	   the	   campaign	   was	   still	   well	   in	   the	   lead,	   there	   was	   a	  
concern	  that	  the	  outpouring	  of	  grief	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Diana’s	  death	  might	  result	  in	  
an	  increase	  in	  feelings	  of	  “Britishness”,	  putting	  a	  double	  yes	  vote	  in	  doubt.	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  event,	  the	  result	  was	  emphatic.	  	  On	  both	  questions	  –	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
Scottish	  Parliament,	  and	  to	  that	  Parliament	  having	  a	  tax-­‐varying	  power	  –	  the	  positive	  
response	  carried	  a	  sizeable	  majority	  (see	  table	  6.4).	  	  The	  long	  campaign	  for	  a	  Scottish	  
Parliament	   was	   finally	   over.	   	   The	   Scottish	   people	   hadn’t	   just	   agreed	   to	   have	   a	  
parliament,	  “they	  thumped	  the	  table	  and	  demanded	  it,	  unequivocally”.47	  
	  
                                                
46	  Harvie,	  C.	  and	  Jones,	  P.	  op	  cit.	  p178.	  
47	  Jones,	  P.	  ‘A	  Start	  to	  a	  New	  Song:	  The	  1997	  Devolution	  Referendum	  Campaign’	  in	  Scottish	  Affairs,	  No.	  
21,	  autumn,	  1997.	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Table	  2.4:	  Scotland	  Devolution	  Referendum	  Result	  (1997)48	  
	  
Question	  1	   I	  agree	  that	  there	  should	  be	  	  
a	  Scottish	  Parliament	  
I	  do	  not	  agree	  there	  should	  be	  
a	  Scottish	  Parliament	  
	   74.3%	   25.7%	  
Question	  2	   I	  agree	  that	  a	  Scottish	  
Parliament	  should	  have	  	  
tax-­‐varying	  powers	  
I	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  a	  Scottish	  
Parliament	  should	  have	  	  
tax-­‐varying	  powers	  
	   63.5%	   36.5%	  
	  
Establishing	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  
The	  constitutional	  settlement	  was	  largely	  absent	  from	  political	  debate	  in	  the	  Scottish	  
Parliament	   for	   the	   first	   session.	   	   This	   was	   unsurprising	   when	   the	   extent	   of	  
parliamentary	   business	   (52	   Scottish	   Executive-­‐introduced	   bills	   were	   passed	   in	   this	  
period)	   and	   the	   death	   of	   the	   first	   Scottish	   First	   Minister	   (Donald	   Dewar)	   and	   the	  
subsequent	  resignation	  of	  the	  second	  (Henry	  McLeish)	  are	  taken	  into	  account.49	   	  The	  
focus	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Executive	  under	  its	  third	  First	  Minister,	  Jack	  McConnell,	  and	  the	  
parliament	   itself,	   was	   to	   provide	   stability	   after	   the	   turbulence	   of	   its	   early	   years.	  	  
Indeed,	   it	   was	  McConnell’s	   intention	   to	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   “doing	   less,	   better”,	   thereby	  
moving	   the	   Parliament	   into	   the	   background	   whilst	   still	   delivering	   the	   services	   the	  
public	   expected.50	   	   The	   SNP	   largely	   focused	   on	   internal	   reorganisation	   in	   this	   early	  
period	   while	   MSPs	   such	   as	   Andrew	  Wilson	   and	   Jim	   Mather	   worked	   on	   the	   party’s	  
economic	   policy	   and	   took	   opportunities	   to	   articulate	   their	   concerns	   that	   the	  
Parliament	  lacked	  the	  economic	  levels	  to	  effectively	  support	  business.51	  
	  
                                                
48	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1999	  op	  cit.	  p.199.	  
49	  Mitchell,	  J.	  et	  al.	  ‘Third	  Year,	  Third	  First	  Minister’	  in	  Hazell,	  R.	  (ed)	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  2003	  –	  The	  
Third	  Year	  of	  Devolution	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2003,	  p.126.	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  Keating,	  M.	  The	  Government	  of	  Scotland:	  Public	  Policy	  Making	  after	  Devolution	  (Second	  Edition),	  




In	   contrast	   to	   Wales,	   and	   after	   four	   years	   of	   relative	   instability	   in	   Scotland,	   Jack	  
McConnell’s	   strategy	   was	   to	   lower	   expectations	   of	   what	   devolution	   could	   achieve,	  
attempting	  to	  limit	  the	  damage	  of	  the	  early	  problems	  that	  devolution	  had	  faced,	  both	  
to	  his	  own	  Labour	  party	  and	  to	  the	  Parliament	  itself.52	  	  And	  while	  Labour	  lost	  seats	  in	  
the	  2003	  elections,	  this	  setback	  was	  limited	  by	  two	  factors:	  their	  return	  to	  office,	  in	  a	  
further	   coalition	   with	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats,	   and	   the	   electoral	   performance	   of	   the	  
SNP,	   who	   lost	   8	   seats	   (and,	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   2004	   European	   Parliamentary	  
election,	   saw	   their	   leader	   John	   Swinney	   resign).	   	   These	   developments	   allowed	  
McConnell’s	   strategy	   to	   continue	   relatively	   untroubled,	   and	   the	   coalition	   helped	   to	  
provide	   stability	   to	   the	   Parliament’s	   organisation	   –	   particularly	   in	   light	   of	   growing	  
public	   unrest	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   new	  Holyrood	   building.	   	   They	   also	   contributed	   to	   a	  
continued	   lack	   of	   constitutional	   debate,	   with	   parliament	   continuing	   to	   function	  
relatively	   benignly	   under	   the	   rules	   established	   in	   the	   Scotland	   Act	   1998	   –	  with	   two	  
exceptions.	   	   Firstly,	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats,	   in	   the	   latter	   part	   of	   the	   second	  
parliamentary	  term,	  established	  a	  commission	  under	  the	  chairmanship	  of	  the	  Scottish	  
Parliament’s	   outgoing	   Presiding	   Officer	   Lord	   Steel,	   which	   set	   out	   the	   case	   for	  
extending	  the	  Parliament’s	  powers	  to	  include	  fiscal	  power	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  a	  federal	  
UK.53	  	  Secondly,	  the	  re-­‐election	  of	  Alex	  Salmond	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  SNP	  in	  2005	  (though	  
not	   returning	   to	   the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  until	   the	  2007	  elections)	   saw	   the	  party	   talk	  
more	  freely	  about	  the	  limitations	  of	  devolution,	  fiscal	  autonomy	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  
independence.	  
	  
                                                
52	  Mitchell	  J.	  ‘Scotland:	  Expectations,	  Policy	  Types	  and	  Devolution’	  in	  Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  2004,	  op	  cit.	  p.23.	  
53	  The	  Steel	  Commission,	  Moving	  to	  Federalism:	  A	  New	  Settlement	  for	  Scotland	  Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  
Liberal	  Democrats,	  2006,	  p110-­‐120.	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The	  result	  of	  the	  first	  two	  terms	  of	  devolution	  was	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  electorate	  by	  
the	   time	   the	   2007	   devolved	   elections	   came	   around.54	   	   Voters	   began	   to	   distinguish	  
between	  parties	  they	  would	  vote	  for	  in	  UK	  elections	  and	  those	  they	  might	  support	  in	  
devolved	  elections	  –	  with	  the	  result	  that	  in	  2007	  the	  SNP	  achieved	  something	  which	  it	  
never	  had	  previously:	  government	  office.	  	  The	  SNP	  campaigned	  forcefully	  –	  with	  Alex	  
Salmond	   presenting	   himself	   as	   their	   candidate	   for	   First	  Minister	   –	   as	   an	   alternative	  
government	  to	  Labour,	  with	  a	  slick	  and	  professional	  campaign	  focused	  on	  image	  and	  
personality.	   	   While	   independence	   was	   not	   front	   and	   centre	   in	   the	   campaign,	   their	  
argument	   was	   clear:	   that	   the	   devolution	   settlement	   was	   not	   allowing	   Scotland	   to	  
reach	  its	  potential,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  “time”	  for	  a	  change.55	  	  
	  
Devolution	  in	  Wales	  
The	  devolution	   story	   in	  Wales	   contains	   less	  of	   a	  broad	  base	  of	   support	   than	   that	  of	  
Scotland,	  though	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  	  Legally,	  at	  least,	  Wales	  ceased	  to	  exist	  
as	  a	  separate	  entity	  in	  the	  times	  of	  the	  Tudors,	  with	  laws	  pertaining	  to	  the	  principality	  
contained	  under	  the	  legal	  hybrid	  “England	  and	  Wales”.56	  	  Nevertheless,	  administrative	  
devolution	  had	  existed	   in	  Wales	   since	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  Minister	   for	  Welsh	  Affairs	   in	  
1951,	  and	  proposals	  for	  devolution	  first	  surfaced	  in	  proposals	  from	  the	  Welsh	  Council	  
of	  Labour	  for	  an	  elected	  council	  in	  the	  1960s	  –	  prior	  to	  the	  real	  emergence	  of	  similar	  
demands	   in	   Scotland.57	   	   Indeed,	   support	   for	   a	  Welsh	   Parliament	   passed	   60%	   in	   two	  
                                                
54	  Curtice,	  J.	  ‘Devolution,	  the	  SNP	  and	  the	  Electorate’	  in	  Hassan,	  G.	  (ed)	  The	  Modern	  SNP:	  From	  Protest	  
to	  Power,	  Edinburgh,	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2009(c),	  p.61.	  
55	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  Manifesto	  2007:	  It’s	  Time,	  Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  2007.	  
56	  Foulkes,	  D.	  et	  al	  ‘Wales:	  a	  Separate	  Administrative	  Unit’	  in	  Foulkes,	  D.,	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  R.	  
A.	  (eds)	  The	  Welsh	  Veto:	  The	  Wales	  Act	  1978	  and	  the	  Referendum,	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  
1983,	  p.1.	  




polls	   in	   the	   late	   1960s	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   electoral	   success	   of	   Plaid	  
Cymru	   and	   the	   SNP	   in	   by-­‐elections	   (see	   table	   4.1),	   though	   this	   support	   was	   always	  
subject	  to	  wide	  fluctuations	  based	  upon	  political	  circumstances.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  the	  
pressure	   put	   on	   the	   Labour	   government	   by	   the	   increasingly	   electorally	   relevant	  
nationalist	   parties,	   more	   particularly	   in	   Scotland,	   that	   put	   devolution	   on	   the	   UK	  
political	  agenda.	  	  However,	  whilst	  Plaid	  Cymru	  had	  influenced	  the	  Welsh	  Labour	  Party	  
into	  adopting	  a	  proposal	   for	  devolution	  at	   their	  1966	  conference,	   they	  were	  to	  have	  
very	   little	   impact	   on	   the	   form	   and	   scope	   of	   those	   proposals,	   with	   much	   of	   the	  
following	  debate	  taking	  part	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  Welsh	  Labour	  Party	  itself.58	  
	  
Table	  2.5:	  Wales	  Devolution	  Opinion	  Polls	  (1967-­‐8)59	  
	  
Date	   Poll	   Support	  for	  	  
a	  Welsh	  Parliament	  
Nov	  1967	   Opinion	  Research	  Centre	   60%	  
May	  1968	   Market	  Information	  Services/	  NOP	   39%	  
Sept	  1968	   Market	  Information	  Services/	  NOP	   49%	  
Sept	  1968	   Opinion	  Research	  Centre	   60%	  
	  
The	  Labour	  government	  built	  on	  these	  proposals	  by	  appointing	   its	  Royal	  Commission	  
on	   the	   Constitution.	   	   And	   though	   there	  was	   a	   distinct	   lack	   of	   engagement	  with	   the	  
process	   on	   the	   part	   of	   Scottish	   pressure	   groups,	  Welsh	   organisations	   were	   keen	   to	  
have	  their	  say.	  	  Groups	  as	  disparate	  as	  the	  Anglesey	  Council,	  the	  Association	  of	  Welsh	  
Local	   Authorities,	   the	   Baptist	   Union	   of	   Wales,	   the	   Welsh	   Committee	   for	   Hospital	  
Medical	   Services	  and	   the	  Welsh	  Schools	  Parents’	  Union	  all	  provided	  evidence	   to	   the	  
                                                
58	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  ‘The	  Development	  of	  the	  Devolution	  Debate’	  in	  Foulkes,	  D.,	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  
R.	  A.	  1983,	  op	  cit.	  p.22.	  
59	  Evans,	  J.	  G.	  op	  cit.	  p.123.	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Commission,	   some	   enthusiastic	   about	   devolution,	   others	   less	   so.60	   	   Welsh	   Labour	  
themselves	   provided	   evidence,	   rejecting	   the	   concepts	   of	   federalism	   and	   separatism,	  
and	  also	  the	   idea	  of	  a	   legislative	  assembly.61	   	  This	  was	  evidence	  of	  opposition	  within	  
the	   party’s	   ranks	   to	   an	   elected	  Welsh	   Assembly.	   	  When	   the	   Conservatives	  won	   the	  
election	  in	  1970,	  the	  devolution	  debate	  became	  further	  entrenched	  within	  the	  Welsh	  
Labour	   Party.	   	  While	   the	   party	   as	   a	   whole	   remained	   supportive	   of	   the	   concept,	   its	  
Welsh	   MPs	   were	   less	   than	   enthusiastic.62	   	   By	   the	   time	   Labour	   were	   elected	   as	   a	  
minority	   government	   in	   1974,	   their	   manifesto	   in	   Wales	   had	   committed	   them	   to	  
devolution	  in	  Wales,	  stating	  that	  they	  would:	  
	  
Establish	   a	   directly	   elected	   council	   for	  Wales	  with	   function,	  
power	  and	  finance	  to	  enable	  it	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  force	  in	  the	  
life	  of	  Wales.63	  
	  
Thus,	   when	   the	   devolution	   legislation	   was	   brought	   forward	   in	   the	   1970s,	   it	   was	   a	  
compromise	  between	  what	   the	  party’s	   research	  group	  on	  devolution	  had	  wanted	   (a	  
legislative	   Welsh	   Assembly)	   and	   what	   Labour’s	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Wales	   –	   and	  
some	   of	   his	   Welsh	   MP	   colleagues	   –	   desired:	   an	   indirectly	   elected	   body	   with	   no	  
legislative	  powers.	  	  The	  compromise	  –	  which	  found	  its	  way	  into	  the	  1970s	  legislation,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  1998	  –	  was	  a	  directly	  elected	  Assembly,	  with	  
the	  power	  only	   to	  enact	   secondary	   legislation.64	   	  This	  was	  an	   idea	  which	  pleased	  no	  
one.	  	  For	  Welsh	  Labour	  MPs,	  particularly	  Neil	  Kinnock,	  Leo	  Abse	  and	  the	  “Gang	  of	  Six”,	  
the	  mere	  idea	  of	  devolution	  was	  to	  be	  opposed,	  and	  a	  referendum	  was	  demanded	  as	  
                                                
60	  Drucker,	  H.	  M.	  and	  Brown,	  G.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Nationalism	  and	  Devolution,	  London:	  Longman,	  1980,	  
p.73-­‐4.	  
61	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  1983	  op	  cit.	  p.23.	  
62	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Devolution	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.162.	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  Labour	  Party,	  Policies	  for	  a	  Brighter	  Future	  For	  Wales,	  Cardiff,	  Wales	  Labour	  Party,	  1974,	  p.2.	  
64	  ibid.	  p.165.	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an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   proposed	   assembly.	   	   For	   those	   who	   supported	   devolution	   and	  
wanted	  home	  rule	  for	  Wales,	  the	  proposals	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough,	  providing,	  as	  they	  
did,	  a	  weak	  assembly	  with	  no	  real	  power.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  was	  devolution,	  and	  for	  that	  
reason,	  it	  was	  to	  be	  supported.	  	  
	  
The	  parliamentary	  process	  of	  the	  1976	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  Bill	  –	  and	  the	  subsequently	  
separate	   Scotland	   Bill	   and	   Wales	   Bill	   –	   were	   akin	   to	   “for	   Wales	   see	   Scotland”,	  
especially	   since	   the	  Welsh	   legislation	  was	   timetabled	   to	   follow	   that	   of	   the	   Scotland	  
Bill.65	  	  The	  concession	  to	  Labour’s	  anti-­‐devolutionists	  of	  a	  post-­‐legislative	  referendum	  
during	   the	   failed	   attempt	   to	   pilot	   the	   original	   Scotland	   and	  Wales	   Bill	   through	   the	  
House	  of	  Commons	  was	  a	  more	  serious	  defeat	  than	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  legislation	  itself,	  
as	  it	  meant	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  referendum	  would	  have	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  the	  future	  
attempts	  at	  devolution.66	  	  	  
	  
Table	  2.6:	  Wales	  Devolution	  Opinion	  Polls	  (1975-­‐9)67	  
	  
Date	   Poll	   Yes	   No	   DK	  
12	  Dec	  1975	   R&M	  Wales	  and	  the	  West	  (Western	  Mail/	  HTV	  Wales)	   30	   39	   31	  
1	  Mar	  1976	   R&M	  Wales	  and	  the	  West	  (Y	  Cymro)	   30	   39	   31	  
6	  Dec	  1976	   R&M	  Wales	  and	  the	  West	  (Western	  Mail/	  HTV	  Wales)	   27	   40	   33	  
18	  Mar	  1977	   R&M	  Wales	  and	  the	  West	  (Western	  Mail/	  HTV	  Wales)	   27	   53	   21	  
12	  May	  1978	   Abacus	  (BBC)	   41	   41	   18	  
22	  Sept	  1978	   Abacus	  (BBC)	   38	   49	   14	  
8	  Feb	  1979	   Abacus	  (BBC)	   33	   46	   21	  
24	  Feb	  1979	   R&M	  Wales	  and	  the	  West	  (Western	  Mail/	  HTV	  Wales)	   22	   57	   21	  
28	  Feb	  1979	   Abacus	  (BBC)	   22	   65	   13	  
28	  Feb	  1979	   Marplan	  (The	  Sun)	   22	   67	   11	  
	  
                                                
65	  James,	  M.	  and	  Lindley,	  P.	  D.	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  Parliamentary	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  the	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  in	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  D.,	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  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  R.	  A.	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  op	  cit.	  p.45.	  
66	  Barry	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  op	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67	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  ‘The	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  Experience’	  in	  Bochel,	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  D.	  and	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  cit.	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  D.	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  in	  Foulkes,	  D.,	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  R.	  A.	  1983,	  
op	  cit.	  p.202.	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The	  addition	  of	  the	  Cunningham	  Amendment	  to	  the	  referendum	  (requiring	  40%	  of	  the	  
electorate	   to	   vote	   for	   the	   proposals)	   coupled	   with	   opinion	   polling	   in	   Wales	   which	  
showed	   that	   an	   assembly	   was	   not	   popular	   with	   the	   electorate	   (see	   table	   2.2)	  
suggested	  that	  the	  devolution	   legislation	  was	  doomed	  to	  failure.	   	  However,	   this	  only	  
tells	   part	   of	   the	   story.	   	  With	   division	   among	   the	   political	   parties	   on	   the	   proposals	   –	  
Plaid	   Cymru	  were	   critical	   that	   the	  Welsh	  model	   of	   devolution	   lacked	   the	   legislative	  
powers	  offered	  to	  Scotland;	  the	  Liberals	  were	  also	  unhappy	  with	  the	  limited	  model	  of	  
devolution;	   Labour’s	   pro-­‐devolutionist	  MPs	   thought	   that	   it	   was	   the	   best	   they	   could	  
manage	  but	   that	   it	  would	   soon	  need	  amendment	  while	   their	   anti-­‐devolutionist	  MPs	  
simply	   dismissed	   the	   proposals	   as	   unnecessary	   and	   damaging	   to	   the	   Union	   –	   the	  
campaign	  for	  a	  Yes	  vote	  was	  hamstrung	  before	  it	  even	  begun.68	  	  This,	  coupled	  with	  a	  
clear	   lack	   of	   public	   engagement	   upon	   the	   issue,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   almost	   all	   of	   the	  
devolution	   debate	   had	   taken	   place	   within	   the	   Labour	   party	   itself,	   meant	   that	   the	  
public	   developed	   neither	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   proposals	   nor	   a	   favourable	   opinion	   of	  
them.	   	   Indeed,	   there	   was	   such	   a	   limited	   demand	   for	   devolution	   in	  Wales	   that	   the	  
perception	   was	   that	   the	   proposals	   were	   being	   pressed	   upon	   the	   Welsh	   electorate	  
rather	  than	  providing	  an	  answer	  to	  a	  clearly	  articulated	  demand.69	  	  
	  
The	   Yes	   campaign	   did	   draw	   support	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   sources	   though.	   	   The	  Welsh	  
Labour	  Party	  Executive	  gave	  its	  full	  backing	  to	  the	  campaign	  along	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  
their	  Welsh	  MPs,	  while	  the	  Welsh	  Liberal	  Party	  and	  the	  Wales	  TUC	  also	  gave	  political	  
backing.	  	  After	  some	  internal	  debate,	  Plaid	  Cymru	  decided	  to	  campaign	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
                                                
68	  ibid.	  p.31	  
69	  Wilford,	  R.	  A.	  	  ‘The	  Character	  of	  the	  Lobbies:	  Some	  Theoretical	  Considerations’	  in	  Foulkes,	  D.,	  Barry	  
Jones,	  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  R.	  A.	  1983,	  op	  cit.	  p.112.	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assembly	   while	   well-­‐known	   figures	   from	   Welsh	   sporting	   life	   (Gareth	   Edwards	   and	  
Barry	  John)	  and	  entertainment	  (Max	  Boyce,	  Nerys	  Hughes	  and	  Harry	  Secombe)	   leant	  
their	   support.70	   	   Opposition	   to	   the	   proposals	   was	   led	   by	   the	   Conservative	   Party	   in	  
Wales,	  supported	  by	  7	  of	  the	  8	  County	  Councils	   in	  Wales,	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  
the	  Self-­‐Employed,	   the	  Country	   Landowners	  Association,	   and	   the	   “Gang	  of	   Six”	  anti-­‐
devolutionist	  Welsh	  Labour	  MPs:	  	  Leo	  Abse,	  Donald	  Anderson,	  Ifor	  Davis,	  Fred	  Evans,	  
Ioan	   Evans	   and	   Neil	   Kinnock.71	   	   In	   the	   event,	   the	   latter	   proved	   too	   strong	   for	  
supporters	  of	  the	  proposals,	  and	  devolution	  was	  resoundingly	  defeated	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  
4	  to	  1	  (see	  table	  2.7).	  
	  
Table	  2.7:	  Wales	  Devolution	  Referendum	  Result	  (1979)72	  
	  
Question:	   “Parliament	   has	   decided	   to	   consult	   the	   electorate	   in	   Wales	   on	   the	  
question	  whether	  the	  Wales	  Act	  1978	  should	  be	  put	  into	  effect.	  Do	  you	  want	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Wales	  Act	  1978	  to	  be	  put	  into	  effect?"	  
Yes	   No	   Yes	  (of	  electorate)	   No	  (of	  electorate)	   Did	  not	  vote	  
20.2%	   79.8%	   11.9%	   46.9%	   41.2%	  
	  
The	  scale	  of	  defeat	  for	  devolution	  in	  Wales	  took	  supporters	  by	  surprise.	  	  The	  Secretary	  
of	  State	  for	  Wales	  John	  Morris	  put	  it	  succinctly:	  
	  
When	  you	  see	  an	  elephant	  on	  your	  doorstep,	  you	  know	  it	   is	  
there.73	  
	  
He,	  and	  the	  pro-­‐devolution	  camp	  in	  Wales,	  recognised	  that	  devolution	  had	  suffered	  a	  
massive	  defeat.	   	   “Defeat	   loud	  and	   clear”	  were	   further	   sentiments	  Morris	   put	   to	   the	  
                                                
70	  Morgan,	  K.	  O.	  Wales:	  Rebirth	  of	  a	  Nation	  1880-­‐1980	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1981,	  p.403.	  
71	  Wilford,	  R.	  A.	  op	  cit.	  p.109-­‐110.	  
72	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1999	  op	  cit.	  p.190.	  
73	  Balsom,	  D.	  (1983)	  “Public	  Opinion	  and	  Welsh	  Devolution”	  in	  Foulkes,	  D.,	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  R.	  
A.	  (eds)	  The	  Welsh	  Veto:	  The	  Wales	  Act	  1978	  and	  the	  Referendum,	  Cardiff:	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  
1983,	  p.197.	  The	  original	  quotation	  appeared	  in	  the	  Western	  Mail,	  3	  March	  1979.	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press.74	  The	  Western	  Mail	   itself	  was	   somewhat	  more	  circumspect,	  arguing	   that	   “this	  
concept	  of	  a	  Welsh	  Assembly	  is	  now	  dead	  and	  buried”.75	  	  This	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  a	  
future	  –	  different	  –	  model	  of	  devolution	  to	  be	  considered,	  but	  recognised	  that,	  for	  the	  
foreseeable	  future,	  devolution	  was	  off	  the	  political	  agenda	  in	  Wales,	   just	  as	   it	  was	   in	  
Scotland.	  
	  
Unlike	   in	   Scotland,	   however,	   no	   movement	   emerged	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  
referendum	  defeat.	  	  This	  is	  unsurprising,	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  engagement	  with	  the	  
debate,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   devolution	   remained	   an	   internal	   Labour	   party	   policy	  
discussion	  rather	  than	  a	  public	  debate	  –	  though	  the	  party	  itself	  remained	  split	  on	  the	  
issue.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Campaign	  for	  a	  Welsh	  Assembly	  (CWA)	  was	  established	  in	  1987,	  considerably	  later	  
than	  its	  Scottish	  counterpart.	  	  The	  was	  formed	  as	  a	  cross-­‐party	  body,	  with	  chaired	  by	  a	  
former	   Labour	   candidate	   and	   with	   Liberal	   Democrat,	   Plaid	   Cymru	   and	   Communist	  
party	   representation,	  but	  was	   largely	   ignored	  by	   the	  wider	  Wales	  Labour	  Party	   in	   its	  
early	   existence.76	   	   It	   was	   also	   largely	   a	   Cardiff-­‐based	   effort,	   with	   three	   of	   the	  
unsuccessful	   candidates	   in	   Cardiff	   Central	   in	   the	   1987	   General	   election	   original	  
members	  (see	  box	  2.1).	  
	  
                                                
74	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  R.	  A.	  ‘The	  Referendum	  Campaign:	  8	  February	  –	  1	  March	  1979’	  in	  Foulkes,	  
D.,	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  Wilford,	  R.	  A.	  1983,	  op	  cit.	  p.136.	  	  Original	  quotation	  from	  the	  Western	  Mail,	  3	  
March	  1979.	  
75	  ibid.	  p.138.	  	  Quoted	  from	  the	  Western	  Mail	  editorial,	  5	  March	  1979.	  




Box	  2.1:	  Campaign	  for	  a	  Welsh	  Assembly	  –	  Original	  Members77	  
	  
	  
John	  Owen	  Jones	  (Labour	  candidate,	  Cardiff	  Central,	  1987)	  [Chair]	  
John	  Osmond	  (journalist)	  [Secretary]	  
Frank	  Leavers	  (Liberal	  Democrat	  candidate,	  Vale	  of	  Glamorgan,	  1987)	  
Siân	  Caiach	  (Plaid	  Cymru	  candidate,	  Cardiff	  Central,	  1987)	  
Mike	  German	  (Liberal	  Democrat	  candidate,	  Cardiff	  Central,	  1987)	  
Siân	  Edwards	  (Plaid	  Cymru)	  
Bert	  Pearce	  (Communist	  Party)	  
	  
	  
However,	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  engagement	  with	  the	  process	  –	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  enthusiasm	  
of	  the	  Wales	  Labour	  Party	  for	  what	  the	  CWA	  was	  trying	  to	  achieve	  –	  meant	  that	  it	  did	  
not	  become	  the	  Welsh	  equivalent	  of	  the	  pluralist	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention.78	  	  
Indeed,	   even	   after	   the	   Conservative	   victory	   in	   the	   1992	   general	   election,	   Labour	   in	  
Wales	  were	  reluctant	  to	  consider	  another	  attempt	  at	  securing	  Welsh	  devolution.	  	  With	  
John	   Smith,	   who	   had	   piloted	   the	   devolution	   legislation	   through	   parliament	   in	   the	  
1970s,	  now	  leading	  Labour,	  and	  the	  pro-­‐devolutionist	  Ron	  Davies	  appointed	  to	  shadow	  
the	  Welsh	  Office,	   assisted	  by	   the	   equally	   pro-­‐devolution	  Peter	  Hain	   (MP	   for	  Neath),	  
efforts	   were	   made	   to	   change	   that.	   	   Hain,	   alongside	   the	   Welsh	   TUC,	   advocated	   a	  
constitutional	   convention	   along	   the	   Scottish	  model,	  which	  was	   rejected	  by	  both	   the	  
Wales	   Labour	   Party	   Executive	   and	   the	   Wales	   Parliamentary	   Labour	   Party.79	   	   Cross-­‐
party	  discussion	  on	  devolution	  was	  not	  on	  Labour’s	  radar.	   	  However,	   in	  1993,	  Davies	  
sent	   Hain	   to	   a	   meeting	   of	   what	   had	   been	   the	   CWA,	   but	   was	   now	   renamed	   as	   the	  
Parliament	   for	   Wales	   Campaign	   (PWF),	   taking	   with	   him	   a	   commitment	   that	   a	   new	  
                                                
77	  ibid.	  p.53	  
78	  Andrews,	  L.	  ‘Too	  important	  to	  be	  left	  to	  politicians:	  the	  ‘Yes’	  for	  Wales	  story’	  in	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  
Balsom,	  D.	  The	  Road	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2000,	  p.50.	  
79	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  Wales	  Says	  Yes:	  Devolution	  and	  the	  2011	  Welsh	  Referendum,	  Cardiff,	  
University	  of	  Wales,	  2012,	  p.40	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Labour	   government	   would	   legislate	   for	   a	   Welsh	   Assembly.80	   	   Devolution	   was	   now	  
firmly	  back	  on	  the	  policy	  agenda	  of	  the	  Wales	  Labour	  Party,	  and	  the	  debate	  had	  begun	  
again.	  	  Addressing	  the	  1994	  Labour	  conference	  in	  Blackpool,	  Davies	  argued:	  
	  
Like	   the	   Scots	  we	  are	  a	  nation.	   	  We	  have	  our	   own	   country.	  	  
We	   have	   our	   own	   language,	   our	   own	   history,	   traditions,	  
ethics,	  values	  and	  pride...	  We	  now	  in	  Wales	  demand	  the	  right	  
to	   decide	   through	   our	   own	   democratic	   institutions	   the	  
procedures	   and	   the	   structure	   and	   the	   priorities	   of	   our	   own	  
civic	  life.81	  	  	  	  
	  
At	   this	   stage,	   however,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   events	   were	   once	   again	   being	   driven	   by	  
Scotland,	  where	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention	  continued	  to	  move	  the	  debate.	  	  Wales	  
was	   in	  danger	  of	  being	   left	  behind,	  and	   it	  was	  to	  this	  end	  that	  Davies	  pressed	  ahead	  
with	   his	   proposals	   in	   draft	   form	   in	   autumn	   1994,	   arguing	   to	   Labour’s	   policy	  
commission	   that	   Wales	   should	   have	   an	   Assembly	   with	   primary	   legislative	   and	   tax-­‐
raising	   powers	  which	  would	   be	   elected	   in	   a	   proportional	  manner.	   	  While	   this	   policy	  
commission	   did	   engage	   with	   the	   public	   in	   a	   limited	   way,	   it	   held	   only	   six	   sparsely	  
attended	  public	  meetings	  and	  “barely	  registered	  with	  the	  Welsh	  public”.82	  	  The	  policy	  
commission	  published	  an	  interim	  report	  entitled	  A	  Welsh	  Assembly:	  The	  Way	  Forward	  
in	  1993,	  and,	  after	  objections	  to	  some	  of	  the	  proposals	  by	  both	  Shadow	  Secretary	  of	  
State	   for	  Wales	  Kim	  Howells	   and	   long-­‐term	  opponent	  of	   devolution	   Llew	  Smith,	   the	  
commission	   published	   Shaping	   the	   Vision	   which	   suggested	   a	   more	   conservative	  
package,	   with	   limited	   law-­‐making	   powers,	   no	   tax	   power	   and	   dual-­‐member	  
                                                
80	  Andrews,	  L.	  1999	  op	  cit.	  p.58.	  
81	  Davies,	  R.	  Speech	  to	  UK	  Labour	  Party	  Conference,	  Blackpool,	  1994,	  cited	  Osmond,	  J.	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  Europeans,	  
Seren,	  1995,	  p.79-­‐80.	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  McCrone,	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  and	  Lewis,	  B.	  ‘The	  Scottish	  and	  Welsh	  Referendum	  Campaigns’	  in	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  B.	  and	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  (eds)	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constituencies.83	  	  At	  this	  stage,	  however,	  discussion	  remained	  firmly	  inside	  the	  Wales	  
Labour	   Party,	   with	   no	   cross-­‐party	   debate	   and	   no	   public	   engagement.	   	   This	   left	   the	  
public	  with	  very	  little	  information	  on	  the	  devolution	  proposals	  –	  an	  issue	  which	  would	  
have	  very	  real	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  referendum	  campaign.84	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  while	  no	  one	  was	  considering	  a	  referendum	  on	  devolution	  at	  this	  stage,	  
much	   less	   favouring	   the	  devolution	  proposals	   themselves,	   public	   involvement	   in	   the	  
debate	   appeared	   unnecessary.	   	  When	   Labour’s	   devolution	   plans	  were	  made	   public,	  
the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  made	  clear	  in	  1995	  that	  their	  support	  hinged	  upon	  the	  assembly	  
being	   elected	   through	  proportional	   representation	   (thereby	   providing	   other	   political	  
parties	  with	  a	  voice	  in	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  a	  Labour-­‐dominated	  chamber)	  while	  
Plaid	  Cymru	  believed	   the	  plans	  were	  a	   “waste	  of	   time”.85	   	   It	  was	   clear	   that	   changes	  
would	  be	   required	   if	   they	  were	   to	   support	   the	  proposals.	   	   Internal	  discussions	  were	  
ongoing	   before	   Labour	   agreed	   their	   devolution	   policy	   in	   January	   1997	   –	   just	   four	  
months	   before	   the	   general	   election.	   	   These	   proposals	   included	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	  
proportional	  element	   in	   the	  electoral	   system	   (a	  necessary	   concession,	   in	  Ron	  Davies	  
eyes,	  to	  get	  both	  Plaid	  Cymru	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   involved	  in	  the	  referendum	  
campaign)	  and	  a	  further	  reduction	  in	  seat	  numbers,	  to	  60.86	  	  The	  proposals	  also	  limited	  
the	   powers	   of	   the	   Assembly	   to	   the	   minimalist,	   local	   government-­‐style	   model	  
acceptable	  to	  anti-­‐devolutionists	  within	  the	  party	  –	  a	  compromise	  made	  by	  Davies	  in	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order	   to	  secure	   the	  support	  of	   the	  more	  sceptical	  Labour	  MPs.87	   	  Prior	   to	   the	  Wales	  
Labour	   Party	   finalising	   their	   devolution	   proposals,	   however,	  was	   the	   announcement	  
that	   devolution	  would	   be	   put	   to	   the	   electorate	   in	   both	   Scotland	   and	  Wales	   in	   pre-­‐
legislative	  referendums.	  
	  
Onward	  to	  1997	  
While	  Scotland	  had	  a	  Constitutional	  Convention	  which	  both	  assisted	   in	   the	  design	  of	  
the	  devolution	  proposals	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  measure	  of	  consultation,	  devolution	  in	  
Wales	   had	   had	   no	   engagement	   with	   the	   public	   and	   the	   PFW	   campaign	   was	   much,	  
much	  smaller	  than	  the	  Convention.	  	  The	  Welsh	  public	  had	  been	  largely	  ignorant	  of	  the	  
devolution	   debate,	   and	   now	   they	  would	   be	   asked	   again	   to	   give	   their	   assent	   to	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  devolved	  institution.88	  	  Just	  as	  in	  Scotland,	  the	  Shadow	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
for	  Wales	   –	   by	   this	   point,	   Ron	   Davies	   –	   was	   not	   involved	   in	   the	   decision	   to	   hold	   a	  
devolution	  referendum	  in	  Wales,	  and	  even	  on	  the	  evening	  prior	  to	  the	  announcement	  
was	   denying	   Labour	   were	   planning	   on	   holding	   a	   referendum	   on	   the	   issue.89	   	   The	  
decision	  appeared	  to	  ignore	  completely	  the	  sizable	  defeat	  devolution	  had	  suffered	  in	  
Wales	  in	  1979	  and	  was	  instead	  dictated	  by	  the	  circumstances	  in	  Scotland.90	  	  Not	  only	  
that,	   but	   the	   Welsh	   Labour	   Party	   itself	   had,	   as	   recently	   as	   1995,	   declared	   that	   a	  
referendum	  would	  be	  unnecessary:	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The	  Commission	  feels	  that	  there	  is	  no	  scope	  for	  a	  referendum	  
as	  the	  clearly	  laid	  out	  policy	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party	  will	  leave	  no	  
room	  for	  doubt	  in	  the	  elector’s	  minds.	  	  The	  choice	  they	  need	  
to	  make	  will	  be	  clear.91	  
	  
It	   also	   meant	   that	   public	   support	   would	   be	   required	   for	   the	   institution	   to	   be	  
established,	   and	   given	   the	   four	   to	   one	   margin	   against	   devolution	   in	   1979,	   many	  
considered	   this	  evidence	   that	   Labour’s	   commitment	   to	  devolution	   in	  Wales	  was	   less	  
than	  complete.92	  
	  
Pro-­‐devolutionists,	   however,	   accepted	   the	   challenge	   and	   were	   keen	   to	   develop	   the	  
campaign	   for	  devolution	  beyond	   the	   internal	   Labour	  party	  discussion	   it	   had	  been	   to	  
that	  point.	  	  Yes	  for	  Wales,	  the	  official	  campaign	  for	  a	  Yes	  vote	  in	  the	  referendum,	  was	  
established	  in	  February	  1997	  –	  three	  months	  before	  the	  general	  election	  and,	  indeed,	  
before	  any	  referendum	  was	  guaranteed.	  	  Ron	  Davies	  and	  Peter	  Hain	  were	  key	  actors	  in	  
getting	   the	   campaign	   of	   the	   ground,	   but	   they	   subsequently	   departed	   the	   scene,	  
allowing	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐party	  campaign,	  albeit	  with	  activists	  from	  Labour,	  
the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  in	  key	  roles.	  	  	  
	  
When	  the	  general	  election	  resulted	  in	  a	  landslide	  Labour	  win,	  the	  referendum	  became	  
a	  reality,	  and	  was	  scheduled	  for	  18	  September	  1997	  –	  one	  week	  later	  than	  the	  Scottish	  
vote	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  build	  on	  the	  momentum	  of	   the	  expected	  Scottish	  Yes	  vote.	   	  The	  
campaign	  itself	  is	  examined	  extensively	  in	  subsequently	  in	  this	  chapter,	  but	  there	  are	  
several	  points	  which	  require	  articulation	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  Firstly,	  while	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  was	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the	  primary	  actor	   in	  support	  of	  a	  Yes	  vote	  this	  was	  not	  a	  centralised	  or	  co-­‐ordinated	  
national	   campaign.93	   	   Instead,	   it	   was	   characterised	   by	   localised	   campaigns	   coupled	  
with	   periodic	   announcements	   that	   distinct	   groups	   were	   supporting	   a	   Yes	   vote:	  
Students	  Say	  Yes,	  Actors	  Say	  Yes,	  Women	  Say	  Yes,	  and	  several	  more.94	  	  Secondly,	  while	  
Yes	   for	  Wales	  was	  credited	  as	  the	  official	  Yes	  campaign,	   the	  Wales	  Labour	  Party	  and	  
the	   new	   Labour	   government	   were	   also	   involved	   in	   the	   campaign.	   	   While	   by	   most	  
accounts	  there	  was	  some	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  the	  campaigns,	  there	  were	  also	  the	  
same	   kinds	   of	   tensions	   involved	   in	   cross-­‐party	   campaigning	   that	   the	   Scottish	  
Constitutional	   Convention	   had	   experienced	   in	   Scotland.	   	   This	  was	   especially	   clear	   in	  
relations	  between	  the	  central	  Labour	  party	  in	  London	  and	  the	  Wales	  Labour	  Party	  on	  
how	   to	   run	   the	  campaign.95	   	   Finally,	   there	  was	  evidence	   that	   Labour	  activists	   lacked	  
enthusiasm	  for	  the	  campaign	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  their	  efforts	  in	  the	  general	  election,	  with	  
the	  result	  that	  grass-­‐roots	  Labour	  involvement	  in	  the	  campaign	  was	  limited.	   	  This	  led	  
to	  Plaid	  Cymru	  activists	  –	  who	  were	  by	  no	  means	  sold	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  devolution	  
scheme,	  but	  who	  were	  known	   for	   their	  ability	   to	  put	   their	   “well-­‐honed	  campaigning	  
machine”	  into	  action	  –	  delivering	  Labour	  Yes	  leaflets	  in	  Cardiff	  and	  parts	  of	  the	  north-­‐
east	  of	  Wales.96	  	  	  
	  
These	  were	  necessary	  cross-­‐party	  efforts.	  	  Opinion	  polls	  from	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  
referendum	  in	  1996	  until	  the	  week	  before	  the	  polls	  indicated	  that	  the	  result	  would	  be	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95	  
close,	   with	   most	   suggesting	   that	   those	   responding	   “don’t	   know”	   numbered	   just	   as	  
many	  as	  those	  who	  had	  made	  up	  their	  mind	  to	  vote	  either	  Yes	  or	  No	  (see	  table	  2.8).	  	  	  
	  
Table	  2.8:	  Wales	  Devolution	  Opinion	  Polls	  (1996-­‐7)97	  
	  
Date	   Yes	   No	   Don’t	  Know	  
October	  1996	   39	   32	   28	  
March	  1997	   41	   33	   27	  
April	  1997	   34	   37	   30	  
July	  1997	   39	   27	   34	  
July	  1997	   43	   29	   28	  
August	  1997	   42	   22	   36	  
September	  1997	   37	   36	   26	  
September	  1997	   37	   29	   34	  
	  
As	   in	   Scotland,	   the	   campaign	   was	   just	   beginning	   to	   gather	   momentum	   before	   the	  
death	  of	  the	  Princess	  of	  Wales	  meant	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  campaign	  for	  a	  week.	  	  The	  
impact	   of	   this	   interruption	   was	   more	   keenly	   felt	   in	   Wales:	   a	   combination	   of	   the	  
closeness	  of	  the	  polls	  and	  the	  fact	  Diana’s	  association	  with	  the	  Wales	  meant	  that	  the	  
expected	  upsurge	  in	  British	  sentiment	  was	  more	  pronounced	  than	  in	  Scotland.	  	  On	  the	  
day	  of	  the	  referendum	  itself,	  the	  mood	  among	  pro-­‐devolutionists	  was	  low.	  	  When	  polls	  
closed,	  Peter	  Hain	  told	  reporters	  he	  thought	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  devolution	  to	  
win.	  	  As	  the	  first	  few	  results	  were	  announced,	  Hain’s	  pessimism	  looked	  justified.	  	  The	  
BBC’s	  referendum	  night	  programme	  actually	  announced	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  No	  campaign	  
at	  around	  3pm,	  only	  to	  retract	  their	  assertion	  when	  the	  final	  result	  was	  announced	  in	  
Carmarthenshire.	  	  That	  region	  voted	  Yes	  in	  substantial	  enough	  numbers	  that	  what	  had	  
looked	   like	  an	   inevitable	  defeat	  turned	   into	  a	  slim	  majority	   in	   favour	  of	  an	  Assembly	  
(see	  table	  2.9).	  	  	  
	  
                                                




Table	  2.9:	  	  Wales	  Devolution	  Referendum	  Result	  (1997)98	  
	  
I	  agree	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  
Welsh	  Assembly	  
I	  do	  not	  agree	  there	  should	  be	  a	  	  
Welsh	  Assembly	  
Turnout	  
50.3%	   49.7%	   50.1%	  
	  
On	   a	   turnout	   of	   just	   50%,	   a	  margin	   of	   6,721	   votes	   separated	   those	   in	   favour	   from	  
those	  against.	  	  By	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  referendum,	  this	  was	  a	  win	  for	  devolution,	  but	  with	  
only	  25%	  of	   the	  eligible	  electorate	  voting	   in	   favour,	   it	  was	  an	   inauspicious	  beginning	  
for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  of	  Wales.	  	  Despite	  this	  perceived	  lack	  of	  public	  appetite	  for	  
devolution,	   the	   result	   represented	  a	  decisive	   change	   in	   the	  mood	  of	   the	  public	  with	  
regards	  to	  self-­‐government,	  changing	  what	  had	  been	  a	  4-­‐to-­‐1	  defeat	  for	  devolution	  in	  
1979	  into	  a	  narrow	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  new	  assembly.99	  	  Eventually,	  devolution	  –	  an	  
issue	  which	   had	   been	   on	   and	   off	   the	   political	   agenda	   since	   the	   1960s	   –	  was	   finally	  
delivered	  to	  both	  Scotland	  and	  Wales.	  	  	  
	  
And	  while	  this	  was	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story	  in	  terms	  of	  delivering	  an	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  
the	  nature	  of	   the	  process	   that	   delivered	   it	  was	   to	  have	   significant	   repercussions	   for	  
future	  attempts	  to	  deepen	  the	  devolution	  settlement.	  	  Two	  clear	  issues	  were	  apparent	  
from	  the	  attempts	  to	  deliver	  devolution	  to	  Wales	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  1990s.	  	  The	  first	  
was	  that	  public	  engagement	  on	  the	  issue	  had	  been	  lacking	  in	  any	  significant	  form,	  with	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  devolution	  debate	  having	  taken	  place	  internally	  within	  the	  Labour	  
Party	  in	  Wales.	  	  The	  second,	  rather	  paradoxically,	  was	  that	  a	  precedent	  had	  been	  set	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with	  regards	  to	  the	  use	  of	  referendums	  –	  that	  the	  Welsh	  public	  had	  to	  be	  consulted	  on	  
the	  issue	  of	  constitutional	  change.	  
	  
The	  Devolution	  Era	  
With	  the	  respective	  institutions	  established	  in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  in	  1999,	  discussion	  
within	  political	  circles	  turned	  to	  how	  to	  utilise	  the	  powers	  devolved.	  	  The	  first	  devolved	  
elections	  in	  both	  institutions	  resulted	  in	  Labour	  returning	  the	  most	  seats	  but	  having	  no	  
clear	  majority	   in	  either,	   formalising	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  (quickly	   in	  
Scotland,	   after	   an	   extended	   period	   of	   minority	   governance	   in	   Wales)	   in	   order	   to	  
provide	   a	   stable	   government	   in	   each	   nation.	   	   Plaid	   Cymru,	   who	   had	   continually	  
pointed	  out	   the	  perceived	   inadequacies	  of	   the	  Welsh	  devolution	   settlement	  prior	   to	  
the	   referendum	   itself,	   adopted	   a	   much	   more	   conciliatory	   tone	   when	   the	   Assembly	  
convened	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   preferring	   to	   do	   their	   best	   to	  make	   the	   system	  work	   –	  
especially	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  profound	  mandate	  from	  the	  Welsh	  public	  for	  devolution.	  	  	  
	  
If	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   failed	   to	   spark	   in	   Scotland	  during	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	  
new	   devolved	   institution,	   the	   same	   cannot	   be	   said	   for	  Wales.	   	   Osmond	   recognises	  
three	  distinct	  periods	  in	  the	  first	  term	  of	  the	  Assembly:	  an	  unsteady	  and	  unstable	  first	  
18	  months	  of	  minority	  governance	  (followed	  by	  the	  resignation	  of	  First	  Secretary	  Alun	  
Michael);	   the	   second,	   with	   stability	   provided	   by	   coalition	   governance	   and	   firm	  
leadership	   from	   Rhodri	   Morgan,	   was	   marked	   by	   reflection	   on	   the	   practice	   of	  
devolution	  and	  a	  review	  of	  the	  Assembly’s	  procedures;	  and	  a	  third	  period,	  focused	  on	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the	  upcoming	  election	   in	  2003.100	   	   The	  middle	  period,	   constitutionally	   speaking,	  was	  
particularly	   significant,	   for	   it	   represented	   an	   “emphatic	   rejection”	   of	   the	   corporate	  
body	   model	   of	   devolution	   which	   had	   been	   established	   for	   Wales	   in	   the	  Wales	   Act	  
1998.	   	  This	  was	  embodied	   in	  the	   idea	  that	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  and	  the	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  were	  a	  single	  entity,	  with	  the	  same	  set	  of	  civil	  servants	  
supporting	   the	   Assembly's	   procedures	   and	   delivering	   the	   administration's	   political	  
objectives.101	   	   In	   its	   place	  was	   a	   separation	   –	   inasmuch	   as	   the	  Assembly	   itself	   could	  
change	  its	  own	  procedures	  –	  of	  the	  coalition	  and	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  Assembly.	  	  This	  
period	  also	  saw	  the	  establishment,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  coalition	  agreement	  between	  Labour	  
and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  of	  the	  Richard	  Commission,	  to	  investigate	  the	  organisation	  
and	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Assembly	  and	  to	  report	  its	  recommendations	  for	  improvements	  
in	  the	  following	  Assembly	  term.	  
	  
The	  second	  term	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  of	  Wales	  continued	  where	  the	  first	  had	  left	  
off	  on	  the	  constitution.	  	  The	  split	  between	  the	  coalition	  and	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Presiding	  
Officer	  continued	  to	  lack	  formality,	  given	  that	  the	  separation	  could	  not	  be	  confirmed	  
without	  further	  UK	  level	  legislation.102	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  distinct	  identities,	  characters	  
and	  logos	  of	  the	  respective	  parts	  were	  enhanced	  during	  the	  second	  term.	  	  Further,	  the	  
Richard	   Commission	   reported	   in	   2004,	   recommending	   the	   formalisation	   of	   this	  
separation	   (further	   putting	   the	   Assembly	   on	   the	   road	   towards	   becoming	   a	  
parliamentary-­‐type	   institution).	   	   The	   UK	   Government	   responded,	   issuing	   a	   White	  
Paper	  Better	  Governance	  for	  Wales	  which	  accepted	  the	  confusion	  the	  corporate	  body	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model	   had	   caused	   and	   recognised	   the	   need	   to	   formalise	   the	   changes	   which	   had	  
already	  come	  into	  existence.103	   	  Better	  Governance	  for	  Wales	  proposed	  a	  new	  Wales	  
Act	  providing	  for	  some	  legislative	  powers	  to	  the	  Assembly,	  with	  the	  option	  to	  move	  to	  
full	  legislative	  powers	  in	  twenty	  clearly	  articulated	  policy	  areas	  if	  the	  public	  indicated	  a	  
desire	  to	  do	  so.104	  	  In	  the	  meantime	  –	  that	  is,	  prior	  to	  asking	  the	  public	  if	  such	  powers	  
should	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  Assembly	  –	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  could	  apply	  
for	  powers	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  through	  Legislative	  Competence	  Orders	  (the	  process	  
is	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  subsequent	  chapters).	  	  	  
	  
The	  second	  Wales	  Act	  was	  passed	  in	  2006	  and	  scheduled	  to	  come	  into	  effect	  after	  the	  
third	   elections	   to	   the	   Assembly	   in	   May	   2007.	   	   Plaid	   Cymru	   focused	   upon	   the	   new	  
Wales	  Act,	  arguing	  that,	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  to	  reach	  the	  status	  of	  a	  
parliament	   granted	   to	   Scotland	   in	   1999,	   it	   required	   the	   powers	   which	   would	   be	  
devolved	  to	  it	   in	  full.	   	  Thus,	  in	  the	  2007	  devolved	  elections,	  the	  constitution	  played	  a	  
central	   role	   in	   delivering	   a	   nationalist	   party	   into	   government	   –	   and	   in	   turn	   led	   to	   a	  
renewal	  of	  the	  constitutional	  debate.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   has	   emphasised	   the	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   devolution	   debate	  
developed	   in	   Scotland	   and	  Wales	   since	   it	   first	   breached	   the	   political	   agenda	   in	   the	  
1970s.	   	   The	   Cunningham	   Amendment	   proved	   the	   barrier	   to	   Scotland	   voting	   for	  
devolution	  in	  1979	  (though	  with	  Wales	  voting	  4	  to	  1	  against,	  it	  was	  hardly	  a	  factor	  in	  
the	  Welsh	   case)	   and	  as	   such,	   grievance	  at	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	   referendum	  played	  a	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role	   in	   re-­‐invigorating	   civil	   society	   in	   Scotland	   during	   the	   1980s.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  
Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention	   did	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   work	   in	   setting	   in	   place	   the	  
foundations	   for	   the	   substantial	   majority	   which	   was	   delivered	   in	   the	   devolution	  
referendum	  in	  1997.	   	  With	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  an	  organisation	   in	  Wales,	  devolution	  
was	  delivered	  only	  by	  a	  wafer-­‐thin	  margin,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales	  has	  appeared	  a	  much	  more	  fragile	  institution	  with	  regards	  to	  public	  acceptance	  
of	   its	   role.	   	   It	   is	   in	   part	   due	   to	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   devolution	   debates	   during	   the	  
1970s	   that	   the	   contemporary	   strategies	   of	   public	   engagement	   were	   developed	   in	  










Chapter	  3:	  The	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru:	  	  




No	   general	   theory	   of	   nationalism	   exists	   in	   the	   same	  way	   conservatism,	   socialism	   or	  
liberalism	  exists1	  and	  there	  is	  no	  Burke,	  Marx	  or	  de	  Tocqueville	  as	  eloquent	  or	  elegant	  
proponents	  of	  nationalism.2	  	  The	  1700s	  are	  cited	  as	  the	  ‘birth’	  of	  modern	  nationalism3	  
but	   it	   is	   only	   as	   recently	   as	   the	   1960s	   that	   nationalism	   has	   become	   a	   ‘global	  
phenomenon	  of	  widespread	  academic	  interest’.4	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Scotland,	  where	  the	  1960s	  saw	  the	  breakthrough	  of	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  (SNP)	  
onto	   UK	   political	   stage,	   and	   of	   Wales,	   where	   Plaid	   Cymru	   saw	   their	   electoral	  
breakthrough	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  	  This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  chart	  the	  development	  of	  
these	   parties	   using	   Kris	   Deschouwer’s	   (2008)	   analysis	   of	   the	   lifespan	   of	   political	  
parties.	   	  Beginning	  each	  section	  with	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	   the	  history	  of	  Scotland	  and	  
Wales,	   this	   chapter	   seeks	   to	  place	   the	  development	  of	  nationalism	   in	   the	  context	  of	  
historical	   claims	   to	   nationhood	   and	   establish	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   as	   the	  main	  
vehicles	   through	   which	   those	   claims	   have	   been	   expressed.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   this	   will	  
provide	   the	   historical	   and	   political	   background	   to	   the	   subsequent	   chapters	   in	  which	  
the	  parties’	  efforts	  in	  government	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  their	  constitutional	  aims	  are	  
examined	  in	  detail.	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The	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  
While	   the	   SNP	   had	   existed	   in	   various	   forms	   (as	   a	   party,	  movement,	   splinter	   group)	  
since	   the	   1920s,	   it	   was	   only	   with	   their	   electoral	   breakthrough	   –	   Winnie	   Ewing’s	  
stunning	   by-­‐election	   victory	   in	   Hamilton	   in	   1967	   –	   that	   nationalism	   started	   to	   gain	  
political	  importance	  in	  Scotland.5	  	  Ernest	  Gellner’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  nationalism	  as	  
a	   ‘principle	  which	  holds	   that	   the	  political	  and	  national	  units	  should	  be	  congruent’6	   is	  
one	  which	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  nationalism	  employed	  by	  the	  SNP.	  	  As	  a	  geographic	  entity,	  
Scotland	   has	   had	   consistent	   national	   boundaries	   since	   the	   1400s,	   an	   independent	  
political	  culture	  until	  the	  1707	  Act	  of	  Union	  and	  distinctive	  religious,	  educational	  and	  
legal	   institutions	   throughout	   its	   history.7	   	   As	   James	   Kellas8	   argues,	   nationalism	   in	  
Scotland	   has	   taken	   advantage	   of	   these	   pre-­‐existing	   distinctive	   cultural	   features	   and	  
derived	   its	   membership	   and	   activists	   predominantly	   from	   these	   institutions.	   	   Peter	  
Lynch	  notes	  that	  SNP	  membership	  derives	  mainly	  from	  these	  –	  educated	  –	  professions	  
and	   focuses	   not	   upon	   aspects	   of	   cultural	   distinctiveness	   but	   on	   a	   civic	  
conceptualisation	  of	  nationalism,	  a	  brand	  of	  nationalism	  which	  is	  more	  inclusive	  than	  
the	  historical	  European	  experience.9	   	  Ethnic	  conceptualisations	   (birthplace	  of	   ‘Scots’,	  
anti-­‐Englishness	  and	  even	  to	  an	  extent	  the	  promotion	  of	  Scots’	  and	  Gaelic	  languages)	  
have	   been	   largely	   absent	   from	   the	   SNP’s	   policy	   platform.	   	   Rather,	   the	   party	   has	  
focused	   on	   constructing	   a	   narrative	   of	   inclusion,	   promoting	   self-­‐government	   (and	  
subsequently,	  independence)	  for	  Scotland	  and	  appealing	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  independence	  
as	  a	  natural	  and	  proper	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  It	  is	  the	  development	  of	  Scottish	  nationalism	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  1989.	  
9	  Lynch,	  P.	  2002,	  op.	  cit.	  p.4	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along	  these	  lines	  –	  from	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  National	  Party	  of	  Scotland	  in	  1928	  to	  
the	  present	  day	  SNP	  Scottish	  Government	  at	  Holyrood	  –	  that	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  
section.	  	  
	  
Emergence	  of	  Political	  Nationalism	  in	  Scotland	  
Utilising	   the	  work	   of	  Deschouwer	   and	   Pedersen	   in	   analysing	   the	   lifespan	  of	   political	  
parties	  (and	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter),	  it	  is	  a	  straightforward	  process	  to	  chart	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  SNP.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Scottish	  nationalism,	  the	  beginnings	  of	  
the	  movement	   and	   the	   subsequent	   declaration	   of	   the	   SNP	   as	   a	   political	   party	   took	  
place	  in	  a	  period	  of	  enormous	  upheaval	  in	  UK	  politics.	  	  Scotland	  in	  particular	  saw	  key	  
changes	  to	  how	  it	  was	  represented.	  The	  extension	  of	  the	  franchise	  to	  women	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  working	  class,	  and	  a	  political	  party	   (Labour)	  representing	  the	   latter	  which	  had	  
firmly	   established	   itself	   in	   Scotland	   led	   to	   a	   change	   in	   the	   party	   system	  which	   had	  
hitherto	   been	   dominated	   by	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   the	   Liberals.10	   	   The	   electorate	  
moved	  leftward	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  –	  higher	  levels	  of	  unemployment,	  uncertainty	  
over	   rent	   levels	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   government-­‐initiated	   social	   reforms	   –	   all	   of	   which	  
benefited	   Labour	   and	   put	   them	   in	   the	   ascendancy.11	   	   This	   was	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	  
distinctly	   Scottish	   party	   system	   and	   one	   which	   the	   SNP	   were	   born	   into,	   albeit	   one	  
which	  they	  struggled	  to	  make	  an	  impact	  on	  in	  their	  early	  days.	  	  Devolution	  was	  on	  the	  
agenda	  as	  early	  as	  1880,	   though	   it	  was	   in	   the	  context	  of	   Irish	  Home	  rule,	  which	  was	  
subsequently	  passed	  by	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  in	  1920.12	  	  The	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  was	  
formed	   in	   1934,	   merging	   two	   parties	   who	   supported	   constitutional	   change:	   the	  
                                                
10	  Hutchison,	  I.	  G.C.	  A	  Political	  History	  of	  Scotland	  1832-­‐1924	  Edinburgh,	  John	  Donald	  Publishers,	  1986,	  
p.285.	  
11	  Hutchison,	  I.	  G.C.	  Scottish	  Politics	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  Basingstoke,	  Palgrave,	  2001,	  p.54.	  
12	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Devolution	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.68.	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Scottish	   Party	   and	   the	   National	   Party	   of	   Scotland.	   	   While	   one	   (the	   Scottish	   Party)	  
supported	  home	  rule,	  the	  National	  Party	  of	  Scotland	  supported	  independence,	  which	  
quickly	  became	  the	  constitutional	  goal	  of	  the	  new	  party.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  3.1:	  SNP	  General	  Election	  Results	  (1929-­‐1964)	  
 
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Vote	  (%)	  
1929*	   2	   3,313	   	  
1931*	   5	  	   20,954	   1.0	  
1935	   8	   29,517	   1.1	  
1945	   8	   26,707	   1.2	  
1950	   3	   9,708	   0.4	  
1951	   2	   7,299	   0.3	  
1955	   2	   12,112	   0.5	  
1959	   5	   21,738	   0.8	  
1964	   15	   64,044	   2.4	  




Support	  grew	   for	   the	  SNP	   from	  protest	  voting	  at	  by-­‐elections	   to	   tactical	  voting	   from	  
supporters	  of	  other	  parties	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  SNP	  moved	  into	  a	  position	  where	  they	  
could	  challenge	  for	  the	  seat.	  	  The	  party	  targeted	  the	  growing	  sense	  of	  Scottish	  identity	  
and	   a	   desire	   for	   home	   rule	   which	   the	   Irish	   had	   successfully	   negotiated	   previously.	  	  
Authorisation	  of	  the	  SNP	  as	  a	  political	  party	  arguably	  came	  in	  claiming	  their	  first	  MP	  in	  
the	  Motherwell	  and	  Wishaw	  by-­‐election	   in	  1945.	   	  While	   the	  seat	  was	  held	   for	   fewer	  
than	  three	  months	  –	  and	  did	  not	  prove	  the	  catalyst	   for	  an	   increased	  membership	  or	  
levels	  of	  support	  –	   it	  did	  provide	  the	  party	  with	  an	   indication	  that	  they	  could	  attract	  
some	   electoral	   support.	   	   However,	   the	   party	   continued	   to	   field	   small	   numbers	   of	  
candidates	  in	  General	  Elections	  until	  the	  1960s,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Hamilton	  by-­‐
election	   in	   1967	   that	   the	   party	   really	   announced	   its	   arrival	   on	   the	   political	   scene	   in	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Scotland.13	   	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   1966	   General	   Election,	   Labour	   had	   established	  
themselves	  as	  the	  dominant	  party	  in	  Scotland,	  winning	  49.9%	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  46	  seats	  
compared	  to	  the	  Conservatives’	  37.7%	  and	  20	  seats.	  	  The	  SNP	  had	  only	  contested	  the	  
Hamilton	   seat	   once	   before	   and	   seemed	   unlikely	   to	   mount	   much	   of	   a	   challenge	   to	  
Labour.	   	   In	   the	  event,	   Labour’s	   vote	   in	  Hamilton	   collapsed	  and	   the	   SNP’s	   candidate,	  
Winnie	  Ewing,	  went	  on	  to	  win	  46%	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  comfortably	  take	  the	  seat.	  	  While	  
the	   result	   was	   a	   protest	   vote,	   predominantly	   against	   Labour’s	   economic	   record	   in	  
government	   (the	   pound	   was	   devalued	   by	   the	   Chancellor	   under	   three	   weeks	   later)	  
unusually	   the	   electorate’s	   support	   did	   not	   swing	   to	   the	   main	   opposition	   –	   the	  
Conservatives	   –	   who	   polled	   only	   12.5%	   of	   the	   vote.14	   	   The	   SNP,	   buoyed	   by	   strong	  
performances	  in	  the	  previous	  years’	   local	  elections	  and	  a	  swelling	  membership,	  were	  
able	   to	   contest	   each	   of	   the	   four	   by-­‐elections	   between	   1966	   and	   1970	   and	  make	   a	  
strong	  showing	  in	  each.	  	  The	  result	  in	  Hamilton	  was	  just	  reward	  for	  the	  party	  who	  had	  
gradually	  contested	  more	  seats	  across	  Scotland	  since	  its	  creation	  in	  the	  1920s.15	  
	  
From	  Authorisation	  to	  Representation:	  The	  1970s	  
The	   cause	   and	   effect	   relationship	   between	   nationalism	   and	   its	   sociological	   and	  
institutional	  surroundings	  are	  difficult	  to	  establish.16	  	  Nationalist	  parties,	  as	  a	  blend	  of	  
autonomist	  demands	  (as	  a	  primary	  political	  goal)	  with	  secondary	  characteristics	  of	  the	  
established	   political	   families,	   have	   a	   birth	   and	   development	   that	   is	   difficult	   to	  
determine,	  and	   that	   is	  no	   less	   the	  case	   in	  Scotland	   than	  elsewhere.	   	  The	  by-­‐election	  
                                                
13	  Lynch,	  P.	  2002,	  op.	  cit.	  p.116.	  
14	  ibid.	  
15	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1999,	  op.	  cit.	  p.121.	  
16	  Coakley,	  J.	  ‘The	  Social	  Origins	  of	  Nationalist	  Movements	  and	  Explanations	  of	  Nationalism:	  A	  Review’	  in	  
Coakley,	  J.	  (ed)	  The	  Social	  Origins	  of	  Nationalist	  Movements,	  London,	  Sage	  Publications	  Ltd,	  1992,	  p.214.	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victory	   in	   Hamilton	   provided	   a	   staging	   point	   politically	   and,	   crucially,	   provided	   the	  
party	  with	  some	  media	  exposure	  which	  aided	  considerably	  in	  attracting	  new	  members	  
and	   activists.17	   	   It	   allowed	   the	   party	   to	   deliver	   its	   autonomist	   message	   to	   a	   wider	  
audience	  and,	  despite	   losing	  the	  seat	   in	  the	  general	  election	  of	  1970,	  gave	  the	  party	  
credibility	   –	   and	   potential	   voters	   the	   confidence	   that	   the	   party	   could	   not	   only	   win	  
seats,	  but	  hold	  its	  own	  in	  political	  debate.	  
	  
Table	  3.2:	  SNP	  General	  Election	  Results	  (1966-­‐1974)	  
	  
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Vote	  (%)	   Seats	  Won	  
1966	   23	   128,474	   5.0	   0	  
1970	   65	   306,812	   11.4	   1	  
1974	  (Feb)	   70	   633,180	   21.9	   7	  
1974	  (Oct)	   71	   839,617	   30.4	   11	  
	  
	  
Taking	   the	  Hamilton	   by-­‐election	   as	   a	   stand-­‐alone	   event	   does	   not	   diminish	   from	   the	  
SNP’s	   achievement	   in	   winning	   the	   seat	   from	   Labour	   nor	   does	   it	   decrease	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  event	  as	  a	  staging	  point	  for	  the	  SNP’s	  entrance	  into	  representative	  
politics.	  	  It	  establishes	  that	  the	  party	  was	  able	  to	  convert	  local	  support	  into	  victory	  and	  
continue	  its	  development	  from	  a	  protest	  party	  to	  having	  a	  representative.	  	  It	  was	  also	  
a	  turning	  point	  for	   its	  political	  opponents	  –	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  –	  who	  had	  
previously	   ignored	   the	   Nationalists	   as	   a	   protest	   vote	   unlikely	   to	   upset	   the	   political	  
dynamic	   they	   had	   established	   in	   Scotland.18	   	   After	   Winnie	   Ewing’s	   unlikely	   victory,	  
however,	   they	   had	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   confront	   the	   SNP	   head-­‐on	   –	   attacking	   their	  
policies,	   delivering	   separate	   Scottish	   budgets	   (Labour)	   and	   declaring	   support	   for	  
devolved	  legislation	  (Ted	  Heath’s	  Conservatives).	  	  The	  SNP	  began	  to	  move	  the	  debate	  
                                                
17	  Lynch,	  P.	  2002,	  op.	  cit.	  p.116-­‐120.	  
18	  Bogdanor,	  V,	  1999,	  op.	  cit.	  p.128.	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on	  autonomy	  on	  the	  back	  of	  a	  single	  by-­‐election	  victory.	  	  However,	  the	  party	  were	  to	  
come	  back	  down	  to	  earth	   in	  the	  1970	  General	  Election.	   	  Despite	   losing	  the	  Hamilton	  
seat	  (and	  43	  deposits	  across	  Scotland)	  the	  party	  won	  a	  seat	  in	  the	  Western	  Isles	  –	  their	  
first	  in	  a	  general	  election	  –	  while	  taking	  over	  300,000	  votes,	  11.4%	  of	  the	  Scottish	  vote.	  	  
Though	  they	  did	  not	  know	  it	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  party	  were	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  moving	  into	  
the	  next	  phase	  of	  Deschouwer’s	  party	  development:	  achieving	  blackmail	  potential.	  
	  
Blackmail	  potential:	  	  The	  1974	  elections	  
The	  1970s	  were	  to	  provide	  a	  strong	  test	  for	  the	  SNP	  and	  the	  level	  of	  their	  support.	  	  The	  
discovery	  of	  oil	  in	  the	  North	  Sea	  provided	  the	  party	  with	  a	  second	  policy	  to	  campaign	  
on	  and	  their	  slogan	  –	  ‘It’s	  Scotland’s	  Oil’	  –	  was	  to	  prove	  effective	  in	  bringing	  the	  party	  
electoral	  success	  in	  both	  February	  (seven	  seats,	  22%	  of	  the	  Scottish	  vote)	  and	  October	  
(eleven	  seats,	  30.4%	  of	  the	  vote)	  1974.19	  	  Against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  rising	  global	  oil	  prices,	  
the	   SNP’s	   slogan	   and	   policy	   resonated	   with	   the	   Scottish	   electorate,	   increasing	   the	  
strength	  of	   the	  party	  both	   in	  terms	  of	  representation	  and	   impact.	   	  Between	  the	  two	  
1974	  elections,	   the	  Labour	  government	  produced	  early	   legislation	  on	  devolution	  and	  
the	  October	  election	  saw	  both	  Labour	  and	  the	  SNP	  campaign	  in	  support	  of	  devolution.	  	  
There	  was	  some	  concern	  however,	  that,	  despite	  winning	  nearly	  one	  third	  of	  the	  vote	  
in	  October	   1974,	   the	   SNP’s	   success	   owed	  more	   to	   tactical	   voting	   from	  Conservative	  
voters	  than	  actual	  winning	  over	  of	  the	  electorate.	  	  Later	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  
support	   actually	   came	   predominantly	   from	   core	   SNP	   voters	   and	   Labour/	   Liberal	  
defectors.20	  	  This	  led	  to	  debate	  within	  the	  SNP	  and	  no	  small	  measure	  of	  conflict	  over	  
                                                
19	  ibid.	  p.125.	  
20	  Mitchell,	  J.	  Strategies	  for	  Self-­‐Government:	  The	  Campaigns	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  Edinburgh,	  
Polygon,	  1996,	  p.209.	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the	  strategy	  which	  the	  party	  should	  employ	  to	  win	  further	  seats	  (as	  well	  as	  retain	  the	  
ones	  it	  had	  won)	  and,	  ultimately,	  the	  ideological	  direction	  the	  party	  should	  take.	  	  This	  
debate	  ultimately	  focused	  upon	  two	  diverging	  attitudes.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  were	  
those	  (predominantly	  from	  the	  West	  of	  Scotland)	  who	  felt	  that	  the	  party	  would	  have	  
won	  more	  votes	  and	  seats	  in	  Labour	  heartlands	  if	  the	  party	  displayed	  more	  in	  the	  way	  
of	   leftist	   credentials	   –	   as	  well	   as	   being	   ideologically	  more	   left-­‐wing	   –	   and	  urged	   the	  
party	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  left-­‐leaning	  ideology.	  	  On	  the	  other	  side	  were	  the	  MPs	  elected	  
in	  constituencies	  won	  from	  the	  Conservatives,	  who	  favoured	  a	  more	  centrist	  message	  
–	  one	  which	  would	  not	  hurt	  them	  in	  a	  bid	  for	  re-­‐election.	  	  The	  result	  was	  a	  party	  which	  
voted	  both	   for	   and	  against	   the	   Labour	   government	  –	   and	  was	   attacked	  by	  both	   the	  
Conservatives	   and	   Labour	   in	   the	   subsequent	   election.	   	   Prior	   to	   the	   1979	   election	  
however	  were	  two	  events	  that	  would	  shape	  the	  next	  decade	  for	  the	  SNP:	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	  devolution	  referendum	  and	  the	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence	  in	  the	  Labour	  government.	  
	  
The	   SNP	   was	   in	   a	   quandary	   over	   the	   Scotland	   Bill	   1978.	   	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   self-­‐
government	   was	   finally	   on	   the	   government	   agenda,	   they	   had	   driven	   the	   political	  
debate	  and	  they	  looked	  forward	  to	  having	  a	  legislative	  assembly	  in	  Scotland	  in	  which,	  
they	  hoped	  to	  play	  a	  large	  part.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  devolution	  was	  not	  independence,	  
it	   was	   designed	   to	   undermine	   the	   party	   and,	   crucially,	   its	   passage	   through	  
Westminster	   and	   its	   implementation	   was	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   their	   political	   opponents.	  	  
The	   party	   decided	   to	   support	   the	   legislation	   as	   a	  means	   to	   an	   end.	   	  While	   the	   bill	  
passed	  its	  second	  reading	  in	  November	  1977,	  it	  was	  the	  committee	  stage	  which	  was	  to	  
prove	   its	   undoing	   as	   several	   amendments	   were	   added	   and	   accepted	   at	   the	   third	  
reading	   including	   a	   controversial	   proposal,	   the	   Cunningham	   amendment,	   added	   by	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opponents	   of	   devolution	   that	   a	   referendum	   –	   with	   40%	   of	   the	   electorate	   voting	   in	  
favour	  of	  the	  proposals	  –	  would	  be	  required	  for	  the	  legislation	  to	  become	  law.21	  	  Thus	  
the	  bill	  was	  passed	  and	  the	  referendum	  scheduled	  but	  it	  was	  not	  the	  referendum	  that	  
the	  SNP	  or	  the	  Labour	  government	  had	  wanted.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  that,	  the	  party	  resolved	  to	  
support	  the	  Yes	  campaign	  in	  March	  1979.	  	  	  
	  
The	  timing	  of	  the	  referendum	  could	  not	  have	  been	  worse	  for	  the	  Labour	  government,	  
recovering	  as	  it	  was	  from	  the	  ‘Winter	  of	  Discontent’,	  low	  poll	  figures	  and	  trade	  union	  
strikes	  across	  Britain.	  	  In	  the	  event,	  there	  was	  a	  narrow	  victory	  for	  the	  Yes	  campaign,	  
with	  51.6%	  of	  the	  vote.	  	  However,	  given	  that	  only	  32.85%	  of	  the	  electorate	  had	  voted	  
in	  favour	  of	  devolution,	  this	  was	  a	  decisive	  defeat	  for	  the	  legislation	  and,	  to	  all	  intents	  
and	  purposes,	  for	  the	  SNP,	  who	  had	  forced	  the	  issue	  onto	  the	  political	  agenda.	  	  While	  
the	  minority	  Labour	  government	  tried	  to	  bypass	  their	  own	  amendments	  to	  the	  bill,	  the	  
SNP	   laid	   a	   motion	   of	   no	   confidence	   in	   the	   government,	   which	   was	   surpassed	   by	   a	  
similar	   Conservative	   motion.	   	   The	   SNP	   MPs	   voted	   with	   the	   Conservatives	   to	   bring	  
down	   the	   government.	   	   The	   subsequent	   election	   saw	   devolution	   –	   and	   the	   SNP	   –	  
largely	  ignored.	  	  The	  party	  saw	  its	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  fall	  by	  13%,	  and	  returned	  only	  2	  of	  
the	  11	  MPs	  that	  had	  represented	  the	  party	  in	  the	  previous	  parliamentary	  session.	  	  The	  
Conservatives	   were	   returned	   as	   a	   government,	   remaining	   so	   until	   1997,	   and	   were	  
largely	   uninterested	   in	   devolution	   but	   never	   forced	   into	   defending	   the	   status	   quo	  
given	  the	  collapse	  in	  support	  for	  the	  SNP	  during	  the	  next	  decade.22	  	  The	  referendum,	  
                                                
21	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  1999,	  op.	  cit.	  p.187	  
22	  McLean,	   B.	  Getting	   It	   Together:	   The	   History	   of	   the	   Campaign	   for	   a	   Scottish	   Assembly/	   Parliament	  
1980-­‐1999	  Edinburgh,	  Luath	  Press	  Limited,	  2005,	  p.44.	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and	   the	  political	   ramifications	  of	   the	  vote	   for	   the	  SNP’s	   constitutional	  policy,	  will	   be	  
considered	  more	  fully	  in	  the	  closing	  chapter.	  
	  
Back	  into	  the	  wilderness:	  losing	  blackmail	  potential	  in	  the	  1980s	  
Internal	   conflict	   between	   the	   fundamentalists	   (those	   committed	   to	   instant	  
independence)	  and	  gradualists	  (those	  who	  believed	  independence	  could	  be	  achieved	  
through	  devolution,	  slow	  as	  it	  would	  be)	  continued	  to	  scar	  the	  SNP	  during	  the	  1980s.	  	  
Support	  for	  the	  party	  also	  declined	  both	  in	  electoral	  and	  organisational	  terms	  and	  the	  
party’s	   core	   principle	   of	   independence	   took	   a	   body	   blow	   with	   the	   defeat	   of	   the	  
devolution	  referendum	  in	  1979.	  	  However,	  from	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  into	  the	  1990s,	  the	  
party	  was	   able	   to	   bridge	   the	   strategic	   divide	  within	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   shifting	  
further	   into	  the	  social	  democratic	  mould.	   	  The	  centre-­‐right	  Conservative	  government	  
grew	  unpopular	   in	   Scotland	   –	   particularly	   the	   decision	   to	   implement	   the	   new	   “Poll”	  
Tax	  in	  Scotland	  a	  year	  earlier	  than	  in	  England23	  and	  the	  SNP	  were	  able	  to	  capitalise	  on	  
this	  unpopularity	  by	  providing	  a	  separate	  –	  Scottish	  –	  version	  of	  the	  social	  democratic	  
policies	  offered	  by	  the	  Labour	  party.	  	  While	  the	  Conservatives	  returned	  to	  office	  after	  
general	  elections	  in	  1983,	  1987	  and	  1992,	  the	  party	  won	  an	  ever-­‐decreasing	  share	  of	  
the	  vote	  in	  Scotland.24	  	  General	  unpopularity	  with	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  their	  seeming	  
indifference	   towards	   the	   political	   landscape	   in	   Scotland	   led	   to	   a	   revival	   for	   the	  
devolution	  agenda.25	  	  
	  
                                                
23	  Kellas,	  J.	  1989,	  op.	  cit.	  p.262.	  
24	  Bryant,	  C.	  G.	  A.	  The	  Nations	  of	  Britain	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006,	  p.93.	  
25	  Lynch,	  P.	  2002,	  op.	  cit.	  p.184.	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Table	  3.3:	  SNP	  General	  Election	  Results	  (1979-­‐1997)	  
	  
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Vote	  (%)	   Seats	  Won	  
1979	   71	   504,259	   17.3	   2	  
1983	   72	   331,975	   11.8	   2	  
1987	   72	   416,473	   14.0	   3	  
1992	   72	   629,564	   21.5	   3	  
1997	   72	   621,550	   22.1	   6	  
	  
	  
Nationalism	   in	  Scotland	  continued	   into	  the	  1990s	  where	   it	  had	   left	   the	  1980s	  –	  with	  
little	  electoral	  impact.	  	  Labour’s	  frustration	  continued	  after	  another	  electoral	  defeat	  in	  
1992	  –	   their	   fourth	   in	   a	   row	  –	  which	   left	   them	   in	  opposition	   for	   another	   five	   years.	  	  
However,	  Labour’s	  electoral	  weakness	  in	  England	  was	  not	  mirrored	  in	  Scotland	  where	  
a	  healthy	  number	  of	  MPs	  were	   returned.	   	   Ideas	  were	   formulated	  within	   the	   Labour	  
party	  suggesting	  that	  if	  the	  party	  could	  find	  a	  way	  to	  devolve	  some	  power	  to	  Scotland	  
–	  with	  the	  electoral	  support	  they	  had	  north	  of	  the	  border	  –	  they	  could	  maintain	  power	  
even	   if	   they	   could	  not	  win	  a	  UK	  General	   Election.	   	   The	  party	   joined	  with	   the	   Liberal	  
Democrats,	  the	  Scottish	  Green	  Party,	  and	  business	  and	  church	  leaders	  (as	  well	  as,	  for	  a	  
time,	   the	   SNP,	   though	   they	   later	   distanced	   themselves	   from	   the	   process)	   in	  
establishing	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention.26	   	   The	   Scottish	   Constitutional	  
Convention	  established	  a	  Claim	  of	  Right	  for	  Scotland,	  aiming	  to	  restore	  a	  measure	  of	  
governance	   to	   Scotland.	   	   The	   claim	   was	   strengthened	   by	   the	   feeling	   that	   the	  
Conservative	   government,	   with	   few	   Scottish	   MPs,	   lacked	   a	   mandate	   in	   Scotland.27	  	  
While	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention	   did	   not	   force	   a	   change	   in	   government	  
policy	  under	  the	  Conservatives,	  it	  did	  provide	  the	  blueprint	  for	  a	  devolved	  parliament	  
in	  Scotland,	  a	  policy	  which	  the	  Labour	  party	   in	  Scotland	  was	  keen	  to	  adopt	  ahead	  of	  
                                                
26	  McLean,	  B.	  2005,	  op.	  cit.	  p.118.	  
27	  ibid.	  p.	  108.	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the	  1997	  election.	  	  It	  also	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  SNP’s	  consultation	  strategy,	  discussed	  
in	  more	  detailed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  
	  
Governing	  potential:	  Opposition	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  
When	   Labour	   won	   a	   landslide	   victory	   in	   the	   1997	   UK	   General	   Election	   they	  moved	  
quickly	   to	  deliver	   their	  pre-­‐election	  promise	  of	  referendums	  on	  devolved	   institutions	  
for	  each	  of	  the	  constituent	  parts	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  A	  referendum	  was	  held	  in	  Scotland	  on	  11	  
September	   1997,	   posing	   two	   questions:	   whether	   respondents	   wanted	   a	   Scottish	  
Parliament	   to	   be	   established	   and	   whether	   that	   Parliament	   should	   have	   tax-­‐varying	  
powers.28	  	  The	  SNP	  –	  after	  an	  extended	  internal	  debate	  –	  joined	  Labour	  and	  the	  Liberal	  
Democrats	  in	  supporting	  referendum	  while	  the	  Conservatives,	  with	  no	  Scottish	  MPs	  to	  
aid	   their	   campaign,	   campaigned	  against.	   	   The	   result	  was	  a	   resounding	   “yes”	   to	  both	  
questions	  and	  after	  the	   legislation	  passed	  relatively	  untroubled	  through	  both	  Houses	  
of	  Parliament,	  the	  first	  election	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  was	  held	  on	  6	  May	  1999.29	  
	  
Table	  3.4:	  SNP	  General	  Election	  Results	  (2001-­‐2010)	  
	  
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Vote	  (%)	   Seats	  Won	  
2001	   72	   464,314	   20.6	   5	  
2005	   59	   412,267	   17.7	   6	  
2010	   59	   491,386	   19.9	   6	  
	  
Labour	  –	  expectedly	  –	  won	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  constituency	  seats	  but	  the	  proportional	  
aspect	  of	  the	  Additional	  Member	  electoral	  system	  meant	  that	  they	  could	  not	  secure	  a	  
majority	  of	  the	  129	  seats	  in	  the	  parliament,	  with	  a	  coalition	  agreement	  with	  the	  Liberal	  
                                                
28	  Scotland’s	  Parliament,	  Scottish	  Office	  White	  Paper,	  July	  1997	  
29	  Brown,	  A.	  ‘Scottish	  Politics	  after	  the	  election:	  Towards	  a	  Scottish	  Political	  System?”	  in	  Wright,	  A.	  (ed)	  
Scotland:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Devolution,	  Aldershot,	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  2000,	  p.37	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Democrats	  the	  ultimate	  outcome.	  	  The	  SNP,	  with	  35	  seats,	  finished	  as	  the	  largest	  party	  
outside	   the	   government,	   and	   styled	   themselves	   as	   the	   official	   opposition	   to	   the	  
Labour-­‐Lib	   Dem	   Scottish	   Executive,	   working	   at	   holding	   ministers	   to	   account	   while	  
simultaneously	  pointing	  out	  the	  inadequacies	  in	  the	  devolution	  settlement.	  	  This	  “dual	  
role”	  for	  the	  SNP	  in	  opposition	  mirrored	  the	  internal	  debates	  that	  the	  party	  was	  having	  
at	  the	  time.	  	  On	  the	  one	  side	  were	  the	  gradualists	  (who	  had	  risen	  to	  prominence	  in	  the	  
party)	   arguing	   that	   the	   party	   should	   use	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   as	   a	   vehicle	   to	  
independence,	   to	   show	   the	   Scottish	   electorate	   that	   Scotland	   could	   be	   run	   from	  
Edinburgh	   and	   that	   its	   politicians	  were	  willing	   and	   able	   to	   run	   the	   country.	   	  On	   the	  
other	   side	   were	   the	   party’s	   fundamentalists,	   those	   who	   had	   been	   opposed	   to	  
devolution	  from	  the	  start,	  who	  feared	   it	  was	  a	  means	  of	  stopping	  rather	  than	  aiding	  
independence.30	  	  Outside	  the	  constitutional	  debate,	  the	  party	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  
second	  party	  in	  Scotland	  –	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  votes	  and	  seats	  –	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  and	  it	  
did	   so	  as	  a	   social	  democratic	   challenger	   to	   the	   Labour	  party.	   	  When	  Tony	  Blair	   took	  
over	   Labour	   in	   1994	   with	   his	   ‘third	   way’	   politics,	   re-­‐branding	   the	   party	   as	   ‘New	  
Labour,’	  he	  did	  so	  by	  moving	  the	  party	  away	  from	  the	  socialist	  politics	  associated	  with	  
Neil	  Kinnock	  and	  Michael	  Foot’s	  Labour	  party	  of	  the	  1980s.	  	  Rather,	  the	  party	  moved	  
to	  the	  centre,	  challenging	  the	  Conservatives	  on	  their	  own	  turf.	   	  This	  shift	  worked	  for	  
the	   party	   in	   England	   where	   the	   Conservatives	   had	   continually	   beaten	   Labour	   in	  
elections	  since	  1979.	  	  And	  while	  Labour	  still	  won	  handsomely	  enough	  in	  Scotland,	  the	  
SNP’s	  move	  towards	  social	  democracy	  meant	  that	  they	  could	  challenge	  Labour	  directly	  
for	  their	  core	  –	  left	  of	  centre	  –	  vote.31	  	  
                                                
30	  Lynch,	  P.	  2002,	  op	  cit.	  p.234.	  
31	   Keating,	   M.	  Nations	   Against	   the	   State:	   The	   New	   Politics	   of	   Nationalism	   in	   Quebec,	   Catalonia	   and	  
Scotland	   Basingstoke,	   Macmillan	   Press	   Ltd,	   1996,	   p.179;	   Newell,	   J.	   L.	   ‘The	   Scottish	   National	   Party:	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The	  2003	  Scottish	  Parliament	  election	  would	  prove	  a	  major	  setback	  for	  the	  SNP.	  	  With	  
a	  new	  leader	  in	  John	  Swinney	  (Alex	  Salmond	  having	  resigned	  to	  return	  to	  his	  duties	  as	  
an	  MP	   for	   Banff	   and	   Buchan	   at	  Westminster)	   the	   party	   aimed	   to	   close	   the	   gap	   to	  
Labour	   but	   lost	   8	   seats.	   	   Labour’s	   representation	   was	   also	   down,	   but	   the	   main	  
beneficiaries	   of	   the	   reduction	   in	   their	   vote	   were	   not	   the	   established	   parties	   of	   the	  
Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   the	   Conservatives.	   	   The	   Scottish	   Green	   Party,	   the	   Scottish	  
Socialist	  Party	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Senior	  Citizens’	  Unity	  Party	  combined	  to	  win	  fourteen	  
seats	   while	   three	   independents	   were	   also	   elected.32	   	   The	   end	   result	   was	   a	   second	  
Labour-­‐Liberal	  Democrat	  coalition	  with	  a	  more	  disparate	  opposition	  than	  previously.	  
	  
Table	  3.5:	  Scottish	  Parliament	  Election	  Results	  (1999-­‐2007)	  
	  
	   1999	   2003	   2007	  


















Labour	   53	   3	   56	   46	   4	   50	   37	   9	   46	  
SNP	   7	   28	   35	   9	   18	   27	   21	   26	   47	  
Conservative	   0	   18	   18	   3	   15	   18	   4	   13	   17	  
Lib	  Dem	   12	   5	   17	   13	   4	   17	   11	   5	   16	  
Green	   -­‐	   1	   1	   -­‐	   7	   7	   0	   2	   2	  
SSP	   0	   1	   1	   0	   6	   6	   0	   0	   0	  
Independent	   1	   0	   1	   2	   1	   3	   0	   1	   1	  
Other	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   1	   0	   0	   0	  
While	  Labour’s	  re-­‐elected	  First	  Minister	  Jack	  McConnell	  pledged	  to	  “do	  less,	  better,”33	  
the	  SNP	  spent	  the	  next	  year	  working	  out	  what	  went	  wrong.	  	  Internal	  fighting	  led	  to	  a	  
grassroots	   leadership	   challenge	   which,	   despite	   winning,	   damaged	   John	   Swinney’s	  
leadership	  of	  the	  party	  and,	  after	  a	  poor	  performance	  in	  the	  2004	  European	  election,	  
Swinney	  stood	  down	  as	  leader.	  	  Alex	  Salmond	  returned	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  party,	  
                                                                                                                                         
development	   and	   change’	   in	   De	  Winter,	   L.	  &	   Tursan,	   H.	   (eds)	   	  Regionalist	   Parties	   in	  Western	   Europe	  
London,	  Routledge,	  1998,	  p.111.	  
32	  Mitchell,	   J.	   ‘Scotland:	   Expectations,	   Policy	   Types	   and	  Devolution’	   in	   Trench,	   A.	   (ed)	  Has	  Devolution	  
Made	  a	  Difference?	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  2004	  Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2004,	  p.21.	  
33	  Bradbury,	   J.	  &	  McGarvey,	  N.	   ‘Devolution:	  Problems,	  Politics	  and	  Prospects’	   in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs	  
April	  2003,	  No.	  56	  p.221.	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though	  he	  remained	  as	  a	  Westminster	  MP,	   leaving	  deputy	   leader	  Nicola	  Sturgeon	  as	  
leader	  of	  the	  party	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.34	  	  
	  
The	   party	   fought	   the	   2007	   Scottish	   Parliament	   election	   with	   renewed	   vigour.	   	   Alex	  
Salmond	  set	  ambitious	  targets	  for	  the	  party	  –	  aiming	  to	  win	  twenty	  constituencies,	  to	  
return	   to	  Holyrood	  as	   the	   largest	  party	   in	   the	  parliament	  and	   to	  be	   ready	   to	  govern	  
from	  day	  one.	  	  This	  ambition	  was	  reflected	  in	  their	  2007	  manifesto	  ‘It’s	  time	  to	  move	  
forward’.35	  	  In	  it,	  the	  party	  set	  out	  their	  vision	  of	  government	  –	  a	  smaller,	  more	  joined-­‐
up	  executive	  than	  the	  previous	  administration	  –	  and	  for	  the	  future	  of	  an	  independent	  
Scotland.	  	  Their	  campaign	  matched	  their	  manifesto	  for	  ambition	  and	  professionalism,	  
organisation,	  and	  the	  positive	  message	  the	  party	  was	  trying	  to	  project.36	   	   In	  the	  end,	  
the	   party	   scraped	   through	   as	   the	   largest	   party	   –	   by	   a	   single	   seat	   –	   and	   as	   the	  
announcement	  was	  being	  made,	  Alex	  Salmond	  was	  arriving	  at	  Prestonfield	  House	   in	  
Edinburgh	   –	   by	   helicopter	   –	   to	   address	   the	   media.	   	   The	   party	   had	   convinced	   the	  
electorate	  that	   they	  were	  worth	  a	  chance	  and	  they	  were	  about	   to	   take	  office	  as	   the	  
first	  Nationalist	  party	  to	  govern	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  	  
Governing	  (2007-­‐2011)	  
The	  parliamentary	  arithmetic	  was	  incredibly	  tight	  however.37	  	  With	  the	  SNP	  (47	  seats)	  
just	  a	  single	  seat	  ahead	  of	  Labour	  (46)	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  (17)	  and	  Lib	  Dems	  (16)	  
some	  way	  back,	  a	  minimum-­‐winning	  coalition	  (a	  majority	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  legislature	  –	  in	  
this	  case	  65)	  would	  require	  more	  than	  one	  partner	  for	  the	  SNP.	  	  Given	  the	  venom	  with	  
                                                
34	  Jones,	  P.	  ‘Scotland:	  The	  Nationalist	  Phoenix’	  in	  Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  2008	  Exeter:	  
Imprint	  Academic,	  2008,	  p.29.	  
35	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  Manifesto	  2007	  -­‐	  It’s	  Time	  to	  Move	  Forward,	  Edinburgh,	  SNP,	  2007.	  
36	  Jones,	  2008,	  op.	  cit.	  p.44	  
37	   McEwen,	   N.	   ‘From	   Devolution	   to	   Independence?	   Scots	   elect	   their	   first	   nationalist	   government’	   in	  
Policy	  Options	  June	  2007,	  p.	  58.	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which	   they	   had	   attacked	   each	   other	   in	   the	   election	   campaign,	   an	   oversize	   coalition	  
with	  Labour	  was	  a	  non-­‐starter,	  while	  the	  Conservatives	  had	  ruled	  out	  entering	  into	  a	  
coalition	   agreement	   with	   any	   other	   party	   before	   the	   election.	   	   This	   left	   the	   Liberal	  
Democrats,	  the	  two	  Green	  MSPs	  and	  the	  sole	  independent,	  Margo	  MacDonald	  for	  the	  
SNP	   to	   negotiate	  with.	   	   Although	   a	   coalition	   agreement	  with	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	  
was	  explored,	  it	  quickly	  became	  apparent	  that	  no	  deal	  would	  be	  reached.38	  	  The	  main	  
stumbling	  block	  appeared	   to	  be	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats’	   insistence	   that	   the	  SNP	  drop	  
any	   plans	   for	   a	   referendum	   before	   negotiations	   began	   while	   the	   SNP	   pledged	   that	  
‘nothing	  was	   off	   the	   table’.39	   	   Instead,	   the	   SNP	   planned	   for	   governing	   as	   a	  minority	  
administration	  –	  the	  first	  taste	  of	  this	  form	  of	  government	  in	  Scottish	  politics.	  	  A	  deal	  –	  
of	   sorts	   –	   was	   reached	   with	   the	   two	   Green	   MSPs,	   referred	   to	   as	   “confidence	   and	  
supply,”	  which	  delivered	  the	  two	  Green	  votes	  for	  the	  election	  of	  Alex	  Salmond	  as	  First	  
Minister	  on	  16	  May	  2007.40	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  process	  left	  the	  SNP	  in	  a	  position	  as	  a	  
minority	   government:	   unable	   to	   call	   on	   the	   support	   of	   parliament	   to	   support	  
government	  policy	  outright,	  but	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  coalition	  partner	  allowed	  them	  to	  retain	  
doctrinal	  purity.	  	  This	  was	  an	  advantage	  –	  it	  allowed	  the	  SNP	  to	  remain	  committed	  to	  
an	   independence	   referendum,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   abolishing	   university	   tuition	   fees	   and	  
charges	  for	  prescription	  drugs	  without	  having	  to	  dilute	  their	  position	  in	  deference	  to	  a	  
coalition	  agreement.	   	  Nevertheless,	  at	   times,	   it	  did	  make	   life	  difficult	   for	   the	  party	  –	  
and	  policies	  such	  as	  the	  Local	  Income	  Tax	  and,	  eventually,	  the	  commitment	  to	  hold	  an	  
independence	  referendum	  in	  the	  2007-­‐11	  parliamentary	  term,	  had	  to	  be	  shelved	  due	  
                                                
38	  ibid.	  p.59	  
39	   Lynch,	   P.	   and	   Elias,	   A.	   ‘Devolution	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   Inexorable	   Rise	   of	   Scottish	   and	   Welsh	  
Nationalism?’	  World	  Congress	  of	  Political	  Science	  Conference	  paper,	  July	  2009,	  p.11.	  
40	   Scottish	   National	   Party/	   Scottish	   Green	   Party,	   Scottish	   National	   Party	   &	   Scottish	   Green	   Party	  
Cooperation	  Agreement,	  Edinburgh,	  SNP	  and	  SGP,	  2007.	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to	  lack	  of	  parliamentary	  support.	  	  However,	  in	  eight	  short	  years,	  the	  SNP	  had	  come	  full	  
circle	   –	   from	   an	   internal	   debate	   questioning	   whether	   the	   party	   should	   support	   a	  
Scottish	   Parliament	   to	   leading	   that	   very	   same	   institution	   as	   the	   first	   nationalist	  
Government	  of	  Scotland.	  
	  
Plaid	  Cymru	  
Nationalism	   in	   Wales	   derives	   from	   a	   similar	   root	   to	   that	   in	   Scotland,	   though	   the	  
context	   of	   its	   existence	   is	   widely	   different	   from	   its	   Celtic	   cousin.41	   	   Plaid	   Cymru’s	  
origins	  lay	  in	  two	  distinctly	  Welsh	  movements,	  whose	  aims	  were	  largely	  cultural	  –	  and	  
not	   political.	   	  Byddin	   Ymreolwyr	   Cymru	  (The	  Welsh	   Home	   Rule	   Army)	   and	  Y	  Mudiad	  
Cymreig	  (The	  Welsh	  Movement)	  aimed	  not	  at	  independence	  or	  even	  self-­‐government	  
but	   at	   protecting	   the	   Welsh	   language	   and	   establishing	   it	   as	   the	   solitary	   official	  
language	   of	   Wales.42	   	   While	   the	   party	   began	   contesting	   occasional	   parliamentary	  
constituencies	   from	   the	   1920s	   on,	   electoral	   politics	   were	   neither	   a	   concern	   for	   the	  
movement	   nor	   a	   particular	   success.	   	   Direct	   action	  was	   not	   out	   of	   the	   question	   the	  
movement	  in	  its	  early	  days	  –	  infamously	  in	  1936	  when	  three	  prominent	  members	  set	  
fire	   to	   construction	   works	   at	   RAF	   Penyberth.	   	   The	   subsequent	   trial	   led	   to	   the	  
establishment	   of	   more	   of	   a	   public	   profile	   for	   the	   party	   –	   and	   sympathy	   for	   their	  
objectives,	   if	   not	   their	   actions.43	   	   However,	   it	  was	   not	   until	   the	   election	   of	  Gwynfor	  
Evans	  as	  president	  of	  the	  party	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  that	  the	  organisation	  matured	  into	  a	  
                                                
41	  Adamson,	  D.	  L.	  Class,	   ideology	  and	  the	  nation:	  a	   theory	  of	  Welsh	  Nationalism,	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  
Wales	  Press,	  1991,	  p.7.	  
42	  Davies,	  D.	  H.	  The	  Welsh	  Nationalist	  Party	  1925-­‐1945:	  A	  Call	  to	  Nationhood	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  Wales	  
Press,	  1983,	  p.61;	  p.71.	  
43	  ibid.	  p.160.	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political	  party	  –	  though	  electoral	  success	  was	  still	  some	  way	  off.44	  	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  not	  
until	  Evans	  himself	  was	  elected	  in	  a	  Carmarthen	  by-­‐election	  in	  1966	  that	  Plaid	  Cymru	  
were	  to	  establish	  themselves	  as	  a	  political	  party	  with	  representation	  at	  Westminster.	  	  
From	  then	  on	  –	  and	  coinciding	  with	  the	  SNP’s	  by-­‐election	  victory	  in	  Hamilton	  in	  1967	  –	  
nationalism	  established	  itself	  as	  a	  political	  entity	  in	  both	  Scotland	  and	  Wales.	  	  It	  is	  this	  
development	  of	  Welsh	  nationalism,	   from	  a	  movement	  defending	  and	  promoting	   the	  
Welsh	   language	   to	   its	   position	   as	   a	   coalition	   partner	   in	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  which	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
While	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   saw	   the	   development	   of	   similar	   party	   systems	   –	  
culminating,	   in	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century,	   with	   the	   dominance	   of	   a	   social	   democratic	  
(Labour)	  party	  and	  nationalist	  party	  ostensibly	  utilising	  the	  same	  political	  ground	  –	  the	  
development	  of	   the	  party	   system	   in	  Wales	   is	   rather	  different	   from	   that	  of	   Scotland.	  	  
For	   while	   –	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   1707	   Act	   of	   Union	   –	   Scotland	   retained	   its	   own	  
independent	   legal,	   educational	   and	   religious	   systems	   while	   entering	   into	   political	  
union	  with	  England,	  unique	  Welsh	  institutions	  were	  somewhat	  more	  limited	  in	  scope	  
and	  reach.	  	  Indeed,	  given	  the	  dearth	  of	  Welsh-­‐language	  education,	  the	  establishment	  
of	   a	   non-­‐conformist	   church	   in	   Wales	   was	   an	   important	   cultural	   and	   linguistic	  
development	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Wales,	  preaching,	  as	  it	  was,	  in	  Welsh.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
heavy	   industrialisation	  of	  Wales	  began,	  particularly	   in	  the	  valleys	  of	  the	  south	  where	  
ironworks	  and	  coal-­‐mining	   led	   to	   rapid	  population	  growth.45	   	  Disputes	   rose	  between	  
those	  working	   in	   the	  mines	   and	   ironworks	   –	   predominantly	  Welshmen	   –	   and	   those	  
who	  owner	  and	  run	  them,	  who	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  middle-­‐class	  English	  migrants.	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Conflict	   broke	  out	   between	   the	   two	   classes	   and	  bitter	   riots	   ensued,	   centred	   around	  
conditions,	   pay	   and	   resentment	   of	   the	   class	   difference.	   	   Added	   to	   this	   fact	  was	   the	  
large	   increase	   in	  population	   in	  Wales.	   	   In	   the	  hundred	  years	   from	  1801	  to	  1901,	   the	  
population	   of	   Wales	   rose	   from	   587,000	   to	   2,012,000,	   with	   the	   largest	   rise	   in	  
population	   concentrated	   predominantly	   in	   the	   industrial	   areas	   of	   south	   Wales.	   	   A	  
considerable	  number	  were	  migrants	  from	  England	  in	  search	  of	  jobs.	  	  Subsequently,	  the	  
left	   found	   its	   political	   home	   in	   the	   valleys	   of	  Wales,	   and	   by	   the	   1940s	   Labour	   had	  
replaced	  the	  Liberals	  as	  the	  dominant	  party	  in	  Wales.46	  
	  
Emergence	  of	  political	  nationalism	  in	  Wales	  
Turning	  to	  Deschouwer’s	  party	  lifespan	  model,	   it	   is	  easy	  to	  identify	  distinct	  phases	  in	  
the	  development	  of	  Plaid	  Cymru	   in	  Welsh	  politics.	   	  The	  emergence	  of	  Plaid	  Cymru	  –	  
and	   indeed	   political	   nationalism	   in	   Wales	   –	   falls	   between	   the	   first	   two	   categories	  
identified	   in	   Deschouwer’s	   analysis:	   declaration	   and	   authorisation.	   	   Consistent	   with	  
nations	  across	  Europe,	  nationalism	  in	  Wales	  had	  its	  beginnings	  in	  the	  late	  1800s.	  	  The	  
Liberal	   Party	  –	   at	   the	   time	   the	  dominant	  party	  of	  politics	   in	  Wales	  –	   led	   the	   call	   for	  
autonomy	  in	  Wales	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  Cymru	  Fydd.47	  	  This	  was	  an	  organisation	  
predominantly	  of	  political	  elites	  which	  had	  as	  its	  sole	  aim	  self-­‐government	  for	  Wales.	  	  
While	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  venture	  could	  not	  have	  been	  better,	  seeking	  as	  it	  did	  to	  take	  
advantage	   of	   non-­‐political	   nationalism	   in	   Wales	   that	   had	   produced	   the	   National	  
Eisteddfod	   in	  1861,	   the	  University	  of	  Wales	   in	  1893	  and	  would	  subsequently	  see	  the	  
National	  Library	  of	  Wales	  established	   in	  1907,	  Cymru	  Fydd	  had	   little	  support	  outwith	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its	  membership,	  and	  the	  organisation	  fell	  away.48	   	  After	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  the	  
independence	  of	  several	  European	  countries	  were	  secured,	  support	   for	  home	  rule	   in	  
Scotland	  and	  Wales	  was	  strong.49	  	  Two	  small-­‐scale	  nationalist	  organisations,	  the	  Welsh	  
Home	  Rulers	  and	  the	  Welsh	  Movement	  met	  in	  1925,	  agreeing	  to	  form	  a	  political	  party	  
by	  the	  name	  Plaid	  Genedlaethol	  Cymru	  (National	  Party	  of	  Wales)	  whose	  principle	  aim	  
was	  to	  re-­‐establish	  Welsh	  as	  the	  language	  of	  Wales.50	  	  While	  the	  group	  declared	  itself	  
a	  political	  party,	   it	   railed	  against	  the	  Welsh	  nationalism	  of	  the	  past	  and	  Westminster	  
politics,	   believing	   the	   Parliament	   there	   to	   work	   against	   the	   interests	   of	   Wales	   and	  
Welsh	   speakers	   and	   did	   not	   intend	   on	   contesting	   elections.51	   	   However,	   having	  
established	  Plaid	  Genedlaethol	  Cymru	   as	  a	  political	  party,	   competing	   in	   the	  electoral	  
arena	  was	  a	  natural	  progression.	  	  It	  duly	  occurred	  at	  the	  UK	  General	  Election	  of	  1929	  
when	  Lewis	  Valentine,	  one	  of	  the	  founder	  members	  of	  the	  party	  and	  President	  in	  1925	  
and	  1926,	  stood	  in	  the	  Caernarfon	  constituency,	  polling	  609	  votes.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  3.6:	  Plaid	  Cymru	  General	  Election	  Results	  (1929-­‐1945)	  
	  
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Seats	  Won	  
1929	   1	   609	   0	  
1931	   2	   2,050	   0	  
1935	   1	   2,534	   0	  
1945	   7	   16,017	   0	  
	  
The	  lack	  of	  electoral	  success	   led	  some	  commentators	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  party	  –	  at	  
this	  stage	  of	  its	  development	  –	  was	  much	  more	  successful	  as	  a	  pressure	  group	  for	  the	  
Welsh	  language	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  political	  party.	  	  However,	  when	  Saunders	  Lewis	  took	  
over	  the	  party’s	  presidency	  from	  Valentine	  in	  1926	  he	  brought	  with	  him	  an	  identifiable	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principle:	   to	  establish	  Wales	  on	  a	  par	  with	  England.52	   	   Focusing	  principally	  upon	   the	  
Welsh	   language	  under	  Lewis’	   leadership,	   the	  party	   launched	  a	  campaign	   to	  promote	  
the	   language	   through	   broadcasting,	   withholding	   the	   payment	   of	   TV	   licence	   monies	  
until	  such	  a	  concession	  was	  granted.	  	  Lewis	  moved	  the	  party	  towards	  policies	  of	  self-­‐
government	   and	   representation	   at	   the	   newly-­‐formed	   League	   of	   Nations	   –	   policies	  
which	   were	   represented	   an	   unsuccessful	   attempt	   at	   broadening	   the	   appeal	   of	   the	  
party	  beyond	  its	  traditional	  support.	  
	  
That	  was	  to	  change	  in	  1936.	  	  The	  UK	  Government’s	  decision	  to	  build	  a	  bombing	  school	  
at	   Penyberth,	   for	   generations	   the	   home	   of	   Welsh	   poets,	   brought	   substantial	  
opposition.	   	   A	   deputation	   to	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   representing	   the	   dissent	   of	   over	  
500,000	  Welsh	  protesters	  was	  ignored.	  	  Construction	  began	  upon	  the	  bombing	  school,	  
but	  before	  it	  could	  be	  completed,	  the	  building	  works	  were	  set	  on	  fire,	  Saunders	  Lewis,	  
Lewis	   Valentine	   and	   D.J.	   Williams,	   a	   third	   member	   of	   Plaid	   Genedlaethol	   Cymru	  
claiming	  responsibility	  for	  the	  act.	  	  At	  their	  trial	  in	  Caernarfon	  the	  jury	  failed	  to	  reach	  a	  
verdict	   with	   the	   judge	   sending	   the	   case	   on	   to	   the	   Old	   Bailey	   in	   London.	   	   Saunders	  
Lewis	   had	   been	   sacked	   from	   his	   position	   at	   the	  University	   College	   in	   Swansea	   even	  
before	   the	  Old	   Bailey	   handed	   down	   nine	  month	   prison	   sentences,	   a	   decision	  which	  
angered	  many	  of	  their	  supporters,	  as	  had	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  Welsh	  language	  in	  the	  
duration	   of	   the	   trial.53	   	   The	   event	   provided	   the	   authorisation	   of	  Plaid	   Genedlaethol	  
Cymru	  as	  a	  political	  party	  among	  more	   than	   just	   their	   traditional	   support.	   	   The	  next	  
challenge	  lay	  in	  achieving	  representation	  at	  parliamentary	  level.	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The	  Long	  Road	  from	  Authorisation	  to	  Representation	  
An	   internal	   debate	   on	   how	   to	   harness	   this	   support	   followed.	   	   Lewis	   resigned	   the	  
presidency	   in	   1939	   and	   the	   party	  moved	   towards	   embracing	   a	   new,	  more	   inclusive	  
nationalism	  while	  the	  political	  direction	  moved	  from	  right	  to	  left.	  	  Gwynfor	  Evans	  was	  
elected	  president	  of	  Plaid	  Genedlaethol	  Cymru	  in	  1945,	  and	  it	  was	  under	  his	  leadership	  
that	   the	   party	   was	   to	   find	   its	   first	   electoral	   success,	   albeit	  more	   than	   twenty	   years	  
after	  his	   stewardship	  of	   the	  party	  began.	   	   The	  1945	  election	   saw	   the	  party	   record	  a	  
creditable	   25%	  of	   the	   vote	   in	  Caernarfon	  where	   their	   support	   had	   remained	   strong,	  
but	   still	   could	   not	   make	   an	   electoral	   breakthrough.	   	   Evans	   produced	   a	   pamphlet	  
entitled	  Welsh	  Nationalist	  Aims	  arguing	  that	  ‘although	  it	  insists	  upon	  the	  necessity	  of	  
national	   freedom,	   Plaid	   Cymru	   has	   never	   demanded	   independence	   for	   Wales’.54	  	  
Instead,	   Plaid	   argued	   for	   self-­‐government,	   challenging	   other	   parties	   to	   support	   the	  
principle.	  	  The	  Conservative	  UK	  Government	  partly	  conceded,	  granting	  the	  principality	  
a	  Minister	  for	  Welsh	  Affairs	  in	  1951	  and	  recognition	  of	  Cardiff	  as	  the	  capital	  of	  Wales	  
in	  1955.	  	  The	  party	  advanced	  further	  by	  engaging	  with	  non-­‐Welsh	  speakers,	  marketing	  
themselves	   as	   a	   party	   for	   all	   of	  Wales	   and	   not	   simply	  Welsh-­‐speakers,	   a	   necessary	  
move	  in	  helping	  make	  the	  party	  electable.55	  	  
	  
However,	  it	  was	  an	  event	  outwith	  the	  party’s	  doing	  which	  was	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  an	  
electoral	  opportunity.	  	  In	  1956,	  Liverpool	  City	  Council	  proposed	  to	  make	  a	  reservoir	  by	  
flooding	   the	   Tryweryn	   Valley,	   an	   area	  which	   included	   the	  Welsh-­‐speaking	   village	   of	  
Capel	   Celyn.	   	   Protests	   were	   widespread	   across	   Wales,	   and	   cross-­‐party	   in	   nature.	  	  
Thirty-­‐five	  of	  the	  Welsh	  MPs	  opposed	  the	  bill	  with	  the	  other	  abstaining.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
                                                
54	  Evans,	  G.	  Welsh	  Nationalist	  Aims	  Cardiff,	  Plaid	  Cymru/	  J.	  E.	  Jones,	  1950,	  p.7.	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the	  bill	   passed	   in	   1957	   and	   the	   valley	   flooded	   in	   1965.	   	   Plaid	   Cymru’s	   argument	   for	  
home	   rule	   appeared	   to	   be	   borne	   out:	   	  Wales	   had	   no	   influence	   over	   its	   own	   affairs	  
under	   the	   present	   constitutional	   set	   up.	   	   Unanimously,	   Wales	   had	   rejected	   this	  
development	   and	   yet	   it	   went	   ahead:	   home	   rule	   was	   the	   only	   means	   of	   avoiding	   a	  
repeat	  of	  this	  situation.56	   	  While	  devolution	  was	  not	  on	  the	  government	  agenda,	  the	  
Council	  of	  Wales	  did,	   in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Tryweryn	  decision,	  recommend	  the	  creation	  
of	   a	   Welsh	   Office,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Wales	   as	   a	   permanent	  
representative	   for	   the	   nation	   in	   the	   UK	   Government.	   	   The	   recommendations	   were	  
approved	  and	  effected	  in	  1964	  –	  one	  year	  before	  the	  flooding	  of	  Capel	  Celyn.57	  
	  
At	   the	   1959	  General	   Election	   –	   the	   first	   after	   the	  bill	  was	  passed	  –	   Plaid	  Cymru	  put	  
forward	   20	   candidates	   across	  Wales	   and	   polled	   77,571	   votes,	   increasing	   their	   vote	  
share	   to	   5.2%	   but	   failing	   to	   see	   any	   MPs	   returned.	   	   And,	   despite	   passionate	   radio	  
address	   from	   former	   leader	   Saunders	   Lewis	   in	   1961	   entitled	   “The	   Fate	   of	   the	  
Language”	   leading	   to	   the	   creation	  of	  Cymdeithas	   yr	   Iaith	  Gymraeg	   (Welsh	   Language	  
Society)	  which	  would	  provide	  a	  more	  militant	  defence	  of	  the	   language,	  progress	  was	  
slow.	  
Table	  3.7:	  Plaid	  Cymru	  General	  Election	  Results	  (1950-­‐1966)	  
 
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Vote	  (%)	   Seats	  Won	  
1950	   7	   17,580	   1.2	   0	  
1951	   4	   10,920	   0.7	   0	  
1955	   11	   45,119	   3.2	   0	  
1959	   20	   77,571	   5.2	   0	  
1964	   23	   69,507	   4.8	   0	  
1966	   20	   61,071	   4.3	   0	  
	  
                                                
56	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  L.	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  cit.	  p.101.	  
57	  Morgan,	  K.	  1981,	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  cit.	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124	  
However,	   one	   year	   after	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Tryweryn	   reservoir,	   Plaid	   secured	   their	  
first	   parliamentary	   seat.	   	   Party	   president	   Gwynfor	   Evans	   won	   a	   by-­‐election	   in	  
Carmarthen	  in	  1966,	  securing	  38.9%	  of	  the	  vote,	  finally	  establishing	  Plaid	  as	  an	  elected	  
political	  party.	  	  Subsequent	  by-­‐elections	  in	  Rhondda	  West	  (1967)	  and	  Caerphilly	  (1968)	  
saw	   huge	   swings	   to	   the	   nationalists	   but	   in	   neither	   case	  were	   they	   able	   to	   secure	   a	  
second	  parliamentary	  seat.58	  	  Though	  the	  flooding	  of	  Capel	  Celyn	  did	  have	  an	  impact	  in	  
providing	   Plaid	  with	   a	   platform,	   Evans’	   victory	   in	   Carmarthen	   –	   as	  well	   as	   the	   close	  
second	   places	   in	   Rhondda	  West	   and	   Caerphilly	   –	   have	   been	   seen	   in	   retrospect	   as	   a	  
protest	  vote	  against	  the	  Labour,	  where	  various	  local	  factors	  also	  played	  a	  role.59	  	  New	  
members	   and	   an	   increased	   share	   of	   the	   vote	   in	   elections	   did	   follow	   for	   Plaid,	   but	  
success	  was	  not	  instant	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Tryweryn.	  
	  
Representation,	  Relevance	  and	  Blackmail	  Potential	  (1970s;	  1997-­‐1999)	  
The	   party	   were	   on	   the	   up.	   	   Labour	   had	   responded	   to	   Plaid	   Cymru’s	   advance	   by	  
discussing	   devolution	   but	   backed	   off	   from	   the	   issue	   under	   pressure	   from	   their	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Scotland,	  who	  had	  concerns	  about	  rising	  nationalist	  sentiments	  
there.	   	   In	   1967,	   Plaid	   did	   gain	   a	  measure	   of	   policy	   success	   with	   the	   passing	   of	   the	  
Welsh	   Language	   Act,	   which	   allowed	   Welsh	   to	   be	   used	   in	   Welsh	   courts,	   repealing	  
certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  previous	  Laws	   in	  Wales	  Acts	  of	  1535	  and	  1542.	   	  However,	  this	  
policy	  success	  was	  not	  to	  save	  Gwynfor	  Evans’	  seat	  in	  the	  1970	  General	  Election.	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  Tanner,	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  Challenge:	  Labour	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Balancing	  the	  disappointment	  of	  losing	  the	  seat,	  there	  was	  a	  marked	  improvement	  in	  
the	   competitiveness	   of	   Plaid.	   	   For	   the	   first	   time,	   the	   party	   contested	   every	   seat	   in	  
Wales,	  trebling	  their	  vote	  from	  the	  1966	  election.	  	  While	  Evans	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  his	  
attempt	  to	  reclaim	  the	  seat	  –	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  3	  votes	  –	  in	  the	  first	  of	  the	  1974	  elections,	  
Plaid	   finally	   made	   their	   breakthrough	   at	   a	   General	   Election,	   winning	   two	   seats	   in	  
Caernarfon	   and	  Merionethshire.	   	   The	   October	   1974	   election	   saw	   Evans	   returned	   in	  
Carmarthen,	   swelling	  Plaid’s	   representation	   to	   three.60	   	  This,	   coupled	  with	   the	  SNP’s	  
return	   of	   11	  MPs	   in	   Scotland,	   firmly	   put	   devolution	   on	   the	   agenda	   and	   forced	   the	  
Labour	  government,	  with	  a	  majority	  of	  three	  and	  requiring	  support	  from	  the	  Liberals	  
and	  Nationalists	  to	  survive,	  to	  legislate	  for	  Assemblies	  in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales.	  	  
	  
Table	  3.8:	  Plaid	  Cymru	  General	  Election	  Results	  (1970-­‐1979)	  
	  
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Vote	  (%)	   Seats	  Won	  
1970	   36	   175,016	   11.5	   0	  
1974	  (Feb)	   36	   171,374	   10.7	   2	  
1974	  (Oct)	   36	   166,321	   10.8	   3	  
1979	   36	   132,544	   8.1	   2	  
	  
	  
However,	  as	  Bogdanor	  notes,	  support	  for	  Plaid	  in	  terms	  of	  votes	  actually	  fell	  from	  its	  
height	   in	   1970	   in	   the	   two	   elections	   of	   1974,	   despite	   their	   gaining	   seats.61	   	   This,	   he	  
suggests,	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  where	  the	  1979	  referendum	  went	  wrong.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
Plaid	   Cymru,	   with	   the	   party	   now	   on	   the	   political	   map,	   were	   now	   in	   a	   position	   to	  
influence	   decision-­‐making.	   	  While	   Labour	   had,	   in	   the	   1960s,	   committed	   itself	   to	   an	  
assembly	  in	  Wales,	  it	  had	  done	  so	  reluctantly	  and	  without	  the	  full	  support	  of	  its	  Welsh	  
MPs	  –	  a	   familiar	   theme	   in	  contemporary	  Welsh	  politics.	   	  The	  bill	  brought	   forward	   in	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the	  1970s	  was	  a	  compromise	  between	  what	  the	  Labour	  research	  group	  on	  devolution	  
had	  wanted	   (a	   legislative	  Welsh	  Assembly)	   and	  what	   Labour’s	   Secretary	  of	   State	   for	  
Wales	   desired	   –	   an	   indirectly	   elected	   body	   with	   no	   legislative	   powers.	   	   The	  
compromise	   –	   which	   found	   its	   way	   into	   the	   1970s	   legislation,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  1998	  –	  was	  a	  directly	  elected	  Assembly,	  with	  the	  power	  only	  
to	  enact	  secondary	   legislation.62	   	  This	  was	  an	   idea	  which	  pleased	  no	  one.	   	  For	  Welsh	  
Labour	  MPs,	  particularly	  Neil	  Kinnock	  and	  Leo	  Abse,	  the	  mere	  idea	  of	  devolution	  was	  
to	   be	   opposed,	   and	   a	   referendum	   was	   demanded	   as	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   proposed	  
assembly.	  	  For	  those	  who	  supported	  devolution	  and	  wanted	  home	  rule	  for	  Wales,	  the	  
proposals	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough,	  providing,	  as	  they	  did,	  a	  weak	  assembly	  with	  no	  real	  
power.	  
	  
When	   the	   Wales	   Bill	   was	   presented	   to	   the	   Commons	   alongside	   its	   Scottish	  
counterpart,	   the	   Labour	   government	   was	   in	   a	   weaker	   position.	   	   The	   failure	   of	   the	  
Scotland	  and	  Wales	  Bill	   the	   first	   time	  round	  had	  meant	  concessions	  were	  required	  –	  
the	  first	  of	  those	  was	  that	  a	  referendum	  would	  be	  held	  to	  canvass	  public	  support	  for	  
the	  assemblies.	   	   Consistent	  with	   the	  Scotland	  Bill,	   the	  Cunningham	  amendment	  was	  
added	  to	  the	  Welsh	  referendum,	  requiring	  the	  consent	  of	  40%	  of	  the	  electorate	  –	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  majority	   in	   the	  referendum	  –	   in	  order	   for	  devolution	  to	  occur.	   	  After	  some	  
internal	   debate,	   Plaid	   led	   the	   campaign	   in	   favour	  of	   the	   assembly,	   along	  with	  home	  
rule	   supporters	   in	   the	   Labour	   party,	   who	   officially	   supported	   the	   policy.63	   	   Rebel	  
Labour	   MPs	   –	   including	   the	   future	   Labour	   leader	   Neil	   Kinnock	   –	   campaigned	  
vehemently	  against	  the	  proposals.	  	  In	  the	  event,	  devolution	  in	  Wales	  was	  resoundingly	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defeated	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  4	  to	  1.	  	  While	  the	  SNP	  supported	  the	  Conservative	  motion	  of	  
no	   confidence	   in	   the	  government,	   Plaid	  Cymru	  maintained	   their	   support	   for	   Labour.	  	  
However,	   the	   government	   fell	   and	   after	   the	   subsequent	   election	   the	   Conservatives	  
returned	  to	  power,	  repealing	  the	  both	  devolution	  Acts.	  
	  
By	  1981,	  only	  19%	  of	  Welsh	  people	  spoke	  Welsh	  (see	  table	  2.9).	  	  Gwynfor	  Evans,	  who	  
had	  begun	  campaigning	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Welsh	  language	  television	  channel	  
during	  the	  1970s,	  continued	  that	  campaign	  under	  the	  new	  Conservative	  government.	  	  
And	   though	   he	   lost	   his	   Carmarthen	   seat	   to	   Labour	   in	   1979,	   Evans	   remained	   a	  
prominent	  figure	  in	  Welsh	  politics.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  3.9:	  Welsh	  Speakers	  (1901-­‐1991)64	  
 
Year	   Welsh	  Speakers	   Year	   Welsh	  Speakers	  
1901	   49.9%	   1951	   28.9%	  
1911	   43.5%	   1961	   26.0%	  
1921	   37.1%	   1971	   20.8%	  
1931	   36.8%	   1981	   18.9%	  
1941	   No	  data	  (WWII)	   1991	   18.6%	  
	  
When	  the	  Conservative	  government	  reneged	  on	  its	  commitment	  to	  establish	  a	  Welsh	  
language	   television	   channel	   –	   a	   policy	   which	   had	   considerable	   support	   in	   Wales	   –	  
Evans’	   campaign	   was	   spurred	   into	   action:	   two	   thousand	   Plaid	   Cymru	   members	  
announced	  a	  boycott	  of	  TV	  licence	  payment	  while	  Evans	  himself	  declared	  he	  would	  go	  
on	  hunger	  strike	  in	  support	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  channel.65	  	  Several	  months	  later,	  the	  
Conservative	  government	  relented,	  and	  delivered	  the	  new	  channel,	  S4C,	  in	  November	  
1982.	   	   Though	   the	   party	   lost	   their	   blackmail	   potential	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   new	  
                                                
64	  Evans,	  D.,	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  p.219.	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Conservative	   government,	   they	   maintained	   policy	   relevance	   even	   without	   the	  
influence	  that	  the	  previous	  minority	  government	  had	  provided	  them	  with.	  
	  
Representation	  and	  return	  to	  Relevance	  (1979-­‐1997)	  
After	   Evans’	   successful	   campaign	   for	   S4C,	   Dafydd	   Wigley	   succeeded	   him	   as	   party	  
president	  for	  what	  would	  be	  a	  frustratingly	  quiet	  and	  relatively	  unsuccessful	  period	  in	  
Plaid’s	  history.66	  	  Although	  the	  party	  maintained	  its	  2	  MPs	  in	  the	  1983	  election	  –	  and	  
even	  increased	  their	  representation	  to	  three	  MPs	  in	  1987,	  the	  party’s	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  
continued	  to	  fall.	  	  The	  party	  moved	  leftward	  and	  at	  their	  conference	  in	  1982	  adopted	  
the	   new	   programme	   of	   ‘socialist	   inclusion,’	   attempting	   to	   establish	   for	   Wales	   a	  
‘decentralised	  socialist	  state’.67	   	  The	  polarisation	  of	  Welsh	  politics	   in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  
1984	  miners’	   strike	   and	   the	   collapse	   of	   heavy	   industry	   in	  Wales	   posed	   Plaid	   further	  
challenges,	   explaining	   to	   some	   extent	   this	   gradual	   leftward	   shift.68	   	   The	   party	   too,	  
faced	  a	  challenge	   from	  Labour	  and	  the	  resurgent	  Liberal	  Democrats	  who,	  along	  with	  
Welsh	   trade	  unions,	   began	   campaigning	   again	   for	   an	  elected	  Welsh	   assembly	   in	   the	  
early	  1990s.69	  	  However,	  rather	  than	  squeezing	  out	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  the	  backing	  of	  other	  
Welsh	   parties	   for	   their	   central	   aim	   –	   a	   democratic	  Welsh	   assembly	   –	   lent	   the	   party	  
credibility,	   and	   in	   1992	   they	   secured	   a	   fourth	   MP,	   surpassing	   the	   SNP	   in	   MPs	   and	  
increasing	  their	  vote	  considerably.70	  	  
	  
                                                
66	  McAllister,	  L.	  2001,	  op.	  cit.	  p.107.	  
67	  Christiansen,	  T.	  ‘Plaid	  Cymru:	  dilemmas	  and	  ambiguities	  of	  Welsh	  regional	  nationalism’	  in	  De	  Winter,	  
L.	  &	  Tursan,	  H.	  (eds)	  Regionalist	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  London,	  Routledge,	  1998,	  p.127.	  
68	  ibid.	  
69	  Labour	  Party,	  Meet	  the	  Challenge,	  Make	  the	  Change,	  London,	  Labour	  Party,	  1990;	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  
Changing	  Britain	  for	  Good,	  London,	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  1992;	  Wales	  Trade	  Union	  Congress,	  Annual	  
Report	  1992-­‐1993	  Cardiff,	  WTUC,	  1993.	  
70	  Christiansen,	  T.	  1998,	  op.	  cit.	  p.128.	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Table	  3.10:	  Plaid	  Cymru	  General	  Election	  Results	  (1983-­‐1997)	  
	  
Election	   Candidates	   Votes	   Vote	  (%)	   Seats	  Won	  
1983	   38	   125,309	   7.8	   2	  
1987	   38	   123,599	   7.3	   3	  
1992	   38	   156,796	   9.0	   4	  
1997	   40	   161,030	   9.9	   4	  
	  
	  
And	  while	  the	  party	  saw	  an	  increase	  in	  representation	  so	  too	  did	  they	  see	  the	  impact	  
of	   their	   campaigning.	   	   Welsh	   language	   use	   in	   the	   1990s	   was,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  
several	   decades,	  was	   rising.71	   	   The	  Welsh	   Language	  Act	   1993	  went	   further	   than	   any	  
previous	  legislation	  in	  establishing	  the	  Welsh	  Language	  Board,	  which	  was	  tasked	  with	  
the	  promotion	  of	   the	   language	  and	  policing	   the	  Act,	   formalising	   the	  use	  of	  Welsh	   in	  
courts	   and	   putting	   the	   Welsh	   language	   on	   a	   par	   with	   English	   in	   public	   life.	   	   Plaid	  
Cymru’s	   twin	   policy	   goals	   –	   self-­‐government	   and	   promotion	   of	  Welsh	   language	   and	  
culture	  –	  were	  in	  tune	  with	  the	  mood	  of	  the	  Welsh	  nation.	  	  The	  party	  maintained	  their	  
level	   of	   support	   throughout	   the	   1990s,	   widening	   their	   policy	   agenda	   to	   issues	   like	  
nuclear	   disarmament,	   (as	   part	   of	   their	   historic	   commitment	   to	   pacifism)	   and	  
environmentalism	  (their	  fourth	  MP	  in	  1992,	  Cynog	  Dafis,	  was	  elected	  with	  Green	  party	  
support).72	   	   When	   devolution	   returned	   to	   the	   political	   agenda	   in	   the	   Wales	   in	   the	  
1990s,	   there	  was	   a	  wider	   support	   base	   for	   the	   policy.	   	  With	   Labour’s	   1997	  General	  
Election	   victory	   –	   and	   pledge	   to	   hold	   pre-­‐legislative	   referendums	   on	   devolution	  
delivered	  within	  six	  months	  -­‐	  there	  was	  a	  marked	  shift	  in	  the	  political	  setting	  in	  Wales.	  
	  





Plaid	   Cymru	  were	   not	   as	   hesitant	   as	   they	   had	   been	   in	   1979	   despite	   the	   devolution	  
settlement	  on	  offer	  being	  largely	  similar.	  	  They	  joined	  the	  “Yes	  for	  Wales”	  cross-­‐party	  
group	  which	  was	  established	  in	  February	  1997	  –	  three	  months	  before	  Labour’s	  victory	  
–	  in	  order	  to	  campaign	  for	  a	  yes	  vote.	  	  While	  Labour	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  both	  
supported	   the	   campaign,	   there	   were	   several	   Labour	   MPs	   who	   campaigned	   on	   the	  
opposite	  side.	  	  The	  campaign	  was	  disrupted	  when	  the	  Princess	  of	  Wales	  was	  killed	  in	  a	  
car	   accident	   in	   August	   1997,	   and	   there	   was	   concern	   that	   the	   media	   attention	  
surrounding	   the	   death	   of	   a	   member	   of	   the	   British	   royal	   family	   might	   have	   a	  
detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  referendum.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  referendum	  
was	  held	  on	  18	  September	  1997	  –	  one	  week	  after	  a	  positive	  outcome	  in	  the	  Scottish	  
referendum	  –	   in	   the	  hope	  that	  Scotland’s	   result	  would	   influence	   the	  Welsh	  vote.	   	   In	  
the	   event	   a	   narrow	   majority	   –	   just	   6,712	   from	   a	   total	   of	   1,112,117	   votes	   cast	   –	  
signalled	  a	  wafer-­‐thin	  approval	   for	   a	  Welsh	  Assembly.	   	   It	  was	  hardly	   the	   resounding	  
endorsement	   that	   the	   “Yes	   for	  Wales”	   campaign	   had	   been	   hoping	   for,	   but	   it	  was	   a	  
victory	   nonetheless,	   achieved,	   as	   it	   was,	   on	   a	   turnout	   of	   just	   50.1%.	   	   The	   two	  
devolution	   referendums	   of	   1979	   and	   1997,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   impact	   upon	   public	  
engagement	  in	  Wales,	  are	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  five.	  
	  
Governing	  Potential	  (1997-­‐2007)	  
The	  margin	  of	  victory	  –	  unlike	  in	  1979	  –	  did	  not	  matter,	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  
Act	  1998	  duly	  passed	  the	  UK	  Parliament,	  establishing	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales.	  	  
Plaid	  –	  with	  only	  4	  MPs	  –	  had	  achieved	  their	  aim	  of	  establishing	  self-­‐government	  for	  
Wales.	  	  Of	  course	  the	  settlement	  was	  not	  quite	  what	  they’d	  hoped	  for	  –	  an	  assembly	  
with	   no	   primary	   legislative	   powers,	   with	   no	   separation	   between	   its	   executive	   and	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legislative	   functions	   and	   limited	   support	   from	   the	   Welsh	   public	   –	   but	   it	   was	   a	  
democratically	   elected	   Welsh	   Assembly.	   	   And	   it	   provided	   Plaid	   Cymru	   with	   an	  
opportunity	   to	   gain	  more	   representatives	   –	   and	  more	   influence.73	   	   More	   than	   that	  
though,	   the	   proportional	   electoral	   system	   for	   the	   new	  Assembly	   provided	   the	   party	  
with	  the	  potential	  to	  govern	  –	  not	  as	  a	  majority	  but	  more	  likely	  as	  part	  of	  a	  governing	  
coalition.	   	   The	   first	   election	   to	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales	   in	   1999	   saw	   Plaid	  
cause	  a	  shock	  by	  polling	  more	  than	  600,000	  votes	  across	  the	  two	  voting	  elements	  (the	  
constituency	  vote	  and	  the	  regional	  vote)	  and	  returning	  17	  Assembly	  Members	  (AMs),	  
including	  surprising	  wins	   in	   Islwyn,	  Llanelli	  and	  Rhondda,	  historically	  areas	  with	   large	  
Labour	  support.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  3.11:	  Plaid	  Cymru	  Election	  Results	  (1999-­‐2010)	  
	  
Election	   Votes	   Seats	  Won	  
1999	  Welsh	  Assembly	   290,572/	  312,048	   (9+8)	  17	  
2001	  General	   195,893	   4	  
2003	  Welsh	  Assembly	   180,185/	  167,653	   (5+7)	  12	  
2005	  General	   174,838	   3	  
2007	  Welsh	  Assembly	   219,121/	  204,757	   (7+8)	  15	  
2010	  General	   165,394	   3	  
	  
The	   success	   surprised	   even	   the	   Plaid	   leadership,	   who	   had	   expected	   to	  win	   thirteen	  
seats.74	   	  The	  party	  were	  content	  to	  work	   in	  opposition,	  firstly	  to	  the	  minority	  Labour	  
administration	  then	  to	  the	  Labour-­‐Liberal	  Democrat	  Assembly	  Government,	  the	  party	  
were	  keen	  to	  see	  the	  Assembly	  fulfil	  more	  of	   its	  potential.	   	  While	  Plaid	   lost	  the	  Ynys	  
Môn	   seat	   at	   the	   2001	   UK	   General	   Election,	   the	   party	   did	   gain	   Carmarthen	   East	   &	  
                                                




Dinefwr	  as	  well	  as	  securing	  increasing	  their	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  for	  the	  third	  UK	  election	  
in	  a	  row.	  
	  
A	   party	   conference	   in	   2002	   saw	   new	   leader	   Ieuan	   Wyn	   Jones	   call	   for	   further	  
devolution	  of	  powers	  and	  authority	   to	  the	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales,	  comparable	  
with	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament.	   	   The	   Welsh	   Assembly	   Government	  
established	   the	  Richard	  Commission	   to	   examine	   the	  powers	   of	   the	  Assembly,	  which	  
recommended	  changes	  to	  the	  devolution	  settlement,	  both	  to	  the	  electoral	  system	  and	  
the	  devolved	  powers.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  subsequent	  Welsh	  Assembly	  election	  saw	  the	  party	  lose	  five	  of	  the	  seats	  
they	   had	   won	   in	   1999,	   only	   just	   retaining	   their	   position	   as	   the	   largest	   opposition	  
grouping	  in	  the	  Assembly.	  	  A	  further	  loss	  of	  a	  Westminster	  seat	  in	  2005	  followed,	  and	  
Plaid	  recognised	  that	  changes	  were	  required	  if	  the	  party	  was	  to	  continue	  to	  challenge	  
Labour	  in	  electoral	  politics	  in	  Wales.	  	  The	  party	  structure	  changed,	  switching	  the	  focus	  
to	  the	  Assembly	  and	  giving	  prominence	  to	  the	  party	   leader	  there.	   	  Symbolic	  changes	  
were	  made	   too	  –	   shortening	   the	   title	  of	   the	  party	   from	   ‘Plaid	  Cymru	  –	  The	  Party	  of	  
Wales’	   to	   simply	   ‘Plaid’	  while	   the	   logo	  was	   changed	   for	   the	   first	   time	   since	   1933,	   a	  
yellow	  Welsh	  poppy	  replacing	  the	  three	  peaks,	  with	  yellow	  also	  becoming	  the	  official	  








Like	   the	   SNP	   in	   Scotland,	   Plaid	   contested	   the	  Welsh	  Assembly	   election	   in	   2007	  with	  
energy	  and	  optimism	  surrounding	  the	  future	  of	  politics	  in	  Wales.	  	  The	  Government	  of	  
Wales	   Act	   2006	   was	   due	   to	   be	   enacted	   after	   the	   election,	   providing	   the	   National	  
Assembly	   for	   Wales	   with	   a	   minor	   increase	   in	   power	   (discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	  
subsequent	   chapters).	   	   Not	   only	   was	   there	   hope	   that	   the	   Assembly	   could	   start	   to	  
provide	   a	   better	   level	   of	   governance	   for	  Wales,	   the	   party	   internally,	   fresh	   from	   its	  
radical	   overhaul,	   was	   enthusiastic.	   	  When	   the	   election	   came	   round,	   Plaid	   increased	  
their	   representation	   to	  15	  AMs,	   regaining	   the	  Llanelli	   seat	   from	  Labour	  and	  the	  new	  
Aberconwy	  seat	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  list	  seat	  gained.	  	  The	  2007	  election	  left	  Labour	  without	  
a	  majority,	   and	   for	   the	   first	  month	   the	  party	   governed	   in	  minority	  while	   it	   explored	  
coalition	   deals.	   	   There	   were	   three	   potential	   outcomes:	   	   A	   Labour-­‐Liberal	   Democrat	  
coalition	  (a	  repeat	  of	  the	  1999-­‐2003	  agreement),	  a	  Labour-­‐Plaid	  coalition	  or	  a	  rainbow	  
coalition	  between	  Plaid,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and	  the	  Conservatives.	  	  On	  the	  face	  of	  
it,	   as	   the	   largest	   of	   the	   ‘rainbow’	   parties	   in	   the	   Assembly,	   the	   deal	  with	   the	   Liberal	  
Democrats	   and	   the	   Conservatives	   would	   appear	   to	   have	   been	   the	   more	   prudent	  
option	  for	  Plaid:	  it	  would	  have	  made	  Plaid	  leader	  Ieuan	  Wyn	  Jones	  First	  Minister	  of	  the	  
Welsh	  Assembly,	  and	  the	  party	  would	  have	  had	  a	  clear	  hand	  in	  directing	  the	  policy	  of	  
the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government.75	  	  However,	  that	  Plaid	  preferred	  instead	  to	  pursue	  a	  
position	   as	   junior	   coalition	   partners	   to	   the	   Labour	   party	   –	   on	   the	   expectation	   that	  
Labour	   were	   the	   only	   party	   which	   could	   deliver	   upon	   the	   referendum	   on	   further	  
devolved	  powers	  –	  suggests	   that	  Plaid	  were	  motivated	  by	   the	  opportunity	   to	  deliver	  
                                                
75	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  Wales	  Says	  Yes”	  Devolution	  and	  the	  2011	  Welsh	  Referendum,	  Cardiff,	  
University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2012,	  p.77.	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upon	  (constitutional)	  policy	  rather	  than	  office	  or	  vote	  success.76	  	  This	  commitment	  was	  
made	   clear	   in	   the	   One	   Wales	   Agreement:	   a	   timetable	   to	   hold	   a	   referendum	   was	  
established,	   and	   Labour	   were	   positioned	   to	   support	   an	   affirmative	   outcome.	   	   The	  
Liberal	  Democrats’	   reluctance	   to	   enter	   into	   coalition	   government	   again	   left	   the	  One	  
Wales	  coalition	  as	  the	  only	  real	  option	  on	  the	  table	  and,	  eventually,	  after	  protracted	  
negotiations,	  an	  agreement	  was	  reached	  –	  based,	  predominantly,	  on	  the	  commitment	  
to	  the	  referendum	  on	  further	  devolution.	  
	  
Thus	   Plaid,	   a	   party	   who	   once	   opposed	   standing	   for	   office	   were	   now	   in	   coalition	  
government	  in	  an	  elected	  Welsh	  Assembly.	  	  The	  decision	  to	  enter	  office	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  
one77	  and	  the	  compromises	  brought	  through	  coalition	  government	  have	  an	  impact	  not	  
only	  on	  how	  the	  party	  acts	  in	  the	  legislature	  but	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  party	  both	  
for	  activists	  and	  voters.	  	  Plaid’s	  purpose	  in	  office	  was	  to	  move	  forward	  the	  agenda	  for	  
change	   in	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly,	   seeking	   the	   devolution	   of	   more	   powers	   and	   the	  
delivery	   of	   a	   referendum	   to	   that	   end.	   	   In	   the	   subsequent	   chapters,	   this	   thesis	   will	  
examine	  how	  that	  process	   took	  shape,	  why	  public	  engagement	  was	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  




This	  chapter	  has	  charted	  the	  history	  of	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  by	  examining	  them	  in	  
the	   context	  of	   Kris	  Deschouwer’s	   analysis	   of	   party	  progression	   from	  declaration	  and	  
                                                
76	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  Policy,	  Office	  or	  Votes?	  How	  Political	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  make	  hard	  
decisions,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.1.	  
77	  ibid.	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authorisation	   as	   a	   party,	   establishing	   themselves	   with	   representation,	   becoming	  
system	  relevant	  through	  blackmail	  and	  governing	  potential	  before	  taking	  the	  step	  into	  
governing	  themselves.	  	  It	  has	  analysed	  this	  progression	  by	  identifying	  key	  incidents	  in	  
each	  party’s	  history	  which	  have	  characterised	  each	  of	  these	  phases	  and	  had	  an	  impact	  
upon	  how	   the	   party	   has	   developed	   in	   the	   intervening	   years.	   	   The	   latter	   sections	   on	  
each	   party	   analysed	   the	   move	   from	   opposition	   into	   government	   and	   the	   factors	  
informing	  the	  decisions	  to	  govern	  alone	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  SNP)	  and	  in	  coalition	  (in	  the	  
case	  of	  Plaid).	  	  The	  subsequent	  chapters	  deal	  with	  the	  public	  engagement	  strategies	  of	  
the	   parties	   in	   office.	   	   These	   include	   the	   specific	   constitutional	   consultations	  
established	  by	  the	  respective	  governments	  (the	  National	  Conversation	  in	  Scotland	  and	  
The	   All-­‐Wales	   Convention)	   followed	   by	   a	   chapter	   which	   considers	   the	   outcome	   of	  
those	  consultations:	  a	  further	  devolution	  referendum	  in	  Wales	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  similar	  










The	  Scottish	  National	  Party’s	  position	  as	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  –	  albeit	  in	  a	  minority	  
position	   –	   allowed	   the	   party	   to	   promote	   its	   constitutional	   preference	   through	   the	  
apparatus	   of	   government.	   	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   SNP	   opened	   a	   consultation	   with	   the	  
Scottish	  public	  entitled	  A	  National	  Conversation	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2007.	  	  This	  consisted	  
of:	   the	   publication	   of	   a	   White	   Paper	   (Choosing	   Scotland’s	   Future)	   setting	   out	   the	  
Scottish	   Government’s	   preferred	   constitutional	   option	   (independence);	   a	  
predominantly	   online	   debate	   featuring	   blogs	   from	   Scottish	   Cabinet	  members,	   short	  
videos	  and	  podcasts	  with	  information	  and	  summaries	  of	  Scottish	  Government	  events	  
and	  heated	  discussion	  between	  contributors	  to	  the	  consultation;	  local	  events,	  such	  as	  
question	   and	   answer	   sessions	   which	   have	   allowed	   the	   Scottish	   electorate	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   raise	  with	  Scottish	  Government	  ministers	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   issues;	  and	  
the	   publication	   of	   documents	   on	   several	   policy	   areas	   including	   fiscal	   autonomy,	   oil,	  
foreign	   affairs	   and	   broadcasting	   which	   have	   set	   out	   how	   Scotland	   might	   react	   to	  
independence	   in	   these	   policy	   areas,	   as	   well	   as	   potential	   powers	   short	   of	  
independence.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  construction	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
taking	  forward	  the	  SNP’s	  constitutional	  goals	  and	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  
public	  on	  the	  issue,	  as	  well	  as	  considering	  the	  reaction	  of	  opposition	  politicians	  to	  the	  
SNP	  Scottish	  Government’s	  actions.	  	  It	  will	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  origins	  and	  designs	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of	   A	   National	   Conversation,	   and	   how	   it	   evolved	   from	   what	   was	   a	   small-­‐scale	   web-­‐
based	  consultation	  to	  a	  much	  larger,	  event	  and	  publication-­‐orientated	  debate	  with	  the	  
Scottish	  electorate.	  	  	  
	  
Next	   it	   analyses	   the	   public	   face	   of	  A	  National	   Conversation,	   the	   events	   themselves,	  
arguing	  that	  while	  the	  consultation	  itself	  has	  proved	  popular,	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  
has	  only	  provoked	  a	  minority	  of	  questions	  at	  these	  events.	  	  This	  led	  to	  questions	  over	  
the	   independence	   agenda	   of	   the	   SNP,	   support	   for	   which	   remained	   static	   for	   the	  
duration	   of	  A	   National	   Conversation	   though	   opinion	   polls	   did	   suggest	   that	   the	   SNP	  
remained	   popular	   as	   a	   government.	   	   The	   public	   perception	   of	   independence	   is	  
examined	   in	   the	   following	   section	   before	   the	   impact	   of	   A	   National	   Conversation	   is	  
evaluated	   in	   terms	  of	   three	  criteria:	  how	   it	   contributed	   to	  setting	   the	  agenda	  within	  
the	  Scottish	  political	  scene,	  how	  the	  opposition	  parties	  reacted,	  and	  how	  it	  provided	  
the	   foundations	   for	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   proposed	   referendum	   on	   Scottish	  
independence.	   	   Finally,	   the	   chapter	   concludes	   by	   arguing	   that	   while	   A	   National	  
Conversation	  proved	  a	  popular	  consultation,	  its	  impact	  upon	  the	  Scottish	  electorate’s	  
views	   on	   independence	   was	   limited,	   and	   that	   convincing	   the	   population	   that	   their	  
primary	   policy	   objective	   –	   independence	   –	   is	   necessary	   remains	   a	   challenge	   for	   the	  
SNP.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  success	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  in	  setting	  and	  maintaining	  
the	   constitutional	  debate	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  political	   agenda	  and	  engaging	  not	  only	  







In	   the	   opening	   chapter,	   the	   notion	   that	   involving	   the	   population	   in	   the	   making	   of	  
public	  policy	  through	  consultations	  as	  a	  societal	  good	  was	  considered.1	   	  And,	   indeed,	  
that	   consultations	   promote	   an	   environment	   in	   which	   the	   decisions	   taken	   in	   the	  
aftermath	   of	   public	   engagement	   appear	   more	   legitimate	   is	   also	   clear	   from	   the	  
literature.2	  	  Consultations	  have	  become	  a	  “pervasive...	  feature	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  in	  
Britain”,3	  providing	  governments	  opportunities	   to	  engage	  with	   the	  public,	   “holding	  a	  
dialogue	   and	   encouraging	   a	   debate”.4	   	   However,	   the	   practice	   of	   consultation	   can	  
“range	   from	   cosmetic	   ritual	   to	   meaningful	   bargaining	   between	   government	   and	  
group”,	   meaning	   that	   while	   in	   some	   cases	   consultation	   makes	   a	   real	   difference	   to	  
policy	  outcomes,	  in	  other	  cases	  the	  exercise	  is	  simply	  a	  means	  of	  appearing	  accessible	  
and	  transparent.5	  	  	  
	  
For	  the	  SNP,	  a	  constitutional	  consultation	  represented	  something	  that	  they	  had	  never	  
had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   do	   before:	   engage	   the	   public	   through	   the	   apparatus	   of	  
government	   on	   the	   issue	   upon	   which	   the	   party	   was	   founded.	   	   It	   was	   built	   as	   an	  
attempt	  to	  do	  three	  things:	  build	  support	  for	   independence,	  engage	  the	  political	  and	  
governmental	  establishment	  in	  Scotland	  on	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  and	  to	  maintain	  
                                                
1	  Baxter,	  G.	  ‘The	  Best	  Laid	  Schemes?	  	  The	  Provision	  and	  Accessibility	  of	  Government	  Consultation	  
Information	  in	  the	  UK’	  in	  LIBRI	  –	  International	  Journal	  of	  Libraries	  and	  Information	  Services,	  Vol.	  6,	  No.	  3,	  
2010,	  p.253	  
2	  Cornwall,	  A.	  ‘Locating	  Citizen	  Participation’	  in	  IDS:	  Institute	  of	  Development	  Studies	  Bulletin,	  Vol.	  33,	  
No.	  2,	  April,	  2002,	  p.49.	  
3	  Hogwood,	  B.	  W.	  ‘If	  Consultation	  is	  Everything	  Then	  Maybe	  It’s	  Nothing’	  in	  Strathclyde	  Papers	  on	  
Government	  and	  Politics,	  No.	  44,	  1986,	  p.11.	  
4	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Gammell,	  E.	  The	  Art	  of	  Consultation:	  Public	  Dialogues	  in	  a	  Noisy	  World,	  London,	  Biteback	  
Publishing	  Ltd.,	  2009,	  p.3.	  
5	  Hogwood,	  B.	  W.	  1986,	  op	  cit.	  p.12.	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the	  issue	  of	  independence	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  in	  Scotland.6	  	  To	  do	  so	  successfully	  
meant	   engaging	   the	   Scottish	   public	   at	   various	   different	   events	   and	   through	  
governmental	  publications	  over	  a	   sustained	  period	  of	   time.	   	  This	   strategy	  developed	  
largely	   from	   the	   perceived	   success	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention	   of	   the	  
late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  in	  bringing	  about	  devolution	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  	  That	  the	  
party	  themselves	  were	  not	  involved	  in	  this	  process	  until	  such	  times	  as	  the	  referendum	  
was	   secured	   and	   the	   campaign	   at	   the	   referendum	   itself	   was	   underway	  meant	   that	  
they	  had	  not	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  public	  on	  such	  a	  large	  scale	  until	  
they	  were	  in	  office	  in	  2007.	  	  	  
	  
The	   evident	   success	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention	   (see	   chapter	   two)	   in	  
achieving	   its	   desired	   outcome	   provided	   the	   party	   with	   a	   blueprint	   for	   their	   own	  
consultation	  strategy.	  	  What	  is	  also	  striking	  here	  is	  that,	  though	  a	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  
the	   Constitution	   had	   been	   established	   prior	   to	   the	   1979	   referendum,	   its	   pool	   of	  
evidence	  was	  small,	  with	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  pressure	  groups	  and	  public	  bodies	  engaged	  
in	   the	   process,	   including	   the	   Faculty	   of	   Advocates,	   the	   Law	   Society	   of	   Scotland,	   the	  
Scottish	  Economic	  Planning	  Council	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Plebiscite	  Society.7	  	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  
period	   between	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   report	   and	   the	   first	   devolution	  
bill,	   the	   devolution	   debate	   “took	   place	  mainly...	  within	   the	   Labour	   Party.”8	   	  While	   a	  
“consultation	  document”	  was	  launched	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1974	  on	  the	  issue,	  attempts	  
at	   public	   engagement	   were	   limited	   –	   the	   document	   was	   published	   on	   3	   June	   and	  
                                                
6	  Interview	  with	  Kevin	  Pringle	  (Scottish	  Government	  Special	  Advisor)	  (May	  2010).	  
7	  Drucker,	  H.	  M.	  and	  Brown,	  G.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Nationalism	  and	  Devolution,	  London,	  Longman,	  1980,	  
p.72.	  
8	  ibid.	  p.87.	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invited	   responses	  by	  30	   June,	   allowing	  very	   little	   time	   for	  evidence	   to	  be	   collected.9	  	  
Indeed,	  for	  much	  of	  the	  public,	  the	  first	  engagement	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  devolution,	  the	  
first	  time	  they	  had	  been	  asked	  their	  opinion	  and	  been	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  answer,	  was	  
on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  referendum	  in	  1979.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  referendum	  in	  1979	  –	  and	  
to	   an	   extent	   in	   1997	   –	  was	   the	   consultation.	   	  Much	   has	   changed	   in	   the	  manner	   in	  
which	   governments	   conduct	   consultations	   in	   the	   intervening	   period,	   not	   least	   the	  
transparent	   nature	   of	   governing,	   the	   accountability	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   the	  
legitimisation	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  afforded	  by	  consulting	  the	  electorate.10	  	  
Thus,	  for	  a	  new	  party	   in	  government,	  the	  ability	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  public	  –	  and	  the	  
necessity	  of	  doing	  so	  in	  an	  open	  and	  transparent	  manner	  –	  was	  one	  which	  was	  keenly	  
grasped	   by	   the	   SNP.	   	   And	   though	   there	   was	   a	   clear	   lack	   of	   government-­‐led	  
consultation	   prior	   to	   the	   1979	   and	   1997	   referendums,	   the	   campaign	   for	   devolution	  
provided	  some	  inspiration	  for	  the	  SNP’s	  consultation	  strategy.	  
	  
The	  Roots	  of	  the	  Strategy:	  The	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention	  
Mitchell	   examines	   the	   use	   of	   constitutional	   conventions	   by	   the	   Scottish	   National	  
Movement	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  argues	  that	  “there	  has	  never	  been	  
any	   serious	   attempt	   made	   to	   bring	   the	   Scottish	   public	   into	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
process”.	   	   Instead,	   they	   had	   been	   “elite	   affairs”	   which	   held	   a	   “disdainful	   attitude	  
towards	   the	   Scottish	   people”.11	   	   However,	   the	   Campaign	   for	   a	   Scottish	   Assembly’s	  
realisation	   of	   the	   concept	  was	   to	   be	   different	   –	   a	   vehicle	   for	   civic	   society,	   including	  
                                                
9	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Devolution,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1979,	  p.152.	  
10	  See	  National	  Consumer	  Council,	  Government	  Consultations:	  Not	  Just	  a	  Paper	  Exercise	  –	  A	  Consultation	  
Document,	  London,	  NCC,	  1997	  and	  Cornwall,	  A.	  op	  cit.	  
11	  Mitchell,	  J.	  Constitutional	  Conventions	  and	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Movement:	  Origins,	  Agendas	  and	  




political	  parties,	  to	  join	  together	  and	  engage	  in	  the	  debate	  and,	  crucially,	  to	  provide	  a	  
united	   voice	   arguing	   the	   case	   for	   devolution.	   	   It	   was	   an	   idea	   which	   gathered	  
momentum	   within	   civic	   society	   and,	   though	   the	   SNP	   dropped	   out	   after	   initially	  
showing	   tentative	   support,	   Labour	   and	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   furnished	   the	  
Convention	   with	   their	   combined	   57	   Scottish	   MPs,	   thereby	   providing	   the	   political	  
legitimacy	   the	   fledgling	   organisation	   required.	   	   They	   were	   joined	   by	   all	   bar	   one	   of	  
Scotland’s	  MEPs	  (the	  SNP	  representative	  in	  Brussels),	  all	  12	  of	  Scotland’s	  Regional	  and	  
Island	   Councils	   and	   47	   of	   the	   53	   District	   Councils,	   as	   well	   as	   representatives	   of	   the	  
Social	   Democrats,	   Co-­‐Operative	   Party,	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Great	   Britain,	   the	  
Scottish	  Greens,	  the	  Orkney	  and	  Shetland	  Movement,	  several	  church	  leaders	  and	  the	  
Scottish	  Trades	  Union	  Congress	  (STUC).12	  	  There	  was,	  however,	  a	  lack	  of	  input	  from	  the	  
business	   community,	   though	   the	   National	   Federation	   of	   Self-­‐Employed	   and	   Small	  
Businesses	  (which	  would	   later	  become	  the	  FSB)	  did	  send	  representatives.	   	  While	  this	  
was	   a	   Convention	   which	   drew	   representatives	   from	   a	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   Scottish	  
society,	  some	  still	  argued	  that	   it	  was	  “difficult	  to	  see	  how	  it	  could	  claim	  to	  speak	  for	  
Scotland”.13	  	  Indeed,	  even	  though	  it	  drew	  support	  from	  civic	  society,	  the	  Convention’s	  
membership	   appeared	   to	  be	   “socially	   narrow	  and	   very	   traditional	   in	   its	   composition	  
and	  style”.14	  	  Despite	  its	  limitations	  and,	  most	  noticeably,	  the	  setbacks	  of	  Conservative	  
electoral	   victories	   in	   1987	   and	   1992,	   the	   Convention	   galvanised	   support	   around	   the	  
concept	   of	   a	   Scottish	   Parliament	   and	   strengthened	   itself	   through	   public	   activities,	  
including	  a	  vigil	  on	  Calton	  Hill	  beginning	  after	  the	  1992	  general	  election.	  
                                                
12	  Mitchell,	  J.	  1991	  op	  cit.	  p.15-­‐16.	  
13	  Mitchell,	  J.	  Strategies	  for	  Self-­‐Government:	  The	  Campaigns	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  Edinburgh,	  
Polygon,	  1996,	  p.131	  
14	  Paterson,	  L.	  and	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  “Does	  civil	  society	  drive	  constitutional	  change?	  	  The	  case	  of	  Wales	  and	  
Scotland”	  in	  Taylor,	  B.	  and	  Thomson,	  K.	  (eds)	  Scotland	  and	  Wales:	  Nations	  Again?	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  
Wales	  Press,	  1999,	  p.180.	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Origins	  and	  Designs	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  
In	  their	  2007	  manifesto	  for	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  election,	  the	  SNP	  promised	  the:	  	  
	  
Publication	  of	  a	  White	  Paper	  detailing	  the	  concept	  of	  Scottish	  
independence	   in	   the	  modern	   world	   as	   part	   of	   preparations	  
for	  offering	  Scots	  the	  opportunity	  to	  decide	  on	  independence	  
in	  a	  referendum,	  with	  a	  likely	  date	  of	  2010.15	  
	  
When	   the	   party	   won	   the	   election	   2007	   Scottish	   Parliamentary	   election	   –	   by	   the	  
slimmest	  of	  margins	  –	  it	  was	  this	  commitment	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  on	  independence	  
that	   was	   to	   foil	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   force	   the	   SNP	   into	  
governing	  alone.16	   	   Support	   for	   the	  SNP’s	  constitutional	  preference	  of	   independence	  
within	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  SNP	  themselves,	  the	  two	  Green	  MSPs	  
(Robin	  Harper	  and	  Patrick	  Harvie)	  and	  Independent	  MSP	  Margo	  MacDonald,	  a	  former	  
member	  of	  the	  party.	  	  The	  staunchly	  unionist	  Conservative	  party	  lined	  up	  in	  opposition	  
with	  Labour	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  the	  latter	  in	  favour	  of	  providing	  more	  powers	  
to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  but	  stopping	  well	  short	  of	  independence.	  	  The	  arithmetic	  for	  
the	   SNP	   was	   bleak	   –	   with	   only	   50	   of	   the	   129	   MSPs	   in	   favour,	   the	   party	   lacked	   a	  
majority	  to	  legislate	  for	  a	  referendum	  on	  independence.	  	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   party	   held	   to	   their	  manifesto	   commitment	   and	   produced	   a	  White	  
Paper	  entitled	  Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future	  –	  A	  National	  Conversation	   in	  August	  2007,	  
only	   three	   months	   after	   taking	   office.	   	   This	   began	   what	   would	   be	   a	   three-­‐year	  
consultation	  on	  Scotland’s	  constitutional	  future.	  	  It	  was	  a	  malleable	  process,	  designed	  
to	  adapt	  to	  the	  changing	  circumstances	  and	  political	  environment	  of	  the	  time.	  	  As	  was	  
                                                
15	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  Manifesto	  2007:	  It’s	  Time,	  Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  2007,	  p.8.	  
16	  Lynch,	  P.	  and	  Elias,	  A.	  ‘Devolution	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  Inexorable	  Rise	  of	  Scottish	  and	  Welsh	  
Nationalism?’	  World	  Congress	  of	  Political	  Science	  Conference	  paper,	  July,	  2009,	  p.11.	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pointed	  out	  to	  the	  author,	  A	  National	  Conversation	  was	  not	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Scottish	  
Government	  –	  independence	  for	  Scotland	  was.	  	  The	  consultation	  process	  was	  just	  that	  
–	  a	  process	  designed	  to	  move	  Scotland	  closer	  to	  that	  constitutional	  future.17	  	  However,	  
A	   National	   Conversation	   bears	   all	   the	   hallmarks	   of	   a	   policy	   process,	   whether	   the	  
Scottish	   Government	   recognised	   it	   as	   such	   or	   not.	   	   Hogwood	   and	   Gunn	   note	   nine	  
stages	   through	   which	   an	   issue	   may	   pass	   with	   regards	   policy	   analysis	   (box	   4.1)	   and	  
indicate	  that,	  although	  the	  order	  of	  the	  stages	  may	  be	  different	  and	  that	  actors	  may	  
not	   consciously	   be	   performing	   those	   roles	   specifically,	   the	   process	   of	   progressing	   a	  
policy	  often	  follows	  these	  stages.18	  
	  
Box	  4.1:	  Stages	  of	  Policy	  Analysis19	  
	  
	  
1. Deciding	  to	  decide	  (agenda-­‐setting)	  
2. Deciding	  how	  to	  decide	  (issue	  filteration)	  
3. Issue	  definition	  
4. Forecasting	  
5. Setting	  objectives	  and	  priorities	  
6. Option	  analysis	  
7. Policy	  implementation,	  monitoring	  and	  control	  
8. Evaluation	  and	  review	  
9. Policy	  maintenance,	  succession	  or	  termination	  
	  
	  
Taking	   the	   stages	   in	   the	   order	   listed	   and	   applying	   them	   to	  A	  National	   Conversation	  
shows	   some	   correlation	  with	   the	  model.	   	   Stages	   one	   and	   two	   are	   really	   party-­‐level	  
decisions.	   	   The	   issue	   of	   constitutional	   change	   –	   specifically	   independence	   –	   is	   the	  
party’s	  raison	  d’être,	  and	  the	   issue	  required	  movement,	  not	  only	  to	  maintain	  activist	  
support	   but	   also	   given	   the	   opportunity	   that	   the	   party’s	   first	   term	   in	   office	   afforded	  
                                                
17	  Interview	  with	  senior	  Scottish	  Government	  Official	  (March	  2010).	  





them.	   It	   was	   a	   key	   component	   of	   their	   manifesto	   and,	   though	   there	   would	   be	  
repercussions	   and	   costs	   to	   be	   met,	   it	   was	   central	   to	   the	   party’s	   ideology.	   	   The	  
definition	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  remained	  quite	  vague	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  but	  the	  
SNP	   as	   a	   governing	   party	   were	   able	   to	   proceed	   with	   forecasting,	   speculating	   in	  
Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future	  about	   the	  “alternative	  possible	   futures”	  Scotland	   faced.20	  	  
The	  objective	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  was	   thus	   threefold:	   to	   lay	   the	  groundwork	  
for	  an	  independence	  referendum	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  future;	  to	  engage	  the	  public	  in	  
discussions	   about	   Scotland’s	   constitutional	   future	   and	   to	  maintain	   the	   issue	   on	   the	  
political	  agenda.21	  	  The	  first	  of	  those	  could	  be	  described	  as	  the	  “ultimate”	  goal,	  while	  
the	  latter	  two	  “proximate”	  goals,	  the	  means	  to	  the	  higher	  end	  that	  is	  independence.22	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  option	  analysis,	  consultation	  was	  the	  preferred	  choice	  of	  the	  SNP,	  primarily	  
because	  it	  allowed	  the	  party	  to	  engage	  the	  public	  in	  discussion	  about	  the	  constitution	  
and	  did	  so	  through	  a	   type	  of	  process	  with	  which	  they	  were	   familiar,	   thereby	  using	  a	  
traditional	  method	  (consultation)	  to	  normalise	  a	  debate	  (constitutional	  change)	  which	  
had	   not	   commonly	   been	   discussed	   in	   public	   forums.23	   	   The	   implementation	   and	  
evaluation	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  subsequent	  sections.	  	  Finally,	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  over	  a	  three-­‐year	  period	  indicates	  continual	  
review	  of	  the	  process.	  	  	  
	  
Thus,	   with	   regard	   to	   Hogwood	   and	   Gunn’s	   model	   for	   policy	   analysis,	   A	   National	  
Conversation	  can	  clearly	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  policy.	  	  However,	  while	  consultation	  is	  
                                                
20	  ibid.	  p.8.	  
21	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  ‘Inside	  the	  National	  Conversation:	  The	  SNP	  Government	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Independence	  2007-­‐2010’	  in	  Scottish	  Affairs,	  No.	  80,	  Summer	  2012(b),	  p113.	  
22	  Hogwood,	  B.	  W.	  and	  Gunn,	  L.	  A.	  1984,	  op	  cit.	  p.157.	  
23	  Interview	  with	  Keith	  Brown	  MSP	  (then-­‐Minister	  for	  Schools	  and	  Skills)	  (April	  2010).	  
 
145	  
a	   fairly	   common	   tool	   of	   governance,	   this	   consultation	  was	  distinctive	   for	   the	   SNP	   in	  
that	  it	  was	  directed	  not	  at	  a	  policy	  area	  such	  as	  health	  or	  education,	  but	  at	  the	  party’s	  
core	  value	  –	  independence.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  was	  like	  no	  other	  consultation,	  and	  was	  
much	  more	  of	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  than	  an	  end	  in	  itself.24	  
	  
A	  National	  Conversation	  –	  White	  Paper	  
The	  White	  Paper	  itself	  set	  out	  what	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  viewed	  as	  three	  “realistic	  
choices”	   for	   the	   future	   of	   Scotland.	   These	   were:	   maintaining	   the	   status	   quo	   of	   a	  
Scottish	  Parliament	  within	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  redesigning	  devolution	  to	  extend	  the	  
powers	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  (including	  fiscal	  powers	  but	  short	  of	  independence)	  
and	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   preferred	   option,	   independence.25	   	   The	   Scottish	  
Government	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  within	  this	  document	  to	  show	  that	  this	  was	  not	  to	  
be	  a	  one-­‐way	   street,	   that	  all	   views,	  even	  –	  and	  perhaps,	   in	  particular	  –	   those	  which	  
were	  opposed	  to	  independence,	  were	  welcomed	  within	  the	  discussion.26	   	  Schedule	  5	  
of	  the	  Scotland	  Act	  (1998)	  details	  the	  powers	  which	  are,	  at	  present,	  reserved	  to	  the	  UK	  
Parliament.	  	  These	  include	  international	  relations,	  defence,	  the	  economy,	  immigration,	  
energy,	  social	  security,	  broadcasting	  and	  the	  constitution.27	  	  Chapter	  2	  of	  the	  Choosing	  
Scotland’s	   Future	   saw	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   propose	   several	   alterations	   to	   the	  
                                                
24	  The	  Scottish	  Government	  lists	  on	  its	  website	  (www.scotland.gov.uk/Consultations/Current)	  the	  
consultations	  which	  are	  active	  at	  any	  given	  period	  of	  time.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  there	  were	  24	  active	  
consultations,	  on	  issues	  ranging	  from	  Procurement	  Reform	  to	  Biodiversity.	  
25	  Scottish	  Government,	  Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future:	  A	  National	  Conversation	  –	  Independence	  and	  
Responsibility	  in	  the	  Modern	  World,	  Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  Government,	  2007,	  p.vii-­‐viii.	  
26	  Jones,	  P.	  ‘Scotland:	  The	  Nationalist	  Phoenix’	  in	  Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  (2008)	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  2008	  
Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2008,	  p.51;	  Mitchell,	  J.	  ‘Ever	  Looser	  Union’	  in	  Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  The	  State	  of	  the	  
Nations	  2008,	  Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2008,	  p.254.	  
27	  HM	  Government	  Scotland	  Act	  1998,	  Schedule	  5,	  London,	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office.	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Scotland	  Act	  1998	  which	  would	  strengthen	  devolution.28	   	  The	  proposals	   included	  the	  
devolution	   of	   powers	   in	   the	   field	   of	   taxation,	   energy	   policy,	   firearms	   legislation,	  
employment	   law	   and	   broadcasting.29	   	   These	   proposals	   were	   pragmatic	   in	   their	  
approach:	   	   the	   party	   recognised	   that	   their	   own	   constitutional	   preference	   –	  
independence	  –	  was	  not	  the	  constitutional	  preference	  of	  the	  majority	   in	  the	  Scottish	  
Parliament	   (and,	   indeed,	   according	   to	   opinion	   polls,	   only	   a	  minority	   of	   the	   Scottish	  
population).30	  	  	  
	  
Thus,	   by	   presenting	   their	   own,	  more	   radical,	   goal	   alongside	   proposals	   which	   would	  
provide	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   with	   more	   powers,	   the	   SNP	   were	   able	   to	   promote	  
their	   second	   preference	   –	   more	   powers	   for	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   –	   as	   a	   more	  
reasoned,	   less	   radical	   proposal.	   	   This	   transformed	   the	   end-­‐game	   that	   the	   SNP	  were	  
playing.31	   	   Instead	   of	   presenting	   themselves	   as	   a	   government	   transfixed	   upon	  
independence,	   stopping	   at	   nothing	   to	   achieve	   their	   constitutional	   goal,	   the	   party	  
changed	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game.	  	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  independence	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum,	  all-­‐
or-­‐nothing	  game,	  the	  option	  of	  constitutional	  reform	  stopping	  short	  of	  independence	  
–	  or,	   as	   it	  was	   subsequently	  approximated,	   “devo-­‐max”	  –	  meant	   that	   the	  SNP	  could	  
legitimately	  argue	  that	  they	  have	  made	  progress	  towards	  their	   long-­‐term	  goal,	   if	  and	  
when	   devolved	   powers	   are	   extended	   into	   other	   areas.32	   	   The	   inclusion	   of	   a	   further	  
                                                
28	  Lynch,	  P.	  ‘Regionalist	  Parties,	  Economic	  Development	  and	  Regional	  Government:	  The	  SNP	  in	  
Government	  2007-­‐2009’,	  Conference	  Paper,	  IXth	  Congreso	  Asociación	  Española	  de	  Ciencia	  Política	  y	  de	  
la	  Administración	  (AECPA),	  Malaga,	  September,	  2009,	  p.12-­‐13.	  
29	  Scottish	  Government,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	  p.11-­‐17.	  
30	  TNS	  System	  Three	  polls	  for	  the	  Sunday	  Herald,	  cited	  Curtice,	  J.	  ‘Public	  Attitudes	  and	  Elections’	  in	  
Cairney,	  P.	  (ed)	  Scotland:	  Devolution	  Monitoring	  Report,	  UCL,	  London:	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  May,	  
2009(b),	  p.16-­‐17.	  
31	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  Policy,	  Office	  or	  Votes?	  How	  Political	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  Make	  Hard	  
Decisions,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.306.	  
32	  Lynch	  P.	  and	  Elias,	  A.	  op	  cit.	  p.20.	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constitutional	  option	  would	  also	  play	  an	   important	   role	   later	   in	   the	  process	   towards	  
the	   referendum,	   particularly	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   ballot	   paper	   design	   (specifically,	  
whether	   there	   should	   be	   a	   single	   question	   on	   independence,	   or	   a	   second	   question	  
asking	   if	  voters	  wanted	  “devo-­‐max”)	  and	  the	  campaigns	  themselves.	   	  That	   it	  was	  the	  
SNP	  which	  proposed	  a	  third	  constitutional	  option	  –	  extended	  devolution	  short	  of	  their	  
constitutional	   goal	   of	   independence	   –	   was	   also	   an	   insight	   into	   the	   party’s	   strategy.	  	  
The	  1980s	  divisions	  between	  fundamentalists	  and	  gradualists	  within	  the	  party	  appears	  
to	  have	  been	  settled	   in	   the	  ascendency	  of	   the	   latter,	  with	   the	  party	  now	  apparently	  
happy	   to	   accept	   further	   devolution	   as	   a	   stepping	   stone	   towards	   independence.	  	  
Indeed,	  as	   it	  was	  put	   in	   interviews	  with	  the	  author,	  “everyone	   is	  a	  gradualist	  now”33	  
and	   “‘devo-­‐max’	   would	   be	   a	   great	   success	   for	   the	   SNP,	   part	   of	   a	   continuum	   on	   to	  
independence”.34	  
	  
Naturally	   though,	   independence	   did	   feature	   heavily	   in	   the	   White	   Paper	   alongside	  
these	   proposals.	   	   Chapter	   3	   set	   out	   the	   steps	   which	   would	   be	   taken	   in	   order	   that	  
Scotland	   “achieve”	   full	   independence,	   the	   likely	   format	   of	   negotiations	  with	   the	  UK	  
Government	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  membership	  of	  the	  latter,	  
the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   view	   of	   defence	   and	   foreign	   policy	   and	   the	   relationship	  
between	  Scotland	  and	  the	  monarchy	  post-­‐independence.35	  	  A	  draft	  form	  of	  the	  SNP’s	  
proposed	  referendum	  question	  was	  included	  in	  Annex	  B	  of	  the	  White	  Paper:	  
	  
                                                
33	  Interview	  with	  Alasdair	  Allan	  (SNP	  MSP)	  (March	  2010).	  
34	  Interview	  with	  Ian	  McKee	  (SNP	  MSP)	  (March	  2010).	  
35	  Scottish	  Government,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	  p.18-­‐24.	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The	  Scottish	  Government	  should	  negotiate	  a	  settlement	  with	  
the	   Government	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   so	   that	   Scotland	  
becomes	  an	  independent	  state.36	  
	  
The	  White	  Paper	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  has	  no	  competence	  over	  the	  
UK	   constitution,	   but	   proposed	   that	   if	   the	   question	  were	   framed	   in	   such	   a	  way	   as	   a	  
precursor	   to	   negotiations	   on	   independence	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   demand	   for	  
independence,	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  would	  likely	  have	  the	  competence	  to	  hold	  such	  
a	  referendum.37	  	  	  
	  
This	   is	   derivative	   of	   the	  work	   of	   one	   of	   the	   SNP’s	   foremost	   legal	   and	   constitutional	  
scholars,	   the	   late	   Neil	   MacCormick,	   who	   argued	   that	   such	   a	   referendum,	   with	   an	  
advisory	   nature,	   would	   be	   well	   within	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   parliament.38	   	   He	  
pointed	   out	   that	   an	   advisory	   referendum	   would	   be	   consistent	   with	   previous	   UK	  
referendums	   (since	   the	   UK’s	   unwritten	   constitution	   makes	   no	   provision	   for	  
referendums	  to	  be	  legally	  binding)	  and	  that,	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  Scottish	  population	  
vote	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   SNP’s	   proposal,	   such	   a	   vote	  would	   be	   sufficient	   for	   secession	  
negotiations	   to	  begin.39	   	   And	   though	   a	   referendum	  was	   the	   stated	  end	  point	   of	   the	  
Scottish	  Government’s	  National	  Conversation,	  the	  process	  of	  getting	  to	  that	  point	  and	  
how	   the	   government	   presented	   their	   case,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   debate	   surrounding	   the	  
constitutional	   future	   of	   Scotland,	   is	   important	   in	   itself.	   	   It	   is	   this	   debate	   which	   the	  
                                                
36	  ibid.	  p.35.	  
37	  ibid.	  
38	  MacCormick,	  N.	  ‘Is	  There	  a	  Constitutional	  Path	  to	  Scottish	  Independence’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs,	  
2000,	  Vol,	  53,	  No.	  4,	  p.726.	  
39	  ibid.	  p.723,	  p.726.	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Scottish	  Government’s	  White	  Paper	  began	  and	  one	  which	   the	  National	  Conversation	  
consultation	  sought	  to	  develop	  on	  the	  road	  to	  a	  referendum	  on	  independence.40	  
	  
The	  White	  Paper	  was	  the	  first	  step	  to	  this	  end.	  	  It	  allowed	  the	  SNP	  to	  give	  substance	  to	  
their	   constitutional	   goals	   through	   the	   apparatus	   of	   government.	   	   They	  were	   able	   to	  
use	  their	  position	  as	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  to	  present	  their	  proposals,	  not	  in	  a	  party	  
political	   manifesto	   but	   –	   for	   the	   first	   time	   –	   as	   a	   government	   document,	   with	   the	  
intention	   of	   producing	   legislation	   in	   this	   area	   and	   moving	   forward	   towards	  
independence.	  	  This	  is	  important	  in	  several	  respects.	  	  By	  making	  the	  “hard	  choice”41	  of	  
taking	   office,	   the	   SNP	   gave	   themselves	   the	   opportunity	   to	   achieve	   –	   or	   at	   the	   very	  
least,	  advance	  –	  their	  constitutional	  goals	  through	  governing.	  	  The	  party	  could	  thus	  call	  
on	  the	  expertise	  of	  civil	  servants,	  special	  advisors	  and	  constitutional	  experts	  in	  order	  to	  
evaluate	   and	   refine	   their	   strategies	   in	   campaigning	   for	   independence.	   	   History	   will	  
show	  the	  SNP	  have	  always	  been	  in	  a	  position	  to	  influence	  the	  policy	  positions	  of	  state-­‐
wide	   parties	   by	   increasing	   their	   electoral	   viability	   and	   campaigning	   vigorously	   for	   a	  
measure	  of	  home-­‐rule	  for	  Scotland	  –	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success.42	  	  However,	  as	  a	  
party	   of	   government,	   the	   party	   was	   able	   to	   set	   the	   agenda	   on	   the	   constitutional	  
debate	   by	   establishing	   their	   own	   government	   consultation	   process.	   	   The	   National	  
Conversation	   process	  was	   prefaced	   by	   the	  White	   Paper,	   which	   set	   the	   tone	   for	   the	  
debate	   and	   the	   parameters	   for	   discussion.	   	   But	   this	   was	   just	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  
                                                
40	  While	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  were	  keen	  to	  solicit	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Scottish	  electorate	  on	  the	  
constitutional	  question,	  this	  was	  not	  an	  exercise	  in	  “constitutional	  crowd-­‐sourcing”,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  reforming	  the	  Icelandic	  constitution	  between	  2011	  and	  2012.	  	  See	  Gylfason,	  T.	  ‘From	  Collapse	  to	  
Constitution:	  The	  Case	  of	  Iceland’	  in	  CESifo	  Working	  Paper,	  June	  2012,	  available	  online	  at:	  www.cesifo-­‐
group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1214953.PDF	  for	  more	  details	  on	  the	  Icelandic	  constitutional	  
process.	  
41	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.1.	  
42	  Bogdanor,	  V.	  Devolution	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.127-­‐8.	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process,	  and	  one	  which	  made	  clear	  from	  the	  outset	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  SNP	  Scottish	  
Government	  –	  to	  build	  towards	  and	  win	  a	  referendum	  on	  independence	  to	  be	  held	  in	  
2010.	  
	  
Aims	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  
Herein	  lay	  the	  objectives	  –	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  –	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation.	  	  The	  
primary	  objective	  of	  the	  consultation	  was	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  referendum	  on	  
independence.	   	   This	   was	   made	   clear	   in	   the	   introductory	  White	   Paper.43	   	   However,	  
even	   this	  was	  a	  minor	  misrepresentation	  of	   the	   consultation’s	  objectives.	   	   For	  while	  
building	   towards	   a	   referendum	   did	   dominate	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   thinking	  
through	   the	   consultation,	   independence	   itself	   –	   and	   not	   the	   referendum	   –	  was	   the	  
long-­‐term	   objective	   of	   the	   process.44	   	   Building	   towards	   a	   yes	   vote	   at	   a	   referendum	  
then,	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  key	  objective	  of	  the	  process.	   	  Nevertheless,	  behind	  
this	  objective	   lay	  several	  secondary	  aims.	   	  Firstly,	  and	  perhaps	  most	   importantly,	  the	  
consultation	  allowed	  the	  party	  to	  set	  the	  political	  agenda	  in	  Scotland.	  	  This	  was	  a	  key	  
consideration	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	   and	  provided	  “a	   tangible	  means	  of	   judging	  
the	   success	  of	   the	   consultation”.45	   	   Agenda-­‐setting	  was	   key	   to	   the	   SNP’s	   strategy	  of	  
normalising	   the	   constitutional	   debate,	   providing	   the	   party	   with	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
explain	  their	  vision	  of	  independence	  through	  an	  “apparatus	  which	  was	  bigger	  than	  the	  
party”	  and,	  perhaps	  even	  more	  crucially,	  engaged	   the	  civil	   service	   in	  Scotland	   in	   the	  
constitutional	  debate,	  preparing	  the	  wider	  Scottish	  Government	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  
                                                
43	  Scottish	  Government,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	  p.18-­‐24.	  
44	  Interview	  with	  a	  senior	  Scottish	  Government	  Official	  (March	  2010).	  
45	  Interview	  with	  Kevin	  Pringle,	  Special	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  (March	  2010).	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independence	  and	  what	   it	  would	  mean	   for	   government.46	   	   Public	   engagement	   then,	  
was	  crucial	  to	  the	  SNP’s	  strategy,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  means	  of	  promoting	  their	  constitutional	  
goal,	   but	   also	  as	   a	  means	  of	  placing	  and	  maintaining	   the	   constitutional	   issue	  on	   the	  
political	   agenda	   and	   engaging	   the	   political	   classes	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   machinery	   of	  
government	  and	  the	  media)	  in	  discussions	  upon	  the	  issue.	  
	  
A	  National	  Conversation	  –	  A	  National	  Process	  
Phase	   one	   of	   A	   National	   Conversation	   began	   with	   a	   speech	   by	   First	   Minister	   Alex	  
Salmond	  at	  Napier	  University	  on	  14	  August	  2007	  and	  the	   launch	  of	   the	  White	  Paper	  
Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future.	   	  The	  First	  Minister	   indicated	  that	   it	  was	  “the	  start	  of	  the	  
next...	  phase	  of	  Scotland’s	  progress	  of	  constitutional	   reform.”47	   	  He	  also	  argued	   that	  
“there	  is	  now	  no	  substantive	  debate	  about	  whether	  there	  should	  be	  change,	  only	  what	  
change	   there	   should	  be,”	   and	   that	   a	   “range	  of	   options”	  would	  be	   considered	   in	   the	  
process	  of	  consultation.48	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  an	  interactive	  website	  was	  launched	  on	  
which	   Cabinet	   Secretaries	   and	  Ministers	   from	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   contributed	  
articles	   and	   blog	   posts	   and	   which	   allowed	   the	   public	   to	   post	   comments	   and	   join	  
discussions	   on	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   topics	   related	   to	   the	   constitutional	   debate.	   	   For	   six	  
months,	  the	  consultation	  process	  was	  predominantly	  limited	  to	  written	  submissions	  –	  
articles	  by	  Cabinet	  members	  and	  comments,	   letters	  and	  emails	  from	  the	  public,	  with	  
only	  the	  First	  Minister	  delivering	  a	  series	  of	  public	  lectures	  to	  keep	  the	  consultation	  in	  
the	  public	  eye.49	  	  A	  St	  Andrew’s	  Day	  lecture	  on	  national	  days	  was	  the	  first	  of	  these,	  in	  
                                                
46	  Interview	  with	  a	  senior	  Scottish	  Government	  Official	  (March	  2010).	  
47	  Salmond,	  A.	  Launch	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation,	  speech	  at	  Napier	  University,	  14	  August,	  2007(a).	  
48	  ibid.	  
49	  Keating,	  M.	  ‘The	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Debate’	  in	  Cairney,	  P.	  (ed)	  Scotland:	  Devolution	  Monitoring	  
Report,	  UCL,	  London:	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  May,	  2009,	  p.6.	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which	  the	  First	  Minister	  emphasised	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  constitutional	  process,	  arguing	  
that	   “the	   case	   for	   consulting	   the	  people	   is	  unanswerable.”50	   	  At	   the	  Playfair	   lecture,	  
the	  First	  Minister	  reiterated	  his	  party’s	  position	  that	  “an	  independent	  Scotland	  has	  at	  
its	  core	  an	  active	  and	  positive	  membership	  of	  the	  EU.”51	   	  The	  message	  that	  Scotland	  
would	  play	  an	  active	  role	   in	  global	  politics	  was	  one	  which	  was	  further	  emphasised	  in	  
the	   First	  Minister’s	   subsequent	   lecture,	   to	   the	   Scotland	   in	   the	  World	   Forum	   at	   the	  
University	  of	  Aberdeen.	  	  Here,	  he	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  “those	  smaller,	  independent	  nations	  
which	   have	   been	   the	   great	   success	   story;”	   that	   “independence	   matters”	   but	   that	  
“interdependence	   is	  a	  welcome	  fact	  of	  modern	  global	  politics.”52	   	  And	  these	   themes	  
continued	   to	   play	   a	   large	   part	   in	   the	   First	  Minister’s	   public	   appearances	   as	   he	   gave	  
speeches	   in	   Dublin,	   Virginia	   and	   Brussels,	   widening	   the	   discussion	   to	   an	   overseas	  
audience	  and	  making	  clear	  the	  international	  relevance	  of	  the	  constitutional	  debate.	  
	  
Box	  4.2:	  First	  Minister	  Speeches	  at	  National	  Conversation	  events53	  
	  
	  
• Launch	  of	  Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future	  –	  Napier	  University,	  August	  2007	  
• Playfair	  Lecture	  –	  Edinburgh	  University,	  December	  2007	  
• Scotland	  in	  the	  World	  Forum	  –	  University	  of	  Aberdeen,	  February	  2008	  
• Shaping	  Scotland’s	  Future	  –	  Trinity	  College,	  Dublin,	  February	  2008	  
• Launch	  of	  Phase	  Two	  of	  National	  Conversation	  –	  Edinburgh,	  March	  2008	  
• Scotland	  and	  America	  –	  University	  of	  Virginia,	  April	  2008	  
• Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future	  –	  Scotland	  House,	  Brussels,	  April	  2008	  
	  
                                                
50	  Salmond,	  A.	  St	  Andrew’s	  Day	  Lecture,	  National	  Days	  Conference,	  Glasgow	  Caledonian	  University,	  30	  
November,	  2007(b).	  
51	  Salmond,	  A.	  Playfair	  Lecture	  on	  the	  40th	  Anniversary	  of	  the	  Europa	  Institute,	  Edinburgh	  University,	  12	  
December,	  2007(c).	  
52	  Salmond,	  A.	  Reflections	  on	  Scotland	  in	  the	  World,	  Lecture	  to	  the	  “Scotland	  in	  the	  World”	  Forum,	  
University	  of	  Aberdeen,	  4	  February,	  2008(a).	  
53	  The	  First	  Minister’s	  participation	  at	  National	  Conversation	  events	  is	  part	  of	  the	  list	  of	  events	  




These	  public	  engagements	  played	  a	  different	  role	  to	  the	  question	  and	  answer	  sessions	  
of	   the	   Cabinet	   roadshows.	   	   Far	   from	  being	   a	   two-­‐way	   conversation	  with	   the	   public,	  
these	  events	  were	  traditional	  political	  speeches,	  with	  the	  First	  Minister	  setting	  out	  his	  
–	   and	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   –	   views	   on	   governance,	   independence	   and	   the	  
political	   process.	   	   They	   provided	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   the	   later	   discussions	   as	  well	   as	  
being	   relatively	   large	   media	   events	   which	   engaged	   the	   (predominantly	   anti-­‐
independence)	   Scottish	   press	   in	   discussions	   about	   Scotland’s	   constitutional	   future.	  	  
While	   the	   editorials	   of	   these	   newspapers	  may	   not	   be	   to	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	  
taste,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   press	   was	   writing	   about	   independence	   and	   the	   National	  
Conversation	   was	   a	   step	   forward	   in	   itself	   for	   both	   the	   SNP	   and	   the	   Scottish	  
Government.54	   	   This	   was	   about	   setting	   the	   political	   agenda.	   	   The	   opportunity	   to	  
address	  wide	  audiences	  both	  at	  the	  events	  themselves	  and	  through	  the	  media	  reports	  
allowed	   Alex	   Salmond	   to	   control	   the	   constitutional	   agenda.	   	   With	   no	   opposition	  
politicians	   present	   at	   the	   National	   Conversation	   publication	   launches	   or	   public	  
speeches,	   the	   Scottish	  Government	   has	   taken	   the	  opportunity	   to	   present	   the	  public	  
with	   a	   clear	   idea	   of	   their	   view	   of	   independence.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   events	  
themselves	  allowed	  for	  direct	  engagement	  with	  the	  public	  –	  “without	  the	  traditional	  
anti-­‐SNP,	   anti-­‐independence	   media	   filter”	   –	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   clear	   advantage	   to	   the	  
Scottish	  Government’s	  consultation.55	  	  
	  
Phase	   two	   of	  A	  National	   Conversation	   began	  with	   another	   public	   lecture	   from	   Alex	  
Salmond,	   this	   time	   delivered	   to	   leaders	   of	   several	   Scottish	   institutions	   –	   schools,	  
businesses,	   trade	  unions	  and	  churches.	   	  Here,	   the	  First	  Minister	   stressed	   the	  “broad	  
                                                
54	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  2012(b),	  op	  cit.	  p.95.	  
55	  Interview	  with	  Stuart	  McMillan	  (SNP	  MSP)	  (March	  2010).	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acceptance	   across	   the	   entire	   political	   spectrum”	   that	   Scotland	   required	   “greater	  
decision-­‐making	  responsibility”	  and	  welcomed	  any	  moves	  towards	  this	  end	  –	  including	  
what	   was	   at	   the	   time	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	   opposition	   unionist	   parties	   to	   establish	   a	  
Commission	  on	  Scottish	  Devolution.56	   	  What	  was	  also	  a	  clear	  message	  from	  the	  First	  
Minister’s	  speeches	  was	  that	  the	  Scottish	  population	  should	  be	  consulted	  as	  to	  their	  
preferred	   constitutional	   future,	   reiterating	   his	   view	   that	   “the	   people	   are	   sovereign”	  
and	  that	  “the	  right	  to	  choose	  the	  future	  for	  this	  country	  is	  their	  right”.57	  	  Thus,	  it	  was	  
clear	   early	   in	   the	   consultation	   process	   that,	   in	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   view,	   the	  
public	   should	  have	  a	  central	   role	   in	   the	  constitutional	  debate.	   	  And	   this	  was	  evident	  
throughout	  this	  phase	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation,	  which	  was	  marked	  by	  more	  public	  
events,	   including	   meetings	   with	   several	   of	   these	   institutions,	   as	   well	   as	   Cabinet	  
meetings	  scheduled	  around	  Scotland	  and	  public	  meetings	  in	  the	  style	  of	  Question	  and	  
Answer	  sessions,	  where	  members	  of	  the	  public	  were	   invited	  to	  share	  their	  thoughts,	  
questions	  and	  concerns	  with	  Cabinet	  Secretaries	  and	  Ministers	  present.	  	  	  
	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  Scottish	  Government	  published	  several	  documents	  on	  several	  
different	  aspects	  of	  policy	  (box	  4.3)	  while	  reiterating	  their	  intention	  to	  introduce	  a	  bill	  
proposing	   a	   referendum	   on	   independence	   for	   Scotland	   in	   the	   2009-­‐2010	  
parliamentary	   session.	   	   Phase	   three	   was	   intended	   to	   include	   the	   campaign	   for	   a	  
referendum	  and	  the	  referendum	  itself	  –	  but,	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  parliamentary	  majority	  
for	   a	   referendum,	   this	   bill	  was	  never	   brought	   forward.	   	   The	   lack	  of	   a	   referendum	   is	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  six.	  
	  
                                                




Box	  4.3:	  Scottish	  Government	  National	  Conversation	  Publications58	  
 
	  
• Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future	  White	  Paper	  (August	  2007)	  
• Fiscal	  Autonomy	  in	  Scotland	  (February	  2009)	  
• An	  Oil	  Fund	  For	  Scotland	  (July	  2009)	  
• Europe	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (September	  2009)	  
• Opportunities	  for	  Broadcasting	  (September	  2009)	  
• Rural	  Affairs,	  Environment	  and	  Climate	  Change	  (October	  2009)	  
• People	  and	  Communities	  (November	  2009)	  
• Employability	  and	  Skills	  (November	  2009)	  
• Energy	  (November	  2009	  –	  web	  only)	  
• Supporting	  Business	  and	  Enterprise	  (November	  2009	  –	  web	  only)	  




The	  consultation	  itself	  was	  designed	  to	  allow	  the	  Scottish	  population	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
engage	  with	  the	  constitutional	  debate.	  	  The	  White	  Paper,	  Choosing	  Scotland’s	  Future,	  
as	   detailed	   above,	   gave	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   Scottish	  Government’s	   position	   and	   the	  
various	   other	   constitutional	   options	   available	   to	   Scotland.	   	   In	   February	   2009	   the	  
Scottish	  Government	  Published	  Fiscal	  Autonomy	  in	  Scotland:	  The	  case	  for	  change	  and	  
options	   for	   reform,	   examining	   the	   options	   for	   change	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   fiscal	  
arrangements	  surrounding	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.	  	  Here,	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  set	  
out	  five	  potential	  scenarios:	  
	  
• Full	  fiscal	  autonomy	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  
• Devolution	  “max”	  –	  full	  fiscal	  autonomy	  within	  the	  UK	  (“devo-­‐max”)	  
• Creating	  enhanced	  devolution	  
• Assigning	  revenues	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  
• Continuing	  with,	  or	  marginally	  changing	  the	  current	  framework59	  
	  
                                                
58	  A	  National	  Conversation	  was	  chronicled	  on	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  website	  at:	  
www.scotland.gov.uk	  
59	  Scottish	  Government	  Fiscal	  Autonomy	  in	  Scotland:	  The	  Case	  for	  Change	  and	  Options	  for	  Reform,	  
Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  Government,	  February,	  2009(a),	  p.25.	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In	   July	  2009,	   the	   Scottish	  Government	  published	  a	   further	  document	  entitled	  An	  Oil	  
Fund	  for	  Scotland:	  Taking	  Forward	  our	  National	  Conversation,	   the	  next	  of	  a	  series	  of	  
reports	  published	  as	  part	  of	  the	  National	  Conversation	  consultation.60	  	  An	  Oil	  Fund	  for	  
Scotland	  detailed	  the	  Scottish	  Government’s	  plan	  to	  establish	  an	  oil	  fund	  based	  on	  the	  
tax	   revenues	   from	   North	   Sea	   oil,	   saving	   and	   investing	   the	   revenues	   for	   long-­‐term	  
prosperity	   rather	   than	   for	   short-­‐term	   consumption.61	   	   The	   Scottish	   Government	  
followed	  up	  An	  Oil	   Fund	   for	   Scotland	   in	   September	  with	  Europe	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs:	  	  
Taking	   forward	  our	  National	  Conversation	  which	   set	  out	   several	  questions	   regarding	  
Scotland’s	  role	  in	  international	  affairs	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  to	  act	  
dependent	   on	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   devolution	   settlement.	   	   The	   paper	   explored	   the	  
constitutional	  options	  open	  to	  Scotland	  and	  their	  impact	  upon	  Scotland’s	  membership	  
of	   international	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	   European	  Union,	   the	  United	  Nations,	   the	  World	  
Trade	  Organisation	  and	   the	  Commonwealth.62	   	  Also	   in	  September	  2009,	   the	  Scottish	  
Government	   published	  Opportunities	   for	   Broadcasting:	   Taking	   forward	   our	   National	  
Conversation,	   examining	   how	   broadcasting	   powers	   were	   distributed	   and	   how	   they	  
might	   be	   devolved.	   	   It	   drew	   upon	   work	   undertaken	   by	   the	   Scottish	   Broadcasting	  
Commission	  which	  had	  made	  several	  recommendations	  regarding	  a	  Scottish	  Network	  
and	  a	  Scottish	  public	   service	   television	  channel,	  as	  well	  as	  various	   recommendations	  
for	  the	  BBC	  regarding	  its	  Scottish	  programming	  and	  more	  power	  for	  Scottish	  Ministers	  
over	  broadcasting	  appointments.63	  	  	  
                                                
60	  Scottish	  Government,	  An	  Oil	  Fund	  For	  Scotland:	  Taking	  forward	  our	  National	  Conversation,	  Edinburgh,	  
Scottish	  Government,	  July,	  2009(b),	  p.9.	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  ibid.	  p.23.	  
62	  Scottish	  Government,	  Europe	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs:	  	  Taking	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Edinburgh,	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  Government,	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  2009(c),	  p.33.	  
63	  Scottish	  Broadcasting	  Commission,	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  for	  Success:	  Final	  Report	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  Scottish	  Broadcasting	  
Commission,	  Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  Government,	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In	   October	   and	   November	   2009,	   five	   more	   subject	   papers	   were	   published	   by	   the	  
Scottish	   Government	   to	   widen	   the	   debate	   further.	   	   The	   first	   paper	   dealt	   with	   the	  
combined	  fields	  of	  rural	  affairs,	   the	  environment	  and	  climate	  change.	   	   It	  argued	  that	  
the	  Scottish	  Government	  had	  done	  much	  in	  these	  areas	  to	  improve	  the	  situation,	  but	  
that	  the	  “limits	  on	  Scotland’s	  responsibilities	  constrain	  and	  have	  constrained	  this	  and	  
previous	   Scottish	  Governments’	   capacity	   fully	   to	   deliver”.64	   	   The	   second	  paper	   dealt	  
with	  issues	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  justice,	  health	  and	  transport	  –	  three	  further	  areas	  in	  which	  
responsibility	  for	  legislation	  is	  devolved.	  	  It	  considered	  the	  success	  of	  distinctive	  policy-­‐
making	  that	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  has	  been	  able	  to	  achieve	  under	  the	  Scotland	  Act	  
1998	   (including	   Free	   Personal	   Care	   for	   the	   Elderly	   and	   the	   Smoking	   Ban	   –	  with	   the	  
latter	  prompting	  the	  UK’s	  other	  nations	  to	  adopt	  similar	  legislation).65	  	  A	  third	  paper,	  
focused	   on	   post-­‐education	   opportunities,	   argued	   that,	   though	   the	   Scottish	  
Government	   had	   attempted	   to	   improve	   employability	   in	   Scotland	   through	   a	   new	  
“Curriculum	   for	   Excellence,”	   key	   levers	   –	   such	   as	   social	   security	   and	   employment	  
support	  –	   remained	   reserved,	   limiting	   the	  Scottish	  Government’s	   scope	   for	  action	   in	  
this	  area.66	  
	  
With	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  building	  towards	  a	  St	  Andrew’s	  Day	  launch	  of	  their	  next	  
consultation	  paper,	   the	   following	   two	  papers	  were	  hurriedly	   published	   in	   an	  online-­‐
only	  format	  on	  the	  Scottish	  Government’s	  National	  Conversation	  website.	  	  The	  first	  of	  
those	  focused	  on	  energy	  policy,	  discussing	  topics	  such	  as	  energy	  regulation,	  the	  future	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  Scottish	  Government,	  Rural	  Affairs,	  Environment	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  Climate	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  Government,	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  Government,	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of	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry	  and	  reducing	  energy	  demand.67	  	  It	  considered	  the	  fact	  that	  
Scotland	   is	   “an	   energy	   rich	   nation”	   but	   that	   “influence	   in	   a	   number	   of	   areas	   is	  
constrained”.68	   	   The	   second	   of	   these	   web-­‐only	   publications	   dealt	   with	   business.	   	   It	  
argued	   that	   though	   devolution	   had	   provided	   business	   with	   some	   benefits,	   Scotland	  
lacked	  “the	  full	  set	  of	  levers	  for	  building	  a	  wealthier	  and	  fairer	  nation”.69	  	  This	  was	  an	  
unsurprising	   theme	   throughout	   the	   subject	   papers,	   with	   the	   Scottish	   Government	  
painting	  devolution	  as	  a	  half-­‐measure	  –	  that	  the	  powers	  it	  had	  delivered	  were	  good	  as	  
far	   as	   they	  went,	   but	   that	   it	  was	   only	  with	   the	   powers	   associated	  with	   “devo-­‐max”	  
and,	  ultimately,	  independence,	  that	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  could	  deliver	  in	  each	  of	  
the	  policy	  areas	  outlined.	  	  	  
	  
The	  ideas	  formulated	  in	  each	  of	  the	  subject	  papers	  were	  pulled	  together	  in	  a	  second	  
White	   Paper,	   the	   final	  National	   Conversation	   publication	   Your	   Scotland,	   Your	   Voice	  
published	  on	  St	  Andrew’s	  Day	  2009.	  	  This	  publication	  functioned	  both	  as	  a	  conclusion	  
to	   A	   National	   Conversation,	   drawing	   together	   information	   from	   the	   original	   White	  
Paper,	  the	  events	  around	  the	  country	  and	  the	  subject	  papers,	  and	  as	  an	  introduction	  
to	   the	   next	   phase	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   strategy	   for	   a	   referendum.	   	   It	  
discussed	   the	   same	   options	   for	   change	   (the	   proposals	   of	   the	   by-­‐then	   completed	  
Calman	   Commission,	   devo-­‐max	   and	   independence)	   while	   setting	   out	   the	   Scottish	  
                                                
67	  Scottish	  Government,	  Energy	  –	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Government’s	  own	  preference	  for	  independence.70	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  also	  functioned	  
as	   a	  manifesto	   for	   independence,	  with	   the	  perceived	  benefits	  of	   each	   constitutional	  
option	  discussed	  in	  detail	  –	  but	  with	  independence	  clearly	  identified	  as	  the	  preferred	  
option.	   	   It	   is	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that,	   at	   this	   stage,	   the	   Scottish	   Government	  
remained	   intent	   on	   introducing	   legislation	   for	   a	   Referendum	   Bill	   into	   the	   Scottish	  
Parliament	  in	  2010.71	  	  However,	  with	  opposition	  parties	  refusing	  to	  support	  the	  SNP’s	  
proposed	   referendum,	   the	   party	   decided,	   in	   May	   2010,	   to	   publish	   their	   intended	  
referendum	  bill	  as	  a	  consultation	  paper.	  	  This	  change	  of	  strategy	  is	  considered	  in	  more	  
detail	  in	  the	  final	  chapter.	  
	  
The	  National	  Conversation	  in	  Action	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  publications	  discussed	  above,	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  was	  keen	  to	  
engage	   the	   public	   in	   A	   National	   Conversation	   through	   events	   and	   public	   meetings.	  	  
Taking	  place	  around	  the	  country	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Cabinet	  roadshow	  or	  as	  stand-­‐
alone	  events	   hosted	  by	  Cabinet	   Secretaries	   and	  Ministers,	   these	   events	   allowed	   the	  
Scottish	   public	   to	   question	   ministers	   about	   their	   views	   on	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   issues.	  	  
Depending	   on	   the	   host	   town	   in	   question,	   the	   questions	   ranged	   from	   Scottish	  
Government	   policy	   on	   energy	   and	   wind	   power	   (the	   Borders),	   science	   and	   research	  
grants	   (Dundee),	   Gaelic	   education	   and	   population	  migration	   (Western	   Isles)	   and	   oil	  
production	   (Aberdeen).	   	  These	   issues	  –	  and	  many	  others	  –	  were	   raised	  with	  Cabinet	  
ministers	  alongside	  the	  issue	  which	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  had	  intended	  to	  discuss	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  p.5,	  137.	  
71	  ibid.	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at	  these	  events:	  the	  constitutional	  future	  of	  Scotland.72	  	  This	  debate,	  however,	  largely	  
played	  second	  fiddle	  to	  the	  many	  policy	  concerns	  that	  the	  public	  had,	  and	  comprised	  
only	   a	   fifth	   of	   the	   questions	   asked	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   public	   events	   (see	   graph	  
below).73	  	  However,	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  viewed	  the	  process	  as	  a	  success	  in	  that	  it	  
allowed	  members	  of	  the	  public	  access	  to	  Government	  Ministers	  to	  discuss	  their	  views	  
on	   any	   issue	   of	   importance	   to	   them.74	   	   While	   this	   was	   public	   engagement,	   it	   was	  
engagement	  on	  the	  public’s	  terms.	  
	  
The	  events	   themselves	   took	   three	   forms.	   	  For	   some	  events,	  one	  or	   two	  members	  of	  
the	  Cabinet	  hosted	  an	  event	   in	  the	  style	  of	  a	  town	  hall	  forum.	  	  The	  lead	  Minister	  (or	  
Cabinet	   Secretary)	   would	   speak	   for	   fifteen	   minutes	   to	   outline	   the	   Scottish	  
Government’s	   constitutional	   preference	   and	   then	   take	   questions	   from	   the	   audience	  
for	  approximately	  one	  hour.	   	  A	  similar	   format	  was	   initiated	  at	  National	  Conversation	  
events	   immediately	   following	  meetings	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Cabinet	   around	   the	   country.	  	  
On	   those	   occasions,	   First	   Minister	   Alex	   Salmond	   would	   address	   the	   audience	   for	  
around	   twenty	   minutes	   and	   questions	   could	   be	   directed	   to	   any	   member	   of	   the	  
Cabinet.	   	  These	  events	  tended	  to	  be	   larger,	  with	  more	  questions	  of	  a	  specific	  nature	  
which	   allowed	   the	   relevant	   Cabinet	  minister	   to	   answer	   in	  more	   detail.	   	   Finally,	   the	  
Scottish	   Government	   arranged	   several	   events	   in	   co-­‐operation	   with	   voluntary	  
organisations	   –	   the	   Scottish	   Council	   for	   Voluntary	   Organisations	   (SCVO)	   and	   the	  
Council	   of	   Ethnic	   Minority	   Voluntary	   Organisations	   (CEMVO)	   in	   particular	   –	   while	  
several	  events	  were	  organised	  by	  Young	  Scot,	  a	  charity	  which	  provides	  information	  to	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young	  people	   in	  Scotland.	   	  These	  organisations	  became	   involved	  with	   the	  process	   in	  
different	   ways	   –	   partly	   because	   of	   their	   engagement	   across	   different	   Scottish	  
Government	   portfolios	   and	   partly	   through	   pre-­‐existing	   contacts	   between	   the	  
organisations	   themselves	   and	   the	   Scottish	   Government.	   	   The	   process	   itself	   was	  
intended	   to	   be	   “fluid,	   not	   rigid;	   a	   flexible	   vehicle”	   to	   be	   altered	   to	   suit	   the	  
circumstances.75	  	  	  
	  
These	  events	  were	  marked	  by	  questions	  predominantly	  related	  to	  the	  voluntary	  sector	  
–	   funding,	   education	   and,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   CEMVO,	   similar	   issues	   from	   other	   events	  
(health,	   education,	   immigration)	   but	   framed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   impact	   upon	   and	  
specific	  concerns	  of	  ethnic	  minority	  communities.	   	  For	  CEMVO,	  assisting	   the	  Scottish	  
Government	  with	  A	  National	  Conversation	  helped	  the	  organisation	  to	  “increase	  black	  
and	  ethnic	  minority	  participation	  in	  the	  civic	  and	  democratic	  process”,	  and	  organisers	  
welcomed	  the	  opportunity	  in	  particular	  to	  “allow	  all	  communities	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  
constitutional	   debate	   and	   to	   feel	   that	   their	   views	   were	   taken	   into	   account.”76	  	  
Whatever	   the	   context	   of	   the	   issues	   raised,	   however,	   the	   events	   allowed	   the	  
Government	  Minister(s)	  in	  attendance	  an	  opportunity	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  both	  
members	  of	  the	  public	  and	  members	  of	  organisations	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  government	  
policy,	   to	  address	   those	   issues	   in	   responses	  and	  to	  engage	  the	  public	   in	  a	  discussion	  
not	   only	   about	   the	   issues	   raised	   but	   also	   about	   issues	  which	  may	   be	   of	   concern	   to	  
them	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
	  
                                                
75	  Interview	  with	  a	  senior	  Scottish	  Government	  official	  (May	  2010).	  




While	   the	   primary	   purpose	   of	   A	   National	   Conversation	   was	   to	   engage	   the	   Scottish	  
population	   in	   discussion	   about	   the	   constitutional	   future	   of	   Scotland,77	   a	   number	   of	  
wide-­‐ranging	  issues	  were	  raised	  with	  members	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Cabinet	  at	  these	  events.	  	  
	  
Graph	  4.1:	  Questions	  at	  National	  Conversation	  Public	  Events78	  
	  
Of	   the	   69%	   of	   questions	   to	   ministers	   comprising	   policy	   concerns,	   a	   large	   number	  
related	  to	  the	  future	  of	   the	  voluntary	  sector,	   in	  particular	  how	   it	  was	  to	  be	  financed	  
and	  the	  services	  utilised,	  both	  under	  the	  current	  constitutional	  arrangements	  and	  in	  a	  
potentially	  independent	  Scotland.	  	  This	  was	  an	  unsurprising	  outcome,	  since	  voluntary	  
organisations	  played	  a	   role	   in	  organising	   some	  of	   the	  events	   and	  members	  of	   these	  
                                                
77	  Interview	  with	  Kevin	  Pringle	  (Special	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Government)	  (May	  2010).	  
78	  Podcasts	  or	  videos	  of	  25	  of	  the	  42	  events	  were	  available	  on	  the	  National	  Conversation.	  	  The	  questions	  
from	  participants	  were	  coded	  into	  four	  different	  categories.	  	  The	  total	  number	  of	  questions	  was	  as	  
follows:	  Post-­‐Independence	  Scotland	  –	  95	  questions;	  Constitutional	  Change	  –	  24	  questions;	  Referendum	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organisations	   were	   present	   during	   the	   discussions.	   	   Energy	   policy	   was	   also	   a	  major	  
concern,	  for	  oil	  industry	  workers	  in	  Aberdeen,	  anti-­‐wind	  farm	  campaigners	  in	  Jedburgh	  
and	  energy	  sector	  stakeholders	  at	  the	  post-­‐Cabinet	  event	  in	  Pitlochry.	  	  However,	  there	  
was	   recognition	   that	   a	   variety	   of	   energy	   sources	   would	  make	   up	   Scotland’s	   energy	  
future,	  as	  this	  questioner	  put	  it	  in	  Melrose:	  
	  
Nuclear,	   tidal,	   wind,	   clean-­‐coal	   are,	   in	   varying	   proportions,	  
ingredients	   for	   energy.	   	   The	   Scottish	  Government	   is	   against	  
nuclear	   energy,	   so	   is	   there	   any	   confident	   assurance	   that	  
other	   remaining	   sources	   are	   adequate	   to	  meet	   present	   and	  
future	  demands,	  and	  within	  reasonable	  timescales?79	  
	  
Each	  concern	  was	  met	  with	  the	  same	  response	  from	  Scottish	  Government	  Ministers:	  
oil	  supplies	  would	  not	  last	  forever,	  Scotland	  was	  already	  investing	  in	  renewable	  energy	  
solutions	  and	  that	  wind,	  offshore	  marine	  and	  tidal	  power	  would	  provide	  Scotland	  with	  
a	  “second	  great	  win	  on	  the	  energy	  lottery”.80	  	  Transport	  links	  from	  rural	  communities	  
comprised	  a	  number	  of	  queries	  at	  the	  Cabinet	  events	  in	  Melrose	  and	  Stornoway	  while	  
questions	   on	   affordable	   housing,	   pension	   schemes,	   the	   recession	   and	   broadcasting	  
regulations	  were	   raised	  at	   several	   events	   around	   the	   country,	   alongside	  a	   variety	  of	  
specifically	   local	   concerns.	   	  While	   the	   Scottish	  Government	   perhaps	   did	   not	   get	   the	  
discussion	  they	  had	  hoped	  for	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  constitution,	  many	  pointed	  out	  that	  
–	  in	  their	  view	  –	  policy	  issues	  could	  be	  dealt	  with	  more	  efficiently	  with	  independence,	  
thereby	  linking	  the	  policy	  questions	  to	  the	  constitutional	  debate.81	  
	  
                                                
79	  Question	  from	  Melrose	  Summer	  Cabinet,	  28	  July,	  2009	  (contributor	  unidentified),	  cited	  Scottish	  
Government,	  2009(j),	  op	  cit.	  p.85.	  	  	  
80	  Salmond,	  A.	  Untitled	  speech,	  Scottish	  Cabinet/	  National	  Conversation	  Event	  at	  the	  Corn	  Exhange,	  
Melrose,	  28	  July,	  2009.	  
81	  Interview	  with	  Richard	  Lochhead	  (SNP	  MSP	  and	  Cabinet	  Secretary	  for	  Rural	  Affairs	  and	  the	  




Responses	   to	  questions	   surrounding	   the	  utility	  of	   the	  events	   to	  community	   councils,	  
however,	   drew	   a	   mixed	   response.	   	   The	   representative	   from	   Westhill	   and	   Elrick	  
Community	  Council	  thought	  it	  
	  
very	   welcome	   and	   somehow	   quite	   surprising	   that	   the	  
Scottish	  Government	   showed	   on	   the	   day	   to	   many	  
organisations	  that	  a	  consultation	  process	  can	  be	  open,	  led	  by	  
questions	   from	   the	   floor	   and	   yet	   rich	   in	  the	   content	   of	   its	  
delivery.	   If	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   consultation	   was	   a	  conversation	  
between	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   and	   local	  
organisations	  like	  ours	  then	  it	  was	  just	  that.82	  
	  
He	   also	   considered	   the	   event	   of	   great	   benefit	   to	   his	   own	   community	   council,	  
describing	  it	  as	  a	  “unique	  opportunity	  for	  community	  leaders	  to	  share	  their	  views	  with	  
the	  members	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Cabinet”.83	  	  This	  was	  a	  view	  shared	  by	  the	  representative	  
of	   Meldrum,	   Bourtie	   and	   Daviot	   Community	   Council,	   who	   thought	   it	   was	  
“commendable	  that	  so	  many	  ministers	  took	  the	  trouble	  to	  put	  themselves	  on	  a	  public	  
platform	   in	   this	  way”.84	   	   Turriff	   and	  District	   Community	  Council’s	   representative	   felt	  
that	   the	   process	   was	   “well-­‐organised	   and	   friendly”	   but	   that	   he	   “came	   away	   feeling	  
that	  it	  was	  a	  wasted	  day”.85	  	  The	  latter	  viewpoint	  was	  more	  in-­‐keeping	  with	  sentiments	  
from	  community	  councils	  outwith	   the	  north-­‐east	  of	  Scotland.	   	   In	  Glasgow,	   the	  event	  
was	  seen	  as	  “poorly	  focused”,	  the	  aims	  “laudable,	  but	  laughable”86	  while	  the	  Melrose	  
event	  was	   considered	   to	  be	   “more	   like	  propaganda”	   though	   it	   “did	  provide	  a	  useful	  
                                                
82	  Email	  interview	  with	  Christian	  Allard	  (Westhill	  and	  Elrick	  Community	  Council)	  (January	  2010).	  
83	  ibid.	  
84	  Email	  interview	  with	  Isabel	  Page	  (Meldrum,	  Bourtie	  and	  Daviot	  Community	  Council)	  (January	  2010).	  
85	  Email	  interview	  with	  J.	  Smith	  (Turriff	  and	  District	  Community	  Council)	  (January	  2010).	  
86	  Email	  interview	  with	  Allan	  Clarke	  (Broomhill	  Community	  Council)	  (January	  2010).	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platform	  for	  individuals	  to	  air	  their	  concerns”.87	  	  Thus,	  while	  community	  councils	  were	  
happy	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  process,	  there	  was	  a	  consideration	  that	  while	  it	  was	  a	  good	  
idea	  to	  “get	  the	  gang	  together	  and	  talk	  to	  people,”	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  “talking	  and	  being	  
constructive	   are	   entirely	   different”88	   and	   that	  A	  National	   Conversation	   was	   another	  
consultation	  just	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  consultation.	  	  The	  Scottish	  Government’s	  strategy	  of	  
engaging	  the	  people	  in	  the	  process	  was	  thus	  considered	  with	  some	  cynicism,	  with	  the	  
biggest	   question	   being:	   what	   is	   in	   this	   for	   us?	   	   And,	   from	   the	   answers	   of	   selected	  
community	  councils,	  it	  looked	  like	  the	  answer	  was	  “not	  very	  much.”	  
	  
The	   question	   and	   answer	   sessions	   at	   these	   events	   were	   lively	   and	   covered	   a	   wide	  
variety	  of	  issues.	  	  They	  were	  also	  useful	  in	  providing	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  with	  an	  
opportunity	   to	   make	   themselves	   accessible	   to	   the	   public	   around	   the	   country,	   to	  
engage	  with	  their	  issues	  and	  to	  consult	  widely	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  constitutional	  future	  
of	   Scotland.89	   	   However,	   the	   evidence	   here	   suggested	   that	   a	   broader	   constitutional	  
debate	  was	  required,	  with	  engagement	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate,	  for	  an	  informed	  
decision	  to	  be	  made	  by	  Scotland’s	  population	  in	  any	  referendum	  on	  the	  subject.90	  
	  
Pressure	  Group	  Engagement	  
The	   process	   of	   widening	   the	   debate	   did	   take	   place	   –	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   –	   through	  
Scottish	   Government	   engagement	  with	   several	   pressure	   groups,	   charities,	   voluntary	  
organisations	  and	  churches.	  	  National	  Conversation	  events	  were	  organised	  not	  only	  by	  
                                                
87	  Email	  interview	  with	  R.	  Thomson	  (Floors,	  Makerstoun,	  Nenthorn	  and	  Smailholm	  Community	  Council)	  
(January	  2010).	  
88	  Email	  interview	  with	  Allan	  Clarke	  (Broomhill	  Community	  Council)	  (January	  2010).	  
89	  Interview	  with	  Alasdair	  Allan	  (SNP	  MSP)	  (March	  2010).	  
90	  Keating,	  M.	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.13.	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Scottish	   Government	   Ministers	   but	   also	   by	   the	   Scottish	   Council	   for	   Voluntary	  
Organisations	   (SCVO),	   the	   Council	   for	   Ethnic	   Minority	   Voluntary	   Organisations	  
(CEMVO),	  in	  association	  with	  Young	  Scot,	  and	  with	  religious	  leaders	  in	  Scotland	  as	  part	  
of	  phase	  two	  of	  the	  A	  National	  Conversation,	  which	  focused	  upon	  civic	  institutions	  in	  
Scotland.	   	   A	   total	   of	   £98,793	   was	   provided	   to	   the	   SCVO	   (£37,873),	   Young	   Scot	  
(£50,000)	  and	  CEMVO	  (£10,920)91	   in	  order	  to	  organise	  and	  promote	  events	   linked	  to	  
the	  National	   Conversation.	   	   These	   events	   included	   the	   town	   hall-­‐style	   events,	   with	  
government	  ministers	  present	  to	  participate	   in	  question	  and	  answer	  sessions	  as	  well	  
as	   several	   informal	   round-­‐table	   discussions	   attended	   by	   members	   of	   local	  
organisations	  and	  MSPs	  open	  to	  the	  debate.	  
	  
However,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  remarkable	  engagement	  with	  civil	  society	  was	  the	  Scottish	  
Government’s	  discussions	  with	  the	  faith	  community	  in	  Scotland.	  	  Church	  leaders	  from	  
eleven	  different	  churches	  –	  including	  the	  leader	  of	  Scotland’s	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church,	  
Cardinal	  Keith	  O’Brien	  –	  met	  with	  Scottish	  Government	  Ministers	  and	  officials	  in	  June	  
2008	  as	  part	  of	  the	  National	  Conversation.	  	  Most	  present	  were	  members	  of	  Action	  of	  
Churches	   Together	   in	   Scotland	   (ACTS),	   an	   umbrella	   body	   of	   nine	   different	  
denominations	  in	  Scotland.	  	  The	  group	  focused	  on	  three	  main	  themes	  in	  their	  meeting:	  
principles	  and	  values,	  history	  and	  tradition,	  and	  communication,	  and	  agreed	  that	  the	  
principles	  of	  the	  National	  Conversation	  were	  consistent	  with	  those	  present,	  and	  that	  
the	  question	  of	  Scotland’s	  constitutional	  future	  was	  one	  in	  which	  the	  churches	  should	  
play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  debating.92	  	  	  	  
                                                
91	  Foulkes,	  G.	  Parliamentary	  Question,	  11	  February,	  2009(a),	  op	  cit.	  
92	  The	  meeting	  between	  ACTS	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  was	  held	  in	  the	  Scottish	  




Among	   attendees	   themselves,	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   event	   was	   rather	   mixed.	   	   The	  
Scottish	  Government’s	   attempt	   to	  engage	  with	   the	   faith	   community	  was	  applauded,	  
and	   those	   in	   attendance	   felt	   that	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   “properly	   respected	   the	  
autonomy	  of	   the	  Churches	   to	  arrive	  at	   their	  own	  view.”93	   	  And	  while	   the	  Methodist	  
Church	  welcomed	   the	  opportunity	   for	   “communication	  between	  denominations	   and	  
links	  between	  churches,”	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  “constitutional	  change	  was	  not	  a	  vital	  issue	  
for	  churches	  –	  poverty	  and	  homelessness	  were	  much	  further	  up	  the	  agenda”.94	   	  This	  
was	  a	  sentiment	  shared	  by	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  Scotland,	  who	  maintained:	  
	  
It	   is	   not	   for	   Churches	   to	   decide	   on	   constitutional	  
arrangements.	   	   	   The	   autonomy	   of	   people	   in	   the	   political	  
sphere	   should	   be	   respected	   and	   many	   Christians	   will	   have	  
contradictory	  views.	   	  The	  Church’s	   role	   is	   to	  remind	  political	  
authority	   of	   the	   dignity	   of	   the	   human	   person	   and	   that	  
political	  structures	  exist	  to	  serve	  each	  person	  in	  society.95	  
	  
The	  practicalities	  of	  constitutional	  change	  were	  also	  problematic,	  with	  Dr	  Reid	  noting	  
that	  the	  Methodist	  Church,	  the	  Salvation	  Army	  and	  the	  United	  Reform	  Church	  are	  all	  
structured	  within	  a	  British	  framework.	  	  The	  concern	  of	  his	  own	  organisation	  was	  clear:	  
	  
How	  these	  organisations	  would	  operate	  with	  vastly	  different	  
legislation	   across	   the	   UK	   –	   particularly	   if	   Scotland	   was	   a	  
sovereign	   state	   –	   is	   something	   that	   needs	   more	  
                                                                                                                                         
ACTS	  members	  released	  a	  statement	  supporting	  A	  National	  Conversation	  which	  is	  available	  on	  the	  
Scottish	  Government	  website	  at:	  	  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/a-­‐national-­‐
conversation/actsnationalconversation	  
93	  Email	  interview	  with	  John	  Deighan	  (Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  Parliamentary	  Liaison/	  Assistant	  to	  
Cardinal	  O’Brien)	  (January	  2010).	  
94	  Interview	  with	  Dr	  William	  Reid	  (Methodist	  Church	  Connexional	  Liaison	  Officer	  for	  Scotland)	  (January	  
2010).	  
95	  Email	  interview	  with	  John	  Deighan	  (Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  Parliamentary	  Liaison/	  Assistant	  to	  
Cardinal	  O’Brien)	  (January	  2010).	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consideration.	  	  Planning	  for	  the	  future	  whilst	  in	  constitutional	  
limbo	  is	  difficult	  for	  voluntary	  organisations	  and	  churches.96	  
	  
Thus,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   while	   the	   constitutional	   issue	   was	   a	   priority	   for	   the	   SNP	   in	  
government,	   other	   organisations	   simply	   wanted	   clarity	   on	   the	   issue	   and	   a	   decision	  
made	  quickly.	  	  
	  
Public	  Opinion	  and	  Independence	  
Through	  the	  National	  Conversation,	   the	  SNP	  Scottish	  Government	  were	  able	  to	  keep	  
constitutional	  change	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  in	  Scotland.	  	  This	  was	  a	  key	  objective	  of	  
the	   process,	   as	   discussed	   previously,	   and	   agenda-­‐setting	   proved	   successful	   in	   a	  
number	  of	  ways,	  normalising	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  and	  engaging	  the	  civil	  service	  
in	   the	   process.97	   	   Alongside	   this	   objective,	   the	   party	  were	   able	   to	  maintain	   popular	  
levels	  of	  support	  in	  opinion	  polls	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  consultation.	  	  	  
	  
The	   party	   continued	   to	   do	   better	   in	   polls	   testing	   intention	   to	   vote	   in	   Scottish	  
Parliamentary	   elections	   over	   Westminster	   election,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   public	  
continued	  to	  see	  the	  SNP	  as	  more	  relevant	  at	  Holyrood	  than	  at	  Westminster,	  and	  that	  
the	   party’s	   position	   as	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   strengthened	   their	   claim	   to	   be	   the	  
party	  that	  best	  represents	  Scotland’s	  interests.	  	  This	  is	  the	  structural	  and	  institutional	  
advantage	  of	  devolutionary	  politics	  for	  the	  SNP	  –	  the	  fact	  that	  Scottish	  politics	  is	  about	  
Scottish	  issues	  and	  interests	  allows	  the	  party	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  agenda.98	  	  	  
                                                
96	  Interview	  with	  Dr	  William	  Reid	  (Methodist	  Church	  Connexional	  Liaison	  Officer	  for	  Scotland)	  (January	  
2010).	  
97	  Interviews	  with	  Kevin	  Pringle	  (Special	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Government)	  (May	  2010)	  and	  with	  a	  
senior	  Scottish	  Government	  official	  (May	  2010).	  
98	  Trench,	  A.	  2008,	  op	  cit.	  p.5.	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Table	  4.2:	  Scottish	  Parliament	  Opinion	  Polls	  (2007-­‐9)99	  
	  
Date	   Poll	   SNP	   Lab	   Con	   Lib	  Dem	  
	   	   %	   %	   %	   %	  
May	  2007	   ELECTION	   32.9/31.0	   32.2/29.1	   16.6/13.9	   16.2/11.3	  
Aug	  07	   YouGov/Times	   32/32	   32/25	   12/13	   12/12	  
Jan	  08	   YouGov/Express	   38/30	   29/27	   14/13	   14/12	  
Feb/Mar	  08	   MRUK/Times	   39/40	   31/30	   15/13	   12/11	  
Apr	  08	   YouGov/Sun	   40/33	   32/30	   12/13	   13/12	  
Apr	  08	   YouGov/Telegraph	   36/37	   31/28	   13/13	   15/13	  
Aug	  08	   YouGov/SNP	   44/-­‐	   25/-­‐	   13/-­‐	   14/-­‐	  
Sept	  08	   YouGov/Times	   42/35	   26/25	   14/13	   15/14	  
Oct	  08	   YouGov/Times	   39/32	   31/29	   14/16	   12/11	  
Jan	  09	   YouGov/Times	   38/34	   32/28	   13/15	   12/11	  
Mar	  09	   YouGov/Times	   35/30	   34/32	   14/15	   12/11	  
Apr	  09	   YouGov/SNP	   37/37	   20/28	   15/15	   13/13	  
Apr	  09	   TNS/Herald	   41/40	   29/30	   15/13	   11/10	  
First	  figure	  represents	  constituency	  vote;	  second	  figure	  represents	  regional	  vote.	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  Scotland-­‐wide	  election	  after	  the	  SNP	  won	  the	  2007	  Scottish	  Parliamentary	  
election,	   the	  party	   topped	   the	  poll,	   indicating	   that	   this	   support	  was	  not	   confined	   to	  
opinion	   polls.100	   	   This	  was	   the	   European	   Parliament	   election	   in	   June	   2009,	   just	   over	  
halfway	   through	   the	   Scottish	   Parliamentary	   term	   –	   the	   SNP’s	   first	   in	   office	   –	   and	  
indicated	   that	   the	   SNP’s	   honeymoon	   period	   as	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   remained	  
intact.	  	  This	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  the	  first	  major	  test	  of	  support	  for	  the	  SNP	  since	  their	  
election	   victory	   and	   although	   they	   failed	   to	   add	   to	   their	   two	   MEPs,	   the	   party	  
succeeded	  in	  winning	  more	  votes	  than	  Labour	  for	  the	  second	  election	   in	  a	  row.	   	  The	  
                                                
99	  Poll	  data	  from:	  	  Paun,	  A.	  ‘Public	  Opinion’	  in	  Paun,	  A.	  (ed)	  Scotland:	  Devolution	  Monitoring	  Report,	  
September,	  UCL,	  London,	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  September,	  2007;	  	  Curtice,	  J.	  ‘Public	  Attitudes’	  in	  
Jeffrey,	  C.	  (ed)	  Scotland:	  Devolution	  Monitoring	  Report,	  UCL,	  London,	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  January,	  
2008(a);	  	  Curtice,	  J.	  ‘Public	  Attitudes	  and	  Elections’	  in	  McEwen,	  N.	  (ed)	  Scotland:	  Devolution	  Monitoring	  
Report,	  UCL,	  London,	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  May,	  2008(b);	  	  Curtice,	  J.	  ‘Public	  Attitudes’	  in	  Jeffrey,	  C.	  (ed)	  
Scotland:	  Devolution	  Monitoring	  Report,	  UCL,	  London:	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  September,	  2008(c);	  	  
Curtice,	  J.	  ‘Public	  Attitudes	  and	  Elections’	  in	  Cairney,	  P.	  (ed)	  Scotland:	  Devolution	  Monitoring	  Report,	  
UCL,	  London:	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  January,	  2009(a);	  	  Curtice,	  J.	  2009(b),	  op	  cit.	  	  	  
100	  Peev,	  G.	  and	  Macdonell	  H.	  ‘Labour	  trounced	  by	  SNP	  in	  Euro	  election’,	  The	  Scotsman,	  8	  June,	  2009.	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party	   managed	   to	   maintain	   support	   by	   delivering	   on	   populist	   policies	   from	   their	  
manifesto.	  	  	  
	  
Governing	  as	  a	  minority	  administration	  provided	  the	  SNP	  –	  as	  a	  party	   in	  government	  
for	   the	   first	   time	   –	  with	   increased	   challenges.101	   	   Every	   SNP	   policy,	   every	  manifesto	  
commitment	   scrutinised	   in	   fine	   detail	   as	   opposition	   parties	   worked	   to	   support	   the	  
government	  on	  an	  issue-­‐by-­‐issue	  basis,	  lending	  their	  support	  to	  policies	  they	  approve	  
of,	  rejecting	  out	  of	  hand	  anything	  with	  which	  they	  disagreed.	  	  The	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  
for	   the	   first	   time,	   became	   an	   actor	   in	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   business	   of	   government.102	  	  
Evidence	   of	   the	   difficulties	   of	   minority	   government	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   budget	  
negotiations	  of	  both	  2008	  and	  2009,	  with	  the	  latter	  voted	  down	  at	  the	  first	  attempt	  on	  
the	  casting	  vote	  of	  the	  Presiding	  Officer.103	   	  The	  potential	  for	  this	  had	  led	  the	  SNP	  to	  
streamline	   their	   government	   –	   reducing	   the	   Scottish	   Cabinet	   from	   the	   nine	   senior	  
members	   the	   previous	   administration	  maintained	   to	   six	   departments	   heads	   –	  while	  
also	   limiting	   the	   amount	   of	   legislation	   brought	   before	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament.104	  	  
Thus,	  while	   the	   first	   Labour-­‐Liberal	   Democrat	   coalition	   delivered	   52	   bills	   in	   the	   first	  
four	  years	  of	   the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  the	  second	  administration	  an	  even	  50,	   the	  
SNP	  passed	  only	  13	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  (ignoring	  budget	  bills)	  in	  their	  first	  two	  years	  in	  
office	  (see	  box	  4.4).	  	  	  
	  
                                                
101	  Deschouwer,	  K.	  (ed)	  New	  Parties	  in	  Government:	  In	  power	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  Abingdon,	  Routledge,	  
2008,	  p.5.	  
102	  Trench,	  A.	  2008,	  op	  cit.	  p.12.	  
103	  Lynch,	  P.	  and	  Elias,	  A.	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.15.	  
104	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	  p.14.	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Box	  4.4:	  Scottish	  Government	  Bills	  Enacted	  (2007-­‐9)105	  
	  
	  
• Abolition	  of	  Bridge	  Tolls	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
• Climate	  Change	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
• Convention	  Rights	  Proceedings	  (Amendment)	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
• Damages	  (Asbestos-­‐related	  Conditions)	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
• Education	  (Additional	  Support	  for	  Learning)	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  	  
• Flood	  Risk	  Management	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
• Glasgow	  Commonwealth	  Games	  Bill	  	  
• Graduate	  Endowment	  Abolition	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  	  
• Health	  Boards	  (Membership	  and	  Elections)	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  	  
• Judiciary	  and	  Courts	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
• Public	  Health	  etc.	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
• Scottish	  Local	  Government	  (Elections)	  Bill	  
• Sexual	  Offences	  (Scotland)	  Bill	  
	  
	  
This	   was	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	   political	   position	   the	   party	   found	   themselves	   in	   –	  
governing	   as	   a	   minority	   administration	   with	   an	   opposition	   openly	   hostile	   to	   core	  
ideological	  principle.	   	  However,	  much	  was	  achieved	  without	   the	  need	   for	   legislation.	  	  
Cabinet	   Secretary	   for	   Finance	   and	   Sustainable	   Growth	   John	   Swinney	   negotiated	   a	  
concordat	  with	  COSLA	  –	  the	  umbrella	  organisation	  for	  Scotland’s	  32	  local	  authorities	  –	  
which	  saw	  the	  Council	  Tax	  frozen	  across	  Scotland	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  
term:	   a	   popular	   policy	   from	   the	   SNP’s	  manifesto.	   	   The	   party	   also	   provided	   a	   cut	   in	  
business	   tax	   for	   small	   businesses	   (with	   Conservative	   support),	   preserved	   facilities	   at	  
two	   hospitals	   threatened	   with	   downgrading	   under	   the	   previous	   administration,	  
legislated	  for	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  graduate	  endowment	  fee	  for	  students	  (with	  Liberal	  
Democrat	  support)	  and	  scrapped	  the	  tolls	  on	  the	  Forth	  and	  Tay	  bridges	  –	  all	  policies	  
which	  were	  popular	  with	  various	  sections	  of	  Scottish	  society.106	  
                                                
105	  The	  Bills	  passed	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  during	  its	  2007-­‐11	  session	  are	  listed	  on	  the	  institution’s	  
website	  at:	  http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/25539.aspx	  




The	   SNP	   identifies	   itself	   as	   a	   social	   democratic	   party,107	   and	   pursued	   a	   policy	  
programme	   which,	   in	   the	   main,	   adhered	   to	   this	   particular	   ideological	   leaning.	  	  
However,	   social	   democracy	   is	   not	   the	   defining	   characteristic	   of	   the	   party:	  
independence	   is.	   	   This	   is	   the	   party’s	   raison	   d’être.108	   	   And	   it	   is	   upon	   this	   criteria	   –	  
whether	   the	   party	   can	   achieve	   independence	   –	   that	   the	   success	   of	   the	   party	   in	  
government	  will	  be	  judged.109	  	  And	  while,	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation,	  
the	  SNP	  maintained	  the	  support	  of	  the	  public	  as	  a	  popular	  government,	   this	  support	  
did	  not	  translate	  into	  support	  for	  the	  party’s	  constitutional	  preference.	  	  Opinion	  polls	  
indicated	   that	   support	   for	   independence	   remained	   static	   for	   the	   period	   of	   the	  
consultation	   and,	   dependent	   upon	   how	   the	   question	   was	   worded,	   support	   ranged	  
from	  just	  under	  to	  just	  over	  one	  third	  in	  support	  of	  independence,	  with	  just	  under	  half	  
saying	  they	  would	  vote	  against	  (see	  table	  4.3).110	  	  A	  Populus	  poll	  for	  The	  Times	  in	  April	  
2009	   gave	   respondents	   four	   options	   regarding	   their	   constitutional	   preference:	  
independence,	   further	   devolution	   within	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   the	   status	   quo	   and	  
significantly	  fewer	  powers	  for	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.	  	  The	  result	  saw	  only	  one	  in	  five	  
indicate	  a	  preference	  for	  independence,	  with	  41%	  supporting	  increased	  devolution	  –	  a	  
finding	  that	  confirmed	  previous	  polls	  on	  the	  subject.111	  
	  	  	  
                                                
107	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	  p.20.	  
108	  Newell,	  J.	  L.	  ‘The	  Scottish	  National	  Party:	  development	  and	  change’	  in	  De	  Winter,	  L.	  &	  Türsan,	  H.	  
(eds)	  Regionalist	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  London,	  Routledge,	  1998,	  p.112.	  
109	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  1999,	  op	  cit.	  p.7.	  
110	  Cutice,	  J.	  2009(b),	  op	  cit.	  p.18.	  
111	  ibid.	  p.17-­‐18.	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I	   agree	   that	   the	   Scottish	  
Government	   should	   negotiate	  
a	   settlement	   with	   the	  
Government	   of	   the	   United	  
Kingdom	   so	   that	   Scotland	  
becomes	  an	  independent	  state.	  
I	   do	   not	   agree	   that	   the	   Scottish	  
Government	   should	   negotiate	   a	  
settlement	  with	   the	  Government	  
of	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   so	   that	  
Scotland	   becomes	   an	  
independent	  state.	  
Aug	  07	   35%	   50%	  
Nov/	  Dec	  07	   40%	   44%	  
Mar/	  Apr	  08	   41%	   40%	  
June/	  July	  08	   39%	   41%	  
Oct	  08	   35%	   43%	  
Jan/Feb	  09	   38%	   40%	  
	  
Thus,	   there	   was	   a	   distinct	   dilemma	   for	   the	   SNP	   in	   power.	   	  With	   the	   advent	   of	   the	  
Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  the	  party’s	  elevation	  from	  main	  opposition	  to	  government	  in	  
Scotland,	   the	   SNP’s	   strategy	   was	   clear.	   	   The	   party	   was	   determined	   to	   govern	  
effectively	   and	   competently,	   and	   to	   deliver	   popular	   policies	   in	   government.113	  	  
Anything	  which	  they	  could	  not	  deliver	  could	  be	  blamed	  on	  the	  limited	  powers	  of	  the	  
Scottish	  Parliament,	   the	   tight	   financial	   settlement	   from	   the	  UK	  Government	  and	   the	  
global	   recession.114	   	   If	   the	   message	   was	   right,	   the	   Scottish	   population	   would	  
sympathise	  with	   the	   SNP	   in	   government,	   recognise	   their	   ambitions	   for	   Scotland	  and	  
support	   independence	  as	   their	   constitutional	   preference.	   	  However,	  while	   the	   SNP’s	  
execution	   of	   this	   strategy	   was	   –	   with	   one	   or	   two	   difficulties	   –	   relatively	   successful	  
(their	   standing	   in	   opinion	   polls	   certainly	   indicated	   that	   they	   were	   a	   popular	  
government)	   they	  were	   unable	   to	   shift	   public	   opinion	   in	   favour	   of	   independence.115	  	  
The	   National	   Conversation,	   as	   a	   consultation	   based	   upon	   the	   SNP’s	   constitutional	  
                                                
112	  TNS	  System	  Three	  polls	  for	  the	  Sunday	  Herald,	  cited	  Curtice,	  J.	  2009(a),	  op	  cit.	  and	  Curtice,	  J.	  2009(b),	  
op	  cit.	  
113	  Trench,	  A.	  2008,	  op	  cit.	  p.4-­‐5.	  
114	  ibid.	  p.10.	  




preference,	  had	  a	  marginal	  impact	  upon	  support	  for	  independence	  (see	  table	  above).	  	  
While	   the	   public	   were,	   in	   general,	   happy	   to	   attend	   events,	   to	   meet	   ministers	   and	  
engage	   them	   in	   debate,	   those	   debates	   rarely	   (as	   demonstrated	   above)	   centred	   on	  
Scotland’s	   constitutional	   future.	   	   Instead,	   the	  public	   took	   the	  opportunity	   to	   discuss	  
issues	  of	  importance	  to	  them.	  	  	  
	  
Impact	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  
The	  process	  of	  consultation,	  of	  transparency	  and	  accountability,	  was	  a	  success	  for	  the	  
SNP	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  a	  popular	  activity.	  	  The	  public	  like	  to	  be	  consulted	  on	  issues,	  like	  
to	   be	   able	   to	   present	   their	   views	   and	   to	   hold	   those	   in	   power	   to	   account.	   	   This	  
benefited	  the	  SNP	  in	  several	  ways,	  notably	  as	  a	  means	  of	  appearing	  as	  a	  government	  
which	  was	  open	   to	   the	  public	   but	   also	   in	   terms	  of	   popular	   support.	   	  As	   the	  opinion	  
polls	  suggest,	  the	  SNP	  remained	  a	  popular	  party	  of	  government.116	  	  And,	  indeed,	  while	  
questions	   relating	   to	   the	   constitution	   remained	   in	   the	  minority	   at	   these	   events,	   the	  
issue	   remained	   on	   the	   political	   agenda	   throughout	   the	   SNP’s	   term	   in	   office	   –	   a	  
significant	  success	  for	  the	  party	  in	  terms	  of	  agenda-­‐setting.117	  	  However,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
continuing	   the	   debate	   upon	   Scotland’s	   constitutional	   future,	   the	   National	  
Conversation	   failed	   to	   deliver	   upon	   its	   primary	   objective	   –	   a	   distinct	   increase	   in	  
support	   for	   independence.	   	   And	   this	   remained	   the	   difficulty	   for	   the	   SNP	   even	   after	  
2011,	   when	   they	  moved	   from	  minority	   to	   majority	   government	   –	   how	   to	   translate	  
their	  support	  as	  a	  government	  into	  support	  for	  their	  constitutional	  preference.118	  
	  
                                                
116	  Lynch,	  P.	  and	  Elias,	  A.	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.20.	  
117	  Interview	  with	  Keith	  Brown	  (SNP	  MSP	  and	  then-­‐Scottish	  Government	  Minister	  for	  Schools	  and	  Skills)	  
(April	  2010).	  
118	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  2012(b),	  op	  cit.	  p.113.	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A	  National	  Conversation	  allowed	  the	  SNP	  to	  firmly	  set	  the	  agenda	  on	  the	  constitutional	  
debate	   though,	   and	   this	   was	   a	   significant	   achievement	   for	   the	   party.	   	   With	   the	  
publication	   of	   the	  White	   Paper	   Choosing	   Scotland’s	   Future	   just	   three	   months	   after	  
taking	   office,	   the	   SNP	   did	   not	   hesitate	   in	   setting	   out	   their	   position	   as	   advocates	   of	  
independence	  and	  offered	  a	  timescale	  for	  moving	  towards	  a	  referendum	  in	  which	  the	  
Scottish	   population	   would	   be	   allowed	   to	   determine	   the	   constitutional	   future	   of	  
Scotland.	   	   This	   was	   opposed	   by	   the	   collective	   Unionist	   parties	   in	   the	   Scottish	  
Parliament	  –	  Labour,	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  –	  but	  supported	  by	  
the	  Greens	  and	  former	  SNP	  MSP	  Margo	  MacDonald.	  	  
	  
For	   the	   SNP,	   the	   agenda-­‐setting	   aspect	   of	   A	   National	   Conversation	   was	   a	   major	  
success.	   	   While	   the	   opposition	   parties	   did	   not	   wish	   to	   countenance	   constitutional	  
change	  during	   the	  2007	  election	  campaign,	   the	  SNP’s	  presence	   in	  government,	   their	  
constitutional	   consultation	   and	   their	   continual	   pursuit	   of	   the	   issue	  meant	   that	   they	  
were	   forced	   into	   the	   constitutional	   debate.	   	   The	   Scottish	   Government	   were	   thus	  
driving	  the	  agenda,	  and	  their	  opposition	  were	  forced	  to	  react	  –	  and	  react	  they	  did.	  	  For	  
while,	   individually,	   the	   opposition	   parties	   were	   limited	   in	   their	   response	   to	   the	  
National	   Conversation,	   collectively,	   and	   with	   the	   backing	   of	   UK	   counterparts	   at	  
Westminster,	  the	  parties	  established	  the	  Calman	  Commission	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  wrest	  
the	  constitutional	  debate	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  SNP.	  
	  
The	   Calman	   Commission	   process,	   and	   recommendations	   –	   and	   the	   subsequent	  
attempts	   to	   legislate	   for	   them	   through	   the	   Scotland	  Bill	   –	   provided	  evidence	  of	   two	  
things:	   that	   the	   SNP	   achieved	   something	   in	   the	  way	   of	   success	  with	   regard	   to	   their	  
 
176	  
autonomy	   goals,	   and	   that	   they	   continued	   to	   set	   the	   agenda	   with	   regard	   to	  
constitutional	   issues,	   even	   when	   they	   were	   not	   the	   protagonist	   of	   the	   action.119	  	  
Indeed,	   although	   the	   Calman	  Commission	  was	   considered	   “a	   political	   response	   to	  A	  
National	  Conversation”120	  by	  one	  Scottish	  Government	  minister,	  it	  was	  also	  considered	  
as	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  discussion	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  had	  initiated.121	  	  	  
	  
As	   a	   minority	   government,	   the	   SNP	   struggled	   to	   turn	   all	   of	   their	   manifesto	  
commitments	   into	   legislation.	   	   As	   a	   party	   whose	   core	   business	   was	   and	   remains	  
independence,	   the	  SNP	  succeeded	   in	   forcing	  the	  opposition	  –	  Unionist	  –	  parties	   into	  
recommending	   the	   ceding	   of	   further	   powers	   to	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament.	   	   The	  
establishment	   and	   subsequent	   report	   of	   the	   Calman	   Commission	   were	   an	  
acknowledgement	   by	   Labour,	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   that	   the	  
devolution	   settlement	   as	   it	   existed	  was	   insufficient	   and	   that	   the	   Scottish	  Parliament	  
required	  more	  powers	  in	  order	  to	  function	  more	  efficiently.122	  	  	  
	  
It	  was	  also	  a	  tacit	  admission	  that	  questions	  about	  the	  constitutional	  future	  of	  Scotland	  
must	  be	  addressed	  and	  that	  the	  electoral	  success	  of	  the	  SNP	  has	  placed	  this	   issue	  at	  
the	   forefront	   of	   Scottish	   politics.	   	   That,	   in	   itself,	   represents	   progress	   for	   the	   SNP	   in	  
government,	   just	   as	   the	   home	   rule	   debate	   of	   the	   1970s	   and	   the	   devolution	  
referendum	  of	  the	  1990s	  did	  for	  the	  party	  in	  opposition.	  	  	  
	  
                                                
119	  Jones,	  P.	  2008,	  op	  cit.	  p.53.	  
120	  Interview	  with	  Richard	  Lochhead	  (SNP	  MSP,	  Cabinet	  Secretary	  for	  Rural	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Environment)	  
(May	  2010).	  
121	  Interview	  with	  Kevin	  Pringle	  (Special	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Government)	  (May	  2010).	  
122	  Commission	  on	  Scottish	  Devolution,	  2009,	  op	  cit,	  p:	  remit.	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Evaluating	  A	  National	  Conversation	  
The	   impact	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   National	   Conversation	   was	   therefore	  
twofold.	   	   Firstly,	   it	   played	   an	   agenda-­‐setting	   role	   in	   promoting	   the	   constitutional	  
debate.	   	   It	  forced	  independence	  onto	  the	  political	  agenda	  in	  Scotland	  and	  engaged	  –	  
albeit	  at	  a	  distance	  –	  the	  opposition	  parties	  in	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  constitutional	  
future	   of	   Scotland.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   established	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   position	  
through	  a	  series	  of	  papers	  aimed	  at	  providing	  information	  to	  the	  Scottish	  population	  in	  
order	  that	  an	  informed	  decision	  might	  be	  made	  regarding	  Scotland’s	  future.	  	  Secondly	  
it	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  referendum	  on	  independence	  which	  the	  SNP	  hoped	  would	  
allow	   them	  –	   as	   the	   Scottish	  Government	   –	   to	   open	   negotiations	  with	  Westminster	  
with	  a	  view	  to	  Scotland	  becoming	  a	  sovereign	  state.123	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Final	  Report	  
of	   the	   Calman	   Commission,	   First	  Minister	   Alex	   Salmond	   announced	   that	  A	  National	  
Conversation	  would	   conclude	  with	   a	  White	   Paper	  on	   independence	  which	  would	  be	  
published	   on	   St.	   Andrew’s	   Day	   2009.	   	   Providing	   substantive	   policy	   analysis	   of	   what	  
Scotland	  would	  look	  like	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  under	  the	  SNP,	  Your	  Scotland,	  Your	  
Voice	   combined	   elements	   of	   the	   previous	   National	   Conversation	   documents	   and	  
concluded	  the	  consultation	  by	  maintaining	  the	  SNP’s	   intention	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  
on	  independence	  on	  St.	  Andrew’s	  Day	  2010.124	  	  However,	  this	  was	  where	  the	  process	  
came	  predictably	  unstuck	  for	  the	  SNP,	  and	  their	  inability	  to	  convince	  their	  opposition	  
to	   support	   a	   referendum	   led	   to	   a	  new	   tactic.	   	   The	   referendum	  bill	  was	  published	   in	  
draft	  format	  in	  early	  2010	  as	  a	  consultation	  paper	  with	  a	  concession	  that	  it	  would	  not	  
                                                
123	  Scottish	  Government,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	  p.35.	  
124	  Arnott,	  M.	  A.	  and	  Ozga,	  J.	  ‘Policy	  Making	  &	  the	  ‘Nation’	  under	  the	  SNP	  Government:	  
Interdependencies	  &	  Interrelationships	  in	  Post	  Devolution	  Territorial	  Governance’	  Scotland:	  Ten	  Years	  
On	  Conference	  Paper,	  June,	  2009,	  p.5.	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be	   brought	   before	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament.125	   	   The	   publication	   was	   in	   two	   parts:	   a	  
consultation	   paper,	   which	   outlined	   choices	   for	   a	   referendum	   (ballot	   options,	  
organisation	   and	   rules,	   and	   financial	   arrangements	   for	   the	   vote	   itself)	   and	   secondly,	  
the	  draft	  bill	  itself,	  which	  outlined	  legislation	  which	  would	  be	  required	  to	  establish	  an	  
independence	  referendum.126	  	  Instead	  of	  bringing	  forward	  the	  legislation	  at	  the	  time,	  
the	  SNP	  cited	  a	  lack	  of	  parliamentary	  support	  for	  the	  referendum	  and	  postponed	  the	  
bill,	  asking	   instead	   that	  voters	   re-­‐elect	   the	  party,	   this	   time	  as	  a	  majority,	   in	   the	  May	  
2011	   Scottish	   Parliamentary	   election.	   	   The	   efforts	   to	   achieve	   this	  majority,	   and	   the	  
draft	  bill	  consultation	  itself,	  are	  considered	  more	  fully	  in	  chapter	  five.	  
	  
However,	  while	  A	  National	  Conversation	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  SNP	  to	  keep	  
independence	   on	   the	   political	   agenda	   and	   to	   lay	   the	   groundwork	   for	   a	   proposed	  
referendum	   on	   the	   subject,	   it	   failed	   to	   capture	   the	   imagination	   of	   the	   Scottish	  
electorate.	   	  While	  Scottish	  Government	   figures	  suggest	   that	   there	  were	  474,000	  hits	  
on	  the	  National	  Conversation	  website	  and	  4,300	  comments127	  and	  over	  3,500	  people	  
attended	   National	   Conversation	   events	   around	   the	   country,128	   discussion	   at	   these	  
events	  centred	  on	  predominantly	  local	  issues	  and	  not,	  as	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  had	  
hoped,	   upon	   the	   constitutional	   future	   of	   Scotland.129	   	   In	   engaging	   the	   Scottish	  
electorate	   in	   a	   discussion	   about	   constitutional	   options,	   the	   SNP	   had	   intended	   that	  
                                                
125	  Scottish	  Government,	  2010,	  Scotland’s	  Future:	  Draft	  Referendum	  (Scotland)	  bill	  consultation	  paper,	  
Edinburgh,	  Scottish	  Government.	  
126	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  ‘Getting	  to	  Yes:	  What	  Can	  Scottish	  Independence	  Campaigners	  Learn	  From	  
the	  Devolution	  Referendums	  of	  1979	  and	  1997?’	  Political	  Studies	  Association	  Conference	  Paper,	  April,	  
2012(a),	  p.5.	  
127	  Answer	  to	  a	  Parliamentary	  Question	  asked	  by	  George	  Foulkes	  on	  26	  February,	  2009(c)	  by	  Michael	  
Russell	  on	  9	  April,	  2009	  and	  available	  at	  
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Apps2/Business/PQA/default.aspx?pq=S3W-­‐21421	  
128	  Purvis,	  J.	  Parliamentary	  Question,	  23	  April,	  2009(a),	  op	  cit.	  
129	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  2012(b),	  op	  cit.	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their	  ability	   to	  promote	   independence	  as	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  Scotland	  through	  public	  
events	   would	   increase	   support	   for	   independence	   in	   advance	   of	   a	   proposed	  
referendum	   on	   the	   issue.	   	   However,	   as	   detailed	   above,	   support	   for	   independence	  
remained	   static	   while	   the	   SNP	   in	   government	   maintained	   and	   even	   increased	   in	  
popularity	  due,	   in	  part,	   to	  delivering	  popular	  policies	   in	  government	  and	  engaging	   in	  
consultation	  with	   the	   Scottish	   electorate.	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   impact	   of	  A	  National	  
Conversation	   was	   limited	   to	   maintaining	   the	   popularity	   of	   the	   SNP	   Scottish	  
Government	   but	   not	   increasing	   support	   for	   their	   constitutional	   goals.	   	   And	   that	   is	  
emblematic	  of	  the	  problem	  facing	  the	  SNP	  –	  and,	   indeed,	  other	  regionalist	  parties	   in	  
government:	   how	   to	   transfer	   support	   for	   the	   party	   to	   support	   for	   constitutional	  
change.	   	  The	  SNP	  did	  achieve	  success	   in	  forcing	  the	  issue	  onto	  the	  political	  agenda	  –	  
and	  parties	  in	  Scotland	  that	  are	  vehemently	  opposed	  to	  independence	  had	  to	  react	  by	  
discussing	   options	   for	   reforming	   devolution	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   devolution	   of	  
further	  powers	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.	  	  	  
	  
While	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   referendum	   to	   complete	   the	  process	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  
has	  led	  to	  opposition	  parties	  and	  political	  commentators	  arguing	  that	  the	  consultation	  
had	   failed.130	   	   However,	   and	   perhaps	   importantly,	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   support	   for	  
independence	  at	  the	  consultation’s	  conclusion,	  the	  fact	  that	  A	  National	  Conversation	  
began,	   maintained	   and	   developed	   a	   widespread	   constitutional	   debate,	   inclusive	   of	  
political	  elites,	  civic	  society	  and	  pressure	  groups	  among	  others,	  appeared	  to	  contradict	  
this	   viewpoint.	   	   Since	   the	   SNP	   entered	  minority	   government	   in	   2007,	  we	   appear	   to	  
have	  entered	  an	  expansionist	  phase	  of	  constitution-­‐making	  in	  Scotland.	  	  Indeed,	  while	  
                                                




the	  Calman	  Commission	  spawned	  the	  Scotland	  Bill	  –	  a	  clear,	  tangible	  outcome	  which	  
altered	   the	   devolution	   settlement	   –	  A	  National	   Conversation	   appears	   to	   have	   left	   a	  
lasting	   legacy	   of	   public	   engagement.	   	   While	   the	   government’s	   consultation	   is	   long	  
since	  complete,	  what	  we	  see	  now	  is	  a	  multi-­‐lateral	  consultation	  on	  the	  constitution	  –	  
advocates	   for	   independence	   and	   the	   union	   leading	   the	   debate	   with	   civic	   society,	  
pressure	  groups	  and	  wider	  Scottish	  society	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  places	  and	  through	  a	  variety	  
of	  media	  –	  in	  which	  government	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  main	  actor.	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  A	  National	  
Conversation	   –	   and	  more	   prominently,	   since	   the	   SNP	  were	   returned	   to	   power	   as	   a	  
majority	   government	   –	   civic	   society	   has	   engaged	   in	   constitutional	   debates	   amongst	  
themselves.	   	   Herein	   lies	   the	   lasting	   legacy	   of	   the	  National	   Conversation	   process:	   a	  
public	  engaged	   in	  the	  constitutional	  debate,	  actively	   interested	   in	  the	  discussion	  and	  
pursuing	   preferred	   ends.	   	   By	   this	   measure,	   the	   consultation	   itself	   can	   be	   judged	   a	  
relative	  success.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	  Scottish	  Government’s	  National	  Conversation	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  SNP	  
to	  open	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  electorate	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  Scotland’s	  constitutional	  future.	  	  
This	   comprised	   several	   components	   –	   a	  White	   Paper,	   an	   online	   interactive	  website,	  
local	   events,	   Scottish	   Cabinet	   tours,	   publication	   of	   a	   series	   of	   research	   papers	   –	   all	  
aimed	   at	   promoting	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   in	   general	   and	   the	   Scottish	  
Government’s	  preference	  of	  independence	  in	  particular.	  	  At	  a	  cost	  of	  over	  £600,000,	  A	  
National	   Conversation	   provoked	   condemnation	   from	   opposition	   parties,	   who	  
established	   their	   own	   review	   of	   devolution	  with	   a	   remit	   to	   improve	   the	   devolution	  
settlement	   and	   increase	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament.	   	   The	   Calman	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Commission,	   however,	   had	   one	   crucial	   difference	   –	   it	   ignored	   the	   SNP’s	   preferred	  
option	   of	   independence	   and	   focused	   solely	   on	   how	   to	   improve	   the	   work	   of	   the	  
Scottish	   Parliament	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
establishment	  of	  such	  a	  commission	  –	  given	  the	  vehement	  opposition	  of	  the	  Unionist	  
parties	  to	  further	  autonomy	  for	  Scotland	  prior	  to	  the	  SNP’s	  election	  –	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  
the	   progress	   the	   SNP	   have	   made	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   autonomy	   goals.	   	   A	   National	  
Conversation	   allowed	   the	  party	   to	   set	   the	  political	   agenda	   in	  Scotland	  and	   force	   the	  
opposition	  parties	   into	  discussing	  the	  potential	   for	  constitutional	  reform	  through	  the	  
Calman	  Commission.	  	  If	  any	  of	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Commission	  are	  enacted,	  
as	  would	  appear	   likely,	   then	   the	  SNP	  Scottish	  Government	   can	   claim	   that	   they	  have	  
been	  the	  protagonist	  of	  reform	  –	  despite	  the	  party	  refusing	  to	  engage	  with	  it.	  
	  
Engagement	   with	   the	   public	   was	   also	   largely	   a	   success,	   with	   well	   attended	   events	  
across	  the	  country.	  	  Government	  Ministers	  were	  accessible,	  answering	  questions	  on	  a	  
wide	   range	   of	   subjects,	   including	   independence.	   	   Alongside	   the	   delivery	   of	   several	  
popular	  and	  high	  profile	  manifesto	  commitments	  such	  as	  freezing	  the	  council	  tax	  and	  
abolishing	   the	   graduate	   endowment	   for	   students,	   public	   engagement	   helped	   to	  
maintain	   the	   SNP	   as	   a	   popular	   government.	   	   Opinion	   polls	   regularly	   had	   the	   party	  
obtaining	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   the	   vote	   than	   when	   they	   were	   elected	   in	   2007	   –	   an	  
achievement	   not	   often	   associated	   with	   governments	   halfway	   through	   their	   term	   in	  
office,	  especially	  those	  governing	  for	  the	  first	  time.131	  	  However,	  if	  the	  events	  had	  an	  
impact	   upon	   the	   electorate’s	   views	   on	   constitutional	   reform,	   it	   was	   negligible,	   with	  
polls	  indicating	  that	  support	  for	  independence	  remained	  static,	  and	  that	  increasing	  the	  
                                                
131	  Deschouwer,	  K.	  2008,	  op	  cit.	  p4-­‐5.	  
 
182	  
powers	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   remained	   the	   constitutional	   preference	   of	   the	  
Scottish	  electorate.	   	  There	   is	  some	   indication	  that	  support	   for	  “devolution	  max”	  as	  a	  
constitutional	  preference	  could	  be	  considered	  ‘soft’	  and	  those	  who	  held	  that	  view	  may	  
swing	  towards	  independence	  by	  the	  time	  of	  a	  referendum.	  	  But,	  for	  the	  period	  of	   its	  
existence,	   A	   National	   Conversation	   failed	   to	   provide	   any	   real	   movement	   towards	  
independence	  in	  the	  polls.132	  
	  
As	  an	  exercise	   in	  providing	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  with	  the	  opportunity	   to	  consult	  
with	  wider	  Scottish	  society,	  to	  provide	  information	  regarding	  the	  SNP’s	  constitutional	  
preference	   and	   to	   lay	   the	   groundwork	   for	   a	   referendum	  on	   the	   subject,	  A	  National	  
Conversation	   proved	   moderately	   successful.	   	   The	   voluntary	   sector	   and	   religious	  
leaders	   in	   particular	   were	   successfully	   engaged	   in	   discussions	   about	   Scotland’s	  
constitutional	   future,	   while	   opposition	   parties	   wasted	   no	   time	   in	   criticising	   the	  
publications	  released	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  as	  part	  of	  the	  National	  Conversation	  
series.	  	  As	  noted	  above	  however,	  the	  only	  substantive	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation	  –	  at	  
least,	  prior	  to	  the	  SNP’s	  victory	  in	  the	  2011	  Scottish	  Parliamentary	  election	  –	  were	  the	  
limited	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Commission	   on	   Scottish	  Devolution,	  which	   became	  
legislation	  through	  the	  Scotland	  Bill.	  
                                                
132	  Lynch,	  P.	  and	  Elias,	  A.	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.20.	  
 
183	  




The	  2007	  One	  Wales	  Agreement	  between	  the	  Welsh	  Labour	  Party	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  led	  to	  
the	   latter	   taking	   government	   office	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   	   This	   gave	   Plaid	   Cymru	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  promote	  further	  autonomy	  for	  Wales	  as	  a	  party	  of	  government,	  and	  the	  
power	  of	  an	  implicit	  threat	  to	  leave	  the	  coalition	  if	  progress	  was	  not	  made	  towards	  their	  
autonomy	  goals.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  agreed	  to	  convene	  the	  All	  
Wales	   Convention,	   a	  Wales-­‐wide	   consultation	   chaired	   by	   former	  UN	   diplomat	   Sir	   Emyr	  
Jones	   Parry.	   	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   National	   Conversation,	   the	   All	  
Wales	   Convention	   had	   a	   wide	   remit:	   to	   provide	   information	   on	   how	   the	   National	  
Assembly	   for	  Wales	   currently	   operates;	   to	   debate	   the	   extension	   of	   its	   powers;	   and	   to	  
report	   to	   the	  Welsh	   Assembly	   Government	   its	   findings	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   consultation	  
process.1	   	   The	   process	   consisted	   of	   public	   meetings	   around	   Wales	   as	   well	   as	   written	  
submissions	   of	   evidence	   to	   the	   executive	   committee.	   	   In	   all,	   2,700	   submissions	   were	  
made,	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  and	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  formats,	  before	  the	  final	  report	  of	  the	  




In	   contrast	   to	   the	   Scottish	   Constitutional	   Convention,	  which	   provided	   the	   blueprint	   for	  
devolution	  in	  Scotland	  and	  achieved	  its	  ambition	  of	  a	  devolved	  Scottish	  Parliament	  after	  
                                                




the	   1997	   referendum,	   the	   clear	   lack	   of	   public	   consultation	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   Welsh	  
referendum	  made	   for	  an	  “inauspicious	  start”	   for	   the	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales,	  with	  
the	  active	   support	  of	   just	  one	   in	   four	  of	   the	  population.3	   	  The	   referendum	  campaign	   in	  
1997	  focused	  upon	  the	  “functional	  arguments	  for	  devolution”,	  giving	  the	  public	  a	  view	  of	  
what	  could	  be	  achieved	  within	  the	  structure	  of	  devolution	  but	  without	  engaging	  with	  or	  
soliciting	  their	  views	  on	  what	  the	  structure	  of	  devolution	  itself	  should	  look	  like.4	  	  Thus,	  for	  
the	  initial	  period	  of	  devolution	  in	  Wales,	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  that,	  not	  only	  was	  the	  National	  
Assembly	   for	   Wales	   desired	   by	   a	   minority	   of	   the	   population,	   its	   purpose,	   remit	   and	  
responsibilities	  were	  ill-­‐defined	  and	  ill-­‐understood.	  	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  
Act	   2006	   was	   passed,	   and	   the	   system	   of	   Legislative	   Competence	   Orders	   adopted,	   the	  
system	  of	  devolution	  in	  Wales	  had	  become	  increasingly	  complex,	  it	  was	  “quite	  clear”	  that	  
people	   didn’t	   understand	   the	   process,	   and	   that	   trying	   to	   explain	   it	   to	   the	   public	   was	  
“maddeningly	   difficult”.5	   	   There	   was	   a	   feeling	   then,	   that	   if	   a	   further	   referendum	   –	   a	  
referendum	  mandated	  by	  the	  2006	  Act	  –	  was	  to	  be	  won,	  a	  period	  of	  electorate	  education	  
would	  be	  required.	   	  Recognising	  this,	  when	  Plaid	  Cymru	  entered	  office	  for	  the	  first	  time	  
after	   the	  2007	  elections,	   they	  did	   so	  only	  after	  an	  agreement	  with	  Labour	  was	   reached	  
which	  would	   see	   them	  work	   towards	  a	   referendum	  on	   further	  powers	   for	   the	  National	  
Assembly	  for	  Wales	  by	  way	  of	  a	  consultation	  with	  the	  Welsh	  public	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  The	  All	  
Wales	   Convention	  was	   the	   outcome	   of	   this	   agreement.	   	   With	   a	   remit	   to	   educate	   the	  
Welsh	  population	  about	  devolution,	  “to	  explain	  the	  settlement	  under	  the	  Government	  of	  
Wales	  Act	  2006	  and	  how	  it	  might	  change”	  through	  the	  referendum,	  this	  was	  a	  “mammoth	  
                                                
3	  Rawlings,	  R.	  Delineating	  Wales:	  Constitutional,	  Legal	  and	  Administrative	  Aspects	  of	  National	  Devolution,	  
Cardiff,	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2003,	  p.49.	  
4	  Bradbury,	  J.	  ‘Devolution	  in	  Wales	  –	  An	  Unfolding	  Process’	  in	  Bradbury,	  J.	  (ed)	  Devolution,	  Regionalism	  and	  
Regional	  Development:	  The	  UK	  Experience,	  Abington,	  Routledge,	  2008,	  p.47.	  
5	  Interview	  with	  Most	  Rev’d	  Dr	  Barry	  Morgan	  (Archbishop	  of	  Wales	  and	  Chair	  of	  Cymru	  Yfory)	  (June	  2010).	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task”	  and	  one	  which	  was	  not	  envied	  by	  those	  with	  experience	  of	  political	  engagement	  in	  
Wales.6	  	  	  
	  
Jones	   and	   Gammell	   note	   that	   “there	   is	   no	   standard	   methodology”	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  
consultations,	   which	   makes	   judging	   the	   success	   of	   a	   consultation	   difficult,	   particularly	  
from	  a	  comparative	  perspective.7	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  a	  consultation	  
should	   be	   judged	   against	   its	   own	   aims	   and	   objectives,	   succeeding	   only	   when	   it	   has	  
achieved	   what	   it	   set	   out	   to	   do.	   	   Underpinning	   the	   use	   of	   consultation	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
involving	   the	   public	   in	   the	   policy	   process	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   doing	   so	   encourages	   a	  more	  
engaged	   citizenry,	   better	   decisions	   on	   policy	   and	   better	   government.8	   	   Not	   only	   do	  
consultations	  improve	  decision-­‐making,	  according	  to	  this	  thesis,	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  process	  
of	  legitimising	  the	  decision	  itself.	  	  Decisions	  on	  how	  to	  proceed	  with	  a	  particular	  policy	  are	  
still	  the	  bastion	  of	  elected	  representatives,	  but	  if	  the	  public	  have	  been	  invited	  to	  provide	  
their	  opinions,	  and	  those	  opinions	  have	  been	  listened	  to,	  engaged	  with,	  and	  incorporated	  
into	  the	  decisions,	  the	  policy	  itself	  is	  seen	  as	  more	  legitimate	  (even	  by	  individual	  citizens	  
who	   still	   disagree	  with	   the	   outcome).	   	   Fishkin	   identifies	   a	   further	   difficulty	  with	   public	  
engagement,	  arguing	  that	  it	  has	  become	  “difficult	  to	  effectively	  motivate	  citizens	  in	  mass	  
society	  to	  become	  informed”,	  establishing	  a	  real	  need	  to	  use	  consultations	  not	  simply	  to	  
gather	  information	  but	  to	  educate	  as	  well.9	  	  The	  All	  Wales	  Convention’s	  remit	  (discussed	  
in	   more	   detail	   below)	   combined	   these	   considerations,	   aiming	   to	   inform	   the	   Welsh	  
                                                
6	  Interview	  with	  Huw	  Rhys	  Thomas	  (Assembly	  Advisor,	  NFU	  Cymru)	  (July	  2010).	  
7	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Gammell,	  E.	  The	  Art	  of	  Consultation:	  Public	  Dialogues	  in	  a	  Noisy	  World,	  London,	  Biteback	  
Publishing	  Ltd.,	  2009,	  p.149.	  
8	  Cornwall,	  A.	  ‘’Locating	  Citizen	  Participation’	  in	  Institute	  of	  Development	  Studies	  IDS	  Bulletin,	  Vol.	  33,	  No.	  2,	  
April,	  2002,	  p.49.	  
9	  Fishkin,	  J.	  S.	  When	  the	  People	  Speak:	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  and	  Public	  Consultation,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2009,	  p.2.	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population	   about	   how	   the	   devolved	   settlement	   had	   changed,	   how	   it	   could	   be	   further	  
altered,	   and	   to	   engage	   the	   public	   in	   considering	   whether	   such	   further	   changes	   were	  
desired.	  	  The	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  could	  thus	  be	  judged	  according	  to	  how	  well	  it	  achieved	  
these	  objectives.	  
	  
Origins	  and	  Design	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  
The	   establishment	   of	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   in	   1999,	   following	   the	   narrow	  
referendum	  victory	  in	  1997,	  was	  both	  a	  beginning	  and	  an	  end	  for	  devolutionists	  in	  Wales.	  	  
An	  end,	  because	  it	  finally	  laid	  to	  rest	  the	  ghosts	  of	  the	  heavy	  1979	  referendum	  defeat	  by	  
delivering	   the	   institution	   which	   activists	   had	   spent	   generations	   campaigning	   for.	   	   A	  
beginning,	  because	  it	  opened	  up	  a	  new	  chapter	  in	  Welsh	  politics	  and	  society	  –	  and	  with	  a	  
system	  of	  devolution	  which	  amounted	  to	  executive	  powers	  controlled	  through	  a	  “body-­‐
corporate”	  model,	  a	  chapter	  which	  would	  provide	  cause	  for	  debate.	  	  Devolution	  in	  Wales,	  
in	  the	  oft-­‐quoted	  and	  well-­‐considered	  words	  of	  Ron	  Davies,	  was	  very	  much	  a	  process	  and	  
not	  an	  event	  in	  and	  of	  itself.10	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  Davies’	  sentiments	  are	  seldom	  expressed	  
and	  yet	   in	   this	   context	   they	  merit	   further	   consideration,	   for	   they	   continue	   to	   ring	   true.	  	  
For	  Davies	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  devolution	  “is	  not	  an	  event	  and	  neither	   is	   it	  a	   journey	  
with	   a	   fixed	   end	   point...	   it	   is	   not	   an	   end	   itself	   but	   a	   means	   to	   an	   end”.11	   	   Given	   the	  
substantial	   upheaval	   in	   the	   Welsh	   political	   system	   since	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   National	  
Assembly	   for	  Wales	   in	   1999,	   a	   process	  with	   no	   fixed	   end	   point	   appears	   an	   apt	  way	   to	  
describe	  Welsh	   devolution.	   	   It	  was	   also	   everything	   to	   everyone:	   	   for	   Labour	   it	  was	   the	  
culmination	  of	  work	   done	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	  Conservative	   governments	   of	   the	   1980s	  
                                                
10	  Davies,	  R.	  ‘Devolution:	  A	  Process	  not	  an	  Event’	  in	  The	  Gregynog	  Papers,	  Vol.	  2,	  No.	  2,	  Cardiff,	  Institute	  of	  




and	  1990s	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  deliver	  on	  a	  pre-­‐election	  pledge	  to	  provide	  an	  electoral	  
assembly	  for	  Wales;	  for	  Plaid	  Cymru	  it	  was	  an	  opportunity	  to	  work	  in	  an	  exclusively	  Welsh	  
political	  context	  and	  to	  promote	  their	  Welsh-­‐specific	  policies;	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  (who,	  
at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   referendum,	   were	   resolutely	   opposed	   to	   devolution)	   it	   restored	  
political	  representation	  in	  Wales	  to	  a	  party	  who	  had	  seen	  electoral	  wipe-­‐out	  in	  the	  1997	  
General	  Election;	  and	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  it	  was	  a	  step	  towards	  the	  federal	  future	  
they	  saw	  for	  the	  UK.	  	  For	  each	  of	  the	  parties,	  however,	  devolution	  was	  a	  new	  challenge	  –	  
a	   unique	   model	   of	   devolution	   set	   against	   the	   somewhat-­‐familiar	   difficulties	   always	  
inherent	   in	  multi-­‐level	  political	  systems.	   	  And	  in	  a	  new	  institution	  which	  had	  no	  primary	  
legislative	  functions,	   limited	  powers	  over	  secondary	   legislation	  and	  no	  separation	  of	  the	  
executive	   and	   legislature,	   the	   difficulties	   were	   apparent	   from	   the	   outset.	   	   	   	   From	   the	  
establishment	   of	   the	   Assembly	   in	   1999	   through	   changes	   to	   its	   procedures,	   the	  
establishment	  (2002)	  and	  report	  (2004)	  of	  the	  Richard	  Commission,	  the	  UK	  Government’s	  
response	  (2005)	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  of	  2006,	  the	  devolution	  settlement	  in	  
Wales	   has	   undergone	   substantive	   development,	   with	   each	   point	   on	   this	   journey	  
influencing	  significantly	  the	  next.	  	  The	  passing	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  was	  
an	  important	  staging	  point	  for	  what	  was	  to	  come	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  2007	  elections	  
to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  and	  as	  such	  is	  where	  discussion	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  
All	  Wales	  Convention	  begins.	  
	  
Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  
The	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  made	  several	   significant	  changes	   to	   the	  devolution	  
settlement	   in	   Wales.	   	   Taking	   on	   board	   some	   of	   the	   Richard	   Commission’s	  
recommendations,	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  made	  provision	  for	  the	  creation	  of	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an	  executive	  –	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  –	  making	  this	  officially	  separate	  from	  the	  
role	   of	   the	  National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales	   for	   the	   first	   time.12	   	  Minor	   changes	  were	   also	  
made	   to	   the	  electoral	  arrangements	   for	   the	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales	  –	  establishing	  
the	  ability	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  to	  call	  an	  extraordinary	  election	  when	  the	  
Assembly	   in	   its	   constituted	   state	   could	  not	   continue	   to	   function	   (requiring	  a	   two-­‐thirds	  
majority	  vote)	  and	  allowing	   the	  Assembly	   to	  provide	  public	   information	  broadcasts	  and	  
leaflets	  regarding	  an	  upcoming	  election,	  as	  well	  as	  disbarring	  those	  candidates	  standing	  in	  
individual	   constituencies	   from	   also	   putting	   their	   names	   forward	   as	   candidates	   on	   the	  
regional	   lists.13	   	  However,	   the	  most	   significant	   changes	   to	   the	  devolution	   settlement	   in	  
Wales	  featured	  in	  Parts	  3	  and	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  
	  
Part	   3	   endowed	   the	   Assembly	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   pass	   primary	   legislation,	   known	   as	  
Measures	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  in	  twenty	  specific	  areas	  known	  as	  Fields	  –	  
set	  out	  in	  Schedule	  5	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  
the	   Assembly	   would	   first	   have	   to	   acquire	   the	   competence	   to	   pass	   legislation	   in	   these	  
particular	   areas.	   	   There	  were	   two	   processes	   of	   transferring	   the	   power	   to	   the	   National	  
Assembly	  for	  Wales	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  	  The	  first	  required	  
the	  Welsh	   Assembly	   Government	   to	  make	   a	   proposal	   to	   the	   UK	   Government	   that	   the	  
transfer	   of	   power	   over	   part	   of	   a	   Field	   (known	   as	   a	  Matter),	   incorporating	   the	   area	   in	  
which	  they	  wish	  to	  legislate,	  be	  included	  in	  a	  UK	  Government	  Bill	  which,	  when	  passed	  as	  
an	  Act	  of	  Parliament,	  would	  insert	  the	  Matter	  into	  Schedule	  5	  and	  allow	  the	  legislation	  in	  
                                                
12	  HM	  Government	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006,	  London,	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  2006,	  p.28.	  
13	  ibid.	  p.4-­‐6.	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the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   to	   be	   competent	   –	   that	   is,	   within	   their	   power	   to	  
legislate.14	  	  	  
	  
Box	  5.1:	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  Fields15	  	  
	  
	  
1:	  	  Agriculture,	  fisheries,	  forestry	  and	  rural	  development	  
2:	  	  Ancient	  monuments	  and	  historic	  buildings	  
3:	  	  Culture	  
4:	  	  Economic	  development	  
5:	  	  Education	  and	  training	  
6:	  	  Environment	  
7:	  	  Fire	  and	  rescue	  services	  and	  promotion	  of	  fire	  safety	  
8:	  	  Food	  
9:	  	  Health	  and	  health	  services	  
10:	  Highways	  and	  transport	  
11:	  Housing	  
12:	  Local	  government	  
13:	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  
14:	  Public	  administration	  
15:	  Social	  welfare	  
16:	  Sport	  and	  recreation	  
17:	  Tourism	  
18:	  Town	  and	  country	  planning	  
19:	  Water	  and	  flood	  defence	  
20:	  Welsh	  language	  
	  
	  
The	  second	  process	  –	  whereby	  Legislative	  Competence	  Orders	  (LCO)	  were	  utilised	  –	  was	  
somewhat	   more	   complicated	   (see	   figure	   5.1).	   	   Rather	   than	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government	   negotiating	   with	   the	   UK	   Government,	   this	   method	   involved	   the	   National	  
Assembly	   for	  Wales	  drafting	   and	  approving	   an	   LCO,	  before	  publishing	   it	   for	   scrutiny	  by	  
both	   an	  Assembly	   Committee	   and	   the	  Welsh	  Affairs	   Committee	   at	  Westminster.	   	   After	  
both	   reported	   on	   the	   LCO,	   the	  Welsh	   Assembly	   Government	   and	   the	   UK	   Government	  
considered	  the	  LCO	  again	  before	  it	  would	  be	  laid	  before	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  
                                                
14	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.18.	  
15	  HM	  Government	  2006,	  op	  cit.	  (Schedule	  5)	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for	   approval.	   	   If	   accepted	   it	  would	   be	   passed	   to	   both	   the	  House	   of	   Commons	   and	   the	  
House	  of	  Lords	  for	  approval	  there.	  	  If	  final	  approval	  was	  granted	  there,	  the	  LCO	  would	  be	  
passed	  and	  the	  additional	  Matters	  added	  to	  Schedule	  5,	  allowing	  the	  National	  Assembly	  
for	   Wales	   to	   legislate	   in	   the	   proposed	   Field.16	   	   This	   process	   allowed	   powers	   to	   be	  
devolved	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  gradually,	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  process	  which	  only	  
gave	  the	  Assembly	  power	  to	  legislate	  in	  areas	  which	  it	  specifically	  requested.17 
 
The	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  did	  however	  provide	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  
the	  opportunity	   to	   acquire	   legislative	  powers	   in	   all	   20	   Fields	   collectively.	   	   Part	   4	  of	   the	  
Government	   of	   Wales	   Act	   2006	   also	   set	   out	   the	   process	   by	   which	   a	   referendum	   (to	  
establish	   whether	   the	   powers	   in	   each	   of	   those	   20	   Fields	   should	   be	   transferred	   to	   the	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	   instantly)	  could	  be	  held,	  with	  a	  positive	  outcome	  in	  such	  a	  
referendum	  removing	  the	  need	  for	  the	  gradual	  devolution	  of	  powers.	  	  In	  that	  event,	  Part	  
3	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  would	  be	  nullified	  and	  replaced	  by	  Part	  4,	  with	  
Schedule	  7	  listing	  the	  20	  areas	  (now	  called	  “Subjects”)	  under	  which	  the	  National	  Assembly	  
for	  Wales	  would	  now	  be	  able	  to	  legislate.18	  	  The	  process	  by	  which	  a	  referendum	  could	  be	  
called	  was	  also	  established	  in	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006,	  allowing	  for	  either	  the	  
UK	  Government	  or	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  through	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales	  to	  initiate	  legislation	  to	  that	  effect.	  	  40	  out	  of	  60	  Assembly	  Members	  (that	  is,	  a	  two-­‐
thirds	   majority)	   would	   have	   to	   vote	   for	   a	   referendum	   before	   the	   First	   Minister	   could	  
notify	   the	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	  Wales	  of	   their	   intention.	   	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  would	  
                                                
16	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.18-­‐19,	  28.	  
17	  For	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  summary	  of	  the	  LCO	  process,	  see	  House	  of	  Commons	  Welsh	  Affairs	  
Committee	  Review	  of	  the	  LCO	  process,	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2009-­‐10,	  HC	  Paper	  155,	  London,	  Her	  
Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  2010.	  
18	  HM	  Government	  2006,	  op	  cit.	  p.59.	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then	  have	  120	  days	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  proceed	  with	  their	  intention,	  which	  would	  then	  
require	  a	  subsequent	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  and	  a	  simple	  
majority	  in	  both	  Houses	  of	  Parliament	  to	  pass.19	  	  
	  





                                                
19	  ibid.	  p.58-­‐9.	  
20	  HM	  Government	  2006,	  op	  cit.;	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  
Proposed	  LCO	  draed	  (by	  
Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  
or	  Assembly	  Member)	  
Proposed	  LCO	  
published	  
Scrurny	  by	  Assembly	  
Commiee	  
Scrurny	  by	  Welsh	  
Aﬀairs	  Commiee	  
Aer	  Commiees	  report,	  the	  LCO	  is	  considered	  by	  both	  
Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  &	  the	  UK	  Government	  
Dra	  LCO	  laid	  before	  
Assembly	  
Dra	  LCO	  laid	  by	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  
Wales	  in	  both	  Houses	  of	  Parliament	  
LCO	  made	  by	  HM	  in	  
Council	  
Maer	  in	  Schedule	  5;	  Assembly	  aquires	  law-­‐
making	  power	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The	  One	  Wales	  Agreement	  
Plaid	  Cymru’s	  2007	  manifesto	  Make	  a	  Difference	  set	  out	  seven	  priorities	  for	  the	  party	  in	  
government:	  cut	  energy	  use	  by	  10%,	  affordable	  childcare,	  laptops	  for	  every	  11	  year	  old	  in	  
Wales,	  help	  students	  with	  loan	  repayments	  for	  five	  years,	  provide	  a	  home	  grant	  for	  first-­‐
time	   buyers,	   tax	   cuts	   for	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	   businesses,	   and	   a	   new	   community	  
health	  service.21	  	  Also	  included	  –	  in	  the	  final	  page	  of	  their	  manifesto	  –	  was	  Plaid	  Cymru’s	  
approach	   to	   governance.	   	   This	   section	   cited	   the	   principle	   that	   the	   party	   based	   their	  
manifesto	  on	  –	  that	  “sovereignty	  lies	  with	  the	  people	  of	  Wales”	  –	  setting	  out	  their	  aim	  to	  
hold	  a	  referendum	  during	  the	  forthcoming	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  term	  to	  establish	  
a	  “proper	  parliament	  for	  Wales”	  following	  the	  model	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  
Act	  2006.22	  	  The	  principle	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Welsh	  people	  and	  the	  seven	  manifesto	  
commitments	   provided	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	   party	   in	   coalition	   negotiations	   –	   and	  
became	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   One	  Wales	   Agreement.	   	   Among	   commitments	   to	   health,	   the	  
economy,	  housing,	  education,	   the	  environment,	   culture	  and	   social	   justice	  –	   the	   latter	  a	  
key	   part	   of	   both	   parties’	  manifestos	   –	   was	   a	   section	   entitled	   “A	   Strong	   and	   Confident	  
Nation.”	  	  	  
	  
There	   will	   be	   a	   joint	   commitment	   to	   use	   the	   Government	   of	  
Wales	   Act	   2006	   provisions	   to	   the	   full	   under	   Part	   III	   and	   to	  
proceed	   to	   a	   successful	   outcome	   of	   a	   referendum	   for	   full	   law-­‐
making	  powers	  under	  Part	  IV	  as	  soon	  as	  practicable,	  at	  or	  before	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  Assembly	  Term.23	  
	  
                                                
21	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  Make	  a	  Difference:	  Manifesto	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  Cardiff,	  Plaid	  Cymru	  –	  
The	  Party	  of	  Wales,	  2007,	  p.7-­‐19.	  
22	  ibid.	  p.36.	  
23	  Labour	  Party	  Wales	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  ‘One	  Wales:	  a	  progressive	  agenda	  for	  the	  government	  of	  Wales:	  an	  
agreement	  between	  the	  Labour	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  Groups	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly’,	  Cardiff,	  Welsh	  Assembly	  
Government,	  2007,	  p.6.	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This	  set	  out	  an	  agreement	  to	  govern	  using	  the	  new	  powers	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales	   and	   to	   continue	   to	   campaign	   for	   an	   increase	   to	   these	   powers.	   	   It	   also	   set	   out	   a	  
commitment	  that	  both	  Plaid	  Cymru	  and	  Labour	  in	  Wales	  –	  which	  had	  not	  always	  given	  its	  
full-­‐throated	  support	  to	  devolution	  –	  would	  support	  a	  campaign	  to	  increase	  the	  powers	  of	  
the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales:	  
	  
Both	   parties	   agree	   in	   good	   faith	   to	   campaign	   for	   a	   successful	  
outcome	   to	   such	   a	   referendum.	   The	   preparations	   for	   securing	  
such	  a	  successful	  outcome	  will	  begin	  immediately.	  We	  will	  set	  up	  
an	  all-­‐Wales	  Convention	  within	  six	  months	  and	  a	  group	  of	  MPs	  
and	   AMs	   from	   both	   parties	   will	   be	   commissioned	   to	   set	   the	  
terms	  of	  reference	  and	  membership	  of	  the	  Convention	  based	  on	  
wide	   representation	   from	   civic	   society.	   Both	   parties	   will	   then	  
take	  account	  of	   the	  success	  of	   the	  bedding	  down	  of	   the	  use	  of	  
the	  new	  legislative	  powers	  already	  available	  and,	  by	  monitoring	  
the	   state	   of	   public	   opinion,	   will	   need	   to	   assess	   the	   levels	   of	  
support	   for	   full	   law-­‐making	   powers	   necessary	   to	   trigger	   the	  
referendum.24	  
	  
In	  October	   2007,	   the	  Welsh	   Assembly	   Government	  made	   good	   their	   commitment	   to	   a	  
national	  consultation,	  with	  First	  Minister	  Rhodri	  Morgan	  and	  Deputy	  First	  Minister	  Ieuan	  
Wyn	   Jones	   appointing	   Sir	   Emyr	   Jones	   Parry,	   previously	   the	   UK’s	   Permanent	  
Representative	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  to	  chair	  the	  Convention.25	  	  
	  
The	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  Process	  
With	  a	   remit	   that	   covered	  public	   information	  as	  well	   as	  public	  engagement	  around	   the	  
devolution	  agenda,	  and	  the	  practical	  issues	  which	  this	  entailed,	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  
of	   the	  All	  Wales	   Convention	   had	   to	   remain	   flexible	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
process.	  	  The	  Committee	  had	  to	  obtain	  expert	  opinion	  from	  government	  officials,	  political	  
                                                
24	  ibid.	  	  
25	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.9.	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parties	  and	  academics,	  whose	  knowledge	  helped	  to	  equip	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  with	  
the	   information	   they	   required	   to	   fulfil	   their	   remit.	   	   Equally,	   the	  Committee	  had	   to	   find	  
ways	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  wider	  public	  in	  forums	  which	  were	  less	  formal	  than	  traditional	  
means	  of	  consultation.	  	  The	  geography	  of	  Wales	  –	  and	  the	  poor	  transport	  links	  between	  
north	  and	  south	  Wales	  –	  provided	  a	  further	  consideration	  for	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  to	  
take	   into	   account.26	   	   This	   led	   the	   Committee	   to	   make	   their	   communications	   and	  
consultation	   strategy	   one	   of	   their	   first	   priorities.27	   	   The	   strategy	   included	   engagement	  
with	   key	   stakeholders	   with	   Executive	   Committee	   members	   attending	   events	   held	   by	  
these	   organisations.	   	   It	   included	   public	   events	   –	   held,	   at	   the	   suggestion	   of	   Executive	  
Committee	  member	  Rob	  Humphrey,	  in	  every	  local	  authority	  in	  Wales.	  	  Mr	  Humphrey	  had	  
wanted	  to	  have	  even	  more	  events,	  stating	  in	  an	  interview:	  
	  
I	  thought	  we	  had	  to	  get	  out	  and	  meet	  the	  public	  –	  and	  I	  was	  very	  
much	  a	  proponent	  of	  having	  meetings	  in	  every	  local	  authority.	  	  I	  
actually	  wanted	   to	  do	  more	  –	   I	   thought	  we	  should	  have	  about	  
40	  or	  50	  public	  meetings,	  but	  the	  Committee	  met	  me	  halfway.28	  
	  
At	   the	  same	  time,	   formal	  evidence	  gathering	  –	  both	   in	   the	   form	  of	  written	  submissions	  
and	   oral	   evidence	   sessions	   in	   different	   parts	   of	  Wales	   –	  were	   undertaken.	   	   Finally,	   the	  
Convention’s	   communication	   strategy	   was	   also	   employed,	   a	   strategy	   which	   included	  
advertising	   through	   local	   newspapers	   and	   radio,	   invitations	   to	   schools	   to	   participate	   in	  
the	   Convention,	   and	   public	   appearances	   by	   Sir	   Emyr	   Jones	   Parry.	   	   A	   website	   and	  
interactive	   discussion	   forum	   on	   Facebook	   were	   also	   established	   to	   advertise	   the	  
Convention	  to	  the	  public.29	  	  	  
                                                
26	  Interview	  with	  Sally	  Hyman	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June	  2010).	  
27	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.11.	  
28	  Interview	  with	  Rob	  Humphrey	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (July	  2010).	  




Part	   of	   the	  Welsh	   Assembly	   Government’s	   considerations	   in	   establishing	   the	  All	  Wales	  
Convention	   rested	   upon	   the	   fact	   that,	   unlike	   Scotland,	   where	   engagement	   with	   civic	  
society	   through	  the	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention	  had	  been	  successful	  prior	   to	   the	  
devolution	   referendum	   in	   1997,	   there	   had	   been	   no	   such	   process	   in	   Wales.	   	   Thus	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   involve	  Welsh	   civic	   society	   –	   as	  well	   as	   the	  wider	  Welsh	  public	   –	   in	   the	  
process	  that	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  hoped	  would	  end	  with	  a	  positive	  outcome	  
in	   a	   referendum	  was	   an	   attractive	   one	   to	   the	   coalition.	   	   However,	   as	   Labour	   AM	  Alun	  
Davies	  commented,	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  two	  processes	  were	  entirely	  different:	  
	  
	  
[The	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention]	  was	  done	  in	  opposition,	  
with	  civic	  society,	  against	  an	  unpopular	  government,	  in	  a	  sense	  
defining	  a	  nation.	  	  What	  we’re	  doing	  is	  essentially	  a	  government	  
consultation	   by	   two	   parties	   in	   coalition	   to	   take	   us	   to	   a	  
destination	  which	   is	   already	   known.	   It	   is	   a	  different	  process	   to	  
do	  a	  different	  thing	  at	  a	  different	  time.30	  
	  
In	  his	  opinion,	  there	  had	  been	  “huge,	  fundamental	  change	  of	  mood	  in	  Wales”	  with	  regard	  
to	   devolution	   between	   1979	   and	   1997,	   and	   that	   the	   government	   consultation	   was	   a	  
means	   of	   “catching	   up	   with	   public	   opinion”.31	   	   This	   was	   a	   unique	   perspective	   among	  
interviewees.	  	  Most	  argued	  that	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  was	  required	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  
between	  the	  narrow	  mandate	  for	  devolution	  in	  1997	  and	  the	  intended	  transfer	  of	  powers	  
to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  through	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006,	  but	  here	  
was	  a	   suggestion	   that	   there	  was	  a	  public	  desire	   for	   such	  a	   transfer	  of	  powers	  –	   from	  a	  
Labour	   AM	   –	   and	   that	   the	   politicians	   in	  Wales	  were	   the	   ones	  who	  were	   following	   the	  
public.	  
                                                




Nevertheless,	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  attempted	  to	  recreate	  the	  Scottish	  model’s	  links	  
with	   civic	   society,	   and	   did	   so	   by	   actively	   engaging	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   consultation	  
process.	   	   Getting	   organisations	   involved	   in	   the	   process,	   both	   in	   the	   discussion	   process	  
itself	  and	  by	  utilising	  their	  networks	  to	  further	  widen	  the	  Convention’s	  reach	  among	  the	  
population,	   was	   a	   key	   aspect	   of	   the	   communications	   strategy.32	   	   This	   led	   to	  All	  Wales	  
Convention	   Executive	   Committee	   members	   attending	   events	   hosted	   by	   stakeholder	  
organisations,	  as	  well	  as	  writing	  articles	  for	  newsletters	  and	  magazines	  of	  some	  of	  these	  
organisations.	  
	  
Box	  5.3:	  Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  Parry	  Speeches	  to	  Stakeholder	  Organisations33	  
	  
	  
• Wales	  Council	  for	  Voluntary	  Action	  (WCVA)	  conference	  (Apr	  2008)	  
• Institute	  of	  Welsh	  Affairs/	  Cymru	  Yfory	  conference	  (Apr	  2008)	  
• Capita	  conference	  (July	  2008)	  
• Welsh	  Local	  Government	  Association	  conference	  (Oct	  2008)	  
• Institute	  of	  Directors	  Wales	  meeting	  (Oct	  2008)	  
• Council	  of	  Ethnic	  Minority	  Voluntary	  Organisations	  community	  event	  (Oct	  2008)	  
• Chartered	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Finance	  and	  Accounting	  Wales	  conference	  (Nov	  2008)	  
• Confederation	  of	  British	  Industry	  (CBI)	  Wales	  council	  meeting	  (Dec	  2008)	  
• Wales	  TUC	  conference	  (May	  2009)	  
• Capita	  conference	  (June	  2009)	  
	  
	  
Executive	   Committee	   chair	   Sir	   Emyr	   Jones	   Parry	   was	   particularly	   involved	   with	   this	  
element	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention’s	  strategy.	  	  Being	  the	  public	  face	  of	  the	  Convention	  
meant	  that	  his	  appearances	  at	  events	  provided	  some	  publicity	  for	  the	  consultation,	  and	  
he	  delivered	  10	  stand-­‐alone	  speeches	  at	  various	  events	  hosted	  by	  stakeholders	  (see	  box	  
5.3).	  	  These	  ranged	  from	  business	  leaders	  (CBI	  Wales;	  Institute	  of	  Directors)	  to	  voluntary	  
organisations	  (WCVA;	  CEMVO)	  and	  academia	  (Institute	  of	  Welsh	  Affairs).	  	  In	  addition,	  he	  
                                                
32	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  pg11-­‐12.	  
33	  ibid.	  p.109-­‐11.	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delivered	  four	  speeches	  at	  student	  events	  at	  Cardiff,	  Swansea,	  Aberystwyth	  and	  Bangor	  
Universities,	   and	   one	   at	   the	   Workers’	   Educational	   Association	   event	   in	   Llanelli	   which	  
preceded	   lengthier,	  wider	   discussions	   on	   devolution	   and	   the	   implications	   of	  moving	   to	  
Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  
	  
Box	  5.4:	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  Stakeholder	  Presentation	  and	  Discussion	  Events34	  
	  
	  
• National	  Eisteddfod	  Q&A,	  Cardiff	  (Aug	  2008)	  
• Carmarthenshire	  Partnership	  Annual	  Forum,	  Llanelli	  (Sept	  2008)	  
• Public	  Affairs	  Cymru,	  Cardiff	  (Sept	  2008)	  
• Pembrokeshire	  Local	  Community	  Event,	  Haverfordwest	  (Sept	  2008)	  
• Caernarfon	  Community	  and	  Voluntary	  Group,	  Caernarfon	  (Oct	  2008)	  
• “Understanding	  Modern	  Government”	  Seminar	  1,	  Cardiff	  (Nov	  2008)	  
• Royal	  Welsh	  Winter	  Fair,	  Builth	  Wells	  (Dec	  2008)	  
• 4	  WCVA	  policy	  events,	  Cwmbran,	  Carmarthen,	  Llandrindod	  Wells,	  Rhyl	  (Jan	  2009)	  
• Cardiff	  University	  event	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• Workers’	  Educational	  Association	  event,	  Llanelli	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• Swansea	  University	  event	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• Aberystwyth	  University	  event	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• Bangor	  University	  event	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• One	  Voice	  Wales	  NEC	  meeting,	  Newtown	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• “Understanding	  Modern	  Government”	  Seminar	  2,	  Cardiff	  (Mar	  2009)	  
• Funky	  Dragon	  Grand	  Council,	  Carmarthenshire	  (Apr	  2009)	  
• Institute	  of	  Welsh	  Affairs	  conference,	  Cardiff	  (Apr	  2009)	  
• Cyswllt	  event,	  Cardiff	  (May	  2009)	  
• Council	  for	  Education	  and	  World	  Citizenship	  event,	  Cardiff	  (May	  2009)	  
• Urdd	  Gobaith	  Cymru	  Eisteddfod	  Q&A,	  Cardiff	  (May	  2009)	  
• Bevan	  Foundation	  conference,	  Cardiff	  (June	  2009)	  
	  
	  
In	  total,	  there	  were	  40	  events	  organised	  by	  or	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Welsh	  civic	  society	  at	  
which	  members	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention’s	  Executive	  Committee	  gave	  presentations	  or	  
speeches,	  engaged	  in	  discussions	  or	  question	  and	  answer	  sessions	  at,	  or	  simply	  attended	  
to	  draw	  attention	   to	   the	  consultation	  process.	   	   In	  addition,	  21	  separate	  organisations	  –	  
including	   the	   Football	   Association	   of	   Wales,	   the	   Welsh	   Rugby	   Union,	   the	   Welsh	   Local	  
                                                
34	  ibid.	  p.109-­‐11.	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Government	  Association	  and	  the	  NFU	  –	  supported	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  by	  publishing	  
articles	  within	   their	   newsletters	   and	   on	   their	  websites,	   sending	   information	   leaflets	   on	  
the	   Convention	   to	   their	   members	   or	   otherwise	   promoting	   the	   Convention’s	   work.	   	   In	  
addition,	  Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  Parry	  met	  with	  representatives	  of	  each	  local	  authority	  in	  Wales,	  
with	  the	  express	  aim	  of	  obtaining	  views	  from	  all	  over	  the	  country.35	  
	  
Public	  Events	  
Engagement	   with	   stakeholders	   was	   only	   part	   of	   the	   All	   Wales	   Convention’s	   remit	  
however,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  concern	  among	  some	  involved	  with	  the	  process	  that,	  if	  it	  was	  
to	  do	  the	  job	  it	  had	  been	  asked	  to	  do,	  	  
	  
it	  was	  critical	  that	  we	  moved	  beyond	  the	  political	  actors	  –	  those	  
members	   of	   policy	   processes,	   the	   people	   and	   organisations	  
always	   involved	   –	   because	   I	   think	   there	   is	   too	  much	  of	   that	   in	  
Welsh	   politics.	   	   And	   there	   is	   a	   feeling	   that	   political	   elites	   are	  
apart	   from	   the	  Welsh	   population...	   so	   we	   needed	   to	   take	   the	  
process	  to	  the	  people.	  36	  	  	  
	  
There	  was	  concern	  too	  that,	  while	  stakeholders	  could	  help	  the	  Convention	  to	  disseminate	  
information	  on	  devolution	  and	  to	  promote	  its	  work,	  when	  the	  referendum	  came	  around,	  
it	  was	  the	  Welsh	  population	  who	  would	  have	  to	  deliver	  their	  votes	  in	  order	  for	  the	  law-­‐
making	  powers	  to	  be	  delivered.	   	  For	  that	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  they	  had	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  the	  
consultation	   process,	   a	   task	  which	  would	   not	   prove	   easy	   for	   the	  All	  Wales	   Convention,	  
and	  one	  which	  required	  some	  creative	  –	  and	  often	  unconventional	  –	  thinking.	  
	  
The	   Convention	   devised	   a	   six-­‐month	   programme,	   comprising	   four	   different	   types	   of	  
public	  event	  and	  running	  from	  January	  until	  June	  2009	  –	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  
                                                
35	  ibid.	  p.112.	  
36	  Interview	  with	  Rob	  Humphrey	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (July	  2010)	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Convention	   process	   and	   almost	   immediately	   prior	   to	   the	   Executive	   Committee’s	   final	  
report.	  	  They	  held	  23	  separate	  events	  in	  that	  six	  month	  period	  and	  engaged	  1,700	  people	  
in	  discussions	  about	  devolution.37	  	  The	  Convention	  held	  9	  Discussion	  Group	  events	  in	  total	  
in	  venues	  across	  Wales.	  	  These	  began	  with	  a	  presentation	  from	  an	  Executive	  Committee	  
member	   to	   set	   the	   context	   of	   debate,	   which	   was	   then	   followed	   by	   smaller,	   group	  
discussions	   whereby	  members	   of	   the	   public	   could	   contribute	   both	   through	   verbal	   and	  
written	  means.	  	  Attendance	  at	  these	  events	  varied,	  from	  the	  17	  who	  attended	  the	  event	  
at	  Pontypridd	  Rugby	  Club	  to	  the	  96	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  discussion	  at	  the	  Quins	  Club	  
event	   in	  Carmarthen	  –	   though	  many	  of	   the	  attendances	  were	  at	   the	   lower	  end	  of	   that	  
scale	  for	  these	  events,	  with	  fewer	  than	  30	  people	  attending	  events	  in	  Denbigh,	  Wrexham,	  
Barry,	  Abertillery	  and	  Newport.38	  
	  
Similar	  in	  style	  to	  the	  Discussion	  Group	  events,	  the	  Convention	  also	  held	  events	  based	  on	  
the	   BBC’s	   “Question	   Time”	   format,	   which	   began	   with	   a	   short	   presentation	   from	   a	  
Convention	  member	  and	  subsequently	  saw	  a	  panel	  of	  politicians,	  councillors,	  academics	  
and	   local	   business	   people,	   as	   well	   as	   Convention	   representatives,	   answering	   questions	  
from	   the	   audience	   on	   the	   devolution	   debate.	   	   There	   were	   8	   of	   these	   events	   held	   in	  
community	   centres,	   theatres,	   and	   schools	   (and	   even,	   in	   one	   case,	   a	   stadium)	   across	  
Wales,	   with	   Sir	   Emyr	   Jones	   Parry	   on	   the	   panel	   at	   each	   event.	   	   He	  was	   joined	   by	   local	  
representatives,	  from	  ministers	  and	  university	  employees	  at	  the	  event	  in	  Anglesey	  to	  MPs	  
and	   businesspeople	   at	   events	   in	   Mold	   and	  Monmouth.	   	   Generally,	   these	   events	   were	  
better	  attended	  than	  the	  Discussion	  Groups,	  ranging	  from	  the	  45	  who	  attended	  the	  event	  
in	  Newtown	  to	  the	  170	  at	  the	  event	  at	  Cardiff	  City	  Hall.	  
                                                
37	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.113.	  
38	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.113.	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Box	  5.5:	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  Public	  Events39	  
	  
	  
Discussion	  Groups	  (9)	  
Port	   Talbot;	   Llandudo;	   Carmarthen;	   Pontypridd;	   Denbigh;	  
Wrexham;	  Barry;	  Abertillery;	  Newport	  
	  
Question	  Time	  (8)	  
Newborough;	   Aberystwyth;	   Swansea;	   Newtown;	   Cwmbran;	  
Mold;	  Monmouth;	  Cardiff	  
	  
Roadshow	  (5)	  
Bridgend;	  Caerphilly;	  Bangor;	  Haverfordwest;	  Cardiff	  
	  




The	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   Roadshow	   events	   were	   very	   different	   in	   nature	   to	   the	  
Discussion	  Groups	   and	  Question	   Time	   events.	   	  On	   five	   occasions,	   Executive	   Committee	  
members	  set	  up	  stalls	  in	  shopping	  centres,	  farmers'	  markets	  and	  busy	  shopping	  streets	  to	  	  
take	   the	   discussion	   directly	   to	   the	   people.	   	   Instead	   of	   inviting	   participants	   to	   attend	  
potentially	   lengthy	   meetings,	   the	   Convention	   simply	   asked	   shoppers	   to	   take	   a	   few	  
minutes	   out	   from	   their	   shopping	   to	   complete	   surveys	   and	   to	   engage	  with	   the	   debate.	  	  
Naturally,	   participation	   rates	   at	   these	   events	   was	   higher	   than	   at	   the	   arranged	   events,	  
since	  there	  was	  less	  of	  an	  “opt-­‐in”	  arrangement	  involved	  in	  participation	  in	  the	  Roadshow	  
events,	   and	   this	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   number	   of	   contributions	   received	   at	   these	   events	   –	  
with	  over	  100	  participants	  recording	  views	  at	  each	  event.	  The	  Convention	  recognised	  that	  
work	  and	  family	  commitments	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  some	  members	  of	  the	  populace	  
being	  unable	  to	  attend	  events	  at	  certain	  times,	  and	  that	  events	  in	  more	  formal	  settings	  –	  
like	  the	  Question	  Time	  events	  –	  could	  have	  proved	  intimidating	  to	  potential	  contributors.	  	  
                                                
39	  ibid.	  p.114-­‐16.	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This	   led	   the	  Executive	  Committee	   to	  make	  use	  of	   the	  Roadshow	  events	   –	   and,	   the	   last	  
type	   of	   event,	   a	   Family	   Day	   held	   in	  Merthyr	   Tydfil,	   which	   provided	   a	   crèche	   facility	   to	  
allow	   those	   with	   young	   families	   to	   join	   the	   debate.	   	   This	   was	   intended	   to	   encourage	  
people	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  debate	  in	  a	  more	  leisurely	  environment,	  especially	  those	  who	  
found	  attending	  the	  other	  events	  impractical.	  	  	  
	  
In	  total,	  during	  the	  public	  events	  phase,	  the	  Convention	  engaged	  with	  over	  1,700	  people.	  	  
As	   a	   proportion	   of	   the	  Welsh	   electorate	   (2.3m)	   this	   is	   a	   relatively	   small	   number,	   and	  
critics	   argued	   that	   this	   fell	  well	   below	  what	  was	  expected	  of	   the	  Convention.	   	  Michelle	  
Matheron,	  of	  the	  WCVA	  put	  it	  most	  succinctly:	  
	  
The	   All	   Wales	   Convention’s	   remit	   was	   for	   all	   Wales	   –	   and	   to	  
inform	  –	  and	  when	  you	  take	  it	   like	  that,	   it	  has	  clearly	  not	  done	  
this.40	  
	  
However,	  she	  was	  quick	  to	  qualify	  this	  criticism:	  
	  
But	   there	   are	   reasons	   for	   this	   –	   it	   is	   hugely	   difficult	   to	   do.	  	  
Communication	   links,	   transport	   links,	   the	   media	   and	   the	  
language	  issue	  –	  they	  all	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  reach	  people...	  The	  
All	   Wales	   Convention’s	   Executive	   was	   very	   good	   –	   they	   didn’t	  
have	   an	   easy	   job...	   but	   meeting	   people	   in	   shopping	   centres	  
worked	  well,	   so	   too	   did	  meeting	  with	   stakeholders	   and	   taking	  
evidence	  from	  them.41	  
	  
Indeed,	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee	  recognised	  this	  themselves.	  	  Sally	  
Hyman	  picked	  up	  on	  both	  the	  geographic	  and	  media-­‐related	  issues:	  
	  
Most	   of	   the	   meetings	   were	   in	   South	   Wales,	   but	   that	   is	  
predominantly	   where	   the	   population	   is,	   so	   that	   was	   to	   be	  
                                                
40	  Interview	  with	  Michelle	  Matheron	  (WCVA)	  (June	  2010).	  
41	  ibid.	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expected.	   	   For	   our	   purposes,	   the	   Convention	   had	   to	   be	   all-­‐
encompassing,	  but	  again	  we	  hadn’t	  realised	  that	  the	  media	  was	  
so	   English-­‐based	   until	   we	   were	   too	   far	   into	   the	   process	   to	  
change	  how	  we	  could	  get	  our	  message	  across.42	  
	  
Politicians	  were	  also	  quick	  to	   identify	  the	  difficulties	   in	  travelling	  around	  Wales.	   	  Gareth	  
Jones	  AM	  noted	  that:	  
	  
There	   is	   sadly	   a	   lot	   lacking	   in	   the	  way	   of	   transport	   systems	   in	  
Wales.	   	  There	  are	  plenty	  places	   that	   remain	   remote	  because	   it	  
suited	   Wales’	   natural	   resources	   and	   industrial	   change	   –	   in	  
particular,	   the	   coal	   mines	   in	   both	   North	   and	   South	  Wales	   are	  
well-­‐connected	  but	  not	  much	  is	  in	  between.	  	  We	  must	  overcome	  
the	   North/South	   divide	   in	  Wales,	   but	  we	  must	   also	   be	   realists	  
about	  it.43	  
	  	  
It	   appears	   that	   public	   engagement	   in	   the	   Convention	   process	   was	   limited	   by	   several	  
issues	   –	   as	   identified	   in	   the	  passage	   above.	   	  However,	   the	  Convention	  was	   still	   able	   to	  
produce	  a	  full	  report	  based	  predominantly	  upon	  the	  formal	  evidence	  gathering	  sessions.	  
	  
Formal	  Evidence-­‐Gathering	  
This	  evidence	  was	  gathered	   in	   three	  ways.	   	  Firstly,	   the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  opened	   its	  
website	   to	   contributions,	  providing	  an	  online	   form	  which	  allowed	  visitors	   to	   the	   site	   to	  
engage	   in	  the	  discussion	  –	  and	   it	  did	  so,	  as	   in	  each	  of	   the	  Convention’s	   forums,	   in	  both	  
English	   and	  Welsh.	   	   This	   allowed	   the	  Convention	   to	   target	   a	   slightly	   different	   audience	  
than	  it	  had	  when	  inviting	  oral	  evidence.	  	  From	  the	  website	  itself,	  the	  Convention	  received	  
392	   separate	   contributions,	   with	   the	   names	   of	   all	   of	   those	   contributing	   through	   this	  
means	  appearing	   in	  Annex	   F	  of	   their	   final	   report.44	   	  While	   this	  was	  a	  useful	   exercise	   in	  
                                                
42	  Interview	  with	  Sally	  Hyman	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June	  2010).	  
43	  Interview	  with	  Gareth	  Jones	  (Plaid	  Cymru	  AM)	  (June	  2010).	  
44	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  pg122-­‐5.	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engaging	   members	   of	   the	   public	   in	   debate,	   the	   number	   of	   anonymous	   contributions	  
limited	   their	   usefulness	   in	   demonstrating	   that	   the	   website	   had	   engaged	   a	   widespread	  
cross-­‐section	   of	   the	  Welsh	   population.	   	   Of	   the	   392	   contributions	   to	   the	   site,	   46	   were	  
labelled	  “Anonymous”	  –	  12%	  of	  the	  total	  –	  with	  several	  more	  individuals	   identified	  only	  
by	  their	  initials	  or	  first	  names.	  	  Nevertheless,	  online	  engagement	  with	  the	  discussion	  did	  
provide	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  with	  a	  collection	  of	  widely	  varying	  views.	  	  Boyd	  Williams	  
of	  Fishguard	  complained	  that:	  
	  
The	  current	  LCO	  system	  of	  transferring	  legislative	  competence	  to	  
the	   National	   Assembly	   is	   hopelessly	   slow	   and	   inefficient.	   In	   a	  
nutshell,	  we	  need	  exactly	  the	  same	  devolution	  deal	  as	  Scotland	  
and	  nothing	  less,	  and	  we	  already	  needed	  it	  10	  years	  ago.45	  
	  
Ed	  in	  South	  Wales	  wanted	  to	  discuss	  abandoning	  the	  whole	  devolution	  project:	  
	  
The	  question	  itself	  demonstrates	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  this	  whole	  
process.	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  hear	  any	  argument	  as	  to	  why	  transferring	  
a	  specific	   law	  making	  power	   to	   the	  assembly	   is	  needed.	  To	  my	  
mind,	  we	   should	  not	  be	   transferring	  additional	   powers	   just	   for	  
the	   sake	   of	   it,	   particularly	   given	   the	   huge	   cost	   of	   running	   the	  
Assembly	   that	   we	   taxpayers	   are	   already	   saddled	   with.	   We	  
should	   be	   trying	   to	   reduce	  waste	   and	   bureaucracy	   in	   times	   of	  
recession,	  not	  increase	  it...46	  
	  
And	  while	  Ed’s	   contribution	  was	  over	  100	  words	   long,	  Adam	  Daniels	   in	  Cardiff	   kept	  his	  
response	  to	  the	  question	  of	  when	  the	  powers	  should	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  Assembly	  as	  
short	  as	  he	  could:	  
	  
As	  soon	  as	  possible,	  all	  at	  once.47	  
	  
                                                






There	  were	  even	  some	  who	  wanted	  to	  go	  further,	  with	  Ian	  Seaton	  in	  Swansea	  beginning	  
his	  contribution:	  
	  
I	   think	   that	   the	   excellent	   report	   of	   Lord	   Richard	   on	   the	   future	  
constitutional	   set	   up	   in	   Wales	   should	   be	   implemented	   in	   full.	  	  
The	   current	   arrangements	   are	   barely	   understandable	   even	   by	  
those	   who	   drew	   them	   up	   and	   have	   certainly	   left	   the	   general	  
public	  in	  Wales	  confused...48	  
	  
The	  website	   contributions	   provided	   the	   Executive	   Committee	  with	   evidence,	   if	   it	   were	  
required,	   that	   there	   was	   little	   agreement	   among	   the	   Welsh	   public	   as	   to	   the	   future	  
direction	  of	  devolution	  in	  Wales.	  	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  online	  debate,	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  invited	  written	  evidence	  to	  be	  
submitted.	   	   This	   could	   be	   done	   in	   two	   ways.	   	   Firstly,	   the	   Convention	   devised	   a	  
questionnaire	  on	   the	  debate	  which	  was	  completed	  by	  1,925	  people	  –	  predominately	  at	  
events	  run	  by	  or	  for	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  (events	  like	  the	  shopping	  centre	  Roadshows	  
were	  particularly	  useful	  for	  providing	  completion	  of	  these	  questionnaires).	  	  Secondly,	  the	  
Convention	  published	  consultation	  questions	  which	  were	  aimed	  at	  aiding	  contributors	  in	  
focusing	   their	   submissions	   (the	   list	   of	   questions	   was	   also	   published	   as	   Annex	   E	   in	   the	  
Convention’s	  final	  report).	  	  While	  the	  Convention	  was	  keen	  to	  ascertain	  people’s	  views	  on	  
the	  specific	  questions	  they	  had	  asked,	  they	  accepted	  all	  contributions	  which	  were	  within	  
the	  remit	  of	   the	  consultation.	   	  This	   resulted	   in	  written	  evidence	  from	  608	  organisations	  
and	   individual	   members	   of	   the	   public,	   ranging	   from	   political	   elites	   (Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government	  ministers	  and	  officials)	  and	  political	  parties	   to	   interested	  stakeholders	   (the	  
British	   Medical	   Association,	   Federation	   of	   Small	   Businesses	   and	   the	   TUC	   Cymru)	   and	  




individuals	   with	   no	   official	   affiliations.49	   	   In	   some	   instances,	   the	   written	   contributions	  
from	  members	   of	   the	   public	  mirrored	   the	  quality	   and	   length	  of	   contributions	   from	   the	  
online	   sources	   –	   most	   were	   deliberately	   short	   and	   to	   the	   point.	   	   However,	   some	  
contributions	  –	   from	  academics	  writing	  as	   individuals	  and	  not	   through	   their	   institutions	  
for	  example	  –	  were	  much	  more	  detailed,	  and	  provided	  evidence	  of	  extensive	  research	  on	  
the	  issue.50	  	  	  
	  
Contributions	   from	   political	   parties	   were	   typically	   reflective	   of	   the	   respective	   parties’	  
position	  on	  the	  devolution	  issue.	  	  The	  Welsh	  Liberal	  Democrats’	  submission	  warned	  that:	  
	  
the	   current	   devolution	   settlement	   is	   overly	   complex,	   poorly	  
understood	  and	  unresponsive.51	  
	  
In	  addition,	  they	  argued	  for	  fiscal	  powers	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  in	  a	  similar	  
model	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament:	  
	  
We	   envisage	   moves,	   in	   the	   long-­‐term,	   towards	   a	   legislative	  
settlement	   such	   as	   that	   which	   Scotland	   enjoys,	   where	   the	  
National	   Assembly	   has	   legislative	   competence	   over	   all	   areas	  
that	   are	   not	   specifically	   excepted.	   	   We	   believe	   that	   a	   good	  
model	  for	  this	  would	  be	  Schedule	  5	  of	  the	  Scotland	  Act,	  1998.52	  
	  
Plaid	   Cymru’s	   parliamentary	   group	   titled	   their	   contribution	   “Time	   for	   a	   Proper	  
Parliament?”	   and	   also	   compared	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales	   with	  
                                                
49	  ibid.	  p.13.	  
50	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  of	  the	  contribution	  from	  Professor	  Laura	  McAllister	  and	  Diana	  Stirbu,	  of	  the	  
University	  of	  Liverpool,	  which	  stretched	  to	  a	  5,000	  word	  article	  comparing	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  
with	  other	  European	  regional	  institutions.	  	  Accessed	  on	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  website	  at:	  
http://allwalesconvention.org/getinformed/evidence/writtenevidence/public/April09/?lang=en	  
51	  Welsh	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  Submission	  to	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  p7.	  	  Accessed	  on	  the	  All	  Wales	  
Convention	  website	  at:	  
http://allwalesconvention.org/getinformed/evidence/writtenevidence/political/?lang=en	  
52	  ibid.	  p.7-­‐8.	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those	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament,	   arguing	   that,	   given	   the	   Scotland	   Act	   provided	   clear	  
evidence	  of	  the	  powers	  which	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  reserved,	  	  	  	  
	  
The	   establishment	   of	   competence	   in	   the	   Scottish	   context	  
therefore	   is	   relatively	   straightforward,	   whereas	   the	   Welsh	  
context	  is	  far	  from	  being	  so.53	  
	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   held	   13	   formal	   evidence	   gathering	   sessions	   to	   hear	  
evidence	  from	  76	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  across	  Wales.54	  	  Of	  the	  13	  sessions,	  7	  were	  
held	  in	  Cardiff	  (see	  box	  5.6)	  which	  did	  nothing	  to	  aid	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  Convention	  
was	  an	  elite-­‐based,	  South	  Wales-­‐centric	  consultation.	  	  	  
Box	  5.6:	  	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  Oral	  Evidence	  Gathering	  Sessions55	  
 
	  
• Cardiff	  1	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• Caernarfon	  (Feb	  2009)	  
• Carmarthen	  (Mar	  2009)	  
• Swansea	  (Mar	  2009)	  
• Cardiff	  2	  (Mar	  2009)	  
• Newport	  (Apr	  2009)	  
• Wrexham	  (Apr	  2009)	  
• Cardiff	  3	  (May	  2009)	  
• Cardiff	  4	  (June	  2009)	  
• Cardiff	  5	  (June	  2009)	  
• Cardiff	  6	  (June	  2009)	  
• Llandrindod	  Wells	  (June	  2009)	  
• Cardiff	  7	  (June	  2009)	  
	  
	  
NFU	  Cymru’s	  Assembly	  Advisor,	  Huw	  Rhys	  Thomas	  noted	  this	  was	  particularly	  noticeable	  
within	  his	  organisation,	  arguing	  that:	  	  
                                                
53	  Plaid	  Cymru	  Parliamentary	  Group,	  Official	  Submission	  from	  the	  Plaid	  Cymru	  Parliamentary	  Group	  to	  the	  
All	  Wales	  Convention,	  p.6.	  	  Accessed	  on	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  website	  at:	  
http://allwalesconvention.org/getinformed/evidence/writtenevidence/political/?lang=en	  
54	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.13.	  




it	  was	  hard	  to	  get	  farmers	  to	  articulate	  their	  views	  on	  something	  
like	   the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  –	  most	  held	   the	  view	  that	   it	  was	  
far	   removed	   from	   what	   they	   were	   doing,	   and	   wasn’t	   that	  
important	  to	  them.56	  	  	  
	  
This	  perception	  provided	  some	  evidence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Convention	  had	  difficulty	  in	  
fulfilling	   the	   second	   of	   their	   objectives	   –	   to	   “facilitate	   and	   stimulate	   a	   widespread,	  
thorough	   and	   participative	   consultation	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   Welsh	   society	   on	   the	   issue	   of	  
primary	   law-­‐making	   powers”.	   	   Indeed,	   Sally	   Hyman,	   of	   the	   Executive	   Committee	   itself	  
argued:	  
	  
I’d	   go	   as	   far	   as	   saying	   that	   the	   one	   failing	   of	   the	   All	   Wales	  
Convention	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  communication	  with	  the	  populace.57	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  these	  sessions	  proved	  invaluable	  for	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  by	  providing	  
access	  to	  individuals	  who	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  LCO	  process	  within	  the	  
National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales	  and	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  –	   including	  the	  First	  
Minister	   and	   Deputy	   First	   Minister,	   members	   of	   the	   Assembly	   Commission	   and	   civil	  
service,	  and	  politicians	  from	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and	  Labour.	  	  In	  addition,	  
the	   Executive	   Committee	   invited	   evidence	   from	   organisations	  which	   had	   experience	   of	  
working	  with	   the	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales,	   including	  the	  Association	  of	  Chief	  Police	  
Officers	   (ACPO),	   NFU	   Cymru,	   CBI	   Cymru	   and	   the	   Wales	   Council	   for	   Voluntary	   Action	  
(WCVA),	   as	   well	   as	   dedicating	   a	   session	   to	   taking	   evidence	   from	  Welsh	  media	   bodies,	  
including	  BBC	  Wales,	  Real	  Radio	  and	  the	  Western	  Mail.58	  	  
	  
                                                
56	  Interview	  with	  Huw	  Rhys	  Thomas	  (Assembly	  Advisor,	  NFU	  Cymru)	  (July	  2010).	  
57	  Interview	  with	  Sally	  Hyman	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June	  2010).	  




The	  first	  distinct	  piece	  of	  information	  which	  was	  discerned	  by	  the	  Convention	  was	  that	  a	  
reluctance	   to	   accept	   devolution	   –	   as	  witnessed	  by	   the	   narrow	  majority	   in	   favour	   of	   an	  
elected	   Assembly	   in	   the	   1997	   referendum	   –	   remained	   prevalent	   among	   the	   general	  
population.	  	  Though	  members	  of	  the	  public	  could	  identify	  some	  policies	  delivered	  by	  the	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  instinctively	  they	  were	  critical	  of	  devolution	  and	  sceptical	  of	  
its	   benefits.	   	   The	   Convention	   was	   quick	   to	   recognise	   that	   difficulties	   in	   effective	  
communication	  across	  Wales	  contributed	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  public	  understanding	  of	  devolution.	  	  
However,	  they	  saw	  a	  bigger	  problem	  in	  the	  complexity	  of	  devolution	  itself.59	  In	  short,	  the	  
public	   had	   difficulty	   identifying	   the	   benefits	   of	   devolution	   in	   part	   because	   the	   process	  
itself	  was	  not	  well	  understood.	  
	  
Similarly,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   All	   Wales	   Convention	  was	   established	   to	   consult	   upon	   an	  
“arcane	  issue”	  about	  the	  “minutia	  of	  the	  law-­‐making	  process”60	  was	  identified	  as	  part	  of	  
its	  problem	  in	  engaging	  the	  wider	  Welsh	  population	  in	  the	  devolution	  debate.	  	  During	  the	  
oral	  evidence	  gathering	  sessions,	  Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  Parry	  repeatedly	  invited	  respondents	  to	  
consider	   the	  “Mrs	   Jones	  Test”.61	   	  This	  was	   the	  Convention’s	  view	  that	   the	  Welsh	  public	  
were	  interested	  in	  the	  political	  process	  only	  in	  as	  far	  as	  they	  could	  identify	  how	  it	  affected	  
their	  interests.	  	  Indeed,	  their	  interest	  in	  the	  process	  was	  only	  concerned	  with	  the	  specific	  
policy	   outcomes	   arising	   from	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   	   How	   those	   decisions	   were	  
made	   were	   of	   little	   concern	   to	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	   population	   –	   and	   this,	   as	   the	  
                                                
59	  ibid.	  p.23-­‐4.	  
60	  Interview	  with	  Harry	  Ludgate	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June	  2010).	  	  This	  point	  was	  
also	  made	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Huw	  Rhys	  Thomas	  (Assembly	  Advisor,	  NFU	  Cymru)	  (July	  2010).	  
61	  In	  interviewing	  Adam	  Price	  MP,	  Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  Parry	  placed	  Mrs	  Jones	  in	  Bon-­‐y-­‐maen,	  while	  in	  addressing	  
Kirsty	  Williams	  AM,	  Mrs	  Jones	  was	  said	  to	  be	  from	  Froncysyllte.	  	  The	  point	  was	  that	  there	  was	  a	  Mrs	  Jones	  
in	  every	  Welsh	  village	  and	  town	  represented	  by	  the	  caricature.	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Executive	   Committee	   pointed	   out	   in	   these	   evidence	   gathering	   sessions,	   would	   be	   a	  
problem	  for	  any	  subsequent	  referendum	  campaign.	  
	  
This	  was	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  and	  
the	   system	   of	   Legislative	   Competence	   Orders	   which	   ensued.	   	   The	   Convention	   took	  
substantial	  evidence	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  The	  broad	  consensus	  among	  those	  who	  were	  actively	  
involved	  in	  the	  processes	  –	  the	  First	  Minister,	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government,	  Assembly	  
Commission	   and	   the	   Welsh	   Affairs	   Committee	   –	   was	   that	   though	   the	   system	   was	  
complex,	   through	  practise	   it	  was	  working	  more	  efficiently.62	  However,	   further	  evidence	  
from	  a	  variety	  of	   sources	  suggested	  disquiet	  with	   the	  process.	   	   Indeed,	  one	  member	  of	  
the	  public	  went	  as	  far	  as	  arguing:	  
	  
If	   we	   judge	   it	   against	   the	   criteria	   of	   openness,	   simplicity	   and	  
value	  for	  money	  it	  fails	  on	  all	  three.	   	   It	   is	  not	  a	  model	  for	  good	  
governance.63	  
	  
This	   is	   a	   view	   shared	  by	  many	   involved	   in	   the	  political	   process	   in	  Wales.	   	   In	   interviews	  
with	  the	  author,	  the	  perceived	  success	  of	  the	  LCO	  system	  amongst	  those	  who	  had	  been	  
involved	   directly	   with	   it	   was	   accepted	   with	   the	   caveat	   that	   the	   only	   way	   reason	   had	  
worked	  well	  to	  that	  point	  was	  because	  there	  was	  the	  political	  will	  in	  both	  Cardiff	  Bay	  and	  
Westminster	  to	  make	  it	  work.	  	  Were	  the	  two	  to	  diverge	  –	  as	  they	  did	  after	  the	  UK	  General	  
Election	  in	  2010	  –	  then	  the	  complications	  of	  the	  process	  would	  be	  much	  more	  apparent	  
and	  the	  process	  manipulated	  for	  political	  gain.64	   	   Indeed,	  there	  were	  signs	  that	  this	  was	  
occurring	  prior	  to	  the	  change	  in	  UK	  Government,	  with	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government’s	  
                                                
62	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.30.	  
63	  Written	  evidence	  of	  Michael	  Haggett,	  31	  January	  2009,	  p6,	  15.	  	  Accessed	  on	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  
website	  at:	  http://wales.gov.uk/docs/awc/publications/090219michaelhaggettfeben.pdf	  
64	  Interview	  with	  Mr	  Harry	  Ludgate	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June	  2010).	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LCO	  pertaining	  to	  Housing	  policy	  –	  sent	  to	  Westminster	  with	  the	  express	  support	  of	  the	  
National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   and,	   through	   consultation,	   the	   wider	   Welsh	   public	   and	  
interested	  stakeholders	  –	  returned	  without	  permission	  to	  legislate.65	  	  	  
	  
The	  evidence	  from	  representatives	  of	  political	  parties,	  though	  subsequently	  in	  agreement	  
(at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  Assembly	  at	   least)	   about	   the	  desirability	  of	  moving	   to	  Part	  4	  of	   the	  
Government	   of	   Wales	   Act	   2006,	   was	   focused	   on	   several	   different	   issues.	   	   Giving	   oral	  
evidence,	  Nick	  Ainger,	   then	  Labour	  MP	   for	  Carmarthen	  West	  and	  South	  Pembrokeshire	  
and	  formerly	  a	  Minister	  in	  the	  Wales	  Office,	  argued	  about	  the	  need	  for	  unanimity	  among	  
the	   parties	   in	   support	   of	   the	   referendum	   –	   and	   indeed	  within	   each	   party	   –	   as	   well	   as	  
confidence	  in	  politicians,	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  moving	  to	  a	  referendum:	  
	  
[T]he	   lessons	  that	  you	  learn	  from	  the	  two	  referendums	  are	  you	  
certainly	  need	   the	  major	  parties	  united,	   you	  certainly	  need	   the	  
Labour	  Party	  having	  a	  settled	  view	  of	  the	  policy,	  and	  you	  need	  I	  
think	   as	  well	   something	  which	  we	   are	   lacking	   at	   the	  moment,	  
which	   is	   confidence	   in	   politicians,	   confidence	   in	   the	   political	  
system.	  	  We	  do	  not	  have	  that	  at	  the	  moment.66	  
	  
	  
He	  also	  reaffirmed	  the	  view	  of	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales	  Peter	  Hain	  that	  moving	  
too	   quickly	   towards	   a	   referendum	   could	   be	   disastrous	   for	   devolution	   if	   there	   was	   a	  
negative	   response.67	   	   Peter	   Hain	   himself	   wrote	   to	   Sir	   Emyr	   Jones	   Parry	   arguing	   that	  
moving	  towards	  a	  referendum	  quickly	  –	  before	  the	  LCO	  system	  had	  really	  bedded	  in	  and	  
so	   soon	   after	   the	   UK	   Government	   had	   passed	   its	   last	   legislation	   pertaining	   to	   the	  
devolution	  settlement	  in	  Wales,	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  –	  would	  show	  “bad	  
                                                
65	  Interview	  with	  Janet	  Ryder	  (Plaid	  Cymru	  AM	  and	  Chair	  of	  the	  Subordinate	  Legislation	  Committee	  in	  the	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales)	  (June	  2010).	  
66	  Nick	  Ainger,	  then	  Labour	  MP,	  oral	  evidence	  to	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  25	  June	  2009,	  accessed	  on	  the	  
All	  Wales	  Convention	  website	  at:	  http://wales.gov.uk/docs/awc/publications/090714nickaingeren.pdf	  
67	  Interview	  with	  Nick	  Ainger	  (then	  Labour	  MP)	  (March	  2010).	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faith”	   to	   the	   UK	   Parliament.	   	   Consequently,	   he	   felt	   that	  MPs	  would	   not	   be	  minded	   to	  
“trigger	  a	  referendum	  before	  or	  during	  2011”	  since	  they	  had	  only	  passed	  the	  2006	  Act	  on	  
the	   understanding	   that	   the	   LCO	   system	  would	   be	   in	   place	   for	   a	   considerable	   period	   of	  
time	  before	  moving	   to	  a	   referendum.	   	  Peter	  Hain	  went	   further	   in	  his	  evidence,	  arguing	  
that	  even	   if	   the	  UK	  Parliament	  agreed	   to	  move	   to	  a	   referendum,	   if	   it	   “were	  held	   today	  
[writing	  in	  October	  2009],	  it	  would	  be	  lost”.68	  
	  
All	  Wales	  Convention	  Recommendations	  
The	   Final	   Report	   of	   the	  All	  Wales	   Convention	   –	   a	   report	   which	   carried	   the	   unanimous	  
backing	  of	  its	  Executive	  Committee	  –	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  
in	   November	   2009.	   	   It	   contained	   broad	   recommendations	   in	   six	   areas.	   	   Firstly,	   the	  
Convention	  commended	  the	  progress	  made	  by	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  and	  the	  
UK	  Parliament	   in	   improving	  the	   level	  of	  scrutiny	   involved	  in	  the	  LCO	  process.	   	  However,	  
recommendations	  were	  made	  that,	  whether	  the	  LCO	  system	  remained	  in	  operation	  or	  the	  
move	  to	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  was	  completed,	  further	  work	  in	  this	  
area	  would	  be	  required	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  the	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  of	  Welsh	  legislation	  into	  line	  
with	   other	   legislatures	   in	   the	  UK.	   	   Secondly,	   the	   Convention	   reported	   a	   distinct	   lack	   of	  
understanding	   throughout	   the	   general	   public	   in	  Wales	   about	   the	   scope	   and	   impact	   of	  
devolution.	   	  Members	  of	   the	  Convention’s	   Executive	  Committee69	   and	  other	   interested	  
stakeholders70	  recognised	  the	  challenges	  of	  effective	  communication	  in	  Wales	  and	  noted	  
that	  the	  Convention	  itself	  had	  largely	  failed	  in	  this	  part	  of	  its	  remit	  –	  that	  is,	  in	  educating	  
                                                
68	  Peter	  Hain	  MP,	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales,	  letter	  to	  Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  Parry	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  
referendum,	  2	  October	  2009,	  and	  quoted	  in	  the	  final	  report	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit,	  p.94.	  
69	  Interviews	  with	  Sally	  Hyman	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June	  2010)	  and	  Harry	  Ludgate	  
(All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June	  2010).	  
70	  Interview	  with	  Michelle	  Matheron,	  (WCVA)	  (June	  2010).	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the	  public	  on	  devolution.	  	  The	  Convention	  recommended	  that	  more	  work	  also	  needed	  to	  
be	  undertaken	  in	  this	  area	  if	  devolution	  was	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Welsh	  political	  
landscape	  in	  a	  way	  it	  was	  not	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1997	  referendum	  victory.	  	  
Thirdly,	   and	   related	   to	   the	   perceived	   lack	   of	   public	   understanding	   of	   devolution,	   the	  
Convention	   recommended	   the	   continuation	   of	   a	   wide-­‐ranging	   public	   debate	   on	  
devolution.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  debate	  needed	  to	  involve	  the	  public	  and	  not	  simply	  political	  
elites	  –	  and,	  specifically,	  the	  disconnect	  between	  the	  public	  and	  the	  political	  elites	  –	  was	  
emphasised	  in	  interviews	  with	  the	  author.71	  	  	  
	  
Fourthly,	   and	   perhaps	   most	   importantly	   given	   it	   related	   directly	   to	   the	   Convention’s	  
remit,	  was	  the	  Convention’s	  recommendation	  that	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  
2006	  offered	  a	  “substantial	  advantage”72	  over	  the	  LCO	  system.	  This	  was	  a	  significant	  and	  
important	   recommendation,	   validating	   as	   it	   did	   the	   coalition’s	   own	   view	   that	   progress	  
towards	   Part	   4	   through	   a	   referendum	   was	   desirable	   (as	   set	   out	   in	   the	   One	   Wales	  
Agreement).	   	   In	  some	  respects,	  this	  outcome	  could	  have	  been	  predicted	  –	  a	  Convention	  
established	   to	   examine	   the	   arguments	   for	   moving	   to	   further	   legislative	   devolution	  
delivers	  a	   report	  which	  supports	   the	  views	  of	   those	  who	  established	   it	  and	  provided	   its	  
remit.	  	  However,	  this	  cynical	  view	  of	  the	  Convention	  has	  not	  gained	  any	  real	  traction	  for	  
several	  reasons:	  the	  selection	  of	  former	  UN	  diplomat,	  the	  widely	  respected	  Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  
Parry	   as	   its	   chair;	   the	   thoroughness	   with	   which	   evidence	   was	   collected	   during	   the	  
Convention	   process;	   and,	   crucially,	   the	   neutrality	   maintained	   by	   the	   Convention	  
throughout	   the	   process.	   	   Thus,	   though	   the	   final	   report	   did	   provide	   proponents	   of	  
                                                
71	  This	  was	  particularly	  evident	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Rob	  Humphrey	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  
Committee)	  (July	  2010).	  
72	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.98.	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devolution	  with	  the	  recommendation	  they	  had	  hoped	  for,	  it	  did	  so	  from	  an	  impartial	  and	  
unbiased	   perspective,	   guided	   only	   by	   the	   evidence	   collected.	   	   That	   neutral	   perspective	  
also	  leant	  the	  Convention’s	  fifth	  recommendation	  –	  that	  a	  ‘Yes’	  vote	  in	  a	  referendum	  was	  
obtainable	  but	  could	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  –	  more	  weight.	  	  Given	  the	  evidence	  collected	  by	  
the	  Convention	  (as	  outlined	  above)	  but	  particularly	  that	  the	  understanding	  of	  devolution	  
in	   Wales	   is	   still	   lacking,	   it	   was	   this	   recommendation	   which	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government	   took	  most	   careful	   note	   of.	   	   The	  All	  Wales	   Convention’s	   report	  made	   clear	  
that	   this	   judgement	   was	   relevant	   only	   to	   the	   period	   for	   which	   the	   Convention	   took	  
evidence	   and	   that	   in	   any	   referendum	  a	   confluence	  of	   factors	   combine	   to	   influence	   the	  
eventual	  outcome.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Convention	  concluded	  that	  it	  could	  be	  said	  with	  no	  certainty	  
that	   a	   ‘Yes’	   vote	   would	   be	   delivered.	   	   Finally,	   in	   terms	   of	   timescale,	   the	   Convention	  
recommended	  that	  if	  the	  original	  timetable	  for	  a	  referendum	  outlined	  in	  the	  One-­‐Wales	  
Agreement	  was	  to	  be	  adhered	  to	  (that	  is,	  that	  the	  referendum	  was	  to	  be	  held	  prior	  to	  the	  
dissolution	  of	  the	  2007-­‐2011	  session)	  then	  a	  decision	  on	  holding	  the	  referendum	  would	  
be	  required	  by	  June	  2010	  at	  the	  latest.	  	  This	  recommendation	  took	  into	  account	  the	  time	  
required	  by	   the	  Secretary	  of	   State	   for	  Wales	   to	   consult	  upon	   the	  potential	   referendum	  
question,	   for	   the	   Electoral	   Commission	   to	   itself	  make	   recommendations	   in	   this	   field	   as	  
well	   as	   designating	   actors	   on	   either	   side	   of	   the	   debate,	   and	   for	   a	   full	   and	   informative	  
campaign	  to	  take	  place.	  
	  
Impact	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  on	  Welsh	  politics	  
With	   the	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   recommending	   that	   a	   move	   to	   a	   referendum	   was	  
preferable,	   the	   Convention	   had	   a	   clear	   influence	   on	   the	  Welsh	   political	   agenda	   for	   the	  
following	  two	  years.	  	  It	  played	  a	  considerable	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  devolution	  debate,	  most	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prominently	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   Assembly	   itself,	   where	   the	   four	   parties	   represented	  
devised	  their	  individual	  and	  collective	  strategies	  to	  move	  towards	  and	  win	  a	  referendum	  
on	  the	  issue.	  
	  
For	  Labour	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  had	  been	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  
One	   Wales	   Agreement	   and	   one	   which	   their	   continued	   partnership	   depended	   upon.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Convention	  was	  central	   to	  the	  coalition	  negotiations	  –	  
without	  agreement	  on	  this	   issue	  there	  may	  have	  been	  no	  coalition	  at	  all.	   	  Plaid	  Cymru’s	  
Chief	  Executive,	  Dr	  Gwenllian	  Lansdown	  made	  the	  point	  that	  the	  Convention	  was	  a	  “red-­‐
line	   issue”	   for	   her	   party	   –	   a	   point	   underlined	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   negotiations	   as	   to	   the	  
wording	   of	   this	   section	   were	   conducted	   by	   Rhodri	   Morgan	   and	   Ieuan	   Wyn	   Jones	  
themselves.73	  	  Bethan	  Jenkins	  AM	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  the	  agreement,	  
and	  that	  it	  was	  needed	  to	  “gauge	  the	  views	  of	  the	  public”	  soon	  after	  the	  enacting	  of	  the	  
terms	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	   	  The	   latter	  also	  noted	  that	  Wales	  had	  not	  
gone	   through	   the	   process	   of	   public	   engagement	   prior	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  
National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   Scotland	   had	   with	   the	   Scottish	  
Constitutional	  Convention,	  and	  that	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  might	  fulfil	  a	  similar	  role.74	  	  	  
	  
For	  Labour	  –	  whose	  MPs	  had	  only	  passed	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  a	  year	  before	  the	  
coalition	  agreement	  was	  signed	  –	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  gave	  an	  opportunity	  to	  assess	  
the	  operation	  of	  the	  LCO	  system	  and	  how	  the	  arrangements	  would	  work	  in	  practise,	  and	  
to	   review	   how	   devolution	   had	   functioned	   in	   its	   first	   two	   terms.	   	   Primarily,	   however,	   it	  
bought	   the	   party	   some	   time	   to	   consider	   its	   strategy.	   This	   applied	   internally:	   how	   to	  
                                                
73	  Interview	  with	  Dr	  Gwenllian	  Lansdown	  (Plaid	  Cymru	  Chief	  Executive)	  (June	  2010).	  
74	  Interview	  with	  Bethan	  Jenkins	  (Plaid	  Cymru	  AM)	  (June	  2010).	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approach	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  referendum	  with	  Labour	  MPs,	  some	  of	  whom	  had	  only	  agreed	  to	  
the	   Government	   of	  Wales	   Act	   2006	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   provision	   for	   a	   referendum	  was	  
included,	   and	   whose	   expectation	   was	   that	   the	   referendum	   would	   not	   be	   in	   the	  
foreseeable	  future?	  	  
	  
The	  publication	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention’s	  report	  caused	  the	  constitutional	  tension	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  the	  coalition	  to	  bubble	  to	  the	  surface,	  and	  a	  governmental	  crisis	  ensued.	  	  The	  
issue	  which	  had	  the	  potential	   to	  bring	  the	  government	  down	  was	   instead	  resolved	  very	  
quickly.	   	   First	  Minister	   Rhodri	  Morgan	   and	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	  Wales	   Peter	   Hain	   on	  
behalf	  of	   the	  Labour	  party	  put	  out	  a	  statement	  about	   the	  recommendations,	  calling	   for	  
internal	  (Labour	  party)	  consultation	  and	  implying	  a	  lengthy	  exercise.	  	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  
timeframe	  agreed	  to	  in	  the	  One	  Wales	  coalition	  would	  not	  be	  met.	  	  Plaid	  immediately	  hit	  
the	   nuclear	   button,	   briefing	   that	   they	   were	   ready	   to	   bring	   down	   the	   government	   if	  
Labour’s	   statement	   was	   not	   retracted.75	   	   While	   Labour	   relented,	   and	  Morgan	   made	   a	  
statement	  which	  welcomed	   the	   recommendations,	   it	   did	   not	   quite	   go	   far	   enough,	   and	  
Plaid	   continued	   to	   press	   Labour	   to	   re-­‐affirm	   their	   commitment	   to	   the	   referendum	  
timeline	  as	  expressed	   in	   the	   coalition	  agreement.	   	  Morgan	  did	   so,	   and	  his	   successor	   as	  
First	  Minister	  and	  leader	  of	  Welsh	  Labour,	  Carwyn	  Jones,	  went	  further,	  and	  scheduled	  the	  
Assembly	  vote	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  referendum.	  	  This	  –	  albeit	  short	  –	  crisis	  in	  Welsh	  
coalition	   relations	  emphasised	   two	   things:	  one,	   that	  Plaid’s	   sole	   focus	   in	  office	  was	   the	  
constitutional	  question	  –	  it	  was	  why	  they	  had	  entered	  office	  with	  Labour	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  
and	  they	  were	  positive	  they	  were	  going	  to	  hold	  Labour	  to	  their	  commitment	  –	  and	  two,	  
that	   there	  was	  a	  clear	   fault	   line	  within	  Labour	   in	  Wales,	  between	  their	  Welsh	  MPs	  who	  
                                                
75	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  Wales	  Says	  Yes:	  Devolution	  and	  the	  2011	  Welsh	  Referendum,	  Cardiff,	  
University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2012,	  p.86-­‐7.	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had	  passed	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  but	  were	  reluctant	  to	  
move	   forward	   to	   a	   referendum	   on	   further	   powers,	   and	   their	   Assembly	   Members,	  
particularly	   those	   in	   government,	   who	   were	   generally	   more	   amenable	   to	   further	  
devolution.	  
	  
Evaluation	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  
The	  All	  Wales	  Convention’s	  remit	  suggested	  it	  was	  never	  intended	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  a	  Yes	  
campaign	  in	  any	  referendum	  on	  further	  powers	  which	  may	  have	  been	  forthcoming	  –	  and	  
the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  Convention	  throughout	  its	  period	  of	  active	  engagement	  was	  strongly	  
emphasised	  in	  interviews	  with	  the	  author.76	  	  However,	  the	  reasons	  for	  its	  establishment	  –	  
as	   a	   consultation	   with	   the	  Welsh	   population	   to	   discuss	   the	   potential	   move	   towards	   a	  
referendum	  –	  suggest	  otherwise.	  	  When	  governments	  control	  a	  referendum	  –	  the	  timing,	  
the	  question,	  the	  campaign	  for	  a	  positive	  result	  –	  they	  will	  “tend	  to	  use	  it	  only	  when	  they	  
expect	  to	  win”.77	   	  The	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government’s	  own	  One	  Wales	  Agreement	  made	  
clear	  the	  coalition’s	  intention	  to	  “proceed	  to	  a	  successful	  outcome	  of	  a	  referendum”	  and	  
that	   “the	   preparations	   for	   securing	   such	   a	   successful	   outcome	  will	   begin	   immediately”	  
with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention.78	  	  Indeed,	  as	  Alun	  Davies	  AM	  put	  it,	  
the	  All	  Wales	   Convention	  was	   “essentially	   a	   government	   consultation	  by	   two	  parties	   in	  
coalition	   to	   take	  us	   to	  a	  destination	  which	   is	  already	  known”79	  while	  comparisons	  were	  
made	  with	  the	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  latter	  was	  a	  bottom-­‐
                                                
76	  Members	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  Sally	  Hyman,	  Harry	  Ludgate	  and	  Rob	  Humphrey	  were	  particularly	  
keen	  to	  point	  out	  the	  Convention’s	  neutrality,	  while	  members	  of	  political	  parties	  (Plaid	  Cymru’s	  Gwenllian	  
Lansdown	  and	  Gareth	  Jones	  AM,	  	  and	  Liberal	  Democrat	  AM	  Jenny	  Randerson	  in	  particular)	  also	  noted	  their	  
respect	  for	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  process.	  	  Interviews	  June/	  July	  2010.	  
77	  Lijphart,	  A.	  Democracies:	  Patterns	  of	  majoritarian	  and	  consensus	  government	  in	  twenty-­‐one	  countries,	  
New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1984,	  p.203.	  
78	  Labour	  Party	  Wales	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	  p.6.	  	  
79	  Interview	  with	  Alun	  Davies	  (Labour	  AM)	  (July	  2010).	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up	  process,	  set	  in	  a	  different	  time	  period	  and	  aimed	  predominantly	  at	  civic	  society	  but	  its	  
goal	  was	  similar	  –	  to	  establish	  public	  support	  in	  a	  referendum	  on	  devolution.	  	  	  
	  
Thus,	  while	  the	  comparison	  in	  activity	  between	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  and	  the	  Scottish	  
Constitutional	  Convention	  of	  the	  1980s	  might	  be	  limited,	  the	  evidence	  is	  there	  to	  suggest	  
that	   when	   a	   referendum	   on	   constitutional	   change	   is	   required,	   prior	   consultative	  
engagement	  with	  the	  population	  is	  considered	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  success	  by	  governments	  
in	  favour	  of	  the	  proposals.	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Scotland	  in	  1997,	  and	  though	  the	  Welsh	  
referendum	   in	   the	   same	   year	   was	  won	  with	   a	   wafer-­‐thin	  margin,	   there	  was	   no	   desire	  
from	   pro-­‐devolutionists	   in	   Wales	   to	   see	   such	   a	   narrow	   outcome	   in	   any	   subsequent	  
referendum.	  	  
	  
The	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   became	   everything	   to	   everyone.	   	   It	   was	   both	   a	   review	   of	  
devolution	   –	  with	   evidence	   provided	   both	   from	   key	   actors	   and	  members	   of	   the	   public	  
evaluating	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  devolution	  to	  that	  point	  –	  and	  an	  opportunity	  
to	  build	  a	  platform	  for	  discussions	  on	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  devolution.	  	  It	  had	  a	  specific	  
focus	   on	   the	   potential	   for	   a	   referendum	  which	  would	   allow	   the	   powers	   set	   out	   in	   the	  
Government	   of	  Wales	   Act	   2006	   to	   be	   devolved	   in	   one	   go	   rather	   than	   the	   incremental	  
devolution	  of	  powers	  which	  existed	  through	  the	  LCO	  system.	   	   It	  helped	  to	  maintain	  the	  
momentum	  for	  legislative	  powers	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  which	  had	  begun	  
with	   the	   1997	   referendum	   and	   continued	   through	   a	   review	   of	   Assembly	   procedures	  
(2002),	  the	  Richard	  Commission	  recommendations	  (2004)	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  
Act	   2006.	   	   To	   put	   it	   in	   its	   proper	   context,	   the	   Convention	   has	   followed	   a	   number	   of	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previous	  initiatives	  which	  have	  considerably	  aided	  the	  building	  of	  a	  consensus	  around	  the	  
desirability	  of	  further	  devolution	  to	  Wales.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  examined	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  as	  a	  means	  of	  moving	  forward	  the	  
constitutional	  debate	  in	  Wales.	  	  Its	  origins	  in	  the	  One	  Wales	  Agreement	  between	  Labour	  
and	   Plaid	   Cymru,	   as	   well	   as	   support	   from	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   Liberal	   Democrats	   in	  
nominating	  participants	  to	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  and	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  former	  UN	  
diplomat	  Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  Parry	  as	  chair,	  provided	  the	  process	  with	  a	  legitimacy	  which	  was	  
perhaps	   lacking	   in	   the	   minority-­‐SNP	   Scottish	   Government’s	   consultation	   A	   National	  
Conversation.	   	   With	   its	   wide	   remit	   –	   informing	   the	   public,	   debating	   the	   extension	   of	  
powers	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  and	  reporting	  its	  findings	  to	  the	  Assembly	  –	  
the	  process	  was	  widely	   seen	  as	   a	   success,	   though	  with	   some	  qualifications,	  particularly	  
about	   the	   breadth	   of	   public	   engagement.	   	   The	   process	   itself	   has	   been	   examined	  
thoroughly,	   with	   analysis	   of	   the	   evidence	   provided	   to	   the	   Executive	   Committee,	   the	  
different	  types	  of	  event	  held	  throughout	  Wales	  and	  the	  recommendations	  included	  in	  the	  
All	  Wales	  Convention	   final	   report.	   	   It	  examined	  the	   impact	  of	   the	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  
citing	  five	  key	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  process	  has	  affected	  the	  devolution	  process.	   	  Firstly,	   it	  
maintained	  the	  governing	  coalition	  between	  Labour	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  in	  office	  and	  was	  a	  
key	   part	   of	   Plaid	   Cymru’s	   support	   for	   the	   coalition.	   	   Secondly,	   it	   maintained	   the	  
momentum	  in	  favour	  of	  devolving	  further	  powers	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  by	  
providing	  a	  forum	  for	  discussions	  surrounding	  the	  constitutional	  future	  of	  Wales	  –	  and	  it	  
did	  so	  without	  breaking	   its	   strict	   requirement	   to	   remain	  neutral	   for	   the	  duration	  of	   the	  
process.	   	   Thirdly,	   it	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   preparing	   the	   groundwork	   for	   the	   powers	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referendum	   through	   its	   engagement	   with	   the	   public	   in	   those	   discussions,	   its	  
recommendation	   that	   such	   a	   referendum	   could	   be	   won,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   National	  
Assembly	   for	  Wales	  unanimous	  vote	  on	   the	   issue.	   	  And	   fourthly,	   it	  has	  played	  a	   role	   in	  
convincing	  the	  public	  of	  the	  need	  for	  change	  by	  recommending	  in	  its	  final	  report	  that	  Part	  
4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  offered	  a	  “substantial	  advantage”	  over	  the	  LCO	  
system.80	   	   Finally,	   it	   considered	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  All	  Wales	   Convention	   on	   the	  Welsh	  
political	   dynamic,	   which	   incorporated	   a	   great	   degree	   of	   consensus	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  
referendum.	   	  This	  was	   in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  all	   four	  of	  the	  parties	  represented	   in	  the	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  Wales	  at	  various	  points	  
in	   the	   process.	   	   Nevertheless,	   the	   consensus	   in	   Cardiff	   Bay	   that	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government	  should	  move	  forward	  to	  a	  referendum	  prevailed.	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  
examine	  this	  watershed	  event	  in	  Welsh	  politics	  in	  more	  detail,	  looking	  specifically	  at	  the	  
role	  of	  Plaid	  Cymru	  in	  the	  Yes	  campaign	  and	  the	  arguments	  made	  in	  favour	  of	  moving	  to	  
Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  
	  
	  
                                                
80	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  2009,	  op	  cit.	  p.98.	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This	  chapter	  will	  contrast	  an	  actual	  event	  –	  the	  successful	  campaign	  to	  hold	  and	  then	  
win	  a	  referendum	  to	  give	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  the	  legislative	  powers	  it	  had	  
been	  allocated	   in	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  –	  with	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  SNP	  
Scottish	  Government	  not	  to	  proceed	  with	  their	  pre-­‐election	  pledge	  in	  2007	  to	  hold	  a	  
referendum	  on	  Scottish	  independence	  before	  the	  end	  of	  their	  first	  term	  in	  office	  as	  a	  
minority	   government.	   	   It	   considers	   two	   clear	   questions:	   why	   were	   referendums	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  best	  means	  to	  deliver	  upon	  constitutional	  change	   in	  each	  case,	  
and	  why	  were	  the	  decisions	  to	  proceed	  (in	  Wales)	  and	  postpone	  (in	  Scotland)	  made?	  	  
While	   the	   answers	   to	   these	   questions	   are	   superficially	   simple	   –	   they	   were	   decided	  
upon	  to	  gain	  public	  legitimacy,	  and	  were	  held	  (and	  postponed)	  on	  the	  judgement	  that	  
public	  opinion	  was	  of	  a	  sufficient	  level	  –	  there	  are	  more	  complicated	  undercurrents	  in	  
each	   case.	   	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   deliberative	   theory	   with	   which	   this	   thesis	   has	  
engaged,	  this	  chapter	  considers	  the	  underlying	  decision	  and	  the	  data	  which	  informed	  
them,	  arguing	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  public	  attitudes	  in	  each	  case	  played	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  shaping	  elites’	  decision-­‐making	  on	  the	  principle	  and	  timetable	  of	  the	  proposed	  
referendums.	   	   It	  also	  provides	  a	  normative	  angle	  from	  which	  to	   judge	  the	  processes,	  
arguing	   that	  while	  public	   engagement	   is	   broadly	   seen	  as	   a	   societal	   good,	   the	  use	  of	  
deliberative	   methods	   in	   these	   cases	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   done	   not	   through	   any	  
appeal	   to	   democratic	   principles,	   but	   as	   a	   pragmatic	  means	  of	   delivering	   support	   for	  
government	   policy.	   	   In	   that	   regard,	   both	   consultation	   and	   referendum	   were	   used	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rather	  more	  cynically	  than	  deliberative	  theorists	  would	  desire	  –	  however,	  their	  use	  did	  
engage	  the	  public	  in	  the	  constitutional	  process.	  
	  
The	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Acts	  1998	  and	  2006	  
The	  model	  of	  devolution	  delivered	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  1998	  created	  an	  
institution	   without	   constitutional	   precedent,	   a	   unique	   scheme	   of	   elected	   executive	  
devolution	  which	   had	   as	   its	   purpose	   not	   the	   devolution	   of	   new	   powers	   to	   the	   new	  
Assembly	  but	   the	  democratisation	  of	   the	  existing	   functions	  of	   the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
for	  Wales.1	   	   The	   administrative	   powers	  which	   had	   been	   vested	   in	   the	  Welsh	   Office	  
were	  now	  given	  over	  to	  the	  new	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  as	  a	  corporate	  body	  –	  to	  
the	   institution	   itself	   rather	   than	   individual	   ministers	   themselves.	   	   This	   lack	   of	   an	  
institutional	  division	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  deliberative	  functions	  of	  the	  National	  
Assembly	  for	  Wales	  led	  to	  significant	  problems	  and	  confusion	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  
Assembly’s	   existence.2	   	   The	   result	   was	   a	   “remarkable	   degree	   of	   constitutional	  
volatility”	  and	  a	  process	  which	  has	  evolved	  in	  a	  flexible	  and	  ad	  hoc	  manner.3	  	  Since	  the	  
devolution	   referendum	   in	  1997,	  Wales	  has	   seen	   two	  Wales	  Acts	   (1998	  and	  2006),	   a	  
commission,	   a	   convention,	   a	   review	   of	   procedures	   and	   a	   further	   referendum	  which	  
itself	  has	  provided	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  with	  legislative	  powers	  the	  original	  
Government	   of	   Wales	   Act	   did	   not	   envision.4	   	   Chapter	   three	   (on	   the	   All	   Wales	  
Convention)	  set	  out	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  dealing	  with	  the	  
                                                
1	  Patchett,	  K.	  ‘The	  New	  Welsh	  Constitution:	  The	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  1998’	  in	  Barry	  Jones,	  J.	  and	  
Balsom,	  D.	  The	  Road	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2000,	  p.229;	  
Trench,	  A.	  ‘Wales	  and	  the	  Westminster	  Model’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  63	  No.	  1,	  2010,	  p.119.	  
2	  Trench,	  A.	  2010,	  op	  cit.	  p.121.	  
3	  ibid.	  p.118.	  
4	  Harvey,	  M.	  ‘How	  to	  Lose	  a	  Referendum	  in	  Seven	  Ways:	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Upcoming	  Welsh	  Powers	  
Referendum’	  in	  Regional	  and	  Federal	  Studies	  Vol.	  21	  No.	  1,	  March,	  2011(a),	  p.91.	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powers	  which	  were	  transferred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  affirmative	  referendum	  vote	  in	  2011.	  	  
This	  section	  will	  discuss	  why	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  was	  required	  and	  how	  
a	   referendum	   on	   extending	   legislative	   powers	   to	   the	   Assembly	   was	   part	   of	   that	  
requirement.	  
	  
From	   the	   “inauspicious	   start”	   offered	   to	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   by	   the	  
wafer-­‐thin	  majority	  in	  the	  1997	  referendum,	  the	  ‘body	  corporate’	  model	  of	  devolution	  
provided	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	  for	  actors	  within	  and	  outwith	  the	  Assembly.5	  	  Indeed,	  
such	   were	   the	   challenges	   –	   particularly	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   division	   between	   the	  
executive	  and	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  Assembly	  –	  that	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  
itself	  took	  responsibility	  for	  a	  change	  in	  its	  own	  procedures	  in	  2002,	  creating	  a	  de	  facto	  
separation	   between	   the	  Assembly	  Administration	   (the	   executive)	   and	   the	   “Presiding	  
Office”	  (the	  Assembly	  itself).	  	  With	  this	  separation	  also	  came	  changes	  in	  nomenclature:	  
Assembly	  Secretaries	  became	  Ministers,	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  became	  the	  Cabinet	  
and	   the	   executive	   itself	   became	   known	   as	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	   Government.6	  	  
However,	   this	  was	  only	   the	  beginning.	   	  Part	  of	   the	  agreement	  which	  saw	  the	  Liberal	  
Democrats	  enter	  coalition	  with	  Labour	  in	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  led	  to	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  Richard	  Commission	  to	  examine	  ways	  devolution	  in	  Wales	  could	  
be	   improved.	   	   While	   there	   was	   general	   acceptance	   of	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   report,	  
recommendations	  –	  including	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Single	  Transferable	  Vote	  electoral	  system	  
and	  an	  increase	  in	  Assembly	  Members	  from	  60	  to	  80	  –	  were	  ignored.7	  	  Indeed,	  while	  it	  
                                                
5	  Rawlings,	  R.	  (2003)	  Delineating	  Wales:	  Constitutional,	  Legal	  and	  Administrative	  Aspects	  of	  National	  
Devolution,	  Cardiff,	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2003,	  p.49.	  
6	  ibid.	  p.133,	  157.	  
7	  Richard	  Commission,	  Report	  on	  the	  Powers	  and	  Electoral	  Arrangements	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales,	  London,	  The	  Stationery	  Office,	  2004,	  p.255,	  259.
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was	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   itself	   which	   commissioned	   Lord	   Richard	   to	  
investigate	   devolution	   in	   Wales,	   the	   Assembly	   was	   not	   empowered	   to	   implement	  
these	  recommendations.8	  	  	  
	  
Instead,	   it	   fell	   to	   the	   UK	   Government	   to	   respond,	   which	   it	   did	   through	   Better	  
Governance	   for	  Wales,	   a	   2005	  White	   Paper.	   	   	   Better	   Governance	   for	  Wales	   largely	  
ignored	   the	   more	   controversial	   aspects	   of	   the	   Richard	   Commission	   Report	   but	   did	  
recommend	   several	   distinct	   changes	   to	   the	   devolution	   settlement	   in	   Wales.9	   	   It	  
recognised	   the	  confusion	  and	   the	   lack	  of	   scrutiny	   time	   in	   the	  committees	  as	  distinct	  
problems	  arising	   from	  the	  body	  corporate	  model	  of	  devolution	  delivered	   in	  1998,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  problems	  of	  accountability	  that	  occur	  with	  the	  Assembly	  as	  a	  whole	  taking	  
responsibility	   for	   individual	   ministerial	   decisions.10	   	   Rather	   than	   engaging	   with	   the	  
recommendations	   of	   the	   Richard	   Commission,	   Better	   Governance	   for	   Wales	  made	  
proposals	  “in	  isolation”11	  and	  set	  out	  a	  three-­‐part	  process	  for	  legislative	  powers	  to	  be	  
devolved	   to	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales	   in	   a	   “more	   gradual,	   staged	  move”	   to	  
make	  the	  Assembly	  a	  legislature.12	  	  	  
	  
The	   three	   stages	   –	   a	   period	   of	   “framework	   powers”;	   a	   second	   period	   of	   Legislative	  
Competence	   Orders	   (LCOs),	   where	   the	   Assembly	   would	   apply	   to	   Westminster	   for	  
powers	   to	   be	   devolved	   on	   an	   individual	   basis;	   and	   a	   third	   period,	   when	   primary	  
                                                
8	  Trench,	  A.	  2010,	  op	  cit.	  p.127.	  
9	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  ‘Welsh	  Devolution:	  The	  End	  of	  the	  Beginning	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of...?’	  in	  
Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  2008,	  Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2008(a),	  p.63.	  
10	  Wales	  Office,	  2005,	  op.	  cit.	  p.12-­‐3.	  
11	  Trench,	  A.	  ‘Better	  Governance	  for	  Wales:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  White	  Paper	  on	  Devolution	  for	  Wales’	  
ESRC:	  The	  Devolution	  Policy	  Papers	  No.	  13,	  London,	  The	  Constitution	  Unit,	  2005,	  p.3.	  
12	  Wales	  Office,	  2005,	  op	  cit.	  p.21.	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legislative	   powers	   in	   twenty	   specific	   fields	   would	   be	   devolved	   –	   were	   discussed	   in	  
more	  detail	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter.	   	  The	  White	  Paper	  was	  clear	   that	   the	   later	  stage	  
would	   “represent	   a	   fundamental	   change	   to	   the	   Welsh	   settlement”	   and	   that	   a	  
referendum	  would	  be	  required	  to	  verify	  the	  electorate’s	  desire	  for	  such	  a	  change.13	  	  
	  
The	   precedent	   established	   by	   the	   1979	   and	   1997	   referendums	   meant	   that	   an	  
argument	  could	  be	  made	   for	  a	   referendum	  to	  be	  held	   if	  any	  considerable	  change	   to	  
the	   devolution	   settlement	   was	   to	   be	   made.	   	   There	   was	   nothing	   written	   in	   the	  
Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  1998	  which	  required	  a	  referendum,	  but	  political	  expediency	  
(attaching	  a	   referendum	  clause	   to	  Part	  4	  of	   the	  2006	  Act	  was	  “the	  only	  way	   the	  Act	  
would	  be	  passed”14)	  meant	  that	  such	  a	  path	  was	  needed.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  argument	  was	  
made	  that:	  	  
The	   1997	   referendum	   set	   up	   the	   NAW	   with	   executive	  
responsibilities,	   and	   giving	   it	   legislative	   powers	   is	   a	  
fundamental	   change	   to	   the	   system.	   	   The	   1997	   referendum	  
did	  not	  provide	  a	  mandate	  for	  that,	  therefore	  there	  is	  a	  case	  
that	  a	  referendum	  was	  required.15	  	  	  
	  
	  
In	   1979	   and	   1997	   the	   constitutional	   change	   on	   offer	   was	   to	   have	   a	   democratically	  
elected	   assembly	   take	   on	   the	   executive	   and	   administrative	   responsibilities	   of	   the	  
Welsh	   Office.	   	   On	   offer	   in	   the	   White	   Paper	   –	   which	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  
Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  –	  was	  a	  move	  from	  executive	  to	  legislative	  devolution,	  
moving	  the	  Assembly	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  Parliament.16	  	  Some	  saw	  the	  White	  Paper	  as	  
obfuscating	  the	  issue,	  creating	  confusion	  as	  to	  what	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Assembly	  would	  
                                                
13	  ibid.	  p.25.	  
14	  Interview	  with	  Senior	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  Official	  (July	  2010)	  (Cardiff).	  
15	  ibid.	  
16	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  2008(a)	  op	  cit.	  p.59.	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be,	   and	   that	   the	   three-­‐step	   process	   from	   framework	   powers	   through	   LCOs	   to	   the	  
referendum	  and	  legislative	  powers	  was	  a	  “political	  compromise”	  aimed	  at	  passing	  the	  
legislation	   through	   the	   UK	   Parliament.17	   	   Others	   argued	   that	   the	   solution	   found	   by	  
then-­‐Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Wales	   Peter	   Hain,	   though	   it	   was	   a	   compromise	   and	   a	  
difficult	   compromise	   for	   proponents	   of	   devolution	   to	   stomach	   at	   the	   time,	   was	  
“elegant,	   ingenious	   and	   potentially	   highly	   favourable	   to	   their	   cause”.18	   	   It	   had	   been	  
clear	  to	  Hain	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  Welsh	  Labour	  MP	  colleagues	  were	  not	  in	  favour	  
of	   extending	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   and	   would	   not	   be	  
disposed	   to	   support	  moves	   in	   that	   direction	   –	   and	   a	   referendum	  was	   a	   concession	  
required	   to	   obtain	   their	   support	   for	   the	   legislation.19	   	   Rather	   than	   allowing	   their	  
reluctance	   to	   devolve	  more	   power	   to	   derail	   the	   bill,	   Hain	   inserted	   a	   post-­‐legislative	  
referendum	   into	   the	   legislation	   –	  meaning	   that	   the	   powers	   sought	   by	   the	  Assembly	  
and	   outlined	   in	   the	   bill	   would	   be	   devolved	   pending	   an	   affirmative	   outcome	   in	   a	  
referendum,	  to	  be	  held	  at	  an	  undetermined	  date	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Hain	  –	  and,	  indeed,	  his	  
Labour	   colleagues	   –	   recognised	   that,	   at	   the	   time,	   victory	   in	   such	   a	   referendum	  was	  
unlikely.	   	   This	  meant	  more	   devo-­‐sceptic	   Labour	  MPs	   could	   consider	   the	   promise	   of	  
such	  a	  referendum	  as	  a	  major	  victory	  against	  the	  devolution	  of	  further	  powers.20	  	  That	  
being	  the	  case,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales	  –	  a	  lifetime	  supporter	  of	  devolution	  –	  
had	   no	   intention	   of	   holding	   the	   referendum	   until	   he	   was	   confident	   that	   it	   would	  
deliver	  a	  victory.21	   	  For	  that	  reason,	  he	   inserted	  several	   locks	  on	   its	  delivery.	   	  First,	  a	  
                                                
17	  Trench,	  A.	  2005,	  op	  cit.	  p.9,	  14;	  Trench,	  A.	  ‘Old	  Wine	  in	  New	  Bottles?	  	  Relations	  between	  London	  and	  
Cardiff	  after	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006’	  in	  Contemporary	  Wales,	  Vol.	  20,	  No.	  1,	  October,	  2007,	  
p.33.	  
18	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  2008(a)	  op	  cit.	  p.64.	  
19	  ibid.	  p.61.	  
20	  ibid.	  p.64.	  
21	  Hain,	  P.	  ‘Good	  News:	  Comprehensive	  Law-­‐Making	  Powers	  for	  Wales’,	  Speech	  delivered	  at	  Cardiff	  
University,	  29	  October	  2009(a).	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two-­‐thirds	  majority	  would	  be	  required	  in	  the	  Assembly	  itself	  (which	  gave	  Labour,	  with	  
roughly	  half	  the	  AMs	  in	  each	  Assembly	  session,	  an	  effective	  veto	  over	  the	  referendum)	  
and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  would	  then	  have	  to	  give	  assent.	  	  The	  referendum	  bill	  would	  
then	  need	  a	  majority	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  House	  of	  Commons	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  to	  be	  
enacted	   and	   scheduled.	   	   Thus,	   Hain’s	   solution	  was	   considered	   a	  win	   for	   both	   sides.	  	  
Anti-­‐devolution	  MPs	  saw	  the	  need	  for	  a	  referendum	  (and	  the	  small	  majority	  in	  favour	  
of	  devolution	  itself	   in	  1997)	  as	  a	  potential	  block	  on	  the	  devolution	  of	  further	  powers	  
while	  pro-­‐devolutionists	  considered	  the	  referendum	  a	  means	  of	  furthering	  support	  for	  
devolution,	   with	   the	   added	   bonus	   that	   it	   would	   be	   up	   to	   those	   in	   favour	   of	   more	  
powers	  to	  decide	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  referendum	  itself.22	  	  
	  
Campaigning	  for	  a	  referendum	  
While	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  move	  towards	  the	  referendum	  had	  
been	  part	  of	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government’s	  coalition	  agreement,	  there	  was	  unity	  
across	  the	  Assembly	  as	  to	  the	  need	  for	  the	  powers	  offered	  by	  the	  referendum	  to	  be	  
devolved	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible.	   	   Plaid	   AMs	   were	   critical	   of	   the	   “unworkable”	   LCO	  
system,	  and	  that	  criticism	  was	  shared	  by	  Liberal	  Democrat	  and	  Conservative	  AMs	  who	  
were	  united	  in	  their	  desire	  to	  move	  towards	  Part	  Four	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  
2006	   at	   the	   earliest	   opportunity.23	   	   The	   politically	   united	   front	   was	   extended	   to	  
questioning	   the	   constitutional	   need	   to	   have	   a	   referendum	   on	   the	   extension	   of	  
devolution,	   with	   AMs	   from	   all	   parties	   considering	   the	   referendum	   an	   unnecessary	  
                                                
22	  Navarro,	  M.	  and	  Lambert,	  D.	  ‘Some	  Effects	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006’	  Contemporary	  
Wales	  Vol.	  20,	  No.	  1,	  October,	  2007,	  p.19.	  
23	  Interviews	  with	  Bethan	  Jenkins	  (Plaid	  AM),	  Gareth	  Jones	  (Plaid	  AM),	  Mike	  German	  (then	  Liberal	  
Democrat	  AM)	  and	  Nick	  Bourne	  (then	  Conservative	  AM	  and	  leader	  of	  the	  Welsh	  Conservatives)	  (June	  
and	  July	  2010).	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hurdle	  to	  the	  Assembly	  securing	  the	  legislative	  powers	  it	  craved.	  	  Gareth	  Jones	  saw	  the	  
referendum	   as	   simply	   a	   “constitutional	   exercise”	   which	   risked	   polarising	   the	  Welsh	  
public	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  devolution	  itself.24	  	  Mike	  German	  argued	  against	  the	  need	  for	  a	  
second	   referendum	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   changes	   which	   would	   result	   from	   an	  
affirmative	  vote	  were	  not	  substantial	  enough	  to	  require	  a	  public	  vote.	  	  He	  also	  argued	  
that	  the	  referendum	  itself	  was	  redundant:	  	  	  	  
	  
The	   issue	   is	   simple	  –	   it	   isn’t	  about	  more	  powers,	   it	   is	  about	  
getting	   control	   of	   the	   powers	   which	   it	   has	   already	   been	  
agreed	   that	   we	   should	   have.	   	   Which	   makes	   it	   crazy	   that	  
we’re	   now	   asking	   people	   to	   okay	   something	   which	   has	  
already	  been	  okayed	  by	  their	  representatives.25	  	  	  
	  
The	   Assembly’s	   then	   Presiding	   Officer,	   Lord	   Elis-­‐Thomas,	   voiced	   his	   own	   concerns	  
about	  the	  referendum	  as	  a	  device,	  considering	  that,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  MPs	  expenses	  
scandal,	  any	  request	  for	  public	  support	  could	  result	  in	  an	  anti-­‐politics	  vote.26	  	  Indeed,	  
even	   Labour	   AMs	   were	   critical	   of	   the	   process.	   	   Alun	   Davies	   was	   clear	   that	   he	  
considered	   the	   LCO	   system	   a	   “bizarre	   and	   Byzantine	   process”	   and	   that	   the	   idea	   of	  
having	  a	  referendum	  was	  “terrible”:	  
	  
It’s	   a	   terrible	   idea.	   	   Awful.	   	   In	   my	   view,	   the	   principle	   of	  
legislative	  powers	  was	  passed	  in	  1997.	  	  Of	  course,	  others	  will	  
see	  it	  differently.	  	  But	  the	  NAW	  was,	  in	  1997,	  empowered	  to	  
make	   laws	   –	   okay,	   it	  was	   secondary	   legislation,	   but	   that	   is	  
still	   legislation	  –	  and	  we	  had	  a	  referendum	  then,	  and	  it	  was	  
approved.	  	  We	  shouldn’t	  need	  another	  one...	  When	  you	  move	  
to	   an	   elected	   body	   –	   as	   opposed	   to	   executive	   functions	  
carried	   out	   by	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   –	   the	   principle	   of	  
legislative	  devolution	  has	  been	  approved.27	  	  	  
                                                
24	  Interview	  with	  Gareth	  Jones	  (Plaid	  AM)	  (June	  2010).	  
25	  Interview	  with	  Mike	  German	  (then	  Lib	  Dem	  AM)	  (July	  2010.	  
26	  Interview	  with	  Lord	  Elis-­‐Thomas	  (Plaid	  AM	  and	  then	  Presiding	  Officer	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales)	  (June	  2010).	  
27	  Interview	  with	  Alun	  Davies	  (Labour	  AM)	  (July	  2010).	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He	   was	   also	   keen	   to	   emphasise	   that	   the	   narrative	   surrounding	   Welsh	   Labour	   MPs	  
being	   somewhat	   sceptical	   about	   devolution	   was	   misplaced	   –	   pointing	   out	   that	   if	   it	  
were	   not	   for	   them	   neither	   the	   powers	   devolved	   through	   the	   LCO	   system	   nor	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  obtain	  further	  powers	  in	  the	  referendum	  would	  have	  been	  there.28	  	  Of	  
course,	   those	  who	  were	   critical	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   holding	   a	   referendum	  were	   pro-­‐
devolutionists,	   who	   feared	   the	   damage	   that	   a	   No	   vote	   would	   do	   to	   devolution	   in	  
Wales.	  	  	  
	  
The	   Conservatives’	   David	  Melding	   offered	   a	   contrasting	   opinion,	   arguing	   that	   it	  was	  
only	   the	   principle	   of	   executive	   devolution	  which	   had	   been	   considered	   in	   1997,	   and	  
that	   what	   was	   on	   offer	   in	   this	   referendum	   was	   legislative	   devolution	   –	   a	   distinctly	  
different	  principle.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  while	  people	  voted	  narrowly	  for	  the	  former,	  it	  was	  
not	  right	  to	  consider	  that	  as	  support	  for	  the	  latter,	  and	  thus	  a	  second	  referendum	  was	  
the	  proper	  means	  of	  determining	  the	  issue.29	  	  He	  was,	  however,	  in	  agreement	  with	  his	  
Assembly	   colleagues	   on	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   referendum,	   declaring	   the	   LCO	   system	  
“preposterous”	  and	  “constitutionally	  crazy”,	  and	  the	  sooner	  a	  referendum	  was	  held	  to	  
deliver	  the	  full	  legislative	  powers	  available,	  the	  better.30	  
	  
Thus	   Plaid	   were	   not	   alone	   in	   holding	   the	   somewhat	   contradictory	   position	   of	  
questioning	  the	  principle	  of	  holding	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  calling	  for	  it	  to	  
occur	  as	   soon	  as	  practically	  possible	  on	   the	  other.	   	  As	  a	  party	  of	   government	   in	   the	  
                                                
28	  ibid.	  




Assembly	  they	  were	  however	  in	  a	  more	  difficult	  position	  than	  Conservative	  and	  Liberal	  
Democrat	  AMs	  who	  were	  pushing	  for	  the	  referendum.	  	  
	  
A	  further	  difficulty	  in	  pursuing	  the	  referendum	  came	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
for	  Wales	  Peter	  Hain,	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  who	  saw	  the	  
Act	  as	  having	  “settled	  the	  question	  of	  Wales’	  constitutional	  status,	  if	  not	  forever,	  then	  
for	   generations	   to	   come.”31	   	   He	   remained	   positive	   about	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   LCO	  
system	  and	  considered	  that	  a	  referendum	  held	  at	  that	  time	  would	  be	  lost	  –	  though	  he	  
was	  clear	  that	  he	  would	  support	  a	  referendum	  when	  he	  was	  confident	  that	  it	  could	  be	  
won.32	   	  He	  also	  remained	  cautious	  of	  the	  public	  perception	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  
for	  Wales,	  and	  considered	   the	   situation	  –	  asking	  a	  public	  which	  was	   sceptical	  of	   the	  
current	   role	   of	   the	   Assembly	   to	   enhance	   it	   by	   convincing	   them	   that	   it	   had	  made	   a	  
discernible	  and	  positive	  impact	  upon	  their	  lives	  –	  problematic,	  with	  his	  conclusion	  that	  
a	  referendum	  should	  not	  be	  rushed.	  	  	  
Table	  6.1:	  Wales	  Constitutional	  Preferences	  (1997-­‐2007)33	  
 
	   Independence	   Parliament	   Assembly	   No	  devolution	   Don’t	  Know	  
1997	   13	   18	   25	   37	   7	  
1999	   10	   28	   33	   24	   5	  
2001	   12	   37	   25	   23	   4	  
2003	   13	   36	   25	   20	   5	  
2006	   11	   40	   24	   20	   5	  
2007	   12	   42	   26	   16	   5	  
2009	   15	   34	   27	   17	   6	  
2011	   13	   34	   27	   18	   8	  
	  
                                                
31	  Hain,	  P.	  ‘Devolution’s	  Next	  Step’	  in	  Agenda,	  No.	  38,	  Summer,	  2009(b),	  p.20.	  
32	  ibid.	  p.21.	  
33	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  2012,	  op	  cit.	  p.68.	  Data	  from	  1997	  Welsh	  Referendum	  Study;	  1999	  Welsh	  
Assembly	  Election	  Study;	  2001	  Wales	  Life	  and	  Times	  Survey;	  2003	  Wales	  Life	  and	  Times	  Survey;	  2006	  
Survey	  by	  NOP	  for	  the	  Electoral	  Commission;	  2007	  Welsh	  Election	  Study;	  2009	  YouGov	  poll	  for	  
Aberystwyth	  University	  and	  Cardiff	  University;	  2011	  Welsh	  Election	  Study.	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Nevertheless,	  when	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	   reported	  their	  view	  that	  a	   referendum	  
was	  winnable,	  and	  with	  public	  attitudes	  in	  Wales	  continuing	  to	  shift	  towards	  favouring	  
a	   “Parliament”	   rather	   than	   “Assembly”	   (see	   table	   6.1),	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government	  were	  keen	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  referendum	  itself.	   	  The	  motion	  to	  
move	  to	  a	  referendum	  was	  considered	  in	  the	  Assembly	  in	  February	  2010	  was	  passed	  
unanimously,	  beginning	  the	  process	  which	  was	  set	  out	  in	  Part	  Four	  of	  the	  Government	  
of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.34	   	  This	  put	  on	  record	   formally	   the	  consensus	   in	   the	  Assembly	   for	  
the	  referendum.	  
	  
The	  Welsh	  Powers	  Referendum:	  Timeline	  
However,	   as	  noted	  above,	   a	   two-­‐thirds	  majority	   in	   the	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales	  
was	  only	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  process	  –	  in	  order	  to	  hold	  the	  referendum,	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  State	  for	  Wales	  was	  still	  required	  to	  give	  his	  permission	  for	  the	  legislation	  in	  the	  UK	  
Parliament	   to	   proceed.35	   	   The	  Welsh	   First	  Minister	  wrote	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State,	  
Peter	  Hain,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  vote,	  indicating	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Assembly	  for	  the	  
progression	   towards	   the	   referendum	   and	   asking	   him	   to	   begin	   the	   process	   at	  
Westminster.	   	   On	   receipt	   of	   the	   letter,	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   then	   had	   90	   days	   in	  
which	   to	   agree	   to	   their	   request	   or	   to	   reject	   it.	   	   The	   Assembly	   vote,	   an	   expected	  
consequence	  of	   the	  One	  Wales	  Agreement	  between	  Welsh	  Labour	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  
put	   Peter	   Hain	   in	   a	   difficult	   position.	   	   He	   had	   succeeded	   in	   convincing	  many	  Welsh	  
Labour	  MPs	   to	   support	   the	   Government	   of	  Wales	   Act	   2006	   –	   with	   the	   referendum	  
                                                
34	  The	  Record	  of	  Proceedings	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  for	  Tuesday,	  9	  February,	  2010,	  at:	  
http://www.assemblywales.org/bus-­‐home/bus-­‐chamber/bus-­‐chamber-­‐third-­‐assembly-­‐
rop.htm?act=dis&id=166346&ds=2/2010#6	  
35	  HM	  Government,	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006,	  London,	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  2006.	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included	  –	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   the	   referendum	   itself	  would	  not	  occur	   for	   some	   time.36	  	  
Now	  he	  was	   in	  a	  position	   to	  accede	   to	   the	  Assembly’s	   request	   for	  a	   referendum,	  or	  
decline.	  
	  
In	   the	  event,	   he	  did	  neither.	   	  A	  UK	  General	   Election	   intervened	   in	  May	  2010,	  which	  
allowed	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  delay	  his	  decision	  until	  after	  the	  election.	  	  With	  the	  
new	  Conservative-­‐Liberal	  Democrat	  coalition	   replacing	  Labour	   in	  government,	  Cheryl	  
Gillan	   was	   appointed	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Wales,	   with	   the	   responsibility	   for	   the	  
referendum	   now	   in	   her	   hands.	   	   First	   Minister	   Carwyn	   Jones	   wrote	   to	   the	   new	  
Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Wales	   two	   weeks	   after	   the	   election,	   notifying	   her	   of	   the	  
Assembly’s	  preference	  to	  have	  the	  referendum	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  2010,	  and	  to	  advise	  
upon	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  question.37	   	  Addressing	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  on	  
the	   event	   of	   the	   Queen’s	   Speech,	   Gillan	   made	   clear	   that	   the	   referendum	   was	   “a	  
priority”	   for	   the	   incoming	   government,	   and	   that	   it	   “should	   be	   held	   as	   rapidly	   as	  
possible,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  wishes	  and	  requests”	  of	  the	  Assembly	  vote.38	  	  To	  that	  
end,	   the	   new	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Wales	   set	   out	   a	   timeline	   which	   suggested	   the	  
referendum	  would	  be	  held	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2011,	  before	  the	  next	  elections	  to	  the	  
Assembly	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government’s	  coalition	  agreement.39	  
	  
A	  week	  after	  announcing	  that	  the	  referendum	  would	  be	  held	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  2011	  
                                                
36	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  2012,	  op	  cit.	  p.77.	  
37	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  statement	  from	  the	  First	  Minister	  on	  the	  Referendum,	  20	  May,	  2010,	  
at:	  http://wales.gov.uk/newsroom/firstminister/2010/referendum/?lang=en	  






Cheryl	   Gillan	   provided	   the	   Electoral	   Commission	   with	   a	   draft	   question	   for	   the	  
referendum.40	   	  The	  Electoral	  Commission	  then	  took	  its	  recommended	  ten	  weeks41	  to	  
test	  the	  question,	  reporting	  its	  findings	  in	  September	  2010.42	  
	  
In	  shaping	  their	  response,	  the	  Electoral	  Commission	  invited	  contributions	  from	  several	  
interested	  actors,	  including	  political	  parties	  represented	  in	  Wales,	  those	  who	  might	  be	  
involved	   in	   the	  upcoming	   campaign,	   and	  noted	  academics.43	   	   Alan	   Trench	  and	  Keith	  
Patchett	   registered	   concerns	   regarding	   the	   consistency	   in	   language	   between	   the	  
Government	   of	  Wales	   Act	   2006	   and	   the	   proposed	   question,	   and	   considered	   that	   a	  
short	   preamble	   would	   be	   useful	   for	   clarity.44	   	   Responding	   to	   these	   concerns,	   the	  
Electoral	  Commission	  recommended	  a	  preamble	  and	  question	  (as	  set	  out	  in	  box	  6.1),	  
which	   was	   subsequently	   accepted	   by	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Wales,	   and	   the	  
question	  outlined	  below	  was	  adopted	  as	  the	  question	  to	  be	  tabled	  in	  the	  referendum.	  	  
The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales	  then	  announced	  in	  October	  2010	  that	  the	  date	  for	  the	  
referendum	   itself	   would	   be	   3	   March	   2011,	   as	   agreed	   with	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	  
Government.45	  	  The	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  itself	  had	  to	  give	  its	  consent	  for	  the	  
referendum	   to	   proceed,	   and	   it	   duly	   did	   so	   with	   a	   second	   unanimous	   vote	   in	   the	  
                                                
40	  Wales	  Office	  Referendum	  Question	  Press	  Statement,	  27	  June,	  2010(a),	  at:	  
http://www.walesoffice.gov.uk/files/2010/06/cg-­‐referendum-­‐question-­‐230610.pdf	  
41	  Interview	  with	  Rhydian	  Thomas	  (Electoral	  Commission)	  (June	  2010).	  
42	  Electoral	  Commission,	  ‘Referendum	  on	  lawmaking	  powers	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales’	  Report	  
of	  Views	  of	  the	  Electoral	  Commission	  on	  the	  proposed	  referendum	  question,	  London,	  The	  Electoral	  
Commission,	  2010(a),	  at:	  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/_media/response-­‐
submission/commission-­‐responses-­‐to-­‐external-­‐consultations/Question-­‐assessment-­‐report-­‐English-­‐
FINAL-­‐no-­‐embargo.pdf	  
43	  ibid.	  p.35.	  
44	  ibid.	  p.12.	  




Senedd	  on	  9	  November	  2010.46	  	  Approval	  from	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  and	  House	  of	  
Lords	   followed	   sixteen	   days	   later,	   which	   allowed	   the	   referendum	   process	   itself	   to	  
begin	  in	  mid-­‐December.47	  	  	  
	  
Box	  6.1:	  Electoral	  Commission	  Wales	  -­‐	  Proposed	  2011	  Referendum	  Question48	  
	  
	  
The	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales:	  what	  happens	  at	  the	  moment	  
	  
The	  Assembly	  has	  powers	  to	  make	  laws	  on	  20	  subject	  areas,	  such	  as:	  	  
•	  agriculture	  	  
•	  education	  
•	  the	  environment	  	  	  
•	  health	  	  	  
•	  housing	  	  
•	  local	  government	  	  
	  
In	  each	  subject	  area,	  the	  Assembly	  can	  make	  laws	  on	  some	  matters,	  but	  not	  others.	  
To	   make	   laws	   on	   any	   of	   these	   other	   matters,	   the	   Assembly	   must	   ask	   the	   UK	  
Parliament	  for	  its	  agreement.	  The	  UK	  Parliament	  then	  decides	  each	  time	  whether	  or	  
not	  the	  Assembly	  can	  make	  these	  laws.	  	  
	  
The	   Assembly	   cannot	  make	   laws	   on	   subject	   areas	   such	   as	   defence,	   tax	   or	   welfare	  
benefits,	  whatever	  the	  result	  of	  this	  vote.	  	  
	  
If	  most	  voters	  vote	  ‘yes’	  	  
The	  Assembly	  will	  be	  able	  to	  make	  laws	  on	  all	  matters	  in	  the	  20	  subject	  areas	  it	  has	  
powers	  for,	  without	  needing	  the	  UK	  Parliament’s	  agreement.	  	  
If	  most	  voters	  vote	  ‘no’	  	  
What	  happens	  at	  the	  moment	  will	  continue.	  	  
	  
Question	  	  	  
Do	  you	  want	  the	  Assembly	  now	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  laws	  on	  all	  matters	  in	  the	  20	  	  




                                                
46	  The	  Record	  of	  Proceedings	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  for	  9	  November,	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http://www.assemblywales.org/bus-­‐home/bus-­‐chamber/bus-­‐chamber-­‐third-­‐assembly-­‐
rop.htm?act=dis&id=202350&ds=11/2010#cynn	  






The	  Yes	  campaign	  agreed	  on	  the	  appointment	  of	  Roger	  Lewis,	  chairman	  of	  the	  Welsh	  
Rugby	  Union,	   to	   lead	   their	   campaign,	  with	   the	   official	   launch	   of	   the	   ‘Yes	   for	  Wales’	  
campaign	   on	   4	   January	   2011.	   	   Campaigning	   against	   were	   ‘True	   Wales’,	   anti-­‐
devolutionists	   who	   had	   participated	   in	   many	   of	   the	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   events,	  
outlining	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  Assembly’s	  powers	  (and,	  indeed,	  to	  
the	  Assembly	  itself).	   	  True	  Wales	  was	  in	  the	  unenviable	  position	  of	  making	  a	  case	  for	  
something	   they	   didn’t	   like	   (the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales,	   as	   it	   was	   currently	  
constituted)	   to	   oppose	   something	   they	   wanted	   even	   less	   –	   an	   extension	   of	   its	  
powers.49	   	  Their	  preferred	  option	  –	  complete	  abolition	  of	  the	  Assembly	  –	  was	  not	  on	  
the	   table.	   	   This	   position	   was	   to	   have	   a	   considerable	   impact	   upon	   the	   referendum	  
campaign	  itself.	  
	  
While	   the	   Electoral	   Commission	   had	   a	   role	   in	   recommending	   the	   question	   for	   the	  
referendum,	   it	   also	   had	   a	   further	   part	   to	   play	   in	   designating	  which	   organisations,	   if	  
any,	  should	  be	  described	  as	  “lead	  campaigns”.	  	  Such	  a	  designation	  carried	  with	  it	  the	  
campaigning	   responsibility	   for	   their	   respective	   side	   of	   the	   debate	   plus	   funding	   for	  
start-­‐up	  costs.	  	  The	  Electoral	  Commission	  were	  clear	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  process	  that,	  
legally,	  if	  only	  one	  side	  met	  the	  criteria	  for	  designation	  –	  or	  if	  only	  one	  side	  applied	  for	  
designation	   –	   then	   they	   would	   have	   to	   deny	   both	   sides	   designation	   as	   lead	  
campaigners,	   thereby	  not	  providing	  any	   institutional	  advantage	   to	  one	  side	  over	   the	  
other.50	   	   In	   the	   event,	   that	   is	   exactly	   what	   happened.	   	   Yes	   for	   Wales	   applied	   for	  
designation	   as	   lead	   campaigners	   on	   the	   Yes	   side,	   and	   their	   application	   was	  
                                                
49	  Trench,	  A.	  ‘The	  Welsh	  referendum	  campaigns,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  turn-­‐out’	  in	  Devolution	  Matters,	  
self-­‐published,	  12	  January,	  2011(a),	  at:	  http://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/2011/01/12/the-­‐
welsh-­‐referendum-­‐campaigns/#more-­‐1907	  
50	  Interview	  with	  Rhydian	  Thomas	  (Electoral	  Commission)	  (June	  2010).	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provisionally	  accepted	  by	  the	  Electoral	  Commission.	  	  However,	  True	  Wales	  declined	  to	  
apply	   for	   designation	   and,	   though	   an	   individual	   did	   apply	   for	   designation	   as	   lead	  
campaigner	   for	   the	   No	   campaign,	   his	   application	   did	   not	   meet	   the	   criteria	   for	  
designation.	  	  Thus	  neither	  side	  could	  be	  designated	  as	  lead	  campaigns.	  	  The	  Electoral	  
Commission	   did	   note	   that	   information	   in	   the	   campaign	   –	   on	   both	   sides	   –	  would	   be	  
required	   for	   voters	   to	  make	   an	   informed	   choice	   in	   the	   referendum	   and	   thus	  would	  
deliver	   some	   neutral	   information,	   as	   well	   as	   working	   with	   the	   “participated	  
participants”	   (those	   parties	   involved	   in	   the	   campaign)	   in	   the	   referendum	   to	   ensure	  
that	  information	  was	  widely	  distributed.51	  	  Despite	  not	  being	  appointed	  as	  designated	  
campaigns,	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  and	  True	  Wales	  were	  the	  primary	  actors	  in	  the	  campaign	  on	  
the	  respective	  sides	  of	  the	  debate.	  
	  
Yes	  for	  Wales:	  The	  Yes	  Campaign	  
The	   lessons	  of	   the	  disjointed	   and	  disunited	   campaign	   in	   1979	  had	  been	   learned	   the	  
hard	  way	  and	  were	  put	  right	  by	  Yes	  campaigners	   in	   the	  1997	  referendum	  campaign,	  
when	   the	   early	   establishment	   of	   the	   Yes	   for	   Wales	   campaign	   helped	   to	   provide	  
direction	   and	   focus	   to	   the	   campaign.52	   	   And	   while	   the	   2011	   version	   of	   the	   Yes	   for	  
Wales	   campaign	   had	   been	   working	   in	   the	   background	   prior	   to	   its	   public	   launch	   in	  
January	  2011	  –	  just	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  referendum	  date	  –	  there	  were	  concerns	  
about	   the	   readiness	  of	  actors	   for	   the	   campaign	   in	   the	  months	  prior.53	   	   In	   interviews	  
                                                
51	  Electoral	  Commission,	  ‘No	  “lead	  campaigners”	  for	  National	  Assembly	  referendum’,	  Press	  Statement,	  
25	  January,	  2011(b).	  Also	  at:	  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/news-­‐and-­‐media/news-­‐
releases/electoral-­‐commission-­‐media-­‐centre/news-­‐releases-­‐referendums/no-­‐lead-­‐campaigners-­‐for-­‐
national-­‐assembly-­‐referendum	  
52	  Andrews,	  L.	  1999	  op.	  cit.	  p.70.	  
53	  Harvey,	  M.	  2011(a),	  op	  cit.	  p.93.	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with	   the	   author	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   2010,	   key	   stakeholders	   identified	   seven	   distinct	  
concerns	  regarding	  the	  campaign:	  
	  
• Cost	  of	  campaigning	  
• Activist	  engagement	  
• Timing	  





Yes	  for	  Wales	  tried	  to	  address	  some	  of	  these	  concerns	  early	   in	  the	  campaign.	   	  Given	  
the	  lack	  of	  designation	  as	  a	  lead	  campaign,	  funding	  became	  both	  more	  and	  less	  of	  an	  
issue.	   	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   campaign	   missed	   out	   on	   public	   funding	   to	   help	   with	  
establishment	   costs	   and	   instead	   had	   to	   rely	   on	   donations	   and	   help	   from	   political	  
parties.	   	   But	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   with	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   designated	   No	   campaign,	   the	  
amount	   Yes	   for	  Wales	   required	   to	   run	   the	   campaign	  was	  much	   less.	   	   Indeed,	   those	  
campaigning	  for	  a	  No	  vote	  spent	   just	  £3,968	   in	  the	  referendum	  campaign	  (£3,785	  of	  
that	  figure	  was	  spent	  by	  True	  Wales)	  which,	  compared	  to	  the	  £140,000	  spent	  by	  those	  
campaigning	   for	   a	   Yes	   vote	   (including	   £81,452	   by	   the	   Yes	   for	   Wales	   umbrella	  
organisation)	  shows	  the	  disparity	  in	  spending	  power	  between	  the	  two	  camps.55	  	  As	  an	  
umbrella	   group,	   Yes	   for	  Wales	  maintained	   some	  control	  over	   the	  national	   campaign	  
but	   gave	   considerable	   freedom	   to	   organisations	   to	   run	   their	   own	   local	   campaigns,	  
helping	  to	  maintain	  activist	  interest	  in	  the	  campaign	  by	  allowing	  those	  local	  groups	  to	  
have	  a	  say	   in	   the	  planning	  of	  events.	   	  The	   leadership	  of	   the	  campaign	  by	   the	  WRU’s	  
                                                
54	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  these	  issues,	  see	  Harvey,	  M.	  ‘How	  to	  Lose	  a	  Referendum	  in	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  Ways:	  Thoughts	  
on	  the	  Upcoming	  Welsh	  Powers	  Referendum’	  in	  Regional	  and	  Federal	  Studies	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  1,	  March,	  
2011,	  pp91-­‐99.	  





Roger	  Lewis	  and	  the	  experienced	  Daran	  Hill	  meant	  that	  political	  parties	  could	  focus	  on	  
their	  own	  contributions	  to	  local	  campaigns	  without	  worrying	  about	  the	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  
team,	   and	   this	   helped	   to	  maintain	   the	   unity	   that	   the	   parties	   had	   pledged	   from	   the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  process.	  	  And	  while	  communication	  might	  have	  been	  a	  problem,	  the	  
Yes	  for	  Wales	  campaign	  kept	  their	  message	  simple.	  	  For	  Yes	  for	  Wales,	  the	  advantages	  
of	  a	  Yes	  vote	  were	  fivefold:	  	  
	  
• To	  save	  time	  and	  resources;	  	  
• To	  allow	  prompt	  implementation	  of	  policy	  as	  needed;	  
• To	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  public	  and	  organisations	  to	  understand	  and	  
participate;	  
• To	  create	  more	  strategic	  legislation;	  and	  
• To	  allow	  AMs	  to	  concentrate	  on	  policy	  rather	  than	  powers.56	  
	  
It	  was	  a	  message	  that	  the	  referendum	  was	  a	  means	  of	  giving	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales	   the	   opportunity	   to	   become	   a	   more	   efficient	   tool	   for	   legislation	   in	   Wales,	  
allowing	  it	  greater	  scope	  to	  help	  the	  Welsh	  population	  in	  particular	  policy	  areas.	  	  True	  
Wales,	  meanwhile,	  focused	  on	  what	  it	  saw	  as	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Assembly	  to	  deliver	  on	  
the	  economic	  promises	  made	  during	   the	  1997	   referendum	  campaign,	  arguing	   that	  a	  
No	  vote	  would	  help	  to	  “roll	  back”	  and	  “undermine”	  devolution	  in	  Wales.57	  	  The	  debate	  
thus	  became	  about	  efficiency,	  with	  Yes	  campaigners	  making	  the	  case	  that	  allowing	  the	  
Assembly	  to	  use	  the	  powers	  devolved	  to	  it	  in	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  
2006	  would	   improve	   legislation	   in	  Wales	  while	  No	  campaigners	  argued	  that	   it	  would	  
only	  add	  to	  the	   inefficiency	  of	  the	  Assembly	  and	  that	  devolution	   in	  Wales	  needed	  to	  
be	   reviewed	   and	   revised.58	   	   No	   campaigners	  were	   also	   keen	   to	   emphasise	   the	   one-­‐
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sided	  nature	  of	  the	  debate,	  with	  the	  “100	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  membership”	  of	  the	  National	  
Assembly	   for	   Wales	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   changes,	   they	   considered	   the	   campaign	   itself	  
undemocratic.59	  
	  
Attitudes	  towards	  devolution	  and	  the	  referendum	  
The	   inability	   of	   the	   Electoral	   Commission	   to	   designate	   lead	   campaigns	   for	   the	  
referendum	  made	  the	  campaign	  itself	  a	  low-­‐key	  affair,	  with	  concerns	  that	  information	  
on	  the	  either	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  come	  by	  for	  both	  journalists	  and	  the	  
wider	  public,	  and	  a	  resultant	  expectation	  that	  turnout	  would	  be	  negatively	  affected.60	  	  	  
	  
Table	  6.2:	  Wales	  Devolution	  Powers	  Opinion	  Polls	  (2010-­‐11)61	  
 
Date	  of	  Poll	   	   Yes	   No	   Don’t	  Know	  
24	  Nov	  2010	  	   ITV	  Wales/	  YouGov	   52%	   29%	   13%	  
28	  Nov	  2010	   BBC	  Wales/	  ICM	   57%	   24%	   18%	  
22	  Dec	  2010	   ITV	  Wales/	  YouGov	   48%	   30%	   14%	  
26	  Jan	  2011	   ITV	  Wales/	  YouGov	   49%	   26%	   26%	  
23	  Feb	  2011	   ITV	  Wales/	  YouGov	   58%	   29%	   13%	  
28	  Feb	  2011	   Western	  Mail/	  R&M	  Group	   49%	   22%	   28%	  
2	  March	  2011	   ITV	  Wales/	  YouGov	   61%	   28%	   12%	  
	  
The	  concerns	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  information	  were	  not	  unfounded.	  	  As	  many	  as	  a	  quarter	  
of	   those	   surveyed	   in	   opinion	   polls	   in	   the	   weeks	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   referendum	  
responded	   that	   they	   didn’t	   know	   how	   they	   would	   be	   voting	   (see	   table	   6.2).	   	   This	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published,	  31	  January,	  2011,	  at:	  http://www.clickonwales.org/2011/01/psychology-­‐of-­‐the-­‐no-­‐
campaign/	  
60	  Trench,	  A.	  ‘Saying	  “No”	  in	  Wales’	  in	  Devolution	  Matters,	  self-­‐published,	  23	  January,	  2011(b),	  at:	  
	  http://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/2011/01/23/saying-­‐no-­‐in-­‐wales/	  
61	  Powell,	  N.	  ‘Welsh	  referendum	  –	  the	  final	  poll’	  in	  ITV	  Wales	  Blog,	  self-­‐published,	  2	  March,	  2011,	  at:	  	  
http://itvwalesblog.com/2011/03/02/welsh-­‐referendum-­‐the-­‐final-­‐poll/;	  ICM,	  ‘Poll	  for	  BBC	  Wales’,	  
December,	  2010,	  at:	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provided	   clear	   evidence	   that	   neither	   side	   was	   particularly	   adept	   at	   getting	   their	  
information	  across.	   	  An	  eve	  of	  poll	  survey	  conducted	  by	  ICM	  for	  the	  BBC	  saw	  48%	  of	  
respondents	   declare	   they	   did	   not	   have	   enough	   information	   to	   make	   an	   informed	  
decision	   as	   to	  how	   to	   vote	   in	   the	   referendum	   itself.62	   	  Nevertheless,	   polls	   remained	  
positive	  for	  the	  Yes	  campaign,	  which	  continued	  to	  register	  a	  sizeable	  lead	  in	  polls	  right	  
up	  to	  the	  referendum	  date	  itself.	   	  This	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  1997.63	  	  
The	  final	  outcome	  in	  1997	  –	  a	  victory	  margin	  of	  just	  6,721	  from	  over	  one	  million	  votes	  
cast	  –	  meant	  that	  no	  one	  in	  the	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  team	  was	  taking	  victory	  for	  granted	  this	  
time	  around,	  with	  leaders	  from	  all	  four	  of	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  campaign	  and	  the	  
campaign	  chairman	  urging	  the	  electorate	  to	  go	  out	  and	  vote	  Yes.64	  
	  
Table	  6.3:	  Wales	  Powers	  Referendum	  Result	  (2011)65	  
	  
Do	  you	  want	  the	  Assembly	  now	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  laws	  
on	  all	  matters	  in	  the	  20	  subject	  areas	  it	  has	  powers	  for?	  
	   Votes	   Vote	  %	  
Yes	   517,132	   63.49%	  
No	   297,380	   36.51%	  
Turnout	   814,512	   35.6%	  
	  
On	  the	  day	  itself,	  the	  polls	  proved	  accurate,	   if	  understating	  the	  strength	  of	  feeling	   in	  
support	   of	   the	  proposals	   slightly.	   	  On	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	  Assembly	   should	  
“now	  be	  able	  to	  make	  laws	  on	  all	  matters	   in	  the	  20	  subject	  areas	  it	  has	  powers	  for”,	  
517,132	  voted	  in	  favour,	  equating	  to	  63.5%	  of	  those	  voting	  (table	  6.3).	  	  This	  provided	  a	  
healthy	  margin	  of	  victory	  for	  the	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  campaign	  of	  219,752	  –	  a	  considerable	  
                                                
62	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increase	   on	   the	   6,721	   margin	   achieved	   in	   1997.	   	   The	   turnout	   of	   35.2%	   was	   not	   a	  
ringing	   endorsement	  of	   the	  proposals.	   	   It	  was	  higher	   than	  many	  expected	  however,	  
and	   with	   limited	   visibility	   of	   the	   respective	   campaigns	   (given	   the	   lack	   of	   lead	  
organisations)	   it	   was	   regarded	   as	   a	   relatively	   strong	   showing.66	   	   However,	   with	   just	  
35%	   of	   the	   electorate	   bothering	   to	   vote,	   the	   result	   could	   “hardly	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	  
triumph	   for	   democratic	   participation”.67	   	   Of	   considerable	   cheer	   for	   supporters	   of	  
devolution	  was	  the	  regional	  breakdown	  of	  results.	  	  Unlike	  in	  1997,	  when	  half	  of	  the	  22	  
unitary	   authorities	   in	   Wales	   voted	   no,	   only	   one	   (Monmouthshire,	   on	   the	   English	  
border)	  did	  so	  this	  time,	  and	  even	  that	  was	  by	  the	  small	  margin	  of	  320	  votes.	  	  
	  
The	  implications	  of	  this	  were	  clear	  –	  even	  for	  True	  Wales,	  whose	  spokesperson	  Rachel	  
Banner	  recognised	  that	  the	  referendum	  result	  was	  a	  “turning	  point	   in	  the	  history”	  of	  
Wales.	  	  However,	  while	  she	  recognised	  that	  the	  referendum	  was	  a	  clear	  mandate	  for	  
the	   extension	   of	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales,	   she	   did	   question	  
whether	  the	  current	  number	  of	  Assembly	  members	  could	  provide	  adequate	  scrutiny	  of	  
legislation	   –	   a	   question	   AMs	   themselves	   had	   been	   asking	   since	   the	   Richard	  
Commission	  reported	  in	  2004.68	  
	  
Referendums	  in	  Wales	  
Putting	  the	  2011	  referendum	  result	  in	  historical	  context	  is	  important,	  and	  comparisons	  
can	   be	   drawn	   between	   the	   three	   referendums	   where	   the	   pro-­‐	   and	   anti-­‐devolution	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  ‘Referendum	  result:	  Wales	  said	  Yes’	  in	  Devolution	  Matters,	  self-­‐published	  4	  March,	  2011(c)	  
at:	  	  http://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/2011/03/04/referendum-­‐result-­‐wales-­‐said-­‐yes/	  
67	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  2012,	  op	  cit.	  p.111.	  




sides	  	  of	  Welsh	  public	  life	  were	  broadly	  represented.	  	  In	  1979,	  voters	  in	  Wales	  rejected	  
devolution	   by	   a	   margin	   of	   four-­‐to-­‐one,	   rendering	   the	   requirement	   that	   40%	   of	   the	  
eligible	   electorate	   vote	   for	   the	   measure	   unnecessary,	   and	   devolution	   was	   soundly	  
defeated.	  	  In	  1997,	  the	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  campaign	  managed	  to	  reverse	  that	  result,	  albeit	  
with	  a	  slim	  margin	  of	  victory	  (winning	  50.3%	  of	  the	  vote,	  on	  a	  50%	  turnout).	  	  The	  1997	  
result,	   however,	   did	   represent	   a	   swing	   of	   15%	   from	   No	   to	   Yes,	   a	   sizeable	   shift	   in	  
opinion,	  without	  which	   the	   Assembly	   could	   not	   have	   been	   established.69	   	   The	   2011	  
result	  saw	  a	  further	  shift,	  with	  the	  Yes	  for	  Wales	  campaign	  securing	  63.5%	  of	  the	  vote,	  
continuing	  the	  trend	  in	  favour	  of	  devolution.	  	  While	  some	  did	  point	  to	  the	  low	  turnout	  
in	  2011	   (just	   35.6%	  of	   those	  eligible	   to	   vote	  on	  3	  March	  did	   so)	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  
mandate	   for	   further	   powers	   was	   not	   unquestionable,	   those	   voting	   Yes	   in	   the	   two	  
referendums	   which	   delivered	   positive	   outcomes	   for	   devolution	   remained	   fairly	  
consistent.	  	  In	  1997,	  559,413	  people	  voted	  for	  devolution	  while	  in	  2011,	  those	  voting	  
to	  enact	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  numbered	  517,132.	  	  Though	  this	  
represented	  a	  reduction	  of	  some	  42,000	  votes	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  proposals,	  over	  half	  a	  
million	  voters	  remained	  in	  favour	  of	  devolution	  and	  enhancing	  its	  role.	  	  Contrastingly,	  
those	  voting	  No	  in	  1997	  numbered	  552,698	  while	  in	  2011	  that	  figure	  was	  297,380	  –	  a	  
reduction	  in	  those	  voting	  against	  the	  proposals	  of	  over	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  million	  voters.	  	  In	  
a	   nation	   in	   which	   the	   electorate	   numbers	   just	   over	   2.2	   million,	   these	   are	   not	  
inconsiderable	  changes,	  and	  represent	  a	  clear	  body	  of	  opinion	  that	  devolution	  is	  now	  
an	  accepted	  part	  of	  the	  Welsh	  political	   landscape,	  and	  that	   it	  should	  be	  enhanced	  to	  
better	  serve	  the	  Welsh	  public.	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242	  
This	  progression	  of	  Welsh	  attitudes	  –	  from	  anti-­‐devolution	  through	  (narrow)	  support	  
for	  devolution	  to	  support	  for	  enhanced	  devolution	  –	  is	  important	  for	  devolved	  politics	  
in	  Wales,	   representing	   as	   it	   does,	   support	   for	   the	  Assembly	   and	   its	  maturation	   as	   a	  
political	  institution.	  	  It	  also	  marks	  a	  clear	  change,	  not	  only	  in	  how	  politics	  is	  perceived	  
in	  Wales,	  but	  how	  it	  operates.	   	  Transparency,	  accountability,	  access	  and	  engagement	  
were	  clearly	  apparent	  in	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  new	  institution,	  and	  this	  was	  made	  clear	  
in	  the	  consultative	  process	  which	  operated	  prior	  to	  the	  2011	  referendum.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  
public	   engagement	   in	   consultations	   or	   debates	   about	   devolution	   in	   1979	   or	   1997	  
meant	  that	  when	  the	  referendum	  came	  around	  in	  those	  cases,	  the	  subject	  was	  treated	  
with	  suspicion,	  since	  the	  public	  were	  wary	  of	  something	  about	  which	  they	  knew	  little.	  	  
Activists	   and	  politicians	   alike	   in	   2011	  had	   learned	   this	   lesson	   the	  hard	  way,	   and	   the	  
Welsh	   Assembly	   Government’s	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   was	   an	   attempt	   not	   only	   to	  
engage	  the	  public	  in	  the	  debate	  but	  to	  educate	  and	  inform	  them	  about	  the	  subject	  of	  
the	   referendum.	   	   When	   the	   referendum	   came	   around	   –	   a	   clear	   test	   of	   public	  
engagement	  with	   the	   institution	  and	   the	   issue	  more	  specifically	  –	   the	   time	  spent	  on	  
consultation	  appeared	  to	  bear	  fruit.	  
	  
Of	   equal	   importance	   for	   the	  Welsh	   political	   landscape	   is	   the	   precedent	   set	   by	   this	  
referendum.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  several	  politicians70	  and	  commentators71	  questioned	  the	  
necessity	  of	  the	  referendum	  itself,	  arguing	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  legislative	  powers	  had	  
already	  been	  passed	  and	  the	  changes	  which	  would	  derive	  from	  the	  2011	  referendum	  
were	   not	   substantial	   enough	   to	   constitute	   the	   holding	   of	   a	   referendum	   on	  
                                                
70	  Interviews	  with	  Gareth	  Jones	  (Plaid	  Cymru	  AM),	  Mike	  German	  (then	  Lib	  Dem	  AM),	  Lord	  Elis-­‐Thomas	  
(then	  Presiding	  Officer	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales)	  and	  Alun	  Davies	  (Labour	  AM)	  (June/	  July	  
2010).	  
71	  Trench,	  A.	  2011(a),	  op	  cit.	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constitutional	  grounds.	   	  However,	   the	  referendum	  was	  a	  necessity	   from	  the	  point	  of	  
view	   that	   the	   Government	   of	   Wales	   Act	   2006	   mandated	   public	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
powers	  set	  out	  in	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Act	  before	  they	  could	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  Assembly.	  	  
But	   this	  presents	  a	  difficult	   challenge	   for	  politicians	   in	  Wales,	  particularly	   those	  who	  
are	  amenable	   to	   the	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales	   securing	   further	  devolved	  powers	  
from	  Westminster	  –	  namely	  whether	  the	  precedent	  of	  this	  referendum	  has	  meant	  that	  
any	   further	   devolution	   (for	   example,	   the	   fiscal	   powers	   outlined	   by	   the	   Holtham	  
Commission)	   would	   require	   ratification	   by	   the	   public	   in	   further	   referendums.72	  	  
Certainly,	  the	  former	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales	  (and	  architect	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  
Wales	  Act	  2006)	  Peter	  Hain	  suggested	  so	   in	   interviews	  on	   the	  day	   the	   results	  of	   the	  
referendum	  were	   announced	   at	   the	   Senedd	   in	   Cardiff.73	   	   The	   Holtham	   Commission	  
report	   itself	   suggested	   that	   if	   fiscal	   powers	  were	   to	  be	  devolved	   then	  a	   referendum	  
would	   be	   required74	   and	   this	   view	   was	   confirmed	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   a	   Welsh	  
Assembly	  Government	  Official.	  	  The	  suggestion	  here	  was	  clear:	  	  the	  1997	  referendum	  
approved	  the	  principle	  of	  executive	  devolution	  and	  the	  2011	  referendum	  allowed	  for	  
legislative	   powers	   to	   be	   devolved	   –	   if	   fiscal	   powers	   were	   also	   to	   be	   added,	   a	   third	  
referendum	  would	  be	  required.75	  	  	  
	  
                                                
72	  The	  Holtham	  Commission	  –	  formally,	  The	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Funding	  and	  Finance	  for	  Wales	  
–	  was	  established	  by	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  to	  examine	  the	  options	  for	  funding	  the	  National	  
Assembly	  for	  Wales.	  	  Among	  the	  recommendations	  for	  change,	  the	  Commission	  suggested	  the	  Assembly	  
should	  have,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  fiscal	  powers	  available	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  through	  its	  sole	  tax-­‐
varying	  power.	  
73	  BBC	  News	  Wales,	  2011(b),	  op	  cit.	  
74	  Holtham	  Commission,	  ‘Fairness	  and	  accountability:	  a	  new	  funding	  settlement	  for	  Wales’	  Final	  Report	  
of	  the	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Funding	  and	  Finance	  for	  Wales,	  Cardiff,	  July,	  2010.	  
75	  Interview	  with	  senior	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  Official	  (July	  2010).	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Thus,	  the	  precedent	  set	  by	  the	  “unnecessary”	  referendum76	  in	  2011	  (and,	  to	  an	  extent,	  
the	   use	   of	   the	   referendum	   as	   a	   device	   to	   ask	   the	   public’s	   consent	   for	   the	  
establishment	  of	  devolved	  institutions	  in	  1979	  and	  1997)	  has	  meant	  that	  any	  attempt	  
to	  make	  further	  changes	  to	  the	  devolution	  settlement	  would	  almost	  certainly	  require	  
some	   public	   consent.	   	   In	   evidence	   to	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   Select	   Committee	   on	   the	  
Constitution,	  Vernon	  Bogdanor	  made	  the	  case	  that	  direct	  democracy	  (that	  is,	  the	  use	  
of	   referendums)	   should	   be	   used	   more	   often	   in	   the	   UK,	   arguing	   that	   “people	   now	  
believe	  [...]	  that	  they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  be	  consulted	  on	  major	  changes”.77	  	  The	  previous	  
(1997-­‐2010	   Labour)	   UK	   Government	   also	   provided	   evidence	   to	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	  
Committee,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  “precedents	  set	  by	  previous	  referendums”	  should	  act	  
as	  a	  guide	   to	   the	   issues	  which	   should	  be	  put	   to	  a	  public	   vote	   in	   the	   future.78	   	   Thus,	  
while	  political	  actors	  did	  not	  welcome	  the	  necessity	  of	  this	  referendum,	  they	  may	  well	  
have	  to	  go	  through	  the	  process	  again	   in	  the	  future	  should	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  
Wales	  seek	  to	  add	  further	  –	  fiscal	  –	  powers	  to	  its	  remit.	  	  	  
	  
The	  (lack	  of	  a)	  Scottish	  referendum	  2007-­‐11	  
For	   the	   SNP	  –	  prior	   to	  devolution	  –	   the	  principle	  of	   a	   referendum	  on	   independence	  
was	  not	  one	  which	  carried	  much	  weight	  within	  the	  party.	  	  The	  understanding	  was	  that,	  
should	  the	  SNP	  win	  a	  majority	  of	  Scottish	  seats	   in	  a	  UK	  General	  Election,	  they	  would	  
thus	   have	   a	   mandate	   to	   negotiate	   the	   separation	   of	   Scotland	   from	   the	   Union.	   	   A	  
referendum	   would	   follow	   only	   to	   approve	   a	   new	   Scottish	   constitution	   and	   bill	   of	  
                                                
76	  Wyn	  Jones,	  R.	  and	  Scully,	  R.	  2012,	  op	  cit.	  p.163.	  
77	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  Constitution,	  “Referendums	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom”,	  12th	  




rights.79	   	  The	   institutional	  problem	  for	   the	  SNP,	  however,	  was	   the	   first	  past	   the	  post	  
electoral	  system,	  which	  made	  such	  an	  outcome	  nearly	  impossible.	  	  Even	  at	  the	  height	  
of	   the	  SNP’s	   success	  –	   the	   two	  elections	  of	  1974	  –	   the	  party	  only	  polled	  30%	  of	   the	  
vote,	  and	  returned	  7,	  and	  then	  11,	  MPs.	  	  Subsequent	  elections	  to	  Westminster	  never	  
succeeded	   in	   overcoming	   the	   former	   total,	   a	   far	   cry	   from	   half	   of	   Scotland’s	  
representation	   in	   the	  House	  of	  Commons.	   	  Furthermore,	   in	  a	  general	  election,	  many	  
factors	   influence	   voters	   –	   they	   are	   never	   solely	   about	   one	   issue	   (though	   this	  was	   a	  
lesson	   the	  SNP	  would	  use	   to	   its	  advantage	   in	  2007	  and	  2011,	   reversing	   this	   strategy	  
and	  telling	  voters	  that	  they	  could	  decide	  upon	  independence	  at	  a	  later	  date).	  	  So,	  while	  
independence	  may	  have	  been	   a	   consideration	   for	   some	   voters,	   the	   recognition	   that	  
the	  SNP	  would	  not	  form	  the	  government,	  or	  a	  preference	  for	  Labour	  or	  Conservative	  
fiscal	  policy	  for	  example,	  may	  have	  proved	  a	  more	  significant	  influence	  on	  their	  vote.	  	  
The	  SNP’s	  strategy	  of	  using	  a	  General	  Election	  to	  provide	  a	  mandate	  for	  independence	  
was	  not	  to	  prove	  successful.	  
	  
Thus,	  from	  the	  1990s	  on,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Alex	  Salmond,	  the	  party	  looked	  to	  a	  
much	   more	   gradualist	   approach,	   supporting	   devolution	   as	   a	   stepping	   stone	   to	  
independence.	  	  And	  when	  devolution	  was	  delivered,	  the	  SNP’s	  manifesto	  for	  the	  first	  
devolved	  election	   in	  1999	   included	  a	  proposal	   to	  hold	  an	   independence	   referendum	  
during	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  first	  parliamentary	  term.80	  	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  referendum	  –	  with	  
multiple	   options	   for	   Scotland’s	   constitutional	   future	   –	   had	   been	   part	   of	   the	   SNP’s	  
internal	  debates	   immediately	  prior	   to	  Alex	  Salmond’s	  becoming	   leader	   in	  1990,	  and,	  
                                                
79	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  Yes	  We	  Can	  win	  the	  best	  for	  Scotland:	  The	  SNP	  General	  Election	  Manifesto,	  
Edinburgh,	  SNP,	  1997,	  p.6.	  
80	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  Scotland’s	  Party,	  Scotland’s	  Parliament:	  Manifesto	  for	  the	  1999	  elections,	  
Edinburgh,	  SNP,	  1999,	  p.10.	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after	  much	   internal	   debate,	   the	   principle	   found	   its	   way	   into	   the	   SNP’s	  manifesto.81	  	  
The	   party	   had	   never	   before	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   compete	   electorally	   in	   a	   solely	  
Scottish	   context	  previously	  and	   this	  gave	   the	  party	  an	   institutional	  advantage	  as	   the	  
only	  major	  party	  solely	  based	  in	  Scotland.82	  	  However,	  with	  35	  MSPs	  elected	  in	  1999,	  
and	  then	  just	  27	  in	  2003,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  2007	  that	  this	  advantage	  became	  apparent.	  	  
The	   SNP’s	   manifesto	   in	   2007	   made	   clear	   the	   party’s	   intention	   to	   work	   towards	   an	  
independence	  referendum	  in	  the	  latter	  stages	  of	  their	  term	  in	  office	  should	  they	  enter	  
government.83	   	  This	  proposal	  appeared	  alongside	  a	   raft	  of	  populist	  policies	  aimed	  at	  
securing	  public	  support	  (opposition	  to	  the	  closure	  of	  accident	  and	  emergency	  units	  at	  
local	  hospitals	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  more	  successful	  of	  these	  policies)	  while	  at	  
the	   same	   time	  playing	  down	   the	   threat	  of	   ‘separation’	   that	  would	   follow	  should	   the	  
party	   be	   victorious.	   	   Instead	   of	   opening	   negotiations	   straight	   away	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
winning	  an	  election,	  the	  party	  indicated	  that	  they	  would	  publish	  a	  consultation	  on	  the	  
constitutional	  future	  of	  Scotland,	  with	  the	  end	  result	  being	  a	  referendum	  on	  Scottish	  
independence.	  	  This	  provided	  the	  party	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  appeal	  to	  parts	  of	  the	  
electorate	   who	   were	   resolutely	   opposed	   to	   independence	   and	   who	   had	   previously	  
been	   reluctant	   to	   vote	   for	   the	  SNP.	   	   Effectively	   the	  party	   told	   them	   that	   they	  didn’t	  
have	  to	  decide	  upon	   independence	  during	  the	  election	  –	  that	  a	  vote	  for	  the	  SNP	  did	  
not	   mean	   a	   vote	   for	   separation.	   	   They	   could	   still	   vote	   against	   independence	   in	   a	  
referendum	  while	  voting	  for	  the	  policy	  platform	  the	  SNP	  were	  fighting	  the	  election	  on.	  	  
As	  an	  electoral	  strategy,	  it	  worked	  –	  the	  SNP	  were	  able	  to	  penetrate	  Labour’s	  electoral	  
heartlands	  in	  west	  and	  central	  Scotland,	  winning	  seats	  and	  votes	  from	  Labour	  and	  the	  
                                                
81	  Mitchell,	  J.	  1996,	  op.	  cit.	  p.165.	  
82	  Trench,	  A	  ‘Introduction:	  The	  Second	  Phase	  of	  Devolution’	  in	  Trench,	  A.	  (ed)	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Nations	  
2008,	  Exeter,	  Imprint	  Academic,	  2008,	  p.5.	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  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  2007,	  op.	  cit.	  p.8.	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election	   with	   more	   votes	   than	   any	   other	   party	   and,	   crucially,	   one	   more	   seat	   than	  
Labour.	  
	  
SNP	  Referendum	  strategy	  2007-­‐10	  
The	  SNP’s	   referendum	  strategy	   for	   the	   first	  half	  of	   their	  period	   in	  office	  had	   several	  
facets,	   some	  of	  which	  proved	   successful	   (to	  a	  point)	   and	  others	  which	  were	   less	   so.	  	  
The	  party	  sought	  to	  separate	  electoral	  support	  for	  the	  SNP	  as	  a	  party	  from	  support	  for	  
their	  constitutional	  goal,	  which	  allowed	  them	  to	  appeal	  to	  voters	  who	  did	  not	  support	  
independence.	   	   The	   party	   also	   sought	   to	   emphasise	   the	   democratic	   nature	   of	   their	  
intention	  –	  thereby	  tying	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐determination	  to	  a	  democratic	  principle:	  
the	   right	   of	   the	   people	   to	   have	   a	   say	   on	   how	   they	   are	   governed.84	   	   Indeed,	   the	  
principle	  of	  a	  referendum	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  connotation	  of	  self-­‐determination:	  that	  this	  
is	  an	  issue	  that	  the	  people	  are	  allowed	  to	  decide	  for	  themselves,	  a	  principle	  which,	  if	  
carried,	  would	  be	  extended	   to	   the	   country	   itself	   as	   an	   independent	   sovereign	   state.	  	  
However,	   the	   SNP’s	   strategy	   also	   recognised	   the	   inherent	   risk	   they	  would	   taking	   in	  
inviting	   the	  public	   to	  have	   their	   say	   in	   a	   referendum	  on	   their	   constitutional	   goal.	   	  A	  
referendum	  on	   the	  constitution	   is	  a	  once-­‐in-­‐a-­‐generation	  event.	   	  The	  opportunity	   to	  
deliver	   independence	   is	   one	   which	   the	   party	   was	   established	   for,	   and	   one	   which	  
governing	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  gave	  the	  party	  a	  chance	  to	  make	  good.	  	  However,	  
leaving	  such	  a	  decision	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  people	  is	  potentially	  dangerous	  for	  a	  party.	  	  
This	  was	  why	  scheduling	   the	   referendum	  at	   the	  most	  opportune	   time	  was	  of	  critical	  
importance	   to	   the	   SNP.	   	   If	   the	   party	   got	   it	   wrong	   –	   if	   the	   public	   were	   to	   reject	  
independence	   in	  a	   referendum,	  as	  opinion	  polls	   throughout	   the	  SNP’s	   term	   in	  office	  
                                                
84	  Interview	  with	  a	  senior	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  Government	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  (May	  2010).	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suggested	  –	  the	  party	  would	  have	  to	  wait	  a	  generation	  to	  hold	  another	  referendum	  on	  
the	  subject	  if,	  indeed,	  they	  ever	  got	  the	  opportunity	  again.	  	  	  
	  
The	   strategy	   then,	  was	   very	  much	   a	   long-­‐term	  one.	   	   The	   SNP	  understood	   that	   their	  
constitutional	  preference	  was	  not	  the	  constitutional	  preference	  of	  the	  majority.	  	  Thus,	  
an	   instant	   referendum	  was	  not	  an	  option.	   	   Indeed,	  as	   Lijphart	  acknowledges,	   “when	  
governments	  control	  the	  referendum,	  they	  will	  tend	  to	  use	  it	  only	  when	  they	  expect	  to	  
win”.85	   	  The	  SNP	  recognised	  that	  they	  were	  unlikely	  to	  win	  such	  a	  referendum	  in	  the	  
early	  years	  of	  their	  term	  in	  office	  and	  thus	  planned	  to	  put	  off	  the	  referendum	  until	  the	  
latter	   part	   of	   the	   session.	   	   The	   focus	   of	   governing	   then	   became	  making	   every	   issue	  
about	  building	  support	  for	  independence.86	  	  However,	  support	  for	  their	  constitutional	  
preference	   remained	   static,	   and	   even	   dipped	   during	   the	   later	   stages	   of	   the	  
consultation	  process.	   	  This	  meant	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  the	  party’s	  referendum	  strategy.	  	  
Patience,	   from	   activists	   and	   elected	   representatives	   alike,	   was	   very	   much	   the	  
watchword.	  	  
	  
Minority	  Government:	  major	  difficulties	  
The	   SNP	   released	   a	   list	   of	   achievements	   from	   their	   first	   100	   days	   in	   office,	   which	  
suggested	  that	  their	  experience	  of	  minority	  government	  was	  a	  positive	  one,	  certainly	  
in	  its	  early	  period.87	  	  But	  as	  their	  opposition	  reacted	  to	  the	  new	  political	  set-­‐up	  (it	  was	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  A.	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  Haven,	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  University	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  National	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  Edinburgh,	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not	  only	  the	  SNP	  who	  had	  to	  react	  to	  the	  system	  of	  minority	  government)	  they	  began	  
to	  use	  the	  parliamentary	  arithmetic	  to	  their	  advantage	  –	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  SNP’s	  
agenda.	   	   There	   were,	   of	   course,	   still	   times	   when	   they	   supported	   the	   government,	  
when	   agreements	   were	   reached	   on	   parliamentary	   budgets	   (with	   the	   Conservatives,	  
somewhat	  surprisingly,	  keen	  to	  work	  with	   the	  SNP	  and	  extract	  concessions	   in	   return	  
for	   helping	   to	   pass	   the	   government’s	   budget).88	   	   But	   the	   more	   substantive	   policy	  
promises	  –	  the	  abolition	  of	  student	  debt	  and	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  council	  tax	  with	  
local	  income	  tax	  –	  were	  issues	  upon	  which	  agreement	  could	  not	  be	  found.	  
	  
Local	  income	  tax	  in	  particular	  was	  a	  difficult	  issue	  for	  the	  party.	  	  Throughout	  the	  2007	  
election	  campaign,	  the	  SNP	  had	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  council	  tax	  was	  unfair	  and	  needed	  
reformed	   –	   and	   that,	   given	   the	   opportunity	   in	   office,	   the	   party	   would	   make	   it	   a	  
priority.	   	   And	   while	   the	   party	   in	   office	  maintained	   that	   they	   wanted	   to	   reform	   the	  
system	  of	  local	  taxation,	  there	  was	  no	  agreement	  with	  the	  other	  parties	  as	  to	  how	  that	  
change	  could	  be	  made.	  	  Labour	  advised	  that	  while	  they	  sought	  change,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  
as	  substantial	  as	  a	  complete	  overhaul	  of	  the	  system	  –	  it	  would	  more	  likely	  update	  the	  
current	  model.	  	  The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  were	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  system	  of	  local	  income	  tax	  –	  
the	  closest	  party	  to	  the	  SNP	  on	  this	  issue	  –	  but	  insisted	  that	  local	  authorities	  should	  be	  
in	  control	  of	  the	  level	  of	  taxation,	  a	  distinct	  difference	  from	  the	  model	  the	  SNP	  were	  
proposing.	  	  The	  Greens	  proposed	  a	  radical	  model	  which	  they	  called	  Land	  Value	  Tax,	  a	  
model	  which	   they	   suggested	  would	  better	   support	   the	   low	   income	   families	   that	   the	  
SNP	  proposed	  to	  help	  through	  LIT.	  	  The	  Conservatives,	  for	  their	  part,	  did	  not	  see	  a	  real	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need	  for	  change.89	   	  For	  the	  first	  year	  and	  a	  half	  of	  the	  SNP	  administration,	  the	  party	  
remained	   optimistic	   that	   a	   deal	   with	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   might	   be	   struck	   and	  
continued	  to	  describe	  the	  freeze	   in	  council	   tax	  which	  had	  been	  agreed	  with	  all	  32	  of	  
Scotland’s	   local	   authorities	   as	   ‘temporary’.	   	   However,	   Cabinet	   Secretary	   for	   Finance	  
and	  Sustainable	  Growth	  John	  Swinney	  announced	  in	  February	  2009	  that	  the	  policy	  did	  
not	  have	  enough	  support	  in	  parliament	  and	  it	  would	  not	  be	  pursued	  for	  the	  remainder	  
of	  the	  parliamentary	  term.90	  	  
	  
This	  put	   the	  party	   in	  a	  difficult	  position.	   	  The	  end	  result	  of	   the	  episode	  was	  that	   the	  
SNP	  had	  dropped	  a	  flagship	  policy	  (local	  income	  tax)	  from	  its	  government	  agenda	  due	  
to	  lack	  of	  parliamentary	  support.	  	  However,	  the	  party	  continued	  to	  pursue	  its	  policy	  of	  
holding	  a	  referendum	  on	  constitutional	  change	  –	  a	  second	  issue	  for	  which	  there	  was	  
not	  a	  parliamentary	  majority	  for.	  	  Opposition	  parties	  pressed	  the	  point	  that	  this	  was	  a	  
clear	  double	  standard	  from	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  –	  that	  they	  recognised	  a	  lack	  of	  
parliamentary	  support	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  withdraw	  a	  policy	  in	  the	  instance	  of	  local	  income	  
tax,	  but	  not	  in	  that	  of	  an	  independence	  referendum.	  	  This	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  
a	  major	  problem	  for	  the	  party	  in	  office.	  
	  
2010-­‐11	  Referendum	  Strategy	  
Phase	  three	  of	  the	  consultation	  was	  launched	  in	  November	  2009	  with	  the	  publication	  
of	  a	  second	  constitutional	  White	  Paper	  entitled	  Your	  Scotland,	  Your	  Voice.	  	  This	  phase	  
–	   after	   the	   initial	   work	   done	   to	   promote	   independence	   through	   public	   events	   and	  
                                                





publications	   –	   was	   intended	   to	   mark	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   campaign	   for	   an	  
independence	   referendum	   and	   stretch	   through	   to	   the	   referendum	   itself,	   tentatively	  
planned	   for	   2010.	   	   However,	  with	   parliamentary	   arithmetic	   still	   against	   them	   –	   and	  
having	  made	  no	  progress	  on	  convincing	  opposition	  parties	  to	  support	  a	  referendum	  –	  
the	   SNP	   were	   faced	   with	   major	   problems	   in	   keeping	   to	   their	   promise	   to	   hold	   a	  
referendum.	  	  Instead	  of	  campaigning	  for	  independence,	  this	  phase	  of	  the	  consultation	  
involved	  efforts	  simply	  to	  hold	  one.	  	  	  
	  
And	   that	   intention	   was	   made	   more	   difficult	   in	   January	   2010	   when	   parliamentary	  
manoeuvring	  by	  opposition	  parties	  meant	  that,	  if	  the	  SNP	  did	  introduce	  a	  referendum	  
bill	  into	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  (as	  it	  intended	  to	  do)	  that	  bill	  would	  be	  considered	  by	  
a	  Labour-­‐chaired	  special	  committee	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.91	  	  The	  SNP	  had	  waited	  
until	  the	  rotation	  of	  party	  committee	  chairs	  had	  returned	  to	  them	  before	  the	  bill	  was	  
to	   be	   announced,	   but	   a	   parliamentary	   intervention	   on	   the	   decision	   by	   Cabinet	  
Secretary	   for	   Justice	   Kenny	   MacAskill	   to	   release	   from	   prison	   Abdelbaset	   Mohmed	  
Ali	  al-­‐Megrahi,	   the	   man	   convicted	   of	   the	   Lockerbie	   bombing	   in	   1989,	   meant	   their	  
opportunity	  to	  convene	  a	  special	  committee	  passed.	  	  This	  move	  put	  Labour	  in	  position	  
to	  convene	  the	  special	  committee,	  a	  move	  which	  was	  likely	  to	  kill	  the	  referendum	  bill	  
before	  it	  reached	  the	  Holyrood	  chamber.	  	  	  
	  
Instead,	  the	  SNP	  published	  their	  intended	  referendum	  bill	  as	  a	  consultation	  paper	  with	  
the	  intention	  of	  keeping	  the	  referendum	  issue	  alive	  through	  the	  UK	  General	  Election.92	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This	   paper	   was	   split	   into	   two	   parts:	   a	   consultation	   paper,	   detailing	   options	   for	  
referendum	  ballot	  papers	  and	  how	  the	  event	  itself	  might	  be	  organised,	  and	  a	  draft	  bill,	  
with	   detail	   of	   how	   the	   legislation	   for	   such	   a	   referendum	   would	   appear	   before	  
parliament.93	  	  This	  extended	  the	  public	  consultation	  on	  the	  constitution,	  keeping	  it	  on	  
the	  political	  agenda	  –	  and	  bought	  the	  SNP	  time	  to	  consider	  their	  next	  move.	  	  With	  the	  
UK	  election	  a	  matter	  of	  months	  away,	  political	  attention	  was	  once	  again	   focused	  on	  
Westminster,	   meaning	   the	   SNP’s	   decision	   to	   postpone	   the	   referendum	   was	   less	  
newsworthy	   than	   it	   might	   have	   been	   had	   the	   decision	   been	   made	   when	   media	  
attention	  was	  more	  focused	  on	  Holyrood.	  
	  
After	   the	   UK	   election	   in	  May	   2010,	   which	   brought	   a	   Conservative-­‐Liberal	   Democrat	  
coalition	  to	  power	  at	  Westminster,	  the	  SNP	  reconsidered	  their	  options.	  	  The	  party	  had	  
made	  several	  attempts	  at	  getting	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  on	  board	  with	  a	  referendum.	  	  
This	   included	   consideration	   of	   a	   multi-­‐option	   referendum,	   with	   “devo-­‐max”	   joining	  
independence	   and	   the	   status	   quo	   as	   options	   on	   the	   ballot	   paper.	   	   “Devo-­‐max”	  was	  
defined	  thereby	  that:	  
	  
the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  Government	  would	  take	  on	  more	  
responsibility	  for	  domestic	  matters	  and	  for	  raising,	  collecting	  
and	   administering	   all	   (or	   the	   vast	   majority	   of)	   revenues	   in	  
Scotland	   and	   the	   vast	   bulk	   of	   public	   spending.	   The	   UK	  
Government	   and	   institutions	   would	   continue	   to	   have	  
responsibility	  for	  matters	  such	  as	  macroeconomic	  policy	  and	  
defence,	  but	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  Government	  would	  
have	   a	   greater	   range	   of	   measures	   available	   to	   them	   to	  
support	  sustainable	  economic	  growth.94	  
	  
                                                
93	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  2012,	  op	  cit.	  
94	  Scottish	  Government,	  2010,	  op	  cit,	  p.12.	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The	  SNP	  perceived	  this	  to	  be	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats’	  preferred	  constitutional	  position,	  
and	   indeed,	  at	   the	  2007	  Scottish	  Parliamentary	  election,	   it	  had	  been.95	   	  However,	  as	  
noted	  previously,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  would	  not	  co-­‐operate	  on	  the	  issue	  –	  and	  their	  
position	   against	   the	   referendum	  was	   further	   hardened	   on	   entering	   UK	  Government	  
office	  in	  May	  2010.	  	  Recognising	  that	  a	  referendum	  bill	  would	  be	  defeated,	  the	  party	  
took	   the	   decision	   not	   to	   bring	   forward	   the	   legislation.	   	   The	   lack	   of	   parliamentary	  
support	  –	  and	  the	  subsequent	  fear	  that	  the	  bill	  would	  be	  defeated	  –	  was	  cited	  as	  the	  
key	  reason	  for	  the	  decision.	  	  Announcing	  the	  decision,	  the	  SNP	  were	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  
that	   they	   remained	   eager	   to	   give	   the	   public	   their	   say	   on	   Scotland’s	   constitutional	  
future,	  but	  that	  it	  was	  unlikely	  the	  opposition	  parties	  would	  agree	  to	  their	  referendum.	  	  
This	  was	  a	  further	  attempt	  to	  paint	  the	  opposition	  as	  an	  obstruction	  to	  democracy	  –	  
and	   to	   tie	   the	   issue	   of	   independence,	   and	   the	   referendum	   itself,	   to	   principles	   of	  
democracy.	  	  There	  was	  a	  consideration	  that	  the	  SNP’s	  hand	  at	  the	  upcoming	  Scottish	  
election	   in	   2011	  would	   have	   been	   strengthened	   considerably	   had	   they	   brought	   the	  
referendum	   bill	   forward,	   in	   the	   knowledge	   that	   it	   would	   be	   defeated,	   making	   the	  
charge	  that	  the	  opposition	  were	  the	  block	  to	  democracy	  more	  substantial.	  	  However,	  
government	   sources96	   were	   keen	   to	   point	   out	   that,	   had	   the	   bill	   been	   introduced,	  
opposition	   amendments	   could	   have	   been	   added	   –	   and,	   given	   the	   parliamentary	  
arithmetic,	   passed	   comfortably	   –	   putting	   the	   SNP	   in	   a	   position	   where	   they	   would	  
either	  have	  to	  accept	  amendments	  which	  were	  contrary	  to	  their	  referendum	  strategy	  
or	   vote	   against	   their	   own	   referendum	   bill.	   	   When	   presented	   with	   these	   options,	  
dropping	  the	  bill	  and	  hoping	  for	  a	  chance	  to	   introduce	   it	  after	  the	  election	  appeared	  
the	  more	  attractive.	  
                                                
95	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  2012,	  op	  cit.	  
96	  Interview	  with	  a	  senior	  Scottish	  Government	  official	  (May	  2010).	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In	  deciding	  not	  to	  bring	  forward	  the	  legislation	  on	  the	  referendum	  bill,	  Alex	  Salmond	  
made	   clear	   that	   this	   was	   not	   an	   abandonment	   of	   SNP	   principle,	   merely	   a	   tactical	  
decision	  aimed	  at	  improving	  the	  party’s	  chances	  of	  securing	  an	  affirmative	  referendum	  
result	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  While	  activists	  were	  disappointed	  that	  the	  party	  had	  not	  taken	  
the	   opportunity	   to	   deliver	   a	   referendum,	   most	   recognised	   the	   weak	   position	   that	  
minority	  government	  put	  the	  party	  in	  and	  accepted	  that	  the	  decision	  had	  been	  taken	  
for	   the	   right	   reasons.97	   	   There	   was	   some	   internal	   discontent	   surrounding	   how	   the	  
decision	   had	   been	   taken,	  with	   a	   lack	   of	   consultation	   among	   even	   elected	  members	  
causing	  some	  disquiet,	  especially	  among	  party	  officials:	  
	  
Generally	  the	  party	  could	  accept	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision,	  
but	   some	   were	   furious	   about	   the	   lack	   of	   consultation	   or	  
mention	  of	  it	  at	  several	  party	  events.98	  	  	  	  	  
	  
However,	  most	  were	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  it	  had	  been	  an	  electoral	  strategy	  delivered	  by	  
Alex	  Salmond	  which	  had	  put	  the	  party	  into	  government	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  and	  that	  
he	  should	  be	  trusted	  on	  this	  decision	  also.99	   	  And	   indeed,	  even	  those	  who	  disagreed	  
with	  the	  decision	  could	  see	  the	  logic	  behind	  it:	  	  	  
	  
I	   think	   the	   reason	   they	   gave	   –	   that	   they	   didn’t	  want	   to	   go	  
into	  an	  election	   campaign	  having	   lost	  a	  parliamentary	   vote	  
on	  their	  core	  issue	  –	  made	  some	  sense.100	  	  	  
	  
The	   decision	   then,	   was	   seen	   not	   as	   an	   abandonment	   of	   SNP	   principle,	   but	   as	   a	  
strategic	   decision	   taken	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   forthcoming	   election	   campaign.101	   	   This	  
                                                
97	  Interview	  with	  SNP	  activist	  (local	  councillor)	  (March	  2011).	  
98	  Interview	  with	  Gareth	  Finn	  (member	  of	  the	  SNP	  National	  Executive	  Committee)	  (February	  2011).	  
99	  Interviews	  with	  SNP	  activists	  (a	  councillor,	  a	  campaign	  manager	  and	  a	  constituency	  organiser)	  
(February	  and	  March	  2011).	  
100	  Interview	  with	  Gareth	  Finn	  (member	  of	  the	  SNP	  National	  Executive	  Committee)	  (February	  2011).	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viewpoint	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  large-­‐scale	  survey	  of	  SNP	  members	  undertaken	  in	  the	  
immediate	   aftermath	  of	   the	   SNP’s	   taking	  power	  at	  Holyrood	   in	  2007.	   	   This	   research	  
suggested	   that	   the	   SNP’s	   membership	   had	   become	   more	   pragmatic,	   and	   that	   the	  
fundamentalist-­‐gradualist	  divisions	  on	  strategy	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  appeared	  to	  be	  
less	  apparent.102	   	   Indeed,	  evidence	  of	  this	  gradualist	   long-­‐game	  was	  further	  provided	  
with	   subsequent	   calls	   for	   a	   multi-­‐option	   referendum,	   with	   enhanced	   devolution	  
(“devo-­‐max”)	   providing	   a	   safety	   net	   should	   the	   public	   not	   yet	   be	   convinced	   of	  
independence.103	  	  Just	  as	  the	  devolution	  referendum	  of	  1997	  had	  been	  supported	  as	  a	  
means	   to	   an	   end,	   so	   too	   could	   enhanced	   devolution	   be	   seen	   by	   gradualists	   as	   a	  
stepping	  stone	  to	  independence.104	  
	  
Even	  so,	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  referendum	  bill	  when	  the	  party	  was	  in	  
office	  for	  the	  first	  time	  –	  and	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  deliver	  its	  fundamental	  political	  
ambition	  –	  was	  a	  gamble.	  	  The	  SNP	  had	  waited	  73	  years	  for	  an	  opportunity	  to	  govern	  
Scotland,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  guarantee	  that	  they	  would	  not	  have	  to	  wait	  as	  long	  to	  win	  
power	  again.	  	  Indeed,	  at	  the	  time	  the	  decision	  was	  made,	  Labour	  held	  a	  considerable	  
lead	  over	  the	  SNP	  in	  opinion	  polls	  for	  the	  forthcoming	  Scottish	  Parliamentary	  election	  
–	   a	   lead	   they	   maintained	   until	   ten	   weeks	   prior	   to	   polling	   day.105	   	   Granted,	   these	  
opinion	  polls	  were	  conducted	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  UK	  General	  Election	  in	  May	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  with	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University	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  Start	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  Power,	  Edinburgh,	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	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2010,	   the	   ramifications	   of	   which	   were	   still	   being	   considered	   as	   late	   as	   early	   2011,	  
which	  perhaps	  explained	  the	  size	  of	  Labour	  leads	  in	  some	  of	  these	  polls.106	  	  However,	  
the	   Scottish	   electorate	   have	   become	   increasingly	   shrewd	   at	   distinguishing	   between	  
voting	   in	   elections	   at	   Scottish	   and	  UK	   level.107	   	   That	   distinction	   allowed	   the	   SNP	   an	  
opportunity	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	  more	  “Scottish”	  than	  the	  other	  parties	  –	  in	  particular,	  
the	  Unionist	  parties	   –	  which	  has	  helped	   to	   increase	   its	   share	  of	   the	   vote	   in	   Scottish	  
elections	   considerably.	   	   Thus,	   the	   party	   could	   well	   believe	   that	   Labour’s	   lead	   was	  
overstated,	   and	   considerably	   inflated	   by	   the	   focus	   on	   Westminster	   politics.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   party	   could	   not	   be	   sure	   that	   their	   decision	   not	   to	   legislate	   for	   a	  
referendum	  would	  not	  come	  back	  to	  haunt	  them.	  
	  
2011	  Election	  
The	   2011	   Scottish	   Parliamentary	   election	   was	   held	   on	   5	   May.	   	   An	   eve	   of	   election	  
opinion	  poll	  conducted	  for	  STV	  had	  put	  the	  SNP	  –	  who,	  by	  this	  point,	  had	  dramatically	  
reversed	  the	  large	  Labour	  lead	  –	  on	  61	  seats,	  four	  short	  of	  an	  overall	  majority.108	  	  This	  
was	  five	  more	  than	  the	  previous	  largest	  seat	  total	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  –	  the	  56	  
seats	  won	  by	  Labour	   in	  1999	  –	  which	  made	  several	  political	   commentators	   sceptical	  
about	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  poll.109	  	  Indeed,	  that	  scepticism	  was	  indeed	  warranted	  –	  but	  
for	  the	  wrong	  reason.	  	  Most	  commentators	  had	  believed	  that	  the	  poll	  overstated	  the	  
SNP’s	  support,	  but	  in	  fact	  the	  opposite	  was	  true.	  	  The	  SNP	  went	  on	  to	  win	  69	  seats	  –	  an	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  63,	  Issue.	  4,	  
2010.	  
108	  STV	  News	  ‘SNP	  on	  course	  for	  landmark	  victory,	  according	  to	  exclusive	  STV	  poll’,	  3	  May,	  2011,	  at:	  
www.news.stv.tv/election-­‐2011/246676-­‐snp-­‐on-­‐course-­‐for-­‐major-­‐victory-­‐according-­‐to-­‐stv-­‐poll/	  	  
109	  Torrance,	  D.	  2011,	  op	  cit.	  p.24.	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absolute	  majority	  in	  the	  chamber,	  and	  an	  increase	  of	  22	  seats	  on	  the	  47	  they	  had	  won	  
in	  2007	  (see	  table	  6.4).	  
	  
Table	  6.4:	  Scottish	  Parliament	  Electoral	  Results	  (2007-­‐11)110	  	  
	  
Party	  













SNP	   21	   26	   47	   53	   16	   69	  
Labour	   37	   9	   46	   15	   22	   37	  
Conservative	   4	   13	   17	   3	   12	   15	  
Lib	  Dem	   11	   5	   16	   2	   3	   5	  
Green	   0	   2	   2	   -­‐	   2	   2	  
Independent	   0	   1	   1	   0	   1	   1	  
	  
	  
With	  such	  a	  result,	   the	  SNP	  were	   in	  a	  much	  stronger	  position	  than	  they	  had	  been	   in	  
2007,	  establishing	  Holyrood’s	  first	  single-­‐party	  majority	  government.	  	  With	  a	  majority	  
government,	  the	  party	  would	  have	  a	  mandate	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  bill	   itself,	  avoiding	  
the	  potential	  for	  amendments	  or	  defeat	  which	  the	  bill	  could	  potentially	  have	  faced	  in	  
the	   previous	   term.	   	   With	   a	   majority	   both	   in	   the	   parliament	   itself	   and	   in	   each	   of	  
Holyrood’s	   committees,	   not	   to	   mention	   a	   Presiding	   Officer	   drawn	   from	   the	   party’s	  
own	  ranks,	  the	  referendum	  bill	  –	  whenever	  it	  was	  brought	  forward	  –	  would	  be	  in	  SNP	  
hands	  throughout	   its	  passage	  through	  parliament.	   	  And	  while	  the	  party	  was	  quick	  to	  
recognise	   that	   their	  election	  victory	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  mandate	   for	   independence,	  
opponents	  –	  both	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  at	  Westminster	  –	  conceded	  that	  it	  did	  
provide	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  
Indeed,	   the	   day	   immediately	   following	   the	   SNP’s	   election	   saw	   discussions	   between	  
                                                




Alex	  Salmond,	  UK	  Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Scotland	  
Michael	  Moore	  aimed	  at	   strengthening	   the	  conditions	  of	   the	  Scotland	  Bill	   to	   further	  
empower	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament.111	   	   The	   outcome	   of	   the	   SNP’s	   second	   Scottish	  
Parliamentary	  victory	  then,	  resulted	  in	  further	  powers	  being	  devolved	  to	  the	  Scottish	  
Parliament	  –	  and,	  a	  long-­‐anticipated	  referendum	  on	  independence.	  
	  
The	  SNP’s	  Referendum	  Strategy	  2011	  onwards	  
With	   a	   single-­‐party	  majority	   government	   in	   place	   in	  Holyrood	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   the	  
SNP’s	   strategy	   on	   the	   referendum	   changed	   once	   again.	   	   Whereas	   in	   the	   previous	  
parliamentary	   session	   the	   party	   had	   focussed	   on	   trying	   to	   build	   a	   parliamentary	  
majority	   to	  pass	  a	   referendum	  bill,	   their	  position	  as	  a	  majority	  negated	  the	  need	  for	  
such	  a	  tactic.	  	  Instead,	  the	  party,	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  session,	  focused	  their	  energies	  
on	  the	  electorate.	   	  For	  while	  the	  party	  itself	  secured	  45%	  of	  the	  constituency	  vote	  in	  
the	   2011	   Scottish	   Parliamentary	   election,	   opinion	   polls	   subsequently	   indicated	   that,	  
though	  the	  party	  remained	  popular,	  their	  constitutional	  preference	  for	  independence	  
was	   not	   a	   preference	   shared	   by	   a	   majority	   of	   the	   Scottish	   electorate.	   	   And	   their	  
strategy	  in	  office	  changed	  to	  reflect	  this	  reality.	  
	  
During	   the	   2011	   election	   campaign,	   Alex	   Salmond	   announced	   that	   it	   was	   the	   SNP’s	  
intention	   to	   hold	   the	   referendum	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   parliamentary	   term	   –	   a	  
timeframe	   which	   mirrored	   that	   of	   the	   2007-­‐10	   strategy.112	   	   This	   timeframe	   was	  
intended	   to	   give	   the	   party	   the	   opportunity	   to	   build	   upon	   their	   electoral	   support	   by	  
                                                
111	  Carrell,	  S.	  ‘Scottish	  independence:	  Cameron	  gives	  green	  light	  to	  referendum’	  in	  The	  Observer,	  8	  May,	  
2011,	  at:	  www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/08/cameron-­‐green-­‐light-­‐scottish-­‐referendum	  
112	  Torrance,	  D.	  2011	  op	  cit.	  p.23.	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delivering	   popular	   policies	   in	   government	  while	   retaining	   the	   public’s	   perception	   of	  
the	  party	  as	  competent	  in	  government.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  SNP’s	  new	  strategy	  did	  not	  
differ	   greatly	   from	   that	  of	   the	  2007-­‐10	  period.	   	  However,	   this	  new	   strategy	  brought	  
with	   it	   a	   clear	   advantage	   for	   the	   SNP	   –	   on	   this	   occasion	   they	  were	  working	  with	   a	  
parliamentary	  majority	  rather	  than	  the	  minority	  government	  of	  the	  previous	  session.	  	  
This	   meant	   that	   SNP	   government	   policies	   were	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   difficulties	  
experienced	   in	   the	  previous	  parliamentary	   term.	   	   It	   also	  meant	   that	   the	  party	   could	  
continue	  to	   link	  their	  actions	   in	  office	  to	   independence.	   	  Crucially	  however,	   it	  meant	  
that	  parliamentary	  opposition	  –	   in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  at	   least	  –	  could	  not	  get	   in	  
the	  way	  of	  a	  referendum	  bill,	  if	  and	  when	  the	  party	  decided	  to	  introduce	  it.	  
	  
What	  was	  also	  clear	  was	  that	  the	  party	  had	  decided	  upon	  an	  “all	  things	  to	  all	  people”	  
strategy,	  meaning	  discussion	  of	  potential	  policy	  decisions	  post-­‐independence	  (such	  as	  
what	  currency	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  would	  use	  or	  whether	  to	  retain	  the	  monarchy)	  
was	   limited.	   	  The	  party	  did	  not	  want	   issues	  such	  as	   these	  to	  dilute	  the	  campaign	   for	  
independence,	   and	   thus	   wanted	   to	   keep	   decisions	   upon	   them	   until	   independence	  
itself	   had	   been	  delivered.	   	   Indeed,	  while	   the	   SNP	   indicated	   their	   preferences	   –	  Alex	  
Salmond	  had	   suggested,	   prior	   to	   the	   economic	   collapse,	   that	   the	   Euro	  would	  be	  his	  
preference	  –	  they	  were	  keen	  to	  point	  out	  that	  any	  decision	  upon	  issues	  of	  this	  nature	  
would	  be	   taken	   in	  a	   referendum,	  allowing	   the	  Scottish	  electorate	  not	  only	   to	  decide	  
whether	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  independent,	  but	  the	  form	  that	  independence	  would	  take.	  	  
This	  was	  a	  clear	  attempt	   to	  address	  concerns	   that	  Scotland	  would	  automatically	   join	  
the	  Euro	  or	   lose	   the	  Queen	  as	  Head	  of	   State	  –	  a	   recognition	   that	   the	   independence	  
campaign	  would	  need	  to	  be	  as	  broad	  as	  possible.	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Conclusion:	  Direct	  Democracy	  and	  Democratic	  Engagement	  
As	  with	  many	  elements	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	  public	  consultation	  in	  this	  case	  was	  
held	  with	  a	  distinct	  goal	  in	  mind	  –	  it	  was	  a	  prelude	  to	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.113	  	  
Fearon	   notes	   six	   distinct	   reasons	   there	   can	   be	   value	   in	   public	   discussion	   prior	   to	  
decision-­‐making,	  several	  of	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  Welsh	  powers	  referendum.	  	  He	  
suggests	  that	  the	  discussions	  –	  which	  could	  potentially	  reveal	  information	  or	  opinions	  
which	  are	  not	  necessarily	  widely	  held	  or	  known	  –	  may	  help	  to	  “render	  the	  end	  choice	  
legitimate”.114	   	   This	   was	   very	   clearly	   part	   of	   the	   motivation	   behind	   both	   the	  
consultation	  and	  the	  referendum	  process	  in	  Wales.	  	  There	  was	  a	  clear	  effort	  made	  on	  
behalf	  of	  politicians	  in	  Cardiff	  Bay	  –	  who	  had	  agreed	  that	  the	  course	  of	  action	  leading	  
to	  a	  legislative	  Assembly	  was	  required	  –	  to	  use	  consultation	  as	  a	  way	  of	  informing	  the	  
public	   about	   devolution	   and	   the	   issues	  which	  would	   be	   at	   stake	   in	   the	   referendum.	  	  
The	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   –	   though	   scrupulously	   neutral	   in	   its	   operation	   and	  
conclusion	   –	   was	   designed	   to	   build	   awareness,	   and	   through	   that,	   support,	   for	  
devolution	  and	  a	  recognition	  that	  it	  could	  function	  better	  with	  the	  powers	  ascribed	  to	  
it	  through	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  	  The	  referendum	  would	  then	  
seek	   to	   reach	   consensus	   on	   the	   issue	   itself	   through	   the	   process	   of	   argument	   and	  
voting.115	   	   However,	   the	   lack	   of	   designated	   lead	   campaigns	   –	   due	   to	   the	   relative	  
weakness	   of	   the	   No	   campaign	   compared	   to	   the	   Yes	   campaign,	   and	   the	   former’s	  
decision	   not	   to	   apply	   for	   designation	   –	   constrained	   the	   public’s	   ability	   to	   access	  
information	   on	   the	   issue,	   leaving	  many	   confused	   and	   unsure	   of	   how	   to	   vote	   in	   the	  
                                                
113	  Dryzek,	  J.	  S.	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  and	  Beyond:	  Liberals,	  Critics,	  Contestations,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2000,	  p.7.	  
114	  Fearon,	  J.	  D.	  ‘Deliberation	  as	  Discussion’	  in	  Elster,	  J.	  (ed)	  (1998)	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  Cambridge,	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998,	  p.45.	  
115	  Elster,	  J.	  ‘Introduction’	  in	  Elster,	  J.	  (ed)	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  1998(a),	  p.5.	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referendum.	   	   Thus,	  while	   the	   result	  of	   the	   referendum	  was	  hailed	  by	  proponents	  of	  
devolution	  as	  indicating	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Welsh	  public	  for	  devolution,	  with	  a	  turnout	  
of	  just	  35%	  and	  many	  voters	  complaining	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  information	  on	  the	  issue,116	  the	  
process	   could	   hardly	   be	   described	   as	   a	   successful	   engagement	   in	   deliberative	  
democracy.	   	  However,	  as	  David	  Melding	  pointed	  out,	  while	   the	  process	  matters,	   the	  
result	   matters	   more	   than	   the	   process	   itself	   –	   a	   majority	   of	   one	   is	   enough	   to	   pass	  
legislation.117	  	  Thus	  the	  One	  Wales	  Agreement	  achieved	  its	  twin	  objective	  of	  engaging	  
the	  public	  in	  consultation	  about	  devolution,	  as	  far	  as	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  possible;	  
and	   bringing	   forward	   and	  winning	   a	   referendum	  which	  would	   deliver	   the	   legislative	  
powers	  which	  had	  been	  earmarked	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales.	  	  	  
	  
To	  put	  the	  SNP’s	  referendum	  strategy	  in	  context	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  elements	  of	  direct	  
and	  deliberative	  democracy	  with	  which	  this	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  requires	  consideration	  
of	   the	   historical	   debates	   surrounding	   devolution	   in	   Scotland.	   	   For	   the	   SNP,	   the	  
necessity	  of	  public	  consultation	  is	  to	  build	  consensus	  –	  which	  is	  not	  yet	  apparent	  –	  for	  
their	  constitutional	  preference.	  	  The	  necessity	  of	  the	  referendum	  is	  to	  take	  from	  that	  
consensus	  a	  mandate	  to	  begin	  discussions	  leading	  to	  Scottish	  independence.	  	  This	  fits	  
with	  Dryzek’s	  notion	  that	  deliberative	  democracy	  can	  involve	  two	  related	  aspects	  –	  an	  
orientation	  towards	  building	  a	  consensus	  on	  an	  issue	  and	  a	  prelude	  to	  voting	  upon	  the	  
same	   issue	   –	   although	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   vote	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   process	  makes	   the	  
emergence	   of	   a	   consensus	   more	   unlikely.118	   	   This	   is	   an	   important	   element	   of	   the	  
constitutional	  debate	  in	  Scotland	  –	  and	  indeed,	  any	  deliberative	  discussion	  –	  since	  the	  
                                                
116	  BBC	  News	  Wales,	  2011(a),	  op	  cit.	  
117	  Interview	  with	  David	  Melding	  (Conservative	  AM)	  (July	  2010).	  
118	  Dryzek,	  J.	  S.	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  and	  Beyond:	  Liberals,	  Critics,	  Contestations,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2000,	  p.7.	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need	  for	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  made	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  debate	  means	  that	  positions	  during	  
the	   debate	   are	   always	   likely	   to	   be	   entrenched,	   and	   any	   shift	   in	   those	   positions	   is	  
unlikely.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  thus	  lacks	  a	  deliberative	  character,	  since	  each	  side	  
already	  has	  in	  mind	  that	  their	  position	  is	  the	  one	  which	  should	  be	  followed	  at	  the	  time	  
of	   the	  decision,	  meaning	  opinion	   forms	  around	  two	  poles	  which	  seem	  to	  get	   further	  
apart,	   rather	   than	   converge	   around	   any	   form	   of	   consensus.	   	   Dryzek	   himself	   defines	  
consensus	  as	  “unanimous	  agreement...	  on	  a	  course	  of	  action...	  but	  also	  on	  the	  reasons	  
for	  it,”	  though	  he	  recognises	  that,	  in	  a	  contemporary	  world,	  agreement	  on	  a	  course	  of	  
action	   for	   different	   reasons	   would	   be	   acceptable,	   since	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   everyone	  
would	  share	  the	  same	  motivations	  for	  the	  outcomes	  agreed	  upon,	  however	  persuasive	  
the	  debate.119	  	  Further,	  Dryzek	  rhetorically	  asks:	  
	  
Should	   deliberation	   be	   constrained	   by	   constitutional	  
specifications	  that	  rule	  out	  in	  advance	  particular	  outcomes	  of	  
deliberation?120	  	  	  
	  
Returning	   to	   the	  question	   later	   in	  his	  book,	  his	   response	   is	   clear:	   that	   “constitution-­‐
making	   itself	  can	  be	  a	  deliberative	  process”.121	   	   In	  relating	  this	  to	  Scotland,	   it	   is	  clear	  
that	   the	   SNP	   have	   followed	   a	   path	   of	   deliberative	   thinking	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
constitutional	   question.	   	   They	   have	   utilised	   their	   time	   in	   office	   to	   engage	   with	   the	  
public	   through	   a	   wide-­‐ranging	   consultation,	   providing	   information	   and	   accepting	  
options	  which	  did	  not	  fit	  with	  their	  own	  constitutional	  goals	  –	  allowing	  the	  process	  to	  
widen	   the	   debate	   away	   from	   the	   independence-­‐union	   dichotomy	   within	   which	   the	  
election	  campaign	  (in	  both	  2007	  and	  2011)	  had	  been	  framed.	  	  The	  SNP	  are	  not	  seeking	  
                                                
119	  ibid.	  p.170.	  
120	  ibid.	  p.7.	  
121	  ibid.	  p.171.	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unanimous	  agreement	  –	  a	  simple	  majority	  of	  the	  Scottish	  electorate	  in	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  
issue	   would	   be	   sufficient	   –	   nor	   are	   they	   seeking	   unanimity	   in	   the	   electorate’s	  
reasoning	   for	   their	   support.	   	   The	   party	   are	   simply	   working	   to	   build	   the	   optimum	  
“winning	   conditions”	   for	   a	   referendum.	   	   And	   while	   this,	   on	   the	   surface,	   does	   not	  
appear	   to	   be	   consistent	   with	   the	   ethos	   of	   deliberative	   democracy,	   the	   methods	  
employed	  in	  working	  towards	  these	  conditions	  are	  clearly	  related	  to	  this	  field.	  
	  
Putting	   the	   case	   in	   historic	   context	   shows	   this	   more	   clearly.	   	   The	   Scottish	  
Constitutional	  Convention	  of	   the	   late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  –	  of	  which	  the	  SNP	  was	  
not	  a	  part	  –	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  in	  action	  in	  Scotland.	  	  The	  
political	  conditions	  in	  Scotland	  at	  the	  time	  –	  an	  electorate	  which	  was	  increasingly	  left-­‐
leaning	   but	   governed	   from	   London	   by	   a	   centre-­‐right	   Conservative	   government	  with	  
little	  support	   in	  Scotland	  –	   led	  to	  more	  urgent	  consideration	  of	  self-­‐government	  and	  
devolution,	  with	  the	  cross-­‐party	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention	  the	  result.	  	  Cross-­‐
party	   as	   a	   descriptor	   does	   the	   campaign	   a	   disservice,	   since	   the	   Convention	   drew	  
membership	   from	   across	   civic	   society	   in	   Scotland,	   building	   consensus	   around	   the	  
“claim	  of	  right”	  for	  a	  devolved	  elected	  assembly	  to	  run	  Scotland’s	  affairs.	  	  The	  Scottish	  
Constitutional	   Convention	   was	   an	   important	   development	   in	   the	   campaign	   for	   a	  
Scottish	   Parliament,	   building	   consensus	   towards	   Labour’s	   decision	   to	   include	   a	  
commitment	  to	  devolution	  in	  their	  1997	  manifesto	  and	  momentum	  into	  the	  successful	  
referendum	  later	  that	  same	  year.	  	  Though	  the	  Scottish	  Constitutional	  Convention	  was	  
a	  bottom-­‐up	  campaign	  for	  devolved	  governance,	  its	  basic	  premise	  was	  very	  similar	  to	  
what	  the	  SNP	  are	  currently	  attempting	  to	  do:	  build	  a	  consensus	  around	  an	  issue	  which	  
would	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  UK	  Government	  to	  make	  concessions	  to	  the	  campaign.	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While	   the	   SNP’s	   attempts	   at	   building	   consensus	   around	   the	   idea	   of	   constitutional	  
change	   (especially	   through	   A	   National	   Conversation)	   clearly	   do	   display	   elements	   of	  
deliberative	  democracy,	  waiting	  for	  “winning	  conditions”	  prior	  to	  the	  scheduling	  of	  a	  
referendum	  is	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  deliberative	  theories	  of	  democracy	  –	  or	  at	  least,	  
not	  consistent	  with	  the	  democratic	  element	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  Engaging	  the	  electorate	  in	  
a	  discussion	  of	  the	  constitutional	  future	  of	  Scotland	  and	  subsequently	  holding	  a	  vote	  
on	   the	   issue	   is,	   of	   course,	   a	   deliberative	   act.	   	   Indeed,	   as	  Gambetta	   argues,	   the	   very	  
definition	   of	   deliberation	   is	   “a	   conversation	   whereby	   individuals	   speak	   and	   listen	  
sequentially	   before	   making	   a	   collective	   decision”.122	   	   The	   nature	   of	   the	   process	   –	  
consultation	   then	   referendum	   –	   is	   deliberative.	   	   However,	   as	   both	   John	   Rawls	   and	  
Jurgen	   Habermas	   argue,	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   political	   decision-­‐making	   rests	   upon	   “the	  
outcome	  of	  deliberation	  about	  ends	  among	  free,	  equal	  and	  rational	  agents”.123	  	  If	  one	  
of	  those	  agents	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  SNP	  –	  withholds	  the	  decision-­‐making	  element	  of	  the	  
process	   (the	  referendum)	  until	   it	   is	  convinced	   its	  desired	  outcome	  will	  be	   the	  result,	  
then	  the	  agents	  are	  no	  longer	  equal.	  	  While	  this	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  –	  governments	  will	  
only	  conduct	  referendums	  on	  matters	  which	  hold	  some	  import	  for	  them	  if	  they	  expect	  
to	  win124	  –	  it	  does	  bring	  into	  question	  whether	  the	  SNP’s	  proclamations	  that	  they	  are	  
the	  party	  who	  are	  defending	  the	  democratic	  right	  of	  the	  Scottish	  people	  to	  have	  a	  say	  
in	  their	  own	  affairs.	   	  Given	  their	  victory	   in	  the	  2011	  Scottish	  Parliament	  election,	  the	  
party	   apparently	   made	   considerable	   political	   capital	   by	   painting	   opposition	   to	   a	  
referendum	  as	  undemocratic,	  yet	   there	   is	  an	  argument	   to	  be	  made	  that	  withholding	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  Gambetta,	  D.	  ‘“Claro!”	  –	  An	  Essay	  on	  Discursive	  Machismo’	  in	  Elster,	  J.	  (ed)	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  
Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	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  cited	  Elster,	  J.	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  in	  Elster,	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  (ed)	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  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	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  Press,	  1998(a),	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123	  Elster,	  J.	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  in	  Elster,	  J.	  (ed)	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  Democracy,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	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  p.5.	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the	   referendum	   until	   their	   preferred	   result	   seems	   likely	   is	   just	   as	   undemocratic.	  	  
However,	  the	  party	  will	  –	  quite	  fairly	  –	  argue	  that	   in	  order	  to	  educate	  the	  electorate	  
about	   the	  potential	   ramifications	  of	   a	   positive	  or	   negative	   result	   in	   a	   referendum,	   a	  
reasonable	   period	   of	   preparation	   is	   required.	   	   Indeed,	   given	   the	   case	   against	  
independence	   has	   been	  made	   by	   now-­‐opposition	   parties	   consistently	   since	   the	   SNP	  
first	  put	   the	   issue	  on	   the	  political	  agenda	   in	   the	  1960s,	  an	  argument	  could	  be	  made	  
that,	  for	  reasons	  of	  fairness,	  the	  SNP	  should	  be	  able	  to	  take	  some	  time	  to	  make	  their	  
case	  to	  the	  electorate	  and	  to	  use	  their	  institutional	  role	  as	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  to	  
do	   so.	   	   Opinion	   polls	   have	   consistently	   shown	   that,	   while	   the	   Scottish	   electorate	  
remain	  unconvinced	  by	   the	  party’s	  arguments	   for	   independence,	   they	  do	  wish	   to	  be	  
consulted	  upon	  Scotland’s	  constitutional	   future	   in	  a	   referendum.	   	  Thus,	  as	   the	  SNP’s	  
second	  term	  in	  office	  progresses,	  there	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  pressure	  from	  the	  electorate	  –	  
and	  from	  opposition	  parties	  seeking	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  support	  for	  the	  Union	  in	  
opinion	  polls	  –	  for	  a	  referendum	  to	  be	  held	  at	  the	  earliest	  opportunity.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  
wake	   of	   the	   SNP’s	   election	   victory	   in	   2011,	   the	   UK	   Government	   were	   quick	   to	  
announce	  a	  consultation	  document	  on	  how	  a	  referendum	  could	  be	  delivered	  legally.125	  	  
However,	   this	   pressure	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   resisted	   as	   the	   SNP	   continue	   to	   adhere	   to	   a	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With	   the	   Labour	  party’s	  devolution	   legislation	  of	   the	  1990s,	   the	  UK	  began	  a	  gradual	  
transition	  from	  unitary	  and	  centralised	  government	  to	  a	  more	  decentralised	  system.1	  	  
The	   establishment	   of	   a	   devolved	   parliament	   in	   Scotland	   and	   an	   assembly	   in	  Wales	  
provided	  a	   structural	   advantage	   for	  nationalist	   parties	   in	   each	  nation	  by	   creating	   an	  
institution	  within	  which	  the	   issues	  and	   interests	  of	   their	   respective	  nations	  were	  the	  
primary	   topic	   of	   discussion,	   and	   fundamentally	   altered	   the	   political	   dynamic	   and	  
competition	   in	   Scotland	   and	  Wales.2	   	   The	   ascension	   of	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   to	  
government	  office	   in	   their	   respective	  nations	  meant	   that	   the	  establishment	  of	   those	  
devolved	   institutions	   in	   1999	   was	   but	   the	   beginning	   of,	   in	   Ron	   Davies’	   oft-­‐quoted	  
phrase,	  a	  process	  of	  devolution,3	  with	  an	  end	  point	  which	  remains	  undetermined.	  	  This	  
was	  a	  sentiment	  which	  the	  constitutional	  expert	  Vernon	  Bogdanor	  shared:	  
	  
Constitutionally,	   devolution	   is	   a	   mere	   delegation	   of	   power	  
from	  a	  superior	  political	  power	  to	  an	  inferior	  one.	  	  Politically,	  
however,	  devolution	  places	  a	  powerful	  weapon	  in	  the	  hands	  
of	  the	  Scots	  and	  the	  Welsh;	  and,	   just	  as	  one	  cannot	  be	  sure	  
that	   a	   weapon	   will	   always	   be	   used	   only	   for	   the	   specified	  
purpose	   for	   which	   it	   may	   have	   been	   intended,	   so	   also	   one	  
cannot	   predict	   the	   use	   which	   the	   Scots	   and	   the	  Welsh	   will	  
make	  of	  devolution.4	  
	  
Contemporary	  political	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  constitutional	  settlement,	  the	  powers	  
already	  and	  yet	  to	  be	  devolved	  to	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  –	  and	  the	  place	  of	  each	  within	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267	  
the	  United	  Kingdom	   in	   the	  coming	  years	  –	   remains	  open-­‐ended.	   	  Unionists	  proclaim	  
the	  benefits	  of	  continued	  membership	  of	  the	  UK,	  the	  potential	  pitfalls	  of	  “separation”	  
and	  oppose	  the	  extension	  of	  devolution	  if	  it	  will	  in	  any	  way	  advance	  the	  arguments	  in	  
favour	   of	   secession.	   	   Nationalists	   in	   both	   Scotland	   and	   Wales	   argue	   that	   their	  
respective	   institutions	  are	  weaker	   than	   they	  should	  be,	   that	  both	  could	  better	   serve	  
the	  needs	  of	  their	  constituents	  with	  more	  substantial	  powers	  –	  be	  that	  as	  independent	  
states	   or	   with	   an	   increased	   array	   of	   powers	   but	   remaining	   within	   the	   UK.	   	   The	  
constitutional	  debate	  remains	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  primarily	  because	  the	  devolution	  
settlements	   afforded	   to	   Scotland	   and	  Wales	   in	   1999	   did	   not	   satisfy	   their	   respective	  
electorates	  –	  they	  were	  not,	   in	  John	  Smith’s	  words,	  the	  “settled	  will”	  of	  the	  people.5	  	  
Of	  course,	  devolution	  was	  granted	  through	  1997	  referendums	  –	  in	  Wales’	  case,	  with	  a	  
wafer-­‐thin	   margin	   of	   victory	   –	   giving	   credence	   to	   the	   view	   that	   some	   form	   of	  
devolution	   was	   the	   express	   desire	   of	   those	   electorates.	   	   Nevertheless,	   debate	   has	  
continued	   as	   to	   the	   form	  which	   that	   devolution	   should	   take	   –	   and	   the	   presence	   of	  
Nationalist	   parties	   in	   government	   has	   only	   exacerbated	   the	   calls	   to	   extend	   the	  
legislative	  reach	  of	  these	  institutions.	  
	  
The	  opportunity	  afforded	  to	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  that	  government	  status	  brought	  
was	  one	  that	  neither	  had	  experienced	  previously.	   	  Prior	  to	  devolution,	  the	  history	  of	  
nationalist	   parties	   in	   Scotland	   and	  Wales	  was	   one	   of	   occasional	   influence	   and	  more	  
frequent	   set-­‐backs.	   	   The	   devolution	   process,	   with	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   1970s	   debates	  
provided	   an	   institutional	   setting	   within	   which	   the	   nationalist	   parties	   had	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   flourish	   electorally.	   	   Pre-­‐devolution,	   governing	   or	   blackmail	   potential	  
                                                
5	  Jones,	  P.	  ‘A	  Start	  to	  a	  New	  Song:	  The	  1997	  Devolution	  Referendum	  Campaign’	  in	  Scottish	  Affairs,	  No.	  
21,	  autumn,	  1997.	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was	  limited.6	  	  Under	  devolution,	  however,	  the	  electorates	  of	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  saw	  
the	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   a	   different	   light,	   and	   in	   2007	   provided	   both	   with	   enough	  
representatives	   to	   enter	   government.	   	  With	   no	   previous	   governing	   experience,	   and	  
opportunities	  to	  influence	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  rare,	  it	  might	  be	  considered	  that	  
entering	   government	   in	   this	   instance	  was	  an	  easy	   choice.	   	  However,	   the	  decision	   to	  
take	  the	  step	  from	  opposition	  into	  government	  for	  the	  first	  time	  –	  for	  any	  party	  –	  is	  a	  
hard	  one.7	  	  The	  risks	  of	  accepting	  the	  responsibility	  of	  governing	  (blame	  for	  difficulties	  
experienced	  by	  voters,	   leading	  to	  electoral	  defeat)	  are	  carefully	  balanced	  against	  the	  
potential	  rewards	  –	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  party’s	  manifesto,	  progress	  towards	  policy	  goals	  
and	   delivery	   in	   office	   of	   those	   objectives.	   	   Only	   when	   the	   rewards	   outweigh	   the	  
potential	   risks	   do	   parties	   decide	   to	   take	   office	   –	   and	   even	   then,	   parties	   remain	  
reluctant	  to	  stake	  their	  political	   reputation	  on	  a	  four-­‐year	  term	  in	  office	  which	  could	  
prove	  disastrous	  for	  their	  future	  existence.8	  	  That	  decision	  was	  further	  complicated	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  SNP	  –	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  for	  Plaid	  Cymru	  –	  when	  the	  constitutional	  
dimension	   is	   considered.	   	   The	   SNP’s	   raison	   d’être	   is	   to	   achieve	   independence	   for	  
Scotland	   –	  with	   other	   policy	   concerns	   a	   secondary	   consideration.9	   	   Plaid	   Cymru	   are	  
also	  committed	  to	   independence,	  but	   their	  political	  platform	  was	  more	  short-­‐term	  –	  
with	   achieving	   legislative	   powers	   for	   the	  National	   Assembly	   for	  Wales	   their	   primary	  
constitutional	  objective	  when	  taking	  office	  in	  2007.10	   	  With	  constitutional	  change	  the	  
endgame	   for	   both	   parties,	   each	   recognised	   the	   risks	   of	   their	   entrance	   into	   regional	  
                                                
6	  Sartori,	  G.	  Parties	  and	  Party	  Systems:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Analysis	  (Volume	  1),	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1976.	  
7	  Müller,	  W.	  C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  Policy,	  Office	  or	  Votes?	  How	  Political	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  make	  hard	  
decisions,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.1.	  
8	  Deschouwer,	  K.	  New	  Parties	  in	  Government:	  In	  power	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  London,	  Routledge,	  2008.	  
9	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  Manifesto	  2007	  –	  It’s	  Time,	  Edinburgh,	  SNP,	  2007.	  
10	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  Make	  a	  Difference:	  Manifesto	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  Cardiff,	  Plaid	  Cymru	  –	  
The	  Party	  of	  Wales,	  2007,	  p.7-­‐19.	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level	   government	   –	   specifically,	   that	   if	   the	   parties	   demonstrated	   that	   the	  
administrations	   they	   ran	   were	   competent	   and	   efficient	   then	   the	   electorate	   would	  
question	   the	   need	   to	   alter	   the	   constitutional	   arrangements.	   	   However,	   both	  
recognised	  the	  value	  of	  government	  office	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end,	  
that	  they	  could	  influence	  the	  central	  government	  on	  the	  constitutional	  question	  better	  
from	   a	   position	   of	   power,	   that	   they	   could	   determine	   the	   policy	   direction	   of	   their	  




Recognising	  regional	  government	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  meant	  utilising	  their	  position	  in	  
office	  to	  build	  consensus	  around	  the	  need	  for	  constitutional	  change.	  	  For	  parties	  who	  
do	  not	  have	  constitutional	  change	  as	  their	  raison	  d’être,	  the	  issue	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  a	  
distraction	   from	   the	   important	   business	   of	   governing	   –	   of	   delivering	   on	   manifesto	  
commitments	  in	  key	  policy	  areas	  such	  as	  health,	  education	  and	  the	  economy.	  	  Not	  so	  
for	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  for	  whom	  constitutional	  change	  was	  just	  as	  –	  if	  not	  more	  
important	  –	   than	  what	  could	  be	  described	  as	   “conventional	  governing”.	   	   This	  meant	  
developing	   a	   governing	   strategy	   which	   combined	   the	   aspects	   of	   conventional	  
governing	   expected	   of	   a	   typical	   government	   with	   a	   means	   of	   keeping	   the	  
constitutional	  debate	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  and	  convincing	  the	  public	  of	  the	  need	  for	  
change.12	  	  For	  both	  the	  SNP	  (in	  minority	  government)	  and	  for	  Plaid	  Cymru	  (in	  coalition	  
with	  Labour	  in	  the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government)	  this	  meant	  a	  dual-­‐strategy	  of	  taking	  
                                                
11	  De	  Swaan,	  A.	  Coalition	  theories	  and	  cabinet	  formation,	  Amsterdam,	  Elsevier,	  1973,	  cited	  in	  Müller,	  W.	  
C.	  and	  Strøm,	  K.	  op	  cit.	  p.7.	  
12	  Interviews	  with	  a	  senior	  Scottish	  Government	  Official,	  and	  Kevin	  Pringle	  (Special	  Advisor	  to	  the	  
Scottish	  Government)	  (May	  2010).	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the	  constitutional	  debate	  to	  the	  electorate	  in	  consultations	  as	  a	  prelude	  to	  their	  voting	  
in	   a	   referendum	   on	   the	   issue.	   	   It	   was	   this	   dual-­‐strategy	   which	   was	   the	   focus	   of	  
investigation	  for	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
To	   put	   the	   strategy	   in	   context	   required	   consideration	   of	   theories	   of	   deliberative	  
democracy.	   	   The	   use	   of	   direct	   democracy	   (citizens’	   initiatives,	   citizen	   juries,	  
“deliberation	   days”	   and	   of	   course,	   referendums)	   is	  much	  more	  widespread	   today.13	  	  
The	  urge	  for	  governments	  to	  consult	  their	  citizens	  on	  wide-­‐ranging	  issues	  –	  from	  the	  
constitution	  to	  the	  site	  of	  a	  new	  landfill	  facility	  –	  is	  also	  in	  vogue.14	  	  Deliberative	  theory	  
argues	   that	   modern	   variations	   of	   representative	   democracy	   have	   limited	   the	  
contribution	   of	   citizens	   in	   the	   law-­‐making	   process	   to	   the	   selection	   of	   their	  
representatives	  every	  four	  or	  five	  years.	  	  Proponents	  (including	  Habermas15,	  Fishkin16,	  
Barber17	  and	  Dryzek18	  to	  name	  but	  four)	  have	  experimented	  with	  different	  methods	  of	  
citizen	   participation	   in	   the	   democratic	   process,	   arguing	   that	   deliberation	   helps	   to	  
shape	   public	   opinion,	   leading	   to	   better-­‐informed	   decision-­‐making.19	   	   Public	  
engagement	  with	  the	  democratic	  process	   is	  also,	   for	  proponents	  of	  these	  theories,	  a	  
means	  of	  legitimising	  not	  only	  the	  policy	  outcomes,	  but	  also	  the	  debates	  themselves.	  	  
Thus,	  as	  applied	  to	  the	  strategies	  employed	  by	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  deliberative	  
                                                
13	  Setäla,	  M.	  ‘Referendums	  in	  Western	  Europe:	  A	  Wave	  of	  Direct	  Democracy?’	  in	  Scandinavian	  Political	  
Studies,	  Vol.	  22,	  Iss.	  4,	  December,	  1999.	  
14	  Baxter,	  G.	  ‘The	  Best	  Laid	  Schemes?	  	  The	  Provision	  and	  Accessibility	  of	  Government	  Consultation	  
Information	  in	  the	  UK’	  in	  LIBRI	  –	  International	  Journal	  of	  Libraries	  and	  Information	  Services,	  Vol.	  6,	  No.	  3,	  
2010,	  p.253.	  
15	  Habermas,	  J.	  Theory	  and	  Practise,	  Boston,	  Beacon,	  1973.	  
16	  Fishkin,	  J.	  S.	  When	  the	  People	  Speak:	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  and	  Public	  Consultation,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2009.	  
17	  Barber,	  B.	  R.	  Strong	  Democracy:	  Participatory	  Democracy	  for	  a	  New	  Age,	  Berkeley,	  University	  of	  
California	  Press,	  1984.	  
18	  Dryzek,	  J.	  S.	  Deliberative	  Democracy	  and	  Beyond:	  Liberals,	  Critics,	  Contestations,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2000.	  
19	  Fishkin,	  J.	  S.	  and	  Ackerman,	  B.	  Deliberation	  Day,	  New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2004.	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methods	   appear	   to	   substantially	   help	   the	   parties	   not	   only	   to	   promulgate	   their	   own	  
constitutional	  preferences	  but	  to	  actively	  engage	  the	  public	  on	  the	  issue	  –	  and	  to	  give	  
the	  impression	  of	  an	  open,	  accessible	  and	  transparent	  government,	  one	  which	  is	  ready	  
to	  react	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  its	  electorate.	  	  	  
	  
That	  consultation	  was	  part	  of	  both	  parties’	  strategy	  for	  constitutional	  change	  is	  not	  a	  
surprise	   –	   consultations	   have	   become	   a	   key	   aspect	   of	   transparent	   and	   accountable	  
governance	  –	  but	  the	  choice	  of	  referendum	  perhaps	  is.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  referendum	  in	  
the	   UK	   –	   prior	   to	   the	   Welsh	   Powers	   Referendum	   of	   2011	   –	   has	   been	   strictly	  
consultative.	   	  There	   is	  no	  mechanism	   in	   the	  UK’s	  unwritten	  constitution	  to	   require	  a	  
referendum	  on	  any	  issue.	   	  The	  Welsh	  Powers	  Referendum	  is	  unique	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  
the	  UK’s	  only	  example	  of	   a	   legally	   required	   referendum.	   	   The	   referendum	   itself	  was	  
not	  the	  choice	  of	  Plaid	  Cymru	  –	  it	  was	  a	  politically	  prudent	  addition	  to	  the	  Act	  by	  then-­‐
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales	  Peter	  Hain,	   included	  to	  ensure	  parliamentary	  passage	  of	  
the	  legislation.	  	  The	  necessity	  of	  the	  referendum	  in	  this	  case	  owed	  more	  to	  pragmatic	  
politics	  –	   internal	  Labour	  party	  debates	  and	  the	  need	  for	   the	  support	  of	   their	  MPs	  –	  
than	  any	  principle	  of	  democratic	  accountability.	   	  Nevertheless,	  Plaid	  Cymru	  did	  want	  
the	  powers	  on	  offer	  devolved	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  and	  campaigning	  for	  
the	   referendum	   thus	   became	   a	   key	   part	   of	   their	   electoral	   and	   governing	   strategies.	  	  
For	  the	  SNP,	  an	  independence	  referendum	  had	  not	  always	  been	  party	  policy	  (prior	  to	  
devolution,	  a	  majority	  of	  Scottish	  MPs	  elected	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  was	  seen	  as	  
sufficient	  to	  begin	  independence	  negotiations20)	  and,	  indeed,	  such	  a	  referendum	  is	  not	  
constitutionally	   required	   (though	   in	   matters	   of	   substantive	   constitutional	   reform,	  
                                                
20	  Scottish	  National	  Party,	  Yes	  We	  Can	  win	  the	  best	  for	  Scotland:	  The	  SNP	  General	  Election	  Manifesto,	  
Edinburgh,	  SNP,	  1997,	  p.6.	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including	   secession,	   a	   referendum	   has	   been	   accepted	   as	   standard	   procedure).21	  	  
However,	   political	   prudence	   –	   and	   electoral	   strategy	   –	   saw	   the	   party	   adopt	   a	  
referendum	   as	   part	   of	   their	   strategy	   to	   deliver	   upon	   their	   constitutional	   goal.	   	   It	   is	  
those	  consultative	  processes	  which	  this	  thesis	  examined	  in	  detail.	  
	  
A	  National	  Conversation	  
The	   opportunity	   to	   engage	   in	   government	   consultation	   provided	   the	   SNP	   with	   an	  
opportunity	   unique	   in	   its	   history	   –	   the	   ability	   to	   open	   a	   national	   dialogue	   on	   the	  
constitutional	   issue	   with	   its	   constituents	   and	   to	   provide	   that	   electorate	   with	   an	  
undiluted	  and	  unfiltered	  view	  of	   the	  party’s	  vision	   for	  Scottish	   independence.22	   	  The	  
vehicle	   for	   this	   citizen	   engagement	   was	   A	   National	   Conversation,	   the	   three	   year	  
consultation	  process	  examined	  in	  chapter	  two	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  consultation	  had	  four	  
broad	  aims	  –	  to	  build	  public	  and	  parliamentary	  support	  for	  the	  referendum	  bill	  (which	  
was,	  at	  the	  time,	  intended	  to	  be	  forthcoming);	  to	  educate	  the	  public	  about	  their	  vision	  
of	  independence;	  to	  prepare	  the	  civil	  service	  for	  what	  independence	  would	  mean	  for	  
government;	   and	   to	   keep	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   on	   the	   political	   agenda	   for	   the	  
entirety	   of	   their	   period	   of	  minority	   government.23	   	   This	   thesis	   examined	   the	   three-­‐
stage	  process	  of	  A	  National	  Conversation,	   arguing	   that	   in	  each	  of	   the	   intended	  aims	  
outlined	   above,	   the	   SNP	   achieved	   varying	   levels	   of	   success.	   	   On	   objective	   one,	   the	  
party	   saw	   opinion	   polls	   suggest	   the	   public	   would	   like	   to	   see	   a	   referendum	   on	  
Scotland’s	  constitutional	  future	  –	  however,	  they	  failed	  to	  convince	  their	  opposition	  in	  
                                                
21	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  Constitution,	  ‘Referendums	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  12th	  
Report	  of	  Session	  2009-­‐10,	  HL	  Paper	  99,	  2010,	  p.7.	  
22	  Harvey	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  ‘From	  National	  Conversation	  to	  Independence	  Referendum?:	  The	  SNP	  
Government	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Independence’,	  paper	  prepared	  for	  the	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  the	  
Political	  Studies	  Association,	  Edinburgh,	  March,	  2010.	  
23	  Interview	  with	  a	  senior	  Scottish	  Government	  Official	  (May	  2010).	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parliament	   of	   the	   argument	   for	   a	   constitutional	   referendum,	   and	   the	   bill	   was	  
subsequently	   dropped.	   	   On	   objective	   two,	   the	   party	   could	   claim	   relative	   success	   in	  
educating	  the	  public	  about	  independence	  and	  its	  potential	  impact,	  though	  this	  success	  
was	  tempered	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  opinion	  poll	  support	  for	  independence.	  	  On	  objective	  three,	  
the	   civil	   service	   were	   actively	   engaged	   in	   the	   consultation	   process,	   as	   well	   as	   in	  
researching	  and	  drafting	  the	  many	  publications	  related	  to	  A	  National	  Conversation	   in	  
various	  different	  policy	  areas.	  	  This	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  institutionalising	  the	  debate	  and	  
ensuring	   that	   those	   working	   within	   the	   government	   of	   Scotland	   would	   have	   a	   full	  
understanding	   of	   how	   Scotland	  might	   function	   if	   it	  were	   independent.24	   	   Finally,	   on	  
objective	  four,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  SNP	  in	  government	  for	  a	  four	  year	  term	  –	  as	  well	  as	  
their	  re-­‐election	  in	  May	  2011	  –	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  to	  promote	  their	  
constitutional	  preference	  meant	  that	  the	  party	  forced	  the	  opposition	  parties	  to	  discuss	  
the	   constitution,	   firstly	   in	   a	   general	   sense	   (as	   the	  media	   began	   to	   report	   the	   SNP’s	  
position	  more	  readily)	  and	  subsequently	  through	  the	  Calman	  Commission.	  	  This	  was	  an	  
attempt	  by	   the	  opposition	  –	  Unionist	  –	  parties	   to	   try	  and	  re-­‐define	   the	   terms	  of	   the	  
constitutional	  debate.	   	  The	  presence	   in	  government	  office	  of	  a	  party	  whose	  desire	   it	  
was	  to	  break	  up	  the	  Union	  forced	  those	  defending	  the	  status	  quo	  –	  that	  is,	  Scotland	  as	  
a	  constituent	  nation	  of	  the	  UK	  –	  into	  a	  pragmatic	  position,	  establishing	  a	  commission	  
with	  a	  remit	  to	  review	  the	  workings	  of	  devolution	  and	  report	  recommending	  how	  the	  
settlement	  could	  be	  strengthened	  enough	  to	  maintain	  its	  usefulness	  as	  an	  institution	  
while	  retaining	  Scotland	  as	  part	  of	  the	  UK.25	  	  	  
                                                
24	  Harvey,	  M.	  and	  Lynch,	  P.	  2010,	  op	  cit.	  
25	  Commission	  on	  Scottish	  Devolution,	  ‘Serving	  Scotland	  Better:	  Scotland	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  the	  
21st	  Century’	  Final	  Report,	  Edinburgh,	  Commission	  on	  Scottish	  Devolution,	  June,	  2009.	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This	   thesis	   contends	   that	   A	   National	   Conversation	   was	   an	   exercise	   in	   deliberative	  
democracy	   which	   was	   aimed	   at	   engaging	   the	   public	   in	   consideration	   of	   the	  
constitutional	  future	  of	  Scotland,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  with	  the	  end	  point	  –	  a	  referendum	  to	  
determine	  what	  that	  constitutional	  future	  should	  be	  –	  intended	  to	  bring	  a	  logical	  end	  
to	  that	  discussion.	  	  It	  argues	  that	  A	  National	  Conversation	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  shaping	  
the	   constitutional	   debate	   in	   Scotland	   from	   the	   arrival	   in	   office	   of	   the	   SNP	   in	   2007,	  
influencing	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Calman	   Commission	   (which	   led	   to	   the	   UK	  
legislation	   on	   the	   Scotland	   Bill)	   and	   laying	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   party’s	   intended	  
campaign	  for	  a	  Yes	  vote	  at	  an	  independence,	  subsequently	  scheduled	  (post	  re-­‐election	  
of	  an	  SNP	  government)	  for	  autumn	  2014.	  
	  
The	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  
While	   A	   National	   Conversation	   was	   ongoing	   in	   Scotland,	   a	   similar	   constitutional	  
discussion	  –	  albeit	  with	  widely	  differing	  parameters	  –	  was	  underway	   in	  Wales.	   	  Plaid	  
Cymru,	  after	  their	  impressive	  showing	  in	  the	  2007	  elections	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  
for	   Wales,	   agreed	   to	   enter	   coalition	   government	   with	   Labour.	   	   The	   cost	   of	   doing	  
business	  was	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  to	  proceed	  to	  a	  referendum	  on	  
Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Assembly	  term	  in	  
2011,	   by	   way	   of	   a	   constitutional	   convention	   to	   measure	   the	   support	   of	   the	  Welsh	  
electorate	   for	   this	   change.26	   	   The	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  was	   intended	   to	  address	   the	  
lack	   of	   constitutional	   debate	   in	   Wales	   by	   taking	   on	   the	   role	   that	   the	   Scottish	  
Constitutional	   Convention	   had	   prior	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   devolution	   in	   the	   late	  
                                                
26	  Labour	  Party	  Wales	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  ‘One	  Wales:	  a	  progressive	  agenda	  for	  the	  government	  of	  Wales:	  
an	  agreement	  between	  the	  Labour	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  Groups	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly’,	  Cardiff,	  Welsh	  
Assembly	  Government,	  2007,	  p.6.	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1990s,27	  though	  it	  was	  recognised	  as	  a	  “different	  process	  to	  do	  a	  different	  thing	  at	  a	  
different	  time”.28	  
	  
The	  All	  Wales	   Convention	   had	   several	   objectives	   laid	   out	   in	   its	   remit.	   	   Firstly,	   it	  was	  
designed	  to	  have	  an	  informative	  and	  educative	  role	  –	  to	  make	  the	  Welsh	  public	  aware	  
of	  the	  devolution	  settlement	  granted	  in	  1999	  and	  how	  it	  had	  been	  altered	  through	  the	  
Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  	  This	  was	  particularly	  important	  given	  the	  provisions	  
of	  Part	  3	  of	  the	  Act	  which	  established	  (limited)	  legislative	  powers	  for	  the	  Assembly,	  to	  
be	  delivered	  through	  a	  complex	  and	  gradual	  process	  involving	  Legislative	  Competence	  
Orders	  (LCOs).	   	  The	  LCO	  system	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  bridge	  to	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  
would	  devolve	  powers	  in	  20	  areas	  without	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Assembly	  to	  apply	  for	  each	  
power	  individually.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  extending	  the	  Assembly’s	  powers,	  the	  
second	  objective	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  was	  to	  stimulate	  a	  public	  discussion	  on	  
the	   merits	   of	   increasing	   the	   role	   of	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales	   to	   that	   of	   a	  
legislative	   body.	   	   Finally,	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	   Government	   asked	   the	   All	   Wales	  
Convention	   to	  analyse	  the	  views	  it	  encountered,	  and	  to	  recommend	  to	  the	  Assembly	  
as	  to	  whether	  a	  referendum	  to	  move	  to	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  
was	  desired,	  and	  whether	  a	  successful	  outcome	  could	  be	  achieved.29	  
	  
In	   examining	   the	   success	   of	   the	  All	  Wales	   Convention,	   this	   thesis	   contends	   that	   the	  
process	  was	  hampered	  by	   factors	   outwith	   its	   control.	   	   The	   geography	  of	  Wales,	   the	  
difficulties	   in	   travelling	   from	  north	   to	   south	   and	   the	   absence	  of	   a	   distinctly	   “Welsh”	  
                                                
27	  Interview	  with	  Bethan	  Jenkins	  (Plaid	  Cymru	  AM)	  (June	  2010).	  
28	  Interview	  with	  Alun	  Davies	  (Labour	  AM;	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  Establishing	  Committee)	  (July	  2010).	  
29	  All	  Wales	  Convention,	  Report	  of	  the	  Establishing	  Committee	  of	  the	  Al	  Wales	  Convention,	  Cardiff,	  
National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  2008,	  p.xx.	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media	   –	  with	  only	   one	  daily	   newspaper	   published	   in	  Wales,	   and	  many	   in	   south	   and	  
east	  Wales	   getting	   their	   television	   signal	   from	   England	   –	   provided	   several	   problems	  
which	  the	  executive	  Committee	  found	  difficult	  to	  overcome.30	  	  Nevertheless,	  what	  the	  
All	   Wales	   Convention	   discovered	   was	   a	   very	   mixed	   picture.	   	   There	   was	   general	  
confusion	  as	  to	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  and	  the	  distinctive	  role	  
the	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  played	  –	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  merits	  of	  devolution	  –	  
which	  were	  lost	  in	  the	  public’s	  difficulties	  in	  understanding	  the	  system.	  	  The	  addition	  
of	  the	  LCO	  system	  further	  complicated	  matters.	  	  Thus,	  what	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  
encountered	  was	  a	  Welsh	  electorate	  which	  was	  uneducated	  about	  devolution,	  and	  on	  
that	  aspect	  of	  its	  remit,	  the	  Convention	  largely	  failed	  to	  alter	  that	  situation.	  	  That	  being	  
the	  case,	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  largely	  failed	  in	  its	  second	  objective	  –	  to	  stimulate	  
widespread	  public	  discussion	  of	  devolution.	  	  Recognising	  this	  failure	  –	  and	  that	  such	  a	  
discussion	   would	   be	   required	   if	   a	   referendum	   on	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   Assembly’s	  
powers	  was	   to	  be	  won	  –	   the	  Convention	   recommended	   the	   continuation	  of	   a	  wide-­‐
ranging	   public	   debate	   on	   Welsh	   devolution.31	   	   Finally,	   given	   the	   evidence	   at	   its	  
disposal,	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  suggested	  that	  a	  move	  to	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  
of	   Wales	   Act	   2006	   offered	   a	   “substantial	   advantage”	   to	   the	   LCO	   system.	   	   The	  
Convention	   thus	   recommended	   that	   a	   referendum	   should	   be	   undertaken	   –	   which	  
fulfilled	   the	   final	   objective	   of	   their	   remit	   –	   but	   that	   a	   Yes	   vote	   could	   not	   be	  
guaranteed.32	  
	  
                                                
30	  Interviews	  with	  Sally	  Hyman	  and	  Rob	  Humphrey	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (June/	  
July	  2010).	  




This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  played	  a	  considerable	  role	  in	  shaping	  
the	  debate	  on	  devolution	  in	  Wales	  in	  four	  distinct	  ways	  –	  as	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  One-­‐
Wales	   Agreement,	   it	   maintained	   the	   governing	   coalition	   between	   Labour	   and	   Plaid	  
Cymru;	   it	   helped	   to	  maintain	   the	  momentum	   for	   legislative	  powers	   for	   the	  National	  
Assembly	  for	  Wales	  as	  one	  of	  several	  initiatives	  with	  this	  ambition;	  it	  played	  a	  role	  in	  
preparing	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  referendum	  on	  extending	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Assembly	  by	  
engaging	  the	  public	  in	  debate	  about	  devolution;	  and	  it	  played	  a	  role	  in	  convincing	  the	  
public	  of	  the	  need	  for	  change.	  	  However,	  as	  noted	  above,	  this	  role	  was	  also	  marked	  by	  
a	   failure	   to	   engage	   the	   public	   in	   the	   debate	   about	   devolution	   and,	   in	   particular,	   an	  
inability	  to	  communicate	  more	  widely	  across	  Wales.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Welsh	  Powers	  Referendum	  2011	  
While	   there	  was	   a	  widely	   held	   view	   among	   politicians	   in	   the	  National	   Assembly	   for	  
Wales	  and	  Welsh	  political	  commentators	  that	  the	  referendum	  held	  in	  Wales	  in	  2011	  to	  
enact	   Part	   4	   of	   the	   Government	   of	   Wales	   Act	   2006	   was	   unnecessary	   from	   a	  
constitutional	  perspective,33	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  a	  requirement	  in	  the	  Act	  itself	  meant	  
that	  if	  the	  Assembly	  desired	  the	  powers	  on	  offer,	  then	  a	  referendum	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
undertaken.	  	  The	  precedents	  of	  1979	  and	  1997	  suggested	  that	  such	  a	  path	  would	  lead	  
to	  some	  nervousness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  campaigning	  for	  the	  powers	  to	  be	  devolved	  
–	  the	  substantial	  defeat	   in	  1979	  followed	  by	  the	  narrow	  victory	  achieved	  in	  1997	  led	  
proponents	  of	  devolution	  to	  resent	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  referendum	  to	  enact	  the	  powers.	  	  
As	  with	  many	  referendums,	  the	  timing	  of	  this	  one	  would	  be	  crucial.	  	  A	  wrongly-­‐timed	  
referendum	   would	   see	   the	   momentum	   towards	   a	   legislative	   National	   Assembly	   for	  
                                                
33	  Interviews	  with	  Mike	  German	  (then-­‐Liberal	  Democrat	  AM),	  Nick	  Bourne	  (then-­‐Conservative	  AM	  and	  
party	  leader)	  and	  Alun	  Davies	  (Labour	  AM)	  (June/July	  2010).	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Wales,	  which	   had	   been	   building	   for	   several	   years	   at	   political	   elite	   level,	   thwarted.34	  	  
Thus,	  work	  was	  required	  to	  be	  undertaken	  to	  prepare	  the	  public	  for	  the	  vote	  –	  work	  
on	  educating	  the	  electorate	  about	  the	  devolution	  settlement	  had	  been	  undertaken	  by	  
the	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   but	   there	   was	   still	   a	   consideration	   that	   confusion	   and	  
misunderstanding	   surrounding	   devolution	  was	  widespread	   among	   the	  Welsh	   public.	  	  
The	  timing	  of	  the	  referendum	  was	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  UK	  Government,	  and	  though	  it	  
was	  Assembly	  Members	  in	  Cardiff	  that	  were	  pushing	  for	  a	  referendum,	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  State	  for	  Wales	  –	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  UK	  General	  Election	  in	  May	  2010	  –	  was	  
sympathetic	  to	  the	  pro-­‐devolutionists	  campaign.	  	  Thus,	  while	  the	  referendum	  was	  not	  
quite	  delivered	   to	  a	   timescale	  hoped	   for	  by	   the	  National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales,	   it	  was	  
scheduled	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  2007-­‐11	  Assembly	  term,	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  One-­‐Wales	  
Agreement.	  
	  
The	  nature	  of	  the	  Welsh	  Powers	  Referendum	  –	  as	  a	  legally	  prescribed	  requirement	  to	  
enact	  the	  provisions	  of	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  –	  meant	  that	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  and	  the	  campaign	  itself	  took	  on	  greater	  significance	  
from	   a	   theoretical	   perspective.	   	   For	   deliberative	   theorists,	   deliberation	   through	  
consultation	   and	   public	   debate	   –	   when	   citizens	   are	   subsequently	   invited	   to	   deliver	  
their	  verdict	  through	  voting	  –	  helps	  to	  provide	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  decision.35	  	  This	  thesis	  
contends	   that	   this	   was	   a	   clear	   motivating	   factor,	   not	   only	   for	   the	   architect	   of	   the	  
second	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  (then-­‐Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales,	  Peter	  Hain)	  but	  
for	  politicians	  in	  Cardiff	  Bay,	  in	  seeking	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  Assembly’s	  powers.	  	  Given	  
                                                
34	  Harvey,	  M.	  ‘How	  to	  Lose	  a	  Referendum	  in	  Seven	  Ways:	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Upcoming	  Welsh	  Powers	  
Referendum’	  in	  Regional	  and	  Federal	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  Vol.	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  No.	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  March,	  2011(a).	  
35	  Fearon,	  J.	  D.	  ‘Deliberation	  as	  Discussion’	  in	  Elster,	  J.	  (ed)	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  Cambridge,	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998(b),	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the	  slim	  mandate	  for	  devolution	  delivered	  in	  the	  1997	  referendum	  which	  established	  
the	   Assembly,	   the	   legitimacy	   afforded	   to	   devolution	   through	   public	   debate	   and	   an	  
affirmative	   vote	   in	   the	   2011	   referendum	   was	   an	   important	   milestone	   in	   Welsh	  
devolved	   politics.	   	   However,	   the	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   methods	   of	   deliberative	  
democracy	   employed	   by	   the	   Welsh	   Assembly	   Government	   in	   this	   process	   were	  
employed	   not	   for	   their	   intrinsic	   merit	   (the	   democratic	   process	   in	   action	   through	  
consultation,	   action	   legitimised	   by	   public	   debate)	   but	   for	   their	   ability	   to	   deliver	   the	  
desired	   outcome:	   the	   devolution	   of	   power	   in	   the	   20	   fields	   set	   out	   in	   Part	   4	   of	   the	  
Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  
	  
The	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum	  
The	  SNP’s	  plans	   to	  hold	  a	   referendum	  on	   independence	  during	   the	  2007-­‐11	  Scottish	  
Parliamentary	   term	  were	   thwarted	   by	   their	   status	   as	   a	  minority	   government	   –	   and	  
their	  inability	  to	  persuade	  parliamentary	  opposition	  to	  support	  the	  policy.	  	  The	  original	  
intention	  of	   this	   thesis	  had	  been	   to	   compare	   the	   strategies	   in	  office	  of	   the	  SNP	  and	  
Plaid	  Cymru	  in	  building	  towards,	  and	  the	  campaigns	  at,	  their	  respective	  referendums.	  	  
However,	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  SNP’s	  referendum	  strategy	  –	  postponing	  the	  bill	  when	  
they	   recognised	   that	   it	   would	   be	   defeated	   in	   parliament	   –	   allowed	   for	   a	   slightly	  
different	  analysis	  of	  strategy.	  	  Dropping	  the	  referendum	  bill	  was	  a	  difficult	  decision	  for	  
the	   SNP,	   and	   one	  which,	   though	   understood,	   disappointed	   activists.36	   	   It	  was	   also	   a	  
decision	  which	  empowered	  the	  opposition	  parties,	  allowing	  them	  to	  paint	  the	  Scottish	  
Government	   as	   disingenuous	   and	   lacking	   the	   ability	   to	   bring	   forward	   key	  manifesto	  
commitments.	   	   Indeed,	  while	  the	  SNP	  had	  previously	  sought	  to	  make	  political	  capital	  
                                                
36	  Interviews	  with	  SNP	  Activists	  (February/	  March	  2011).	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out	   of	   the	   opposition’s	   refusal	   to	   support	   the	   referendum	   bill,	   it	   now	   gave	   the	  
Unionists	  an	  opportunity	  to	  portray	  the	  SNP	  as	  obstructionist	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  their	  
decision	   not	   even	   to	   bring	   forward	   a	   referendum	   bill.	   	   This	   thesis	   argued	   that	   the	  
decision	  not	  to	  advance	  the	  bill	  while	  the	  party	  were	  in	  minority	  government	  –	  for	  fear	  
amendments	   would	   be	   introduced,	   considerably	   altering	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   bill,	  
including	  the	  referendum	  question	  itself	  –	  was	  a	  risk.37	  	  There	  was	  no	  guarantee	  that	  
the	   SNP	   would	   have	   another	   opportunity	   to	   present	   a	   referendum	   on	   Scottish	  
independence	   to	   the	   electorate	   –	   and	  with	   polls	   at	   the	   time	   indicating	   that	   Labour	  
were	   favoured	   to	   emerge	   from	   the	   2011	   Scottish	   Parliament	   election	   as	   the	   largest	  
party,	   it	   looked	   like	   the	   party	   were	   heading	   for	   electoral	   defeat,	   lessening	   their	  
chances	  of	  moving	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  forward.	  	  It	  was	  however,	  a	  risk	  that	  paid	  
off,	   with	   the	   party	   returning	   as	   a	  majority	   government	   in	   the	  May	   2011	   election	   –	  
providing	   new	   impetus	   for	   constitutional	   reform,	   and	   an	   announcement	   that	   an	  
independence	  referendum	  would	  be	  held	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  2014.	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  SNP’s	  referendum	  strategy	  could	  be	  assessed	  –	  and	  it	  did	  mirror	  that	  
of	  pro-­‐devolutionists	  in	  Wales	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  party	  would	  not	  consider	  moving	  
towards	  a	  bill	  until	  it	  considered	  that	  it	  would	  succeed	  in	  the	  public	  vote.	  	  This	  strategy	  
was	  derived	   from	   that	  of	   the	  Parti	  Québécois	   (PQ)	  who,	   on	   two	  occasions,	   believed	  
they	   had	   created	   the	   “winning	   conditions”	   for	   a	   sovereignty	   referendum	   and	   twice	  
came	   up	   short.	   	   The	   PQ	   delivered	   warnings	   to	   the	   SNP	   that	   they	   should	   not	   bring	  
forward	   a	   referendum	   until	   they	   were	   sure	   that	   they	   had	   built	   the	   necessary	  
conditions	  for	  victory	  –	  and	  if	  these	  “winning	  conditions”	  were	  not	  apparent,	  then	  they	  
                                                
37	  Interview	  with	  Gareth	  Finn	  (SNP	  National	  Executive	  Committee)	  (February	  2011).	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should	   postpone	   the	   referendum,	   since	   defeat	   would	   set	   the	   campaign	   for	  
independence	  back	   for	  at	   least	  a	  generation.38	   	  For	   the	  PQ,	   the	  absence	  of	  “winning	  
conditions”	  was	  a	  sufficient	  reason	  not	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum.	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  argued	  
that	   while	   the	   SNP’s	   consultation	   and	   referendum	   strategy	   was	   designed	   with	  
elements	   of	   deliberative	   democracy	   in	   mind	   –	   specifically,	   the	   need	   to	   build	   a	  
consensus	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  constitutional	  change	  among	  both	  politicians	  in	  the	  Scottish	  
Parliament	  and	  the	  wider	  electorate	  –	  waiting	  to	  hold	  the	  referendum	  until	   they	  are	  
sure	  of	  a	  positive	  outcome	  somewhat	  negates	  the	  democratic	  origins	  of	  the	  strategy.	  	  
From	  a	  political	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  SNP	  did	  secure	  a	  mandate	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  by	  
winning	   a	  majority	   of	   seats	   in	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament’s	   2011-­‐16	   term	   –	   a	  mandate	  
recognised	   by	   their	   opposition.	   	   However,	   proponents	   of	   deliberative	   theory	   would	  
question	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  process	  in	  which	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  referendum	  is	  fixed	  to	  
maximise	   the	   chances	   of	   a	   positive	   outcome.	   	   The	   SNP	   argued	   that	   a	   lack	   of	  
understanding	  of	  what	  independence	  means	  for	  Scotland	  meant	  that	  a	  later	  date	  for	  a	  
referendum	  would	  be	  required	  to	  educate	  the	  electorate	  as	  to	  what	  a	  Yes	  and	  No	  vote	  
would	  mean	  in	  a	  referendum,	  and	  how	  Scotland	  might	  look	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  positive	  
result.	   	   And	   indeed,	   this	   is	   why	   a	   deliberative	   process	   incorporating	   a	   public	  
consultation	  prior	  to	  a	  referendum	  is	  so	  important	  –	  a	  process	  in	  which	  the	  public	  are	  
fully	   involved,	   so	   that	  when	   the	   referendum	   is	   scheduled	   they	   are	   fully	   aware	  what	  
their	  vote	  will	  mean.	  
	  
	  
                                                






This	  thesis	  has	  considered,	  with	  reference	  to	  theories	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	  the	  
strategy	  of	  two	  nationalist	  parties	  in	  government,	  who	  undertook	  to	  use	  their	  status	  as	  
governing	   parties	   to	   advance	   their	   constitutional	   goals.	   	   It	   has	   argued	   that,	   though	  
neither	   the	  SNP	  nor	  Plaid	  Cymru	  had	  experience	  of	   government	  office	  prior	   to	   their	  
election	   to	   office	   in	   2007,	   each	  utilised	   this	   position	   to	   promote	   their	   constitutional	  
objectives	   through	   the	   use	   of	   deliberative	   methods	   of	   democracy	   –	   namely	  
consultation	  and	  referendum.	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  examined	  the	  strategy	  of	  each	  party	  in	  
detailed	   case	   studies	   of	   both	   the	   consultations	   undertaken	   by	   the	   parties	   and	   the	  
referendum	   plans	   articulated	   (in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   SNP)	   and	   executed	   (in	   the	   case	   of	  
Plaid	   Cymru).	   	   Through	   case	   study	   analysis	   of	   the	   methods	   of	   public	   participation	  
employed	  by	  the	  respective	  parties	  to	  attempt	  to	  establish	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  need	  
for	  constitutional	  change,	  this	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  parties	  have	  achieved	  some	  
success	  with	  this	  strategy.	  	  For	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  though	  the	  All	  Wales	  Convention	  played	  a	  
limited	   role	   in	   engaging	   the	   public	   in	   the	   constitutional	   debate	   and	   informing	   the	  
electorate	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   devolution	   in	   Wales,	   the	   success	   of	   the	   strategy	   was	  
implicit	  in	  the	  referendum,	  held	  in	  early	  2011,	  which	  delivered	  a	  positive	  outcome,	  and	  
the	  enactment	  of	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006.	  	  This	  was	  achievement	  
of	   the	  party’s	  primary	   short-­‐term	  goal:	   the	   transformation	  of	   the	  National	  Assembly	  
for	  Wales	   into	  a	   legislature	  with	  primary	   law-­‐making	  powers.39	   	  For	  the	  SNP,	  success	  
cannot	  be	  measured	  by	  the	  result	  of	  a	  referendum,	  since	  that	  referendum	  has	  not	  yet	  
occurred.	   	  Rather,	   the	  success	  of	  the	  SNP’s	  strategy	  must	  be	  measured	  by	   its	   impact	  
upon	   the	   devolution	   debate	   and	   the	   outcomes	   it	   has	   influenced.	   	   With	   the	  
                                                
39	  Plaid	  Cymru,	  2007,	  op	  cit.	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establishment	  of	   the	  Calman	  Commission	  as	  a	  direct	   response	   to	   the	  SNP’s	  National	  
Conversation	   and	   the	   subsequent	   legislation	   to	   extend	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Scottish	  
Parliament	   in	   the	   shape	  of	   the	   Scotland	  Bill,	   there	   can	  be	  no	  question	   that	   the	   SNP	  
achieved	  some	  success	  in	  building	  consensus	  on	  the	  need	  to	  change	  the	  constitutional	  
settlement.40	   	   Their	   primary,	   long-­‐term	   aim	   –	   full	   independence	   for	   Scotland,	   in	  
whatever	  form	  that	  concept	  now	  takes	  for	  the	  party	  –	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  achieved,	  and,	  
if	   opinion	   polls	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   SNP’s	   election	   victory	   in	   May	   2011	   are	   to	   be	  
believed,	   is	  unlikely	  without	  a	  substantial	  shift	   in	  public	  opinion.	   	   It	   is	   for	  this	  reason	  
that	  the	  party	  delayed	  their	  ambition	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  and	  waited	  instead	  for	  the	  
“winning	  conditions”	  to	  be	  apparent	  before	  undertaking	  such	  a	  public	  vote.	  
	  
Comparing	  the	  two	  processes,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  public	  engagement	  strategies	  of	  the	  
SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  bear	  some	  similarities	  with	  one	  another.	   	  Both	  were	   top-­‐down	  
affairs,	   executed	   by	   nationalist	   parties	   in	   office	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   	   Both	   set	   out	   to	  
engage	  the	  public	   in	   the	  constitutional	  debate,	  and	  both	  sought	   to	  build	  support	   for	  
their	  party’s	  preferred	  constitutional	  option.	   	   It	   is	   in	   the	  outcomes	  achieved	  through	  
these	  strategies	  that	  the	  similarities	  end.	  	  In	  the	  Welsh	  case,	  the	  public	  –	  as	  in	  the	  1997	  
devolution	   referendum	   campaign	   –	   remained	   disinterested	   in	   the	   process,	   did	   not	  
participate	   in	   the	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   in	   large	   numbers,	   and	   the	   constitutional	  
debate	   was	   largely	   ignored.	   	   It	   was,	   against	   its	   intentions,	   a	   consultation	   which	  
engaged	   “the	   usual	   suspects”	   –	   the	   elite	   actors	   and	   organisations	   in	  Welsh	   political	  
circles.41	  	  However,	  somewhat	  paradoxically,	  the	  referendum	  campaign	  was	  a	  success	  
for	   those	   who	   supported	   devolution,	   with	   almost	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   those	   voting	  
                                                
40	  Crawford,	  B.	  ‘Ten	  Years	  of	  Devolution’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs,	  Vol.63,	  No.	  1.	  2010,	  p.95.	  
41	  Interview	  with	  Rob	  Humphrey	  (All	  Wales	  Convention	  Executive	  Committee)	  (July	  2010).	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supporting	   the	  move	   to	   Part	   4	   of	   the	   Government	   of	  Wales	   Act	   2006.	   	   Thus,	   Plaid	  
Cymru’s	   strategy,	   though	   lacking	   in	   public	   engagement	   with	   the	   consultation,	  
delivered	  their	  desired	  outcome	  in	  the	  referendum.	  
	  
Contrastingly,	   the	   Scottish	   case	   saw	   a	   different	   scenario	   unfold.	   	   A	   National	  
Conversation	   was	   generally	   considered	   by	   those	  who	   engaged	  with	   it	   to	   be	   a	   good	  
initiative,	   and	   allowed	   the	   Scottish	   Government	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   transparent	   and	  
accessible.42	  	  However,	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  endpoint	  (a	  referendum)	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  
no	   tangible	   outcome	   to	   the	   SNP’s	   public	   engagement	   strategy	   –	   at	   least,	   not	   in	   the	  
short	   term.	   	  However,	   in	   terms	  of	  agenda-­‐setting,	   this	  strategy	  spawned	  the	  Calman	  
Commission,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  Scotland	  Bill	  and	  the	  devolution	  of	  further	  powers	  to	  the	  
Scottish	  Parliament.	  	  It	  led	  –	  indirectly	  –	  to	  the	  re-­‐election	  of	  the	  SNP	  in	  2011,	  this	  time	  
as	  a	  majority	  government,	  and	  to	  the	  likely	  delivery	  of	  an	  independence	  referendum	  in	  
2014.	   	  Crucially,	  however,	   it	  has	  also	   led	   to	  widespread	  public	  engagement	  with	   the	  
constitutional	   debate,	   which	   has	   now	   become	  much	  more	   of	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   process,	  
with	  limited	  engagement	  for	  the	  Scottish	  Government.	  	  	  
	  
In	  Wales,	  despite	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  further	  commission	  to	  study	  devolution	  (the	  Silk	  
Commission)43	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   successful	   2011	   referendum,	   the	   public	   remain	  
disengaged	   in	   the	  debate,	  which	   continues	   to	  be	  elite-­‐level	   and	  government-­‐led.	   	   In	  
Scotland,	   and	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   short-­‐term	   success	   for	   the	   SNP	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   	   their	  
constitutional	  objective,	   there	  now	  exists	   a	   constitutional	  debate	  which	  has	  become	  
                                                
42	  Email	  interviews	  with	  Christian	  Allard	  (Westhill	  and	  Elrick	  Community	  Council)	  and	  Isabel	  Page	  
(Meldrum,	  Bourtie	  and	  Daviot	  Community	  Council)	  (January	  2010).	  
43	  Silk	  Commission	  website,	  available	  at:	  	  http://commissionondevolutioninwales.independent.gov.uk/	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multi-­‐lateral.	   	   Civic	   society,	   politicians,	   media	   outlets	   and	   the	   wider	   public	   are	   all	  
engaged	   in	   consideration	   at	   varying	   levels	   in	   a	   constitutional	   debate	   in	   which	   the	  
Scottish	   Government	   is	   no	   longer	   the	  main	   actor.	   	   This	   is	   the	   primary	   difference	   in	  
outcomes	   between	   the	   consultation	   processes	   in	   Scotland	   and	  Wales,	   and	   the	   key	  
finding	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
Limits	  of	  research	  
The	  research	  for	  this	  thesis	  was	  undertaken	  between	  autumn	  2008	  and	  June	  2011.	  	  To	  
put	   this	   timeframe	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   UK’s	   political	   calendar,	   it	   began	   sixteen	  
months	   into	   the	   third	   terms	   of	   Scottish	   and	   Welsh	   devolution	   and	   came	   to	   its	  
conclusion	  one	  month	  after	  the	  devolved	  elections	  in	  May	  2011.	   	  This	  end	  point	  was	  
consciously	   chosen	   to	   allow	   consideration	   of	   the	   election	   results	   and	   their	  
repercussions	   –	   and	   as	   a	   natural	   end	   point	   to	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   governing	  
strategies	  of	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  in	  their	  first	  terms	  in	  office.	  	  The	  research	  is	  thus	  
limited	  to	  consideration	  of	  this	  timeframe	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  respective	  governing	  
parties	  during	  their	  period	   in	  office.	   	  While	  actions	  of	  other	  parties	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  
constitution	  are	  considered	  –	  in	  particular,	  the	  Calman	  Commission	  (and	  the	  resultant	  
Scotland	  Bill),	  the	  Richard	  Commission	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006	  –	  these	  
actions	  are	  considered	  as	  supplementary	  to	  the	  central	  topic	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  And	  while	  
the	  overall	  framework	  of	  devolution	  delivered	  in	  1999	  is	  key	  to	  how	  nationalist	  parties	  
now	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  govern	  within	  their	  respective	  territorial	  institutions,	  the	  
focus	  of	   this	   thesis	   specifically	   on	   the	  public	   engagement	   strategies	   of	   these	  parties	  
means	   that	   wider	   consideration	   of	   devolution	   –	   in	   particular,	   the	   absence	   of	   a	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devolved	  English	   legislature	  and	  the	   impact	  of	  Northern	   Irish	  devolution	  on	  the	  UK’s	  
political	  structure	  –	  was	  not	  included.	  
	  
With	   regard	   to	   methodology,	   research	   was	   limited	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   events	  
examined	   were	   of	   a	   contemporary	   nature,	   subject	   to	   frequent	   adaptation	   and	  
revision.	   	   As	   such,	   little	   in	   the	   way	   of	   academic	   publication	   on	   the	   topic	   under	  
consideration	  was	  released	  during	  this	  period.	  	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  data	  compiled	  for	  
analysis	  fell	  into	  two	  categories.	  	  For	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	  theoretical	  elements	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy	  which	  the	  thesis	  drew	  upon	  –	  as	  well	  historical	  accounts	  of	  the	  
devolution	  debates	  –	  secondary	  sources	  were	  fully	  utilised.	   	   In	  examining	  the	  actions	  
of	  the	  parties	  in	  government,	  academic	  publications	  were	  limited,	  which	  necessitated	  
a	   considerable	   undertaking	   of	   primary	   research	   –	   interviews	   with	   key	   actors,	  
consulting	   government	   and	   party	   publications,	   and	   close	   examination	   of	   the	  
consultation	   processes.	   	   Where	   necessary	   for	   up	   to	   date	   information,	   less	  
conventional	   sources	   –	   newspaper	   articles,	   online	   news	   sources	   and	   blogs	   –	   were	  
utilised.	   	   Thus,	   the	   thesis	   is	   heavily	   reliant	   upon	   journalistic	   rather	   than	   academic	  
sources	   for	   this	   portion	   of	   the	   research.	   	   There	   is	   recognition	   that	   the	   use	   of	   these	  
more	  journalistic	  sources	  does	  necessarily	  limit	  the	  academic	  input	  into	  the	  research.	  	  
It	   is	   hoped,	   however,	   that	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   argument	   and	   the	   topic	   under	  
consideration	  provide	  adequate	  in	  the	  way	  of	  academic	  standard	  to	  offset	  the	  use	  of	  






Direction	  of	  future	  research	  
As	  noted	  above,	  the	  timeframe	  this	  thesis	  considered	  was	  the	  first	  term	  in	  office	  of	  the	  
SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   in	   their	   respective	   institutions,	   and	   within	   that,	   the	   actions	  
undertaken	   to	   promote	   their	   own	   constitutional	   goals.	   	   The	   elections	   of	  May	   2011	  
provided	   a	   fitting	   endpoint	   for	   the	   research,	   delivering	   as	   they	   did	   the	   end	   of	   Plaid	  
Cymru’s	   spell	   in	   office	   as	   well	   as	   the	   end	   of	   the	   SNP’s	   minority	   administration	   in	  
Scotland.	   	   Fitting	   too,	   because	   they	   marked	   the	   end	   of	   a	   distinct	   period	   of	  
constitutional	   debate	   in	  both	   Scotland	  and	  Wales.	   	   The	   SNP’s	  National	   Conversation	  
had	   been	   completed	   without	   a	   real	   conclusion	   while	   in	   Wales	   the	   successful	  
referendum	   in	   March	   2011	   ushered	   in	   a	   new	   era	   of	   legislative	   devolution.	   	   The	  
constitutional	   debate	   in	   Wales	   has	   moved	   on	   towards	   fiscal	   matters,	   with	  
consideration	   of	   the	   Holtham	   Commission44	   report	   intertwined	   with	   demands	   for	  
financial	  powers	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales,	  in	  line	  with	  those	  proposed	  for	  
Scotland	  through	  the	  Scotland	  Bill.45	   	   In	  Scotland	   itself,	  agreement	  has	  been	  reached	  
between	   the	  UK	  and	   Scottish	  Governments	   to	  hold	   an	   independence	   referendum	   in	  
autumn	  2014.	  
	  
The	  constitution	  debate	  in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  progressed	  substantially	  while	  the	  SNP	  
and	  Plaid	  Cymru	  occupied	  government	  office.	   	  However,	  those	  debates	  are	  no	  closer	  
to	  reaching	  a	  conclusion,	  if	  indeed	  a	  constitutional	  debate	  has	  a	  conclusion.	  	  Research	  
in	   Scotland	   will	   inevitably	   centre	   around	   the	   SNP’s	   plans	   to	   hold	   a	   referendum	   on	  
                                                
44	  Holtham	  Commission,	  ‘Fairness	  and	  accountability:	  a	  new	  funding	  settlement	  for	  Wales’	  Final	  Report	  
of	  the	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Funding	  and	  Finance	  for	  Wales,	  Cardiff,	  July,	  2010.	  	  
45	  Williamson,	  D.	  ‘Welsh	  Secretary	  names	  commission	  to	  study	  the	  devolution	  of	  new	  fiscal	  powers	  to	  





independence,	  on	  what	   independence	   in	  a	   twenty-­‐first	  century	  world	  would	  actually	  
look	  like	  for	  Scotland	  and	  the	  impact	  such	  a	  constitutional	  change	  would	  have	  on	  the	  
Scottish	   people.	   	   Research	   too,	   will	   likely	   focus	   on	   the	   Scottish	   electorate,	   their	  
attitudes	   towards	   independence,	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	   to	   the	  wider	  
world	  –	  with	  perhaps	  particular	  interest	  in	  the	  European	  dimension.	  	  An	  independent	  
Scotland’s	   membership	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   is	   by	   no	   means	   certain	   (Spain’s	  
concerns	  over	  similar	  moves	  by	  some	  of	  its	  own	  constituent	  autonomous	  communities	  
–	   not	   to	   mention	   tensions	   regarding	   fishing	   rights	   for	   Spanish	   vessels	   –	   make	   a	  
potential	   Spanish	   veto	   of	   Scottish	   membership	   a	   real	   possibility)	   and	   how	   that	  
dynamic	   plays	   out	   in	   a	   referendum	   campaign	   will	   be	   of	   interest	   to	   politicians	   and	  
academics	   alike.	   	   In	   Wales,	   political	   research	   will	   now	   move	   towards	   the	   financial	  
settlement	  of	  devolution.	   	  On	   the	  morning	   the	   referendum	  result	  was	  announced	   in	  
March	  2011,	  former	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Wales	  Peter	  Hain	  put	  the	  concept	  of	  fiscal	  
devolution	   upon	   the	   radar	   of	   political	   journalists	   in	   an	   interview	   for	   the	   BBC’s	  
referendum	  programme.	   	  However,	  he	  was	  at	  pains	  to	  establish	  that,	   if	  politicians	   in	  
Wales	   desired	   financial	   powers	   for	   the	   National	   Assembly	   for	   Wales,	   the	   Welsh	  
electorate	   would	   have	   to	   assent	   to	   such	   a	   change	   in	   a	   further	   referendum.46	   	   This	  
point	   of	   view	  was	   shared	  with	   several	   of	   the	   interviewees	   for	   this	   thesis,	   indicating	  
that	  the	  Welsh	  public’s	  role	   in	  devolution	  deliberations	  may	  be	  far	   from	  over.47	   	  The	  
prospect	   of	   a	   further	   referendum	   in	   Wales	   may	   well	   provide	   academics	   with	   a	  
substantial	   area	   of	   research	   –	   although	   this	   thesis	   suggests	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   public	  
                                                
46	  BBC	  News	  Wales,	  ‘As	  it	  happened:	  Wales	  Referendum,	  4	  March,	  2011(b)	  at:	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/9413995.stm	  
47	  Interview	  with	  Welsh	  Assembly	  Government	  Senior	  Official	  (June	  2010).	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engagement	  with	  constitutional	  issues	  in	  Wales	  may	  prove	  problematic	  if	  these	  plans	  
for	  fiscal	  powers	  are	  to	  be	  put	  to	  a	  referendum	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
By	  constructing	  a	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  the	  constitutional	  policy	  of	  the	  SNP	  and	  Plaid	  
Cymru	   as	   governing	   parties,	   this	   thesis	   has	   argued	   that	   constitutional	   debate	   in	  
Scotland	  and	  Wales	   is	  one	   in	  which	  the	  electorate	  have	  a	  key	  role	  to	  play.	   	  For	  both	  
parties,	   the	   strategy	  of	  using	  consultations	  and	   referendums	   to	  engage	   the	  public	   in	  
the	   constitutional	   debate	   is	   fundamental	   to	   their	   ability	   to	   deliver	   upon	   their	  
respective	   party	   platforms.	   	   This	   thesis	   has	   considered	   the	   two	   constitutional	  
consultations	   –	   the	   Scottish	   Government’s	   National	   Conversation	   and	   the	   Welsh	  
Assembly	   Government’s	   All	   Wales	   Convention	   –	   to	   have	   achieved	   varying	   levels	   of	  
success	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  primary	  objectives.	  	  However,	  as	  each	  contributed	  to,	  and	  
had	   considerable	   influence	   upon,	   the	   constitutional	   debates	   within	   their	   respective	  
territories,	   their	   secondary	  objectives	  appear	   to	  have	   largely	  delivered	   success.	   	   The	  
thesis	  moved	  on	   to	  consider	   the	   referendum	  strategies	  of	  Plaid	  Cymru	  and	   the	  SNP,	  
arguing	   that,	   by	   waiting	   for	   the	   “winning	   conditions”	   to	   be	   apparent,	   each	   had	  
provided	   themselves	  with	   the	  best	   opportunity	   to	   deliver	   a	   positive	   outcome	   in	   the	  
referendum	   itself.	   	   However,	   this	   finding	   was	   tempered	   by	   the	   argument	   that	   this	  
strategy	  –	  awaiting	  the	  electorate	  to	  be	  convinced	  of	  the	  need	  for	  change	  –	  calls	  into	  
question	   the	  deliberative	  nature	  of	   the	   strategy.	   	  What	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   research	   is	  
that	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  constitutional	  debate	   in	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  was	  dramatically	  
affected	   by	   the	   election	   of	   nationalist	   parties	   to	   government	   in	   their	   respective	  
institutions,	   an	   outcome	   which	   was	   considered	   unlikely	   by	   those	   who	   believed	  
 
290	  
devolution	   would	   kill	   nationalism	   “stone	   dead”.48	   	   Instead,	   nationalism	   has	   moved	  
forward	   the	   scope	  of	   and	   appetite	   for	   constitutional	   change	   in	   the	  UK’s	   constituent	  
nations,	   making	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Parliament	   and	   the	  
National	  Assembly	   for	  Wales	  an	   inevitability;	   the	  subsequent	  break-­‐up	  of	   the	  United	  
Kingdom	  a	  real	  possibility.	  	  Future	  research	  in	  this	  area	  –	  including	  on	  the	  arguments	  
for	   fiscal	   powers	   in	   Wales	   and	   on	   the	   campaign	   for	   and	   at	   an	   independence	  
referendum	   in	   Scotland	   –	   will,	   it	   seems	   certain,	   be	   the	   subject	   of	   much	   academic	  
interest	   in	   the	  coming	  years.	   	  This	   research	  emphasises	   that	   the	  election	  of	   the	  SNP	  
and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   into	   government	   office	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   2007,	   and	   the	  
constitutional	  strategy	  of	  each,	  has	  moved	  the	  constitutional	  debate	  on	  considerably	  
and	   opened	   up	   the	   field	   of	   constitutional	   research	   to	   a	   much	   wider	   audience,	  
particularly	  in	  Scotland.	  	  That	  is	  one	  outcome	  of	  the	  public	  engagement	  and	  governing	  
strategies	   of	   the	   SNP	   and	   Plaid	   Cymru	   –	   a	   more	   substantial	   outcome	   may	   be	   just	  
around	  the	  corner.	  
                                                
48	  McEwen,	  N.	  ‘From	  Devolution	  to	  Independence?	  Scots	  elect	  their	  first	  nationalist	  government’	  in	  
Policy	  Options,	  June,	  2007,	  p.57.	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Dr	  Alasdair	  Allan	   SNP	  MSP	  
March	  2010	  
	  
Christian	  Allard	   Westhill	  and	  Elrick	  Community	  Council	  
January	  2010	  (email	  interview)	  
	  
Keith	  Brown	   SNP	  MSP	  
Minister	  for	  Schools	  and	  Skills	  
April	  2010	  
	  
Allan	  Clarke	   Broomhill	  Community	  Council	  
January	  2010	  (email	  interview)	  
	  
Bruce	  Crawford	   SNP	  MSP	  
Minister	  for	  Parliamentary	  Business	  	  
May	  2010	  
	  
John	  Deighan	   Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  Parliamentary	  Liaison	  Officer	  
Assistant	  to	  Cardinal	  Keith	  O’Brien	  
January	  2010	  (email	  interview)	  
	  
Gareth	  Finn	   SNP	  National	  Executive	  Committee	  
February	  2011	  
	  
Fiaz	  Khan	   Scottish	  Council	  for	  Ethnic	  Minority	  Voluntary	  Organisations	  
January	  2009	  (email	  interview)	  
	  
Richard	  Lochhead	   SNP	  MSP	  
Cabinet	  Secretary	  for	  Rural	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Environment	  
May	  2010	  
	  
Dr	  Ian	  McKee	   SNP	  MSP	  
March	  2010	  
	  
Stuart	  McMillan	   SNP	  MSP	  
March	  2010	  
	  
Isabel	  Page	   Meldrum,	  Bourtie	  and	  Daviot	  Community	  Council	  
January	  2010	  (email	  interview)	  
	  
Kevin	  Pringle	   Scottish	  Government	  Special	  Advisor	  
May	  2010	  
	  







Involved	  with	  Constitutional	  Strategy	  
May	  2010	  
	  
SNP	  Activist	   Constituency	  Campaign	  Manager	  
February	  2011	  
	  
SNP	  Activist	   Constituency	  Organiser	  
February	  2011	  
	  
SNP	  Activist	   Local	  Councillor	  
March	  2011	  (email	  interview)	  
	  
J.	  Smith	   Turriff	  and	  District	  Community	  Council	  
January	  2010	  (email	  interview)	  
	  
R.	  Thomson	   Floors,	  Makerstoun,	  Nenthorn	  and	  Smailholm	  Community	  Council	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Nick	  Ainger	   Labour	  MP	  
March	  2010	  (telephone	  interview)	  
	  
Nick	  Bourne	   Conservative	  AM	  
Leader	  of	  Welsh	  Conservatives	  
June	  2010	  
	  
Alan	  Davies	   Labour	  AM	  
July	  2010	  
	  
Lord	  Dafydd	  Elis-­‐Thomas	   Plaid	  Cymru	  AM	  
Presiding	  Officer,	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales	  
June	  2010	  
	  















Plaid	  Cymru	  AM	  
June	  2010	  
	  
Gareth	  Jones	   Plaid	  Cymru	  AM	  
June	  2010	  
	  
Sir	  Emyr	  Jones	  Parry	  
	  















Welsh	  Council	  of	  Voluntary	  Associations	  	  
Voices	  for	  Change	  Cymru	  
June	  2010	  
	  






Dr	  Barry	  Morgan	  
	  
Archbishop	  of	  Wales	  
Cymru	  Yfory/	  Tomorrow’s	  Wales	  Chair	  
June	  2010	  
	  
Jenny	  Randerson	   Liberal	  Democrat	  AM	  
June	  2010	  
	  
Huw	  Rhys	  Thomas	   NFU	  Cymru	  Assembly	  Advisor	  
July	  2010	  
	  
Janet	  Ryder	   Plaid	  Cymru	  AM	  
June	  2010	  
	  
Rhydian	  Thomas	   Electoral	  Commission	  Wales	  
June	  2010	  
	  
Welsh	  Assembly	  	  
Government	  
Senior	  Official	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